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ABSTRACT
Trade unions in Ghana are, generally speaking, 
fairly recent in origin and politically ineffectual. The 
Railway Union is an important exception. This was the spon­
taneous creation during the 1920's of African skilled workers 
in the Sekondi workshops, who, together with the harbour work­
ers of nearby Takoradi (conjointly the bulk and most active 
section of the Union's membership) have since maintained an 
exceptionally militant style of unionism. On several occasions, 
most notably the railway strikes of 1950, 1961, and 1971, these 
workers have demonstrated their importance as a major power 
centre within Ghanaian society, together with a notable read­
iness to engage in oppositional political activity against 
successive ruling regimes.
The political strength of the railway workers derives 
in part from their strategic position in the national economy, 
but also from the high degree of corporate solidarity which 
enables them to exploit this position so effectively. Concen­
trated in large numbers in the Sekondi-Takoradi workshop and 
harbour installations, and free of serious ethnic divisions, 
the skilled railway workers form a close-knit cultural commun­
ity. Within this community, the ethic of corporate solidarity 
is strengthened by shared attitudes toward the developing social 
structure and by the force of historical tradition.
The railway workers' political orientation is not 
adequately conceived or explained in terms of their association 
with particular political parties. The most striking aspect of 
their historical behaviour has been its independent character, 
together with the ideological continuity which has informed their 
relationship with both colonial and post-colonial regimes. In
some respects, this might be described as a form of class- 
consciousness. It differs from the classical Marxian model, 
however, in that the railway workers see themselves as rep­
resentatives of the urban 'masses' rather than a clearly 
differentiated working-clas.s, and, further, in that this mass 
constituency tends to be communally defined.
ABBREVIATIONS.
The following abbreviations are used in the 
footnotes:
GNA: Ghana National Archives
RAA: Railway Administration Archives
RUA: Railway Union Archives
INTRODUCTION
Of all groups of unionised workers, and, indeed, of all 
'mass' groupings in Ghanaian society, the railway and harbour 
workers of Sekondi-Takoradi occupy a place of quite unrivalled 
importance in the history of their country's political organis­
ation and development. Among the first groups of workers to 
unionise in the 1920's, they were the only group to sustain their 
organisation on an active footing throughout the inter-war period, 
staging a number of effective (if only partly successful) strike 
actions. Other workers were to establish union organisations 
after the Second World War, but the railway workers continued to 
occupy a position of unchallenged leadership over the young trade 
union movement as a whole. Dominating the executive of the first 
Gold Coast TUC which they had initiated in 1945, they attempted, 
in January 1950, to stage a General Strike in support of Kwame 
Nkrumah's 'Positive Action' phase of the nationalist campaign. 
Although most other workers failed to respond, the railway workers' 
own strike action, solidly maintained for two weeks' duration, 
undoubtedly had the effect of harrassing the colonial regime into 
speeding up the process of devolution of power, and of strengthen­
ing Nkrumah's personal claim to national political leadership. 
Having helped bring Nkrumah to power, the railway workers also, 
however, revealed their preparedness to pit their strength against 
him. They led the resistance against the attempt of the Convention 
People's Party to subordinate the trade union movement, and, in 
September 1961, staged a seventeen-day strike which the Govern­
ment recognised as constituting the most serious challenge to its 
existence it had had to face since Independence (1957). Again, in 
October 1971, in response to the TUC's call for anti-Government 
demonstrations the railway and harbour workers of Sekondi-Takoradi 
led the protest against the character and policies of Dr. Busia's 
Progress Party regime.
2All these strikes were clearly of major national 
political significance, and, taken together, appear to indicate 
a continuity of union orientation which might be described as 
highly political in an oppositional (reformist or revolutionary) 
sense. The further questions remain, however: To what degree
or in just what sense, were they consciously conceived as polit­
ical strikes by the railway workers themselves? Were they in 
fact informed by any clear consistency, or continuity, of ideol­
ogical orientation? If so, does this merit description as a form 
of class-consciousness? And how, and why, have the railway 
workers come to develop such a political culture or orientation?
The principal concern of this study is to attempt to answer these 
questions. It is thereby hoped to make some empirical and theor­
etical contribution to the current debate over the political role 
and orientation of trade unions in African societies.
Broadly speaking, two main positions in this general 
debate might be distinguished, (though, as we shall see, there 
are important differences of interpretation within the first of 
these, and a considerable amount of conceptional ambiguity within * 
both). On the one hand, some writers have been concerned to 
emphasise the strength of factors inclining African unions, rank- 
and-file as well as leadership, to political activity and involve­
ments.^ On the other, it has been argued that such political
1. See, for example: Bruce Millen, The Political Role of
Labour in Developing Countries, (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1963); J. Meynaud and A. Salah-Bey, Trade 
Unionism in Africa, (London: Methu'en, 1967); M. Neufeld,
"The Inevitability of Political Unionism in Underdeveloped 
Countries", in Industrial and Labour Relations Review, XIII, 
(April 1960), pp.363-86; and, for the particular case of 
Ghana, L. Trachtman, "The Labour Movement of Ghana: A Study 
of Political Unionism", in Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, X, (January 1962), pp.190-99.
3relationships and activity as the unions have developed, have 
resulted rather from the pressure of governments on a reluctant, 
and, by nature apolitical, union membership.'*'
Exponents of the first view point out that the locus 
of decisions affecting the economic status of unionised workers 
in Africa is usually in the political (or governmental) sphere 
rather than the economic (managerial and market forces) sphere. 
Government is often the largest employer of labour in these 
societies, and thereby determines the level and pattern of wages 
not only for its own employees, but also, more or less indirectly, 
for those in private employment. Further, its general economic 
policies carry direct and extremely serious consequences for the 
real living standards of urban wage earners. (The failure to > 
control inflation, for example, can cost labour more in three 
months than any union could hope to gain in twelve through 
collective bargaining.) Consequently, the government policy 
areas of immediate concern to labour cover a very extensive 
field. As W. H. Knowles has put it:
"Unions cannot by themselves remove all the causes 
of labour unrest in the developing areas. They 
cannot bring about industrialisation, agricultural 
re-organisation, national self-determination, and 
land and tax reforms, nor eliminate city slums, nor 
improve communications. Since these issues cause 
labour unrest and are uppermost in the minds of union 
leaders, the emphasis placed on political action ^
instead of collective bargaining is understandable."
1. The most impressive, and influential, exposition of this
view is that'of Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, "Trade 
Unions", in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), 
Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical 
Africa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964),
pp.340-81.
2. W. H. Knowles, "Industrial Conflict and the Unions", in
W. E. Moore and A. S. Feldman (ed.), Labour Commitment 
and Social Change in Developing Areas" v^ondonl S .S.R.C., 
1960), p.306. - •-
4Beyond such generalisations, however, there are clearly 
important distinctions to be made as to the mode of political 
action favoured or practised by the unions, and the radicalism of 
their socio-economic aims. Much of the literature is deliberately 
vague or silent on such questions. Only Bruce Millen, one of the 
earliest writers on this topic, seems seriously to have consid­
ered the prospect of their involvement in radical political move­
ments in opposition to post-Independence regimes. Most writers 
clearly did not have this in mind when talking of 1political 
unionism*, but rather a desire to influence, or even ally with, 
actual or potential ruling regimes. In other words, the unions 
were expected to perceive a large, predominant measure of common 
interest between themselves and government in the struggle for 
development. The tendency toward a close, even formal or 
structural, association of unions with government, especially in 
allegedly socialist regimes, was likely to be further encouraged 
by the ties developed between union and party political leaders 
in the course of the nationalist movements.
Both of these interpretations of the tendency to
rpolitical unionism* were challenged by Elliot Berg and Jeffrey
Butler in their highly influential survey of trade union develop- 
1
ment in Africa. In those cases, they argued, where close 
relationships between governments and labour movements had been 
established in the newly independent African States, this resulted 
simply from the desire of governments to control the unions rather 
than from any-real political inclination on the latter*s part.
This attempt to subordinate the unions was to be seen as essent­
ially an outcome of the general centralisation of power by the 
new African governments in their drive for economic development, 
not as an indication of the (oppositional) political potential
1. Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, op.cit.
5or inclination of the unions. The latter were generally 
characterised by extreme weakness and a lack of any coherent 
ideology or interest in broad political issues and goals. They 
had played but a minor role in the nationalist movements, and 
were easily confined to an even more restricted political role 
after Independence. The one category of worker which possessed 
the organisational ability and collective strength to play a 
significant political role, the skilled workers, constituted 
but a small minority of the African labour force, and, having 
become a relatively privileged group since Independence, were 
anyway disinclined to oppose government. Berg and Butler con­
cluded that, "There is no inner logic that invariably gives
wage-earning groups a special political inclination, or makes
1
them a potentially strategic element in political life."
The case of the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers clearly 
provides an exception to these generalisations, and would appear 
to lend support to Bruce Millen's position in the debate. It is 
important to recognise, however, that these various positions 
were not, and are not, properly conceived as theories of unres­
tricted applicability, but rather as general descriptions and 
explanations of the most prevalent tendencies in African trade 
unionism. The conclusions of a single, and somewhat exceptional, 
case-study cannot therefore be regarded as disproof of Berg and 
Butler's position. Indeed, this must still appear as a far more 
balanced general view than that of Millen which, in retrospect, 
seems more a product of fear (generated by the Cold War) of 
spreading communism than of sound empirical research. 
Nevertheless, it is argued here, in attempting to refute the 
'political unionism' thesis, Berg and Butler repeat the mistake
1. Ibid, p.380.
6of those they criticise in casting their argument at too high 
a level of generality for any genuine balance of perspective 
to be achieved. In addition, their thesis is characterised by 
a number of serious conceptual inadequacies and theoretical 
naiveties. What this amounts to, for our purposes, is a ten­
dency to seriously under-estimate the extent and significance 
of oppositional political activity or inclination on the part of 
African unions, informed if not by class-consciousness, strictly 
defined, then at least by a denial of legitimacy to the pre­
vailing, highly inegalitarian socio-economic order, and, more 
particularly, the self-enrichment of the political class.
The following case-study of the Sekondi-Takoradi railway 
workers is intended to provide illustrative material for this 
argument. To this purpose, it is set in a comparative context in 
which the nature of railway worker attitudes and the dynamics of 
railway union behaviour are related to those of other groups of 
workers in Ghana, and also to those of similarly political1 
unionists in other African states. By adopting this comparative 
perspective, it is hoped also to go beyond the more general point 
to identifying those factors which might be considered conducive, 
or even essential, to the realisation of a radical political 
orientation among unionised workers, and, conversely, the major 
obstacles to such a development. The present writer's scepticism 
as to the genuinely accurate or balanced nature of Berg and 
Butler's position derived initially not from the following case- 
study but from certain general situational and conceptual con­
siderations. Since these were logically and historically prior 
to the case-study itself, it is appropriate to outline the more 
important of these here (though they are to be developed more 
fully in Section Two of this thesis).
7In the first place, Berg and Butler's definition of 
the term, .'political unionism', is excessively narrow. It is 
admittedly difficult to formulate any clear, generally applic­
able definition, for, as they themselves recognise, "There may 
be profound political elements in the most humdrum of wage dis­
putes".^ But one cannot accept the definition of a "political 
strike" as "one whose main objectives are not directly related
to the short-run occupational interests of the wage-earners 
2
concerned." This would be to exclude those many strikes where 
both short-run occupational interests and wide political motiv­
ations are clearly involved. A more satisfactory criterion would 
be that of whether the strikers' aims extend beyond narrow, or 
short-run, occupational interests. Beyond this, one would wish 
to differentiate various kinds of political interest or motiv­
ation, rather than rest content with a blanket term. Strikes 
staged overtly in support of economic demands inevitably have 
political dimensions when they contravene a legal prohibition on 
strike activity, and/or the situation is such that government is 
expected to perceive such strikes as political actions. This is 
not, however, to accept government's view unconditionally, nor to 
suggest that such strikes are necessarily so conceived. Even less 
is it to attribute revolutionary political objectives to the 
strikers. These latter are rather questions for investigation.
Secondly, the mere aim or achievement of forcing govern­
ment to conciliate popular grievances is itself of considerable 
political significance in societies given to such pronounced 
authoritarian, "anti-political" tendencies. Documentation shows 
quite clearly that strikes by unionised workers have generally 
provided the main exception to the tendency to elimination of 
mass groupings as an active political force by post-Independence
1. Ibid, p.364.
2. Ibid, p.364.
ruling elites. In a number of cases, moreover - the Nigerian j
General Strike of 1964, for example, or those of 1961 and 1971 
in Ghana - strikes have presented quite explicit and extremely j
serious challenges to the legitimacy and stability of ruling 
regimes, of a kind which no other section of the 'masses1 have 
proved able to stage. The large majority of strike actions in 
these countries may not have been of such overt or serious polit­
ical significance. But then, political strikes, at least in the 
sense of Berg and Butler's definition, are bound to be the except- j 
ion rather than the rule in almost any society. It makes but very j
t
simple-minded sense to generalise as to the nature and signific- j
ance of trade union activity on the basis of the majority of !
strikes, or even the majority of unions. Indeed, statements at 
this level of generality are necessarily ill-conceived. This is j
especially clearly the case in developing African societies which 
are characterised not so much by a general prevalence of small, 
weak, apolitical unions, as by a sharp contrast between unions of *
this type and a minority of relatively large, strong unions of 
considerable political strength and radical potential. For the 
roughly similar situation of much of Latin America, H. A. Lands- 
berger has been concerned to emphasise the importance of such a
distinction, with corresponding differences in ideological orien-
1
tation. It is surprising and regrettable that Berg and Butler 
did not do similarly in their African survey.
Thirdly, Berg and Butler's curt dismissal of ideological 
influences as a significant element in African unionism suggests 
an extremely restricted conception of the nature of ideology. It
1. See H. A. Landsberger, "The Labour Elite", in S. M. Lipset 
and A. Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America, (New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.267-90.
9is clear from the context that they have in mind not any coher­
ently related set of attitudes, values, and goals, hut rather 
specifically Marxist ideology, or some other such highly sophis­
ticated, textually-based form. If one adopts a rather wider 
conception of ideology, then the simple truth is that there is 
virtually no evidence on which to base such a conclusion. To 
the best knowledge of the present writer, there has been very 
little serious investigation into the attitudes of groups of 
workers in Africa, the level of their political consciousness, 
or the degree to which they share common conceptions of a kind 
which lend subjective legitimacy to oppositional political 
activity.'*" It is one of the purposes of this study to con­
tribute to the filling of this immense and critical gap in our 
knowledge.
Without anticipating the findings of this investigation, 
it might be remarked here that a number of situational consider­
ations argue for anticipating the probability of some unions 
developing, or seeking to develop, as an independent and (in the 
local context) relatively radical ideological and political force. 
In the first place, there seems more than Berg and Butler allow 
to be said for certain arguments of the ’political unionism1 
theorists. Granted the very direct interest of urban wage-earners 
in governmental conduct and policy-making, and also the expect­
ation, central to the nationalist experience, that government
1. One notable exception to this generalisation which might
be cited here is Adrian Peace, "Towards a Nigerian Working 
Glass: The Lagos Proletariat as a Political Elite", (paper 
presented to the Toronto Conference on Workers, Unions, 
and Development, April 1973).
10
should promote economic development in the interests of the 
masses, then one might surely expect unions to seek to play an 
oppositional or reformist role where successive regimes prove 
elitist and ineffectual. In the context of the immediate post- 
Independence period, the belief, implicit in most of the early 
literature on African trade unionism, that many of the new 
governments are genuinely committed to economic development on 
a relatively egalitarian pattern, was perhaps understandable.
Few would now be so naive as to believe this of any but a few 
regimes, or to doubt the rapid emergence in these societies of 
degrees of socio-economic inequality quite startling even by 
comparison with the advanced capitalist countries. Yet the 
belief widely persists that unionised labour, even where it 
possesses the necessary strength and freedom of action, is dis­
inclined to present any kind of radical opposition to this pattern 
of development. The reason for this advanced by Berg and Butler, 
and widely accepted elsewhere, is that unionised workers, espec­
ially skilled workers, have improved their relative economic 
position since Independence to the extent of becoming a privil­
eged 1 labour aristocracy1.
Somewhat ironically, Berg and Butler find themselves
in essential agreement here with the 'Fanonist' position of
1John Saul and Giovanni Arrighi. These scholars have argued 
that the 'peasantry' are the main, even the sole productive 
force in African societies, and the really poor, exploited class.
1. Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa", in The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 6, 2, (1968), pp.141-69; and, by the 
same authors, "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan 
Africa", in R. Miliband and J. Saville, The Socialist 
Register, (1969), pp.137-88.
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In consequence, they are the only group possessing truly radical, 
or revolutionary, political potential. The unionised workers are 
rather seen as developing an increasing complementarity of 
interests, both economic and political, with the ruling class,
1
and thereby becoming ’’the junior partners to the aristocracy".
A critique of this argument, together with an assessment of the ; 
relative position of skilled workers in the Ghanaian socio- *
economic structure, is presented in Chapter Eight of this study.
It might be pointed out here, however, that, irrespective of the 
precise economic status of skilled workers, Saul and Arrighi 
would certainly appear, on superficial observation, to under- 
estimate the size of the economic gap and the areas of potential 
conflict between skilled workers and the ruling class. More 
important perhaps, the assumption of a simple relationship between 
relative economic position, ideological orientation, and political j 
behaviour is theoretically naive in the extreme. Comparative j
studies in the field of labour politics point quite.conclusively 
to the central importance of factors other than objective econ­
omic situation - education and ideological influences, for
example - In the generation of class-consciousness or the drive
2
to political self-assertion.
1. Arrighi and Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in 
Tropical Africa", op.cit., p.162.
2. Studies which might be mentioned in this regard are simply
too numerous for citation here. The reader's attention 
should be drawn, however, to two particularly outstanding 
works: E. J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1964); and, for a concise general statement, 
Giovanni Sartori, "Sociology of Politics and Politics of 
Sociology", in Government and Opposition, IV, 2, (1969).
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There is, finally, one further and quite crucial 
theoretical point which both Saul and Arrighi, and Berg and 
Butler, overlook. Unionised workers, in contrast (by and 
large) to the peasantry or the urban lumpenproletariat, do at 
least possess some operative form of collective organisation, 
and, through organisation, a network of communication. Depend­
ing, of course, on the degree to which this is effectively con­
trolled by the rank-and-file, such organisation does seem likely 
(in spite of Berg and Butler*s claims to the contrary) to con­
stitute a special potential for purposeful political action.
The following study is divided into two sections, the 
first of which is primarily historical in treatment, and the 
second analytical and comparative. This is, of course, only a 
rather rough distinction. The historical approach of the first 
section is also (necessarily) analytical, and in fact directed 
toward the consideration of particular theoretical questions: 
Whence have the railway workers derived their exceptional union 
militancy, solidarity and political orientation? What degree of 
ideological consistency, or continuity, have they displayed, and 
how significant is this in the explanation of their political 
behaviour? In class terms, should they be considered a radical 
or elitist political force, and how do other sections of the 
Ghanaian masses in fact perceive the relationship between their 
own interests and railway worker oppositional activity? Such 
questions are raised in somewhat cursory manner in the first 
instance, however, and only in the second section developed and 
elaborated in a comparative and theoretical framework.
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The account of Railway Union history is based on 
both documentary and interview materials. The former consist 
primarily of records in the Railway Union archives which were 
made available to the writer by kind permission of A. E. Forson, 
the General Secretary of the Railway Union in 1971. This inform­
ation was supplemented wherever possible by interviews with 
Railway Union officials, past and present, and also some ordinary 
members of longstanding. These interviews (a total of sixty-five), 
together with several hundred informal conversations held with 
railway workers in Sekondi-Takoradi in April-November 1971, were 
the main sources of the quotations presented in the narrative to 
illuminate railway worker perceptions. In addition, a lengthy, 
structured, but open-ended questionnaire was administered to some 
90 workers at the Railway Location Workshops in Sekondi in July- 
August 1971 by permission of the Ghana Railways and Ports 
Authority. This served several purposes, the main being to 
ascertain the degree of consensus in attitudes among the Sekondi 
railway workers, and the most important determinants of such 
differences as obtained. But it also provided an additional 
source of illuminating comments on Railway Union political his­
tory. The questionnaire employed is presented in full in 
Annexure A, while an account of the manner of its administration, 
and an assessment of the representative status of the sample 
are provided in Chapter Seven.
Nearly all of the interviews with Union officials were 
conducted in English, since their command of the language was 
generally good and, the presence of an interpreter might have 
impeded the development of that intimacy of relationship which 
I sought (often, I believe, successfully) to cultivate. As 
regards the questionnaire survey, most, of the interviews were 
conducted in Fante, the first language of the great majority of 
railway workers, and the 'lingua franca' of Sekondi-Takoradi.
14
This was also the language normally used during informal 
interviews and conversations with railway workers (and some 
other local residents) in the bars and various leisure-spots 
of the city. Here, the special qualities of my interpreter,
Jonas Kwablah, are to be emphasized. Himself a Krobo, but a 
fluent speaker of virtually all the main languages in Ghana, 
he had previously been employed on two occasions by British 
field-researchers, and rapidly developed a fine understanding 
of the purposes and requirements of the research in hand. My 
own knowledge of Fante, which I had begun to learn in London, 
increasingly sufficed, as the field-work progressed, to under­
stand most of the content of responses; but it remained in­
adequate to converse fluently or conduct interviews without 
the assistance of an interpreter. The limitations of working 
through an interpreter are to be admitted, but these were, I 
believe, reduced to a minimum in this instance by Jonas* friendly 
and unofficious manner toward interviewees. It is worth observ­
ing, in this regard, that every effort was made to conduct 
interviews in as informal a manner as possible; that Jonas 
and I spent virtually every evening for four months conversing 
with railway workers in the bars of Sekondi-Takoradi; and that 
some of the most illuminating oral material for this study was 
obtained by simply * listening in' to conversations on these 
occasions.
It should be noted that the period of field-work in 
Ghana was one during which a liberal atmosphere prevailed as 
to the expression of political opinions. Very little difficulty 
was experienced, therefore, in eliciting what were apparently 
frank, and often certainly outspoken, opinions. It was also a 
period free of the intensive political party campaigning of 
election times, and therefore one in which attitudes were unlikely 
to be severely conditioned or distorted by the passion of party 
allegiances. It is perhaps also worth remark that, by 1971,
15
Ghanaians were generally inclined to take a more balanced and 
dispassionate view of the Nkrumah regime (1951-66) than they 
would (or could) have done in the years immediately following 
its downfall. In attempting to gather the full potential 
harvest from such fruitful conditions for attitudinal research, 
every effort was made to keep the restricting influences of the 
researcher1s own preconceptions to a minimum, and to listen to 
what people felt it important to say. It is to be hoped that, 
withstanding the constraints of academic generalisation, some 
of the immediacy and subtlety of the railway workers’ own view 
of their world is communicated in the following pages.
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SECTION ONE : A POLITICAL HISTORY OF GHANAIAN RAILWAY UNIONISM.
The seven chapters which make up this section provide 
an account of Railway Union history from its origins in the 1920fs 
through to March 1972. The treatment is selective in that three 
main aspects of this history receive special consideration: the
reasons for the railway workers1 early development and successful 
maintenance of relatively strong, democratic union organisation; 
the role played by the Railway Union in national politics and, 
conversely, the role of national issues in internal Union politics; 
and, finally, the nature, role, and sources of the distinctive 
ideology (or 'political culture') which, it is argued, has infor­
med the railway workers' political behaviour with impressive con­
sistency over the period of the past twenty-five years.
The opening chapter deals with the origins and early 
growth of the Union, and, in particular, the part played therein 
by the various categories of worker within the Railway labour- 
force. The differences in style and degree of participation dis­
played by these various categories in the early period, (with the 
'skilled workers' playing by far the leading and most militant 
role), continue to characterise Railway Union politics throughout 
the period under consideration.
The second chapter deals with the role played by the 
railway and harbour workers of Sekondi-Takoradi (the bulk and 
most active section of the Railway Union's membership) in the 
Ghanaian nationalist movement, and the nature of the ideology 
which informed their Involvement. This ideology, expounded in 
its clearest and most extreme form by the railway workers' 'strong 
man' hero, Pobee Biney, is characterised as a radical 'populist' 
brand of nationalism, entailing expectations of an independent 
government which were far from generally shared by the leading 
members of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party.
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Chapters Three and Four trace the progressive deter­
ioration of relations between the railway workers and the C.P.P. 
regime, culminating in the highly political Sekondi-Takoradi 
strike of September 1961. This, it is suggested, was essentially 
a protest against the regime1s failure to live up to the railway 
workers* minimal expectations, particularly with regard to egal­
itarian reform of the national socio-economic structure and the 
desire for a more open, responsive political system than had 
characterised the colonial regime. But there was also a strong 
communalistic dimension to this conflict which helps to account 
for the Sekondi-Takoradi workers* especial sensitivity to these 
general failings.
The fifth and sixth chapters deal with the attempt 
made under the National Liberation Council (Feb. 1966 - Oct. 1969) 
and Progress Party regimes (Oct. 1969 - Jan. 1972) to develop the 
structure and role of the TUC along lines similar to those con­
sistently advocated by the railway workers since 1950. Given the 
likelihood of governmental opposition, the united support of the 
railway workers was crucial to the success of this experiment in 
independent, reformist trade unionism. Ironically, this was not 
forthcoming in the Government-TUC confrontation of September 1971, 
even though the majority of railway workers were enthusiastic 
supporters of the reformed TUC. A large splinter-group had sec­
eded from the main Railway Union in January 1970, and refused to 
join the strike of their fellow-workers in defence of the TUC.
Chapter Seven analyses the sources of this unprecedented 
division in the ranks of the railway workers, and considers its 
implications for the general argument developed in previous 
chapters. A number of qualifications have accordingly to be 
made as to the consistency of railway worker ideology, its influ­
ence in determining behaviour, and its strength as a unifying
18
force. It is nevertheless clear that the split of 1970-71 
resulted from a quite singular coincidence of divisive factors, 
and that attachment to the historical principles and ideals of 
railway unionism created powerful pressure for the re-unification 
which was eventually achieved in March 1972.
X
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CHAPTER ONE
ORIGINS AND DYNAMICS OF GHANAIAN TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENT.
Trade Unions developed in Ghana by three main pro­
cesses and in response to three main sets of stimuli: (i) the 
spontaneous, creative response of Ghanaian workers to their 
economic situation and grievances; (ii) the encouragement and 
assistance of ‘responsible* trade unions by the British Colonial 
Government; and (iii) the legal institutionalisation of a cen­
tralised, all-embracing trade union structure by the first 
independent Ghanaian government of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the 
Convention People’s Party.
Each of these processes might be conceived as operat­
ing toward the development of a different model of trade unionism. 
The spontaneous process, by which workers organise themselves in 
response to a situation of perceived conflict between themselves 
and their employer, naturally tends to emphasise the upward rep­
resentation function of the union, and the crucial importance 
of the strike weapon in providing the membership with bargaining 
power. Since, in Ghana, government has been responsible for 
employing a large and increasing proportion of the wage-earning 
labour force (some 73 per cent by 1968), and private enterprises 
have generally set their wage levels by reference to those dsor
1. It is proposed, in the interests of simplicity, to use 
the denotation ’’Ghana” or ’’Ghanaian” rather than ’’Gold 
Coast” throughout this study, except in the case of 
proper names or where the reference is historically 
very specific.
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government employees, representation of workers' economic 
demands has tended to bring unions into direct confrontation 
with government on the most important issue of public policy: 
how are public funds to be distributed? In its militant expres­
sions, therefore, representative unionism is almost inevitably 
'political unionism' of a kind.
Nevertheless, the Colonial Government was concerned 
during the last decade of its rule, to encourage adherence to 
an apolitical model of unionism. The distinction implicit here 
was obviously fine, but, in the contemporary context, real 
enough. 'Proper' trade unions, it was suggested, eschewed resort 
to strike action, appreciating the advantages of peaceful neg­
otiation. Most important, they did not involve themselves in 
nationalist, or party, politics. This purified "good behaviour" 
model was, of course, far from being the objective description 
of historical British trade unionism which it was presented as 
being, but the evidence suggests that its propagation met with 
some success.
The Nkrumah Government's model, consciously though 
somewhat formalistically based on the Israeli Histradrut, 
emphasised not only the advantages of peaceful negotiation but 
also the need for worker sacrifice and higher productivity. 
Moreover, it aimed to ensure this through legal prohibition of 
strike action and a rigid downward control structure. Succeed­
ing Ghanaian governments have favoured a similar model, though 
generally displaying far less determination to impose it.
It is a useful starting-point to conceive of the politics 
of trade unionism in Ghana as revolving around conflict between 
these three models and their proponents.
Overview of the Historical Process.
On first sight, it would appear that the major role in
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the development of trade unionism in Ghana has been played by 
government initiative, involving the imitation, whether volun­
tary or compulsory of governments* preferred models. It might 
even be thought that Ghanaian workers have shown little spon­
taneous inclination to organise in furtherance of their collect­
ive interests. For, although, one discovers instances of strike 
action and labour organisation dating from the early days of 
Colonial commerce, it was not until the Second World War, and 
then with the encouragement of the Colonial Labour Department, 
that any substantial expansion of union organisation and member­
ship occurred - from 500 officially registered members in 1943 
to 6,000 in 1945, (see Table 1.1).
Superficially at least, the initiating activity of the 
Nkrumah Government appears to have been even more far-reaching 
and crucial in character. Trade union membership continued to 
grow to 38,000 by 1949, and then, after a temporary recession 
in the wake of government reprisals over the 1950 *Positive 
action* strike, to more than 60,000 by Ghanaian independence in 
1957. But this total membership was divided amongst some 95 
unions, most of which were badly organised, poorly funded, and 
correspondingly incapable of effective industrial action. Under 
the new compulsory structure established by the 1958 Industrial 
Relations Act, however, the leadership of the Ghana TUC intro­
duced union organisation to virtually every group of wage-earners 
in the industrial and commercial sectors. This created a total
1. The earliest recorded strike would seem to be that of 
the Cape Coast canoemen in 1896. And, in 1898, the 
first Commissioner for the Northern Territories was 
deploring the formation of ,,a trade union of a most 
pernicious kind1* among the carriers from the coast.
See D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.44.
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Table 1.1 ; Trade Unions and Membership in Ghana, 1943 " 70.
Year Number Paid-up ^ Number African
Ending______Unions______Members (approx) Wage-Salary Employees
3/1944 11 482
3/1945 14 6,030
3/1947 24 10,976
3/1949 41 38,135
3/1950 56 17,985
3/1951 61 28,170
3/1952 65 32,908
12/1952 73 35,129
12/1953 69 46,309
12/1954 66 44,092 240,000
3/1956 91 67,173 261,849
3/1957 95 57,845 271,714
3/1958 95 40,583 286,266
3/1959 85 (24) 116,000 313,566
9/1960 24 201,991 326,664
9/1961 16 320,248 343,752
9/1962 16 320,295 350,111
9/1963 16 324,648 367,832
9/1964 16 351,711 381,326
9/1965 10 n.d. 387,643
9/1966 16 n.d. 357,031
12/1967 16 270,149 357,249
6/1968 16 338,154 387,170
6/1970 17 342,480 402,500
Sources! J.I.Roper, Labour Problems in West Africa, (London: 
Penguin, 1958), p.107, for early years; Gold Coast (later Ghana) 
Reports of the Labour Department, annual editions, 1951-52 to 
1965-67 and TUC, Report on the Activities of the TUC, 3rd Bien­
nial Congress, 1970,(mimeo), p.l> for 1967-70 figures. The est­
imates of the number of wage and salary earners are drawn from 
Kodwo Ewusi, The Distribution of Monetary Incomes in Ghana, 
(Legon, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic 
Research, p.1971), p.17.
fluctuations in the number of unions reflect not only growth/ 
decease but amalgamations.
bLabour Department figures include only those members the Depart­
ment considered paid-up, and are therefore incomplete. TUC 
estimates were consistently higher, but, for obvious reasons, 
must be considered unreliable in the C.P.P. Period.
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union membership of 320,000 by September 1961, or some 17 per
cent of the total male labour force, these being divided amongst
1
a mere 16 national unions.
Nevertheless, this picture of reliance on government 
initiative and education in trade union establishment is largely 
misleading. In the first place, the figure for 1943 substantially 
understates the number of wage-earners possessing organisation, 
since, prior to that year, there was no official provision for 
trade union registration, and, thereafter, many previously organ­
ised groups, displaying understandable caution, were slow to 
register. In practice, moreover, spontaneous and government- 
initiated processes overlapped in the growth of unions after 
1943. The Colonial Government initiative was no simple matter 
of introducing unions where no intrinsic potential was apparent, 
but rather of responding with the Governments preferred alter­
native to indications of widespread labour unrest and indigenous 
organising activity. This was specifically designed to counter 
the threat that union organisation might spread outside of Gov­
ernment influence, under the leadership of nationalist politic­
ians, or, even worse, the radical leadership of the Sekondi- 
Takoradi unionists.
It was, in part, fear of the latter's influence which 
similarly motivated Nkrumah and the industrial wing of the Con­
vention People's Party leadership to establish unions wherever 
sizeable groups of workers were to be found. In addition to 
insulating particular groups of workers from the influence of 
the radicals, this policy also had the advantage of increasing
1. The total adult male labour force of Ghana was given 
as 1,884,552 in the I960 Population Census of Ghana,
(Accra: Census Office, 1961), vol.iv.
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the C.P.P. unionists' voting strength in the TUC and thereby 
their control over the structure of the union movement as a 
whole* Many of these new unions were in fact little more than 
paper-organisations, unreal, empty, and inactive at the rank- 
and-file level. Where they actually possessed a participant body, 
(and this was generally where informal organisation or potential 
for spontaneous organisation already existed), then the supremacy 
of the C.P.P* unionists and their bureaucratic model of trade 
unionism was often extremely fragile. * Their control only became 
more secure when the Industrial Relations Act of 1958 buttressed 
their position with the legal authority of the state. In any 
case, and even where government initiative was clearly crucial 
in the original establishment of union organisation, the rank- 
and-file showed themselves quite capable, after the coup d'etat 
of 1966, of taking over such tutelary organisation and moulding 
it to express their own, rather than government's conception 
of union operation and objectives. With the post-Independence 
development of conditions more favourable to labour solidarity 
and militancy - e.g. a higher level of job commitment, and declin­
ing living standards - this conception was increasingly akin to 
the conflict-orientated, political unionism of the one group who 
had spontaneously developed strong union organisation in the 
inter-War period, the railway and harbour workers of Sekondi- 
Takoradi .
If, then, the initiating and educative activity of 
government was less crucial and less effective than has some­
times been suggested, why was union development so limited and 
weak in the pre-War period?  ^ A number of factors must be
1. See, for example, loan Davies, African Trade Unions, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966). pp.108-10.
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considered here. In the first place, there simply were not 
many non-agricultural wage-earners prior to the huge expansion 
of employment opportunities during and after the Second World 
War. In the second place, those who did work for wages, with 
the exception of the mineworkers and the railway and harbour 
workers, were generally employed in very small businesses or 
highly dispersed amongst the various branches of the civil 
service and the expatriate firms. Such a situation was not 
congenial to the development of collective organisation or a 
sense of labour solidarity. Thirdly, even where large concen­
trations of workers were to be found, in the mining townships 
for example, the short-term migrant character of much of the 
labour-force militated against the growth of interest in trade 
union activity. (This, of course, is the one element of truth 
in the suggestion that trade unionism did not come naturally to 
Ghanaian workers.) Collective organisation of the labour-force 
was also made difficult by its ethnically heterogeneous char­
acter, and by the tendency for occupational and ethnic divisions 
to coincide. Finally, the labour surplus conditions which 
obtained in the Gold Coast after 1925 placed wage-earners in 
an extremely weak bargaining position. Employers could dismiss 
Agitators* who tried to organise their fellow-workers, or even 
whole groups of workers, without fear of being unable to replace 
them. It was in this more limited sense that the change in 
Colonial Government policy in the early 1940*s was really crucial 
to the development of trade unions: without some form of legal 
or political protection, workers could not hope to organise 
successfully in prevailing market conditions.
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The Growth of a Wage Labour Force, and Early Instances of 
Collective Action*__________________ _ ______________
Before 1874, when dealing in domestic slaves was 
abolished and existing slaves were declared emancipated, 
wage-earning existed only in the then very restricted sphere 
of government and European commercial and missionary employ­
ment* The remarkable expansion of cocoa-farming towards the 
turn of the century involved the employment of increasing 
numbers of hired labourers, most of whom migrated seasonally 
from outside the area of cultivation - i.e. the Colony area 
of Southern Gold Coast and, later, Ashanti. The highly scat­
tered character of this labour force, however, together with
the great variation in the terms of its hire, meant that it
1
possessed little potential for collective action. More
important from the perspective of trade union development was
the fact that this expansion of the cocoa export trade, in turn
resulted in the development of communications, commerce and
2
government administration. These new employment opportunities, 
located mainly in the coastal towns, were reflected in the 1891 
Census figures, although these cannot be taken as either accurate
1. On the growth, and terms of hire, of the agricultural
labour force, see D. Kimble, op.cit.p.40; and A. B. Holmes
IV, lfEconomic and Political Organisations in the Gold 
Coast: 1920-45**, (Ph.D. thesis, Social Science Faculty 
of the University of Chicago, 1972), pp.49-53.
2. G. B. Kay has recently argued that the railway network 
of Ghana was constructed with less concern for cocoa, 
than for gold exportation. G. B. Kay The Political 
Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: A Collection of Docu­
ments and Statistics, 1900 - 1960, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), p.20. While this may have been 
true for the first line constructed, subsequent lines 
appear to have been specifically geared to the expansion 
of cocoa cultivation.
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or exhaustive :
Farmers and agricultural labourers 3,510
Mechanics 3,091
Civil Servants 1,376
The 1911 Census gave figures for twenty-nine Colony
towns, which are obviously not comparable with those for sixteen
2
in 1891, but nevertheless informative :
Farmers
Labourers
Clerks
Carpenters
Bricklayers and Masons 
Engine drivers
8.802
5,198
2,349
1,445
557
15
The 1921 Census figures record the continuing expansion
of urban employment, though, again, these are not strictly com-
3parable with the earlier figures, and probably incomplete :
Occupations of Men in 32 Main Towns.
Farmers 21,272 Blacksmiths 825
Clerks 12,273 Goldsmiths 802
Fishermen & Motor drivers 536
Boatmen 9,502
Teachers 458
Carriers &
Labourers 8,870 Fitters &Mechanics 347
Traders 5,555 Printers 120
Domestic Servants 3,243 Ministers of
Carpenters 2,159 religion 66
Tailors 1,204 Lawyers 50
Bricklayers & Doctors 7
Masons 1,024
Cited in D. Kimble, op.cit., p.40.
2* Ibid., p.41.
3. Ibid., p.41.
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These figures did not, incidentally, include the
mineworkers, by then the largest concentrated labour force
in the Gold Coast, (estimated at over 10,000 in 1921).
Several groups of these wage-earners were stimulated
to collective action by the economic conditions of 1918-21.
A boom in cocoa production coincided with an extension of
public works programmes to precipitate a serious shortage of 
1labour. Urban and industrial employers were most seriously
affected as workers rushed back to the cocoa farms. At the same
time, wages for urban workers generally failed to keep pace with
2the rise in prices. Recognising their increased bargaining1 
power, and dissatisfied with the falling value of their wages, 
the Artisans and Labourers of Accra founded a Union and went
3
on strike when their demand for a wage increase was refused. 
Similarly, the Civil Service clerks elected spokesmen to artic­
ulate their grievances, a strategy which met with success when 
they were awarded a salary increase in November 1921.
It seems likely that this latter award sparked off the 
second recorded African railway workers' strike. The first.had 
occurred in June 1918 following the granting of a War Bonus to 
European and Permanent African Staff in the Civil Service in
belated recognition of the war-time increase in the cost of 
4living. Skilled and unskilled manual workers were not included
1. See J. I. Roper, Labour Problems in West Africa, (London;
Penguin, 1958), p.30.
2. • The Government clerks claimed, in 1920, that the purchas­
ing power of the £ had fallen by more than 50 per cent in 
the previous eight years. See Kimble, op.cit., p.45.
3. J. I. Roper, op.cit., pp.52-54.
4. L. A. Lacy, "A History of Railway Unionism in Ghana",
(M.A. thesis, African Studies Institute at the University 
of Ghana, Legon, 1965), p.45.
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in this award, it being argued that the greatest increases had 
occurred in the prices of imported goods which only the perm­
anent' staff were expected to consume. Incensed at such dis­
crimination, the artisans and labourers in the Railway Admin­
istration downed tools for a week, but with no success save an 
assurance that wage rates would be reviewed in the near future. 
By the end of 1921, these manual workers were understandably 
impatient at government's inaction, and in December they staged 
another week-long strike. Management refused to negotiate.
But Governor Guggisberg intervened to appoint a committee of
enquiry which reported in favour of a wage increase for all
1
lower-paid servants of the Government.
The fact that no durable union organisation emerged 
from this period was largely due to Guggisberg's careful handl­
ing, and the growing prosperity which wage-earners experienced 
in the mid-20's as prices declined from their 1921 peak. But, 
also, there were few groups of workers, with the exception of 
the railway and mines' workers, concentrated in sufficiently 
large numbers to develop a sense of solidarity and maintain 
their organisation in the face of official hostility. The 
skilled railway workers were in the process of developing such a 
sense of common interest and social identity, and this soon led 
them to form a union. As this case illustrated, unionisation 
was not necessarily a simple reaction to objectively declining 
financial circumstances. In the case of the mineworkers, on the 
other hand, similarly concentrated in large numbers in the 
mine townships, factors other than economic prosperity were to 
prevent their establishing a union during the 1920*s. And these
1. Guggisberg's initiative should probably be seen as an
attempt to restore Government's competitive position as 
an employer of labour, rather than simple capitulation 
to the railway workers' demands.
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factors were to continue to undermine all attempts at collective 
organisation even when this was most obviously called for by the 
situation of declining real wage levels which obtained in the 
1930's.
Obstacles to Unionisation amongst the Mineworkers.
For the extraction of the Gold Coast's mineral deposits, 
mainly located in the Western Region of the territory, the Euro­
pean Mining Companies principally required large supplies of 
African unskilled labour. Southern Ghanaians proved reluctant; 
to do such work for cultural reasons, associating unskilled lab­
ouring with slavery, as much as out of lack of interest in the low
2rates of remuneration. Since the Colonial Government would not 
permit the forced recruitment of labour by the Companies, at 
least not in any overt manner, a major proportion of the mines' 
work force had instead to be drawn from the Northern Territories 
of the Gold Coast or from the French colonies. During the period 
before the mid-1920's, that is to say before transportation imp­
roved and the cash economy extended deep into the hinterland, 
labour had to be induced, if not forced, out of such areas by the
1. According to Kuczynski, the mines employed more than 
19,000 Africans by 1917, though this figure subse­
quently fell to 11,000 in 1920, and proceeded to 
fluctuate between 10,000 and 15,000 during the rest 
of the decade. R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of 
the British Colonial Empire, Vol.I: West Africa, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p.425.
2. The rulers of the Ashanti Empire had in fact used a 
large slave labour-force to mine for gold during the 
first half of the previous century. See Ivor Wilks, 
"Ashanti Government" in D. Forde and P. Kaberry (ed.), 
West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.206-38.
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payment of "conscience-money" to the chiefs. From approx­
imately 1925 onwards, in contrast, the growing need and desire 
of northern youngmen for cash in hand resulted in a swelling 
supply of 'voluntary* labour which rapidly outran demand. This 
situation of an abundant supply of cheap labour clearly placed 
the mines' employees in an extremely weak bargaining position.
As late as 1939, some 54 per cent of the mines* work­
force continued to come from the Northern Territories, Northern
2Nigeria, or the French colonies. These workers generally aimed
merely to save a certain financial 'target', and then to return
home. Those who stayed longer in Southern Ghana tended to
change their job frequently, and the Mining Companies, adapting
themselves to this fact, operated a card-system by which an
employee could have a friend or relative substitute for him.
In consequence, the Mines' labour force was, (and has remained),
characterised by an extremely high turnover rate. By 1940, for
example, annual turnover in the Mines amounted to nearly 80 per
cent of the labour force, and about 40 per cent of those leaving
3
the Mines had been employed for less than six months. This
1. See Elliot Berg, "The Development of a Labour Force in
Sub-Saharan Africa", in Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, XIII (1965), pp. 394-412 and for the particular 
case of Ghana, A. B. Holmes IV, "Economic and Political 
Organisations in the Gold Coast: 1920-45", (Ph.D. thesis, 
Social Sciences Faculty of the University of Chicago,
1972),337-40.
2. J. I. Roper, op.cit., p.35,
3. A. J. Murray and J. A. Crocket, Report on the Prevalence of
Silicosis and Tuberculosis among Mine workers in the Gold
Coast, (Accra: Government Printing office, 1941), p.13.
Tenure tended to be associated with skill level, 23 per cent 
of blast boys, for example, having served five or more 
years continuously.
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did not, of course, make either for industrial efficiency or
for strong labour institutions. As Richard Wright has remarked,
"The lessons learned last year are washed down the drain of
tribal life." ^
Additional obstacles faced those who might have wished
to organise the mineworkers for united action. The migrant
northern workers organised themselves in the Mine townships in
a modified form of the traditional tribal system, dividing into
small groups under a 'headman*, who acted as their intermediary
2
with the Management. This arrangement had to be radically
transformed, if not entirely destroyed, before a more efficient,
3
centralised organisation could be developed. Furthermore, 
while most of the underground and unskilled labour was supplied 
by northern Ghanaians, or aliens, the majority of skilled workers 
were from the south. This tendency for ethnic and cultural div­
isions to coincide with occupational divisons exacerbated 
sectional jealousies and vitiated labour solidarity.
In spite of these several obstacles, isolated strike 
incidents did occur in the mines, the first recorded one being 
in 1924, and there were several reports of attempts by the
1. Richard Wright, Black Power, (London: Dobson, 1956), 
p .304.
2. GNA Accra, ADM 26/5/44, Report of D.C. for the Wasaw 
District of the Western Province, 1936.
3. For a fascinating account of how the founders of the 
Zambian Mineworkers* Union overcame just this problem, 
see A. L. Epstein, Politics in an African Urban 
Community, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1958), pp.48-101.
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skilled workers to organise the labour force in the mid-30*s. 
But, in such cases, the repressive policy of the Mining Com­
panies, made possible by the labour surplus conditions of the 
period, provided, as it were, the final straw which broke the 
back of miners* organisation. A. B. Holmes has described the 
Mining Companies* policy!
"The general reaction of the mines toward strike 
activity was to force all the leaders as well as 
any persons who remained adamant after deadlines 
for returning to work. Political officers were 
strongly pro-management and backed anti-strike 
activity with arrests of leaders as rioters or 
intimidators. ** 2
Hence the significance of the Colonial Government’s change of 
policy and introduction of protective union legislation in 
1941-43. Labour organisers stood no chance of success in a 
straight contest of power with management. Only when the 
Government proved willing to provide some compensatory support 
to the weak position of labour could durable organisation 
develop.
The story of the founding of the Mines Employees Union 
illustrates the continuing obstacles to effective organisation 
presented by the character of the mines* labour force, as well 
as the rather ambiguous role played by the Colonial Labour Dep­
artment. According to J. B. Blay, the official historian of the
1. For example, in 1936, the Secretary for Mines wrote that 
"Serious consideration must be given to the possible for 
mation of Trade or similar Unions. At least one body has 
been formed to interest itself in labour matters, and 
there are other signs that attempts are being made to 
induce workers to form themselves into trade or occupat­
ional groups." GNA Accra, ADM 26/5/44, Secretary for 
Mines to Colonial Secretary, 5th March 1936.
2, A. B. Holmes, op.cit., p.358.
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Union, the initiative came from skilled workers at the Abosso 
mine, where a strike in the electric shop against a white sup­
ervisor in June 1944 proved successful and encouraged the
1
creation of a general union. The Abosso mines workers sum­
moned a delegates* meeting at which J, N. Sam was elected 
President. In December, Sam toured the rest of the mines, 
stressing labour*s unity of interest and the benefits of organ­
isation. An attempt was made to register the embryonic union, 
but I. G. Jones, Labour Inspector for the Western Province, 
expressed his opposition to an amalgamated union and urged a 
separated union for each mine. At a second delegates’ meeting 
in January 1945, it was nevertheless decided to insist on a 
single mines* union, and in September of that year, the Gold 
Coast Mines Employees Union was officially registered with 
1,780 paid-up members. Six months later, however, the Union 
could claim to represent no more than 5,000 of the 40,000 
workers then employed in the mines. It was not until the first 
successful strike was staged in October 1947 that the paid-up 
membership grew to a more impressive figure.
This brief consideration of the major obstacles to 
unionisation amongst the mines workers serves to illuminate 
the full range of those special characteristics which facilit­
ated the railway workers* early development of strong and 
durable organisation.
Characteristics of the Railway Labour Force.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Sekondi, in the 
Western Province of the Gold Coast (about 140 miles east of 
Accra) was little more than a fishing village. Its only claim
1. J. B. Blay, The Gold Coast Mines Employees Union, (Devon; 
Arthur H. Stockwell, 1950), pp.11-12.
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to distinction was the location there of both British and Dutch
forts, established in the seventeenth century, but by then long
disused. In the depths of its coastal waters, however, it
possessed a resource of as yet unrealised value. As one of
the few natural ports along the coast suitable for large ships,
it was chosen, in 1897, as the site for the railway terminus and 
1workshops. In the following year, construction began on a 
thirty-nine mile section from Sekondi to Tarkwa, and this had 
been extended to Kumasi by 1903. A second line was begun from 
Accra and had reached Kumasi by 1927. Within this triangular 
network, a third line was constructed from just north of Tarkwa 
stretching into the Central Province in 1923-27. By 1928, the 
rail system of Ghana, as it now exists, had been virtually 
completed, (see Map 1).
In the early years of the construction of the railway, 
the principal labour requirement was, as for the mines, a large 
army of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The Railway Admin­
istration likewise experienced difficulty in recruiting southern 
Ghanaians for such work, and most of the labour required was 
drawn from Nigeria and the Northern Territories of Ghana.
Unlike their fellow northerners in the mines, however, many of 
these unskilled labourers proved prepared to stay and work for 
several years. In particular, many of the 'Lagosians*, as the 
Nigerians came to be called locally, ended up settling relatively 
permanently in Sekondi and its outlying villages, to work, 
rather appropriately, on the Permanent Way (i.e. the railway 
track). This difference is probably to be explained by the 
more healthy conditions of work in Sekondi, and the more
1. Gold Coast Handbook, 1928, pp.123-24.
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congenial social life to be found there, relative to the
overcrowded conditions of the mining townships, with their
forced sexual asceticism. Later, a growing number of southern
Ghanaians joined the Permanent Way labour force, and these too
have displayed a higher degree of job commitment than charact-
1
erises the unskilled mineworkers.
Largely in consequence of their illiteracy and the fact 
that they, work out along the track, away from the centre of 
union activities, the unskilled railway workers have not them­
selves participated very actively or directly in trade union 
organisation and policy formulation. But they have recognised 
the relevance and benefits of trade unionism sufficiently to 
follow the lead of the skilled workers with considerable dis­
cipline and enthusiasm.
From approximately 1910 onwards, the Railway Administration 
employed a growing number of African clerical and skilled workers, 
(or artisans), to man the administrative headquarters and loco­
motive workshops at Sekondi. By the 1930*s, the artisans and 
the semi-skilled employees working with them constituted almost 
a third of the total work force (see Table 1.2),
1. Interview with Mr. J. Amissah, Personnel Manager, 
Railways Administration, 14th June 1971. It was, 
unfortunately, impossible to obtain comprehensive 
statistics on the ethnic composition, or rate of 
labour turnover, of the Permanent Waymen. The 
Personnel Manager estimated that, as at 1970, some 
35 per cent of Waymen were southern Ghanaians, and 
that there was an annual labour turnover rate of 
approximately 40 per cent. A similar labour turn­
over rate (of 43 per cent) was estimated on the 
basis of an examination of Engineering Department 
statistics for 1960 - the only year for which a full 
set was available in the Railway Administration 
Archives.
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Table 1.2 : Railway Department Employees of April 1936
European Staff 
African Clerical Grades 
African Artisans 
African Platelayers, and
107
509
1,688
African Labourers
other Semi-skilled 1,179
2,296
Source: RAA, Gold Coast Railway Department Staff List
(April 1936)
These artisans were genuinely highly skilled (unlike many of
the so-called skilled workers in the mines). The Railway
Administration instituted a five-year Apprenticeship Scheme
to train them, which included sending some to Britain for
experience in the railway workshops at Crewe, It was perhaps
out of concern for the considerable capital investment they
represented, that the Railway Administration adopted a far more
progressive policy towards their skilled workers than did the
Mining Gompanies. Aiming to achieve a high degree of labour
stabilisation, the Railway Administration proved relatively
responsive to demands for improved conditions of service, and
disinclined to resort to mass dismissals when the artisans
sought to organise themselves. In turn, the artisans, who
were mostly literate Fantis from the nearby coastal towns of
Cape Coast and Elmina, regarded skilled technical work as
hopefully providing a relatively permanent and prestigious form
1of employment, a suitable alternative to clerical work. Indeed,
1, Interviews with H. B. Cofie and J. C. Vandyck, 
retired railway artisans, 5th June 1971.
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the skilled African railway worker, and especially the engine 
driver, was a figure of very considerable status, certainly of 
great popular admiration, in the Gold Coast society of the inter­
war years* He was the pioneer of technological progress, fam­
iliar with the white man's magic, opening up the country to a 
new pace of social and economic life. It was natural that he 
should expect official recognition of his high social status in 
terms of an appropriate financial reward.
The Railway artisans were concentrated in large numbers 
in the Sekondi Location Workshops. This situation made for the 
rapid development of a sense of solidarity, and of the power they 
possessed as a corporate group. It also facilitated communication 
and organisation. It was fairly easy, moreover, to communicate 
quickly and secretly with fellow-workers stationed at the *up- 
country* branches through the agency of the itinerant engine- 
drivers ,
One further factor which encouraged the spontaneous 
development of trade unionism amongst the railway workers, and 
lent the union such significance for its members, deserves brief 
mention here. As we have seen, Sekondi was a new town, or, as a 
railway general manager described it in 1912, "an upstart town, 
practically the creation of the railway".^ As young workers 
floated in, beyond the control of the local chiefs, and without 
the close supervision which the Mining companies provided in the 
mine townships, new forms of social organisation, or mutations 
of traditional organisation, were required. The northerners and 
Nigerians developed a modified form of their traditional organ­
isation, with workers from each tribe or area grouping together
1. Quoted by R. B. Davison, "The story of the Gold Coast 
railway", West Africa, (1956), p.587.
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under a headman who was often also their 'ganger* or supervisor 
on the Permanent Itfay.  ^These were in turn subject to the arbit­
rating authority of a Zeriakin, (or supreme-chief), generally a 
relative of the man who had originally gained permission for 
the 'stranger* community to settle in the *zongo*, (as the area 
came to be called).
For the Fanti and other southern Ghanaians, however, no 
such simple adaption of traditional organisation seems to have 
appeared practicable or adequate to the new circumstances. In 
the first place, the traditional urban organisation of the Fanti 
"youngraen" of Cape Coast and Elmina in their "Asafo" companies 
was characterised by intense inter-company rivalry. The over­
riding need in this new situation was for an organisation prom­
oting peace and solidarity among the mass of skilled railway 
workers. In any case, there are indications that these companies
were already becoming ill-adapted to the economic and political
2realities of the twentieth century in Cape Coast itself. It is 
certainly arguable that relatively elaborate forms of social 
organisation such as had been developed in the 'old*towns of 
Cape Coast and Elmina proved less flexible, and less easily 
adaptable to a new urban situation, than did the less sophisti­
cated patterns characteristic of the northerners. Certain 
stylistic characteristics of the "Asafo" companies were, we shall 
see, to find expression in the developing cultural idiom of the 
railway workers union. But, fundamentally, a different form of 
social organisation was required. And, in part at least, this 
was to be provided by the union, with its officials acting as
1. Interviews with Chief Ibrahim, Zeriakin of Sekondi Zongo, 
17th May 1971; and Moses Braimah, Permanent Way Assoc­
iation Chairman, 4th June 1971.
2. Ansu Datta, "The Fante Asafo; A Re-examination", in 
Africa (October 1972), Vol XLII, No. 4., p.365.
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organisers, arbitrators, and spokesmen for the railway workers 
in many areas of social life other than the narrowly occupation- 
al.
Origins of the Railway Union.
The first permanent unions in Ghana, strictly speaking,
were those of self-employed craftsmen, organised on guild lines.
In 1909, the Gold and Silversmiths' Association was formed in
protest against the Gold Mining Protection Ordinance, and two
years later this was reported to be a powerful organisation in
2Accra, ruled by its own Chief and councillors. In 1910, the 
Gold Coast Carpenters' Association was registered under the 
Companies' Ordinance, and there were soon also guilds of other 
self-employed craftsmen, including masons, blacksmiths, and 
coopers. They were all especially concerned to formulate 
elaborate rules concerning apprenticeship and mutual help.
It is hardly surprising that the first attempts at 
formal organisation among the skilled railway workers, them­
selves craftsmen and in need of some arrangement for mutual 
help, should have been modelled on these earlier craftsmen's 
associations. In 1923, a railway officer wrote; "Men are form­
ing into associations in the Railway Workshops, which will
3probably form the nucleus of the trade union in years to come." 
The early organiser was a carpenter, Atta Payine, and, as in the 
craft associations, members were required to take an elaborate
1. Interviews with H. B. Cofie and J. C. Vandyck, founders 
of the Railway Association, 5th June 1971.
2. D. Kimble, op.cit., p.44.
3, RAA., Brown, Chief Mechanical Officer, to General Manager, 
5th October 1923.
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oath, and various traditional ceremonial trappings were adopted. 
But, in spite of the use of these traditional trappings, the 
main function of the Association was to help workers adjust to 
unionised life in an industrial community. Arrangements were 
made for the provision of funds to members who needed to travel 
or meet expenses incidental to funeral and wedding ceremonies.
The leaders would sometimes help newcomers to find accommodation. 
And, in 1926, the Association even attempted to bring cinemas to 
the Location. This, like many other schemes, failed because of 
inefficient management. There was no provision for regular dues 
collection, and meetings became increasingly irregular. Hence, 
the Workshop Association seems to have been barely active by 
1928, when the Railway Association was established. This latter 
organisation was, from the start, less influenced by traditional 
cultural forms, and more specifically concerned with industrial 
grievances. Nevertheless, it made use of what organisational 
infrastructure remained from earlier days in the creation of its 
own structure, and maintained the concern of the Workshop Assoc­
iation with the general social and cultural welfare of its 
2membership.
The establishment of the Railway Association perhaps 
owed something to its organisers * knowledge of the operation of 
British trade unions. As already noted, some of the apprentices 
were sent to Crewe for experience in the workshops there. But 
it was not simple imitation of British practice which motivated 
these trainee-artisans to develop a union at Sekondi. Rather
1. L. A. Lacy, op.cit., p.55.
2. According to one of the founders of the Association, "We
did not know much about trade unionism in those days. We 
moved by experimenting. Whatever we felt was needed by our 
fellow-workers we tried to provide. We interested our­
selves in everything: sports, entertainment, even disputes
among our members.*’ Interview with H. B. Cofie, 5th June 
1971.
42
they wanted a vehicle to express their frustration at the Rail­
way Administrations refusal to accord them equal status with 
clerical staff. As one of the founders explained:
”1 was among the first batch of Africans to be 
given proper Railway training. I was even sent 
overseas. Yet, when we educated people became 
acquainted with technical work, we found our­
selves regarded as inferior to the clerks, even 
though we had as much qualifications. Those on 
the clerical side were on monthly salary and 
enjoyed leave, but we were given only a daily 
rate with no leave. We apprentices decided to
do something about it.11 1
In November 1928, J. C. Vandyck, H. B. Cofie,
W. A. Adottey, H. Renner, F. H. Wood, S. W. Owiredu, and
J. Eshun formed a Railway Association Committee, and set out
to incorporate all the African artisans and apprentices at 
Sekondi Location in a single body. Their principal immediate 
objective was to attain for themselves "permanent" status, 
thereby gaining entitlement to monthly pay, (a generous con­
version from the daily rate being assumed), and annual leave. 
They soon found themselves on the defensive, rather than the 
aggressive, however, and accordingly sought to extend member­
ship to the unskilled workers, so as to attain greater solid­
arity in the face of threats of dismissal.
The 1931 & 1939 Strikes.
In 1928-32, the Gold Coast suffered a severe economic 
depression, related directly to that which hit Europe in the 
same period. Cocoa prices fell drastically, prices of imported 
foods rose in spite of a reduction in customs duties, and a
1. Ibid.
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severe restriction of the import-export trade culminated in the 
staging of a remarkably widespread and effective hold-up of 
cocoa during the 1930-31 season.'*' The Colonial Government was 
forced to cut back its expenditure, and several hundred govern­
ment workers were dismissed, including, in May 1930, the whole 
of the labour force employed on the construction of Takoradi 
Harbour.
The Railway Administration itself suffered a drastic 
reduction in the volume of its traffic, and a corresponding 
decline in revenue, (see Table 1.3).
Table 1.3 : Gold Coast Railway Revenue.
Year Net Revenue
1928/29 + £644,566
1929/30 + £539,323
1930/31 - £120,543
1931/32 - £181,930
1932/33 - £204,576
Source: P. R. Gould, The Development of the Trans­
portation Pattern in Ghana, (Northwestern University 
Studies in Geography, No. 5, 1960), p.58.
Alarmed at this growing threat to the job security of its mem­
bers, the Railway Association demanded improved and more secure 
conditions of service. The Administration responded with the 
elimination of some existing benefits and a warning that some 
dismissals could be expected, while the more fortunate could be 
employed only four days per week. The Association leaders 
organised a mass meeting of all non-Permanent railway workers
1. See Kimble, op.cit., p.51.
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in Sekondi-Takoradi at which agreement was reached on a proposal 
to withdraw their labour entirely until they could all be re­
employed full-time. This met with the Administration's consent, 
on the condition that a small skeleton staff should continue to 
work. The rest of the men then retired to their home villages 
and towns for two months. On return, they were all re-employed, 
though at slightly reduced rates of pay, (see Table 1.4).
Table 1.4 : Railway Wages, 1910-1939.
Occupation 1910 1921-29 1929-30 1931-32 1939
Labourer 9d to 
1/3
2/- 1/6 to 
1/9
1/3 2/-
Artisan 2/- to 
3/-
3/6 to 
5/6
3/- to 
5/-
2/8 to
5/-
3/6 to 
5/6
Engine-Driver n.d. n.d. 3/8 to 
7/-
2/8 to 
7/-
4/- to
lh
Source: L. A. Lacy, A History of Railway Unionism in Ghana,
(M.A. thesis, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 
Legon, 1965), p.48.
It hardly requires stating that the sense of strategy, 
and level of solidarity, displayed by the railway workers in 
1931 was extremely impressive. Nevertheless, the whole exper­
ience had been a somewhat daunting one, and it was not until 
toward the end of the decade that the taste or confidence for 
aggressive ascertion of demands was regained. In addition, the 
economic conditions of the mid-30's, with the world depression 
only gradually lifting, and labour in abundant supply, were 
hardly propitious for effective strike action. The Railway 
Association did petition Management for the restoration of the 
1929 rates of pay in April 1934, and again in November 1936.
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But, when they were requested by Management to be patient, the 
railway workers apparently felt unable to press their demands 
more forcefully. During this period, the efforts of the Assoc­
iation leaders were primarily directed to the gradual improve­
ment and^extension of. their organisation. Dues payment was 
introduced and branches were established all along the line 
from Sekondi to Kuraasi. In November 1938, the Association was 
renamed the Gold Coast Railway African Workers Union. According 
to the General Manager of Railways at the time, "it is claimed to 
be the representative of the whole of the daily-rated staff of 
the Railway, and has delegates from all Branches on the
"I
Committee". Although the Union could not be accorded official 
recognition (there was no legal provision for union registration 
at this date), its leaders helped aggrieved groups of employees 
to draw up petitions to the Management, and were sometimes allow­
ed to participate in the settlement of disputes on an informal 
basis.
In November 1938, with the cost of living rising rapidly,
the G.C.R.A.W.U. again petitioned the Government, via the General
Manager of Railways, for "the restoration of the 1929 rates of
2pay, and an increase in the number of pensionable posts."
There were a number of subsidiary points connected with the age 
of retirement, annual leave, uniforms and the like. When no 
reply had been received by the beginning of May 1939, the Union 
threatened strike action. On 9th May, "all classes of workers, 
from the highly paid engine drivers and artisans to the porters 
and labourers, with the exception of twenty drivers who were on
1. RAA, General Manager to Colonial Secretary, 9th November 
1938.
2. Report of the Labour Department, 1939-40. Cited in
E. A. Cowan, Evolution of Trade Unionism in Ghana, 
(Accra: TUC, 1961), p.12.
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the pensionable establishment, downed tools/*  ^Two days later,
the Governor agreed that the 1929 rates of pay should be restored
(no increase had been granted since the reductions of 1930-31),
and promised to establish a Board of Enquiry to investigate the
remaining grievances. But, the men refused to return to work,
2according to Management "intimidated by the ringleaders", 
until the Union leadership had had time to consider the proposals. 
Gertainly, these leaders saw the strike as an opportunity to 
elevate the status of the Union as well as an economic protest.
On 15th May, J. C. Vandyck, the Union Secretary, informed the 
General Manager that they would return to work on the one further 
condition that the General Manager "recognise the Gold Coast Rail­
way African Workers* Union as the body to which all matters 
affecting the interest of individual workers in his employment
3
should be referred". When the General Manager replied that 
existing laws did not provide for the recognition of trades unions, 
the strike continued. Eventually, a demonstration of workers was 
routed, with considerable violence, by the police, and eighteen 
unionists were imprisoned.
The severity of Government*s reaction was clearly 
intended to reduce the likelihood of similar occurrences amongst 
other government employees. As an official report stated,
"There were naturally repercussions in other 
government departments and there were one or two 
cases where anxiety was caused. Steps were taken 
immediately to put into effect the decisions of 
the Wages Board and, so far as possible, to place 
other departments on the same footing as the Railway.
Any danger of a general upheaval died away though it 
has taken time to settle down, and even yet petitions 
are being received from Government employees, the prin­
cipal demand usually being to be made pensionable." 4
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
RAA, Vandyck to General Manager, 15th May 1939.
4. Cowan, op.cit., p.13.
47
Against the background of the beginning of the Second World 
War, with instructions arriving from London **to take every 
possible step to guard against the contingency of the pos­
sibility of friction between employers and workers in Colonial 
Dependencies** \  it was essential to control this unrest and 
channel the development of union organisation by Ghanaian
workers. For this had received considerable impetus from the
2
large measure of success of the 1939 strike. It is in this 
context that the establishment of a Labour Department by the 
Colonial Government to assist the formation of unions must be 
seen.
Dynamics and Divisions in Early Railway Union Development.
At this point, it is worth considering some of the 
salient features of early Railway Union development. Of part­
icular interest from the general perspective of this study are 
the differences in union orientation and degree of participation 
displayed by the various categories of railway employee. 
Attention should also be paid to the most serious sources of 
divisions which manifested themselves during this early period. 
For, generally speaking, these differences and divisions have 
continued to characterise Railway Union politics down to the 
present day.
Firstly, the establishment of the Union owed nothing to 
the activity of clerical workers, nor did members of this occ­
upational category seek to participate in Union affairs prior 
to the protective trade union legislation of the early 1940*s.
In part, no doubt, this was because unionisation was of partic­
ularly dubious legality, and most clearly guaranteed to meet 
with official disapproval, in the case of ’white-collar1 members 
of the civil service. These people were certainly not without
1. GNA Accra, ADM 26/5/44, Macdonald to Colonial Secretary,
16th January 1940,
2. In addition to the restoration of the 1929 rates of pay, the 
railway workers won an increase in annual leave and in the 
number of pensionable posts. Only their request for pay on 
Public Holidays was turned down.
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their grievances but felt it advisable to articulate them 
through petitioning Government in an informal, 'ad hoc', and 
expressly respectful fashion. This did not, however, reflect 
merely a difference of official attitude toward unionisation for 
manual and clerical employees. When union membership was decl­
ared legitimate for African clerical staff in the civil service, 
(as it was in the early 1940*s legislation), 'clerical* unionists 
continued to display a marked moderation, even humility, in their 
approach to grievance representation. Indeed, many clerical 
workers chose not to join the Union, while those who did were 
rarely to be seen in attendance at mass-meetings. In explan­
ation of this attitude, it should be observed that the career 
structure for clerical workers was not (and has not been) such 
as to encourage a high level of trade union activism. They 
enjoyed greater mobility opportunities - both in number and 
degree - than the skilled workers, and recognised that the path 
to promotion lay in examination-passing and the good opinion of 
supervisors. They focussed their efforts accordingly, showing 
little inclination to collective action, and avoiding involve­
ment in disruptive trade union activity. Hence they had fol­
lowed Management's instructions to refrain from participation in 
the 1939 strike. In addition, they were, of course, highly 
conscious of their superior status to the artisans, and there­
fore inclined to regard the "rowdy", militant style of unionism 
of the latter as very much beneath them. In their own view, no 
doubt, they were also sufficiently well versed in the bureau­
cratic processes and financial problems of Government, to under­
stand the reasons for delay in settling grievances. Manual- 
worker militancy might be seen as resulting from pure ignorance, 
and consequent impatience at what they (incorrectly) saw as 
deliberate delaying tactics on the part of Government or 
Management,
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The Railway Union was rather the creation of a dynamic, 
elementary-school educated, labour elite of artisans, who aimed 
in the first instance at attaining for themselves a socio-economic 
status equivalent to that of the African clerical workers - i.e. 
providing a quasi-European life style and a secure footing in 
the existing social order. This apparently elitist impulse was 
in fact productive of a highly militant style of unionism, 
informed by a well-developed sense of solidarity. A number of 
factors accounted for this. The artisans worked within close 
distance of each other in the Sekondi Workshop concentration, 
and lived side by side in the nearby railway villages. They- 
shared a common sense of grievance at their conditions of work 
and the general shortage of promotion opportunities. Moreover, 
they were generally more aware of these common interests and 
frustrations than of tribal divisions within the group. The 
skilled railway workers were in any case nearly all southern 
Ghanaians and shared a common Akan cultural background. They 
were in the majority Fanti, and the Fante language rapidly 
became the * lingua franca* of Sekondi. Since the Fanti were 
assured of numerical predominance at both rank-and-file and 
leadership levels of the Union, they were quite happy, within 
this framework, to elect suitable candidates from other tribal 
groups to positions of leadership. In consequence, tribal 
divisions among the skilled workers were, from the start, of 
negligible significance in union politics.
Almost half of the artisans, moreover, were of common 
Cape Coast origin and cultural background, and were heirs to a 
Cape Coast tradition of popular political participation. The 
Cape Coast *young men* (or * common men*), as distinct from the 
elders and chiefs, were members of "Asafo" companies, semi­
military organisations which also had recognised political
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functions. During the first half of the twentieth century,
the "Asafos" were frequently and centrally involved in political
disputes over the legitimacy of particular chiefs and their
policies, and sometimes implicit in this, over the institutional
1
reforms the Colonial Government sought to introduce. While
the rules governing "Asafo" politics were vague and highly
changeable - as one historian has observed, "they were little
more than a reflection of the existing balance of power in the 
2
state** - there can be no doubting that they were, in an 
important sense, democratic institutions, both in internal 
structure and as regards their function in the wider political 
system. Stylistically, the Railway Union’s borrowing of Asafo 
cultural elements can be seen in the use, from early days, of 
an **Asafo** "gong-gong" (literally, a gong), an Asafo battle-cry, 
(**Kyor-be** - **Prepare yourselves for the coming struggle**), and, 
more generally, in the quasi-military atmosphere of mass meetings 
of the Union, with speakers trying to outdo each other in bravado. 
The "Asafo** tradition may well have influenced the railway- 
workers* understanding of union organisation and objectives, and 
certainly provided a cultural referent for the concept and 
practice of solidarity.
However, these same factors making for solidarity within 
the skilled worker strata set them off the more sharply from the 
unskilled workers, illiterate Nigerians and Northerners in the 
main, speaking little or no Fante, firmly attached to their own 
cultural traditions, working in small gangs out along the Perm­
anent Way. As we have seen, the artisans extended their union 
organisation to the unskilled workers in a particular situation
1. Ansu Datta, "The Fante Asafo: A Re-Examination** in Africa, 
(October 1972), Vol. VLII, No, 4, p.365.
2. Alan Gawson, "Traditional Organisation and Urban Politics: 
Political Parties and the Gape Coast Asafo", (Paper presented 
to the African Politics Seminar of the Institute of Common- 
itfealth Studies, 1973).
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of common grievances and insecurity, and essentially for the 
opportunistic reason of enhancing their own bargaining position. 
But it was perhaps to be anticipated that, once granted the 
permanent status and conditions of service they desired - monthly 
salary, two weeks annual leave etc., - they would then be incli­
ned to practice a more particularist ("elitist") form of unionism.
Certainly, cultural differences and social distance 
between unskilled and skilled worker strata were such as to make 
any deeper and more lasting solidarity seem unlikely. As a 
senior colonial official remarked in 1936,
"The manual labourer has no standing in the social 
scheme. He is regarded by the educated classes as 
an inferior - also the term ’labourer* is closely 
associated with the word * strangers* which defines 
the status of the natives of neighbouring countries 
and the Northern Territories. Under the present 
order of things it would not be possible for the 
son of an educated man to become a labourer.
"The artisan class is on a different footing, for 
this worker has his niche in the social life of the 
colony, and there is a tendency for sons to follow 
the vocation of their fathers.
"It is obvious that it will be some time before any 
labour movement is created. The probability of any 
co-operation between the artisan and the labourer is 
remote." 1
Surprisingly, this coincidence of ethnic, cultural, and 
economic lines of division was not to be a source of serious 
political disunity within the Railway Union. Labour unity, 
however, has implied the condition that the unskilled workers 
and their representatives, (generally speaking their gang head­
men), should accept second-class status, and a subordinate role,
1. GNA Accra, ADM 26/5/44, Report of Western Province Com­
missioner on "Labour Conditions in the Gold Coast’*, 1936.
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in the Union's power and policy-formulating structure. This 
they have generally been prepared to do out of recognition of 
their dependence on the powerful bargaining position and col­
lective strength of the artisan class. In turn, the artisans 
have been concerned, in nearly all their strike actions, to 
fight general battles for an improvement in the wage-levels of 
all "lower-paid workers’1, (i.e. skilled and unskilled manual 
workers). This might be explained in part by the artisans' 
continuing failure to attain that distinct economic and occup­
ational status which they have long felt themselves to deserve, 
and which, once attained, might have served to differentiate 
their interests more clearly from those of the unskilled 
labourer. But their relationship to the unskilled workers has 
certainly also come to involve a genuinely protective, pater­
nalistic attitude. In accounting for this, the ideological 
influence of Pobee Biney, the railway workers' leader in the 
nationalist period, must be reckoned one important factor.
The most serious lines of division within the Railway 
Union, (or the Railway Union's potential membership), have been, 
firstly, between the skilled workers and the clerical workers: 
and, secondly, between the Workshop artisans and the engine- 
drivers. Both were clearly presaged in the early period of the 
Union's history. Enough has already been said of the difference 
between skilled and clerical workers' union attitudes to indicate 
the nature of this conflict. The artisan-enginemen division 
derived not so much from attitudinal or cultural differences as 
from the almost inevitable sectionalist tendencies of militant 
craft unionism. The enginemen, being the most highly skilled 
of the railway manualworkers, were at an early date accorded 
special privileges which they guarded jealously. In 1939 they 
were initially amongst the most militant advocates of strike
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action. Yet they later opposed prolongation on the grounds 
that it might cause the loss of pensions and other privileges, 
(which very few artisans enjoyed). In the event, the strike 
was maintained, but shortly afterwards, the formation of a 
separate Railway Enginemen1 s Union was announced. With the 
exception of two brief periods, (1943-49 and 1962-66), the 
enginemen have continued to maintain a separate union, evidently 
believing that their own grievances over increment rates, prom­
otion opportunities, job classification, etc. are sufficiently 
particular to require specialised handling.
Nevertheless, the enginemen have generally been in 
accord with the artisans on major, general issues, and have 
acted solidly with them at times of political crisis - the 1950, 
1961, and 1971 strikes, for example. At such times it has been 
the practice to establish a Joint Council of Railwaymen to 
co-ordinate activity between the two Unions. The maintenance of 
this artisan-engineman cohesion, as of that between artisans and 
unskilled workers, owes a great deal to the educative experience 
of Pobee Biney*s leadership in the nationalist era.
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CHAPTER TWO,
THE RAILWAY WORKERS IN THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT - 
______THE MEANING OF POLITICAL COMMITMENT.
Most of the literature on African trade unionism 
emphasises the significant influence of the nationalist exper­
ience on the subsequent development of relations between post-
1
Independence governments and labour movements. Where, as in 
Ghana, the labour movement became closely affiliated to the rul­
ing party after Independence, this is sometimes held to have 
largely resulted from the close ties forged between such parties 
and the unions in the period of nationalist agitation. Other 
writers, most notably Berg and Butler, have argued that, in the 
case of Ghana as of most other African countries, the unions
displayed a marked lack of political commitment in the nation- 
2
alist period. This is said to explain their reluctance to 
accept party control in the immediate post-Independence period,
Ia control successfully asserted only because of the unions 
inability to resist.
Both positions, it should be noted, tend to assume 
that political involvement in the nationalist movement where 
it existed, implied commitment to a particular political party. 
Such an assumption should perhaps not be so glibly made. Both 
also posit a simple continuity in relations, or preferred rela­
tions, between unions and parties in the two eras. Yet it should 
be fairly obvious that such ties as pre-dated Independence, (or 
the period of ^dyarchy”) underwent a radical change of nature 
when the party became the state, and the superficial unity of 
the nationalist period gave way to an increasingly manifest 
differentiation of interests.
1. See, for example, loan Davies, African Trade Unions,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966); and Meynaud and Salah1 
Bey, Trade Unionism in Africa: a study of its growth 
and orientation, (London: Methuen, 1967).
2. Berg and Butler, op.cit.
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The case of the railway workers of Sekondi-Takoradi 
brings home in vivid manner the false simplicity of both of 
these arguments. The foremost proponents of political unionism 
in the nationalist era, (when they staged a two-week strike in 
support of Nkrumah'.s "Positive Action" campaign), the railway 
workers were subsequently to lead union resistance to control 
of the labour movement, by the Convention People's Party. Why 
did they become the leading opponents of party affiliation, and 
how did this relate to their conception of nationalist aims? In 
short, what was the meaning of political commitment for the 
railway workers?
This question assumes importance not only from the 
perspective of general arguments as to the nature of union 
politics in Africa, but also within the particular context of 
Ghanaian politics. In 1949-50, it is apparent, in as far Nkrumah 
possessed a radical, organised mass basis of support, this con­
sisted above all in the railway and harbour workers of Sekondi- 
Takoradi. One looks in vain, as did Nkrumah himself, during 
these years, for any alternative, organised section of the masses, 
able or willing to back up his demands with direct physical 
threats to the continued stability of the colonial regime. This 
is not to cast doubts on the extent or enthusiasm of popular 
support for Nkrumah*s programme; but only the railway workers 
were able to make this support conspicuous and politically tel­
ling. It is important, then, to understand just what this 
politically most crucial of groups conceived to be the aims of 
their nationalist activity.
The Impact of the Labour Department's Model of Trade Unionism.
In 1938, against the background of serious labour 
disturbances in the Carribean colonies, the Gold Coast Govern­
ment established a labour Department. As the Colonial Secretary
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had noted in October 1937,
"The recent spread of labour unrest throughout 
the British Colonial Empire points to the nec­
essity of an organisation with accurate know­
ledge of labour conditions should the day come 
when we have to face serious labour disputes in 
the Gold Coast." 1
Within eighteen months, the Government had to deal with a 
major strike action by the railway workers, and there were 
clear indications of mounting unrest among other workers. In 
November 1941, the railway artisans and labourers again came 
out on strike in support of a demand for more speedy implemen­
tation of the 1939 agreement. The Governor, shocked at the 
railway workers' failure to give advance warning of their inten­
tion, and, even more, at the lack of consideration for the war
effort their action implied, instructed Police and Management
2
to deal severely with the strikers. Many were imprisoned, 
and temporary labourers were taken on by the Railway Department, 
thereby inducing some of the unskilled workers to return to 
work. The Workshop artisans remained solid, however, and 
retaliated against the Government by persuading workers in the 
Public Works and Posts and Telecommunications Departments in 
Sekondi to join them. There were even reports that the strikers 
were intending to storm Sekondi prison "to release the prisoners 
and so obtain their help." ^ After twelve days they were forced
1. GNA, Accra ADM 26/5/44, Colonial Secretary to Secretary for
Native Affairs, 2nd October 1937.
2* GNA, Sekondi, Acc 351/15, Governor's telegram to Commis­
sioner for the Western Province, 26th November 1941.
3. GNA, Sekondi, Acc 357/17, Commissioner for the Western
Province to Colonial Secretary, 3rd December 1941.
GNA, Sekondi, Acc 357/21, Prison Superintendent, Sekondi, 
to Director of Prisons, Accra, 27th December 1941.
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to capitulate and report back to work in return for the release 
of most of their imprisoned fellow-strikers, J, C. Vandyck and 
John A3hun, President and Secretary of the Union, were detained 
until May 1942, and then, predictably, the Railway Department 
refused to reinstate them. The Union approached Nana Kobina 
Nketsia, Chief of British Sekondi, and later J. B. Danquah, to 
lobby for their reinstatement but to no avail. ^
In the aftermath of the December 1941 strike, Government
representatives visited Sekondi Location and gained an assurance
that the railway workers would refrain from further strike activ-
2
ity until the conclusion of the War. Then, the railwaymen were 
promised, Government would give speedy and sympathetic consider­
ation to their claim for a compensatory wage increase. Neverthe­
less, the Colonial Government was understandably anxious to take 
additional measures so as to prevent similar disturbances recur­
ring. Accordingly, in February 1942, the Labour Department 
recruited Mr. I. G. Jones, a former official of the British Union 
of Mineworkers, to man the Trade Union section. It was his res­
ponsibility to organise, or re-organise, Ghanaian unions along 
the most suitable lines (from the Government's point of view), 
and to instruct local unionists in the proper procedures to be 
followed.
These procedures had already been laid down in outline.
In February 1941 the Colonial Government had issued a Trade Unions 
Ordinance authorising the combination of five or more persons, and 
subsequently a series of legislative orders, modelled largely on 
equivalent war-time measures in the United Kingdom, defining a 
'trade dispute', the proper settlement procedures, and the cir-
1. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 28th 
January 1942.
2. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 7th 
January 1942.
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1
cumstances in which strike action was illegal. Initially,
the Labour Department stipulated that industrial disputes be
settled through the local chiefs and elders in the Native
Councils, in the hope that these Councils would moderate the
demands of workers and keep them from approaching Government
directly. The railway workers immediately protested this idea,
however, and in compromise the Labour Department suggested that
the more exalted Provincial Council of Chiefs should act as a
2
mediating body.
The Colonial Government's conception of legitimate 
trade unionism was clearly stated in a pamphlet circulated to 
union organisers:
"A trade union is not an organisation with political 
aims. It is an association which has as its main 
objective the regulation of relations between workers 
and their employers." 3
Such regulation, it was stressed, was better achieved 
through peaceful negotiation than through strike action. This 
was the lesson which Mr. I. G. Jones set out to teach, though 
with considerable sympathy for the predicament of Ghanaian
1. The most important of these measures were: The Conspiracy
and Protection of Property (Trade Disputes) Ordinance, 1941, 
which incidentally did not cover Civil Servants; The Trades 
Dispute (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance, 1941: and The 
Defence (Settlement of Labour Disputes) Order, 1941. An 
important measure with specific reference to the Railway 
Union was The Trade Union (Gold Coast Railway African 
Employees' Union) Order in Council, 1943, which authorised 
Civil Servants - i.e. the permanent staff - to join the 
Union, and therefore made possible incorporation of the 
clerical staff. For fuller details of this legislation, 
see E. Cowan op.cit., pp.15-19.
2. Interview with H. B. Cofie, 5th June 1971.
3. J. S. Patrick, What is a trade union? (London: 1939).
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unionists and employing a rather more flexible approach than 
the preceding quotation suggests.
The Labour Department's Report for 1942 noted that:
"Early in this year, this officer toured the 
country holding informal meetings with groups 
of people in order to explain the principles of 
Trade Unionism and the Provision of the Trade 
Unions Ordinance. In the early stages this 
officer met with considerable suspicion as to 
Government intentions and with a great deal of 
ignorance as to the aims and objects of trade 
unionism. He has been successful in obtaining 
the confidence of all those with whom he has 
come into contact, and his advice on procedure 
has been willingly accepted by the Railwaymen 
whose Union - the Gold Coast Railway African 
Employees' Union - shows the most promise of 
those so far registered." 1
The Railway unionists were indeed highly suspicious of
Government intentions at first, and informed Mr. Jones that they
would co-operate with him only if he helped them to secure the
re-instatement of J. C. Vandyck and John Ashun as Railway employ- 
2
ees. This he was able to achieve towards the end of the year,
and the Railway unionists kept their promise to follow his
advice on re-organisation.
The remarks of H. B. Cofie, Assistant Secretary of the
Union at this time, testify to the confidence which I. G. Jones
managed to establish in his intentions: "It was a surprise to us
that he really fought for us, showed us the proper channel to
3pass, and was most energetic on our behalf in many ways."
1. Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1942. Cited in 
E. Cowan, op.cit., p.13,
2. Interview with H. B, Cofie, 5th June 1971.
3. Ibid.
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Mr. Jones' plans for re-organisation involved incorporating the 
African clerical staff in the re-named Gold Coast Railway African 
Technical and Clerical Employees Union (1943). Clerical staff 
representatives, (or 'clerical unionists* as we shall hence­
forth refer to them), soon came to dominate the Union Executive, 
partly through the numerical predominance which 'ex-officio' 
representation gave them, and partly through their possession 
of the literary and administrative skills, required by more 
sophisticated procedures. ^
This development was largely responsible for giving 
considerable currency in Railway Union deliberations to the 
peaceful, apolitical model of unionism propounded by the Labour 
Department. Most of the skilled worker, or 'technical', union­
ists, while appreciating the usefulness of the more neutral 
advice Mr. Jones had to offer, listened to this 'apolitical* 
line with increasing cynicism as the decade progressed. The 
clerical unionists, on the other hand, took the reasoning behind 
it more seriously. There were a number of possible reasons for 
this. The skilled workers were later to argue that the clerical 
staff were relatively contented with their situation under the 
colonial regime, and more particularly with the pay increase 
awarded them in 1946 by the Harragin Commission. But this was 
no adequate explanation, since the clerical workers, too, 
suffered a severe subsequent decline in living standards from 
the inflation of 1947-50, and the slow rate of Africanisation of 
senior posts in the Civil Service provided a source of real 
resentment. More important were the general situational consid­
erations and cultural characteristics, outlined in the previous
1. Frank Wudu, A Fallen Labour Hero of Ghana, (Accra: State
Publishing Corporation, 1968), p.3. Frank Wudu (or Woode) 
was General Secretary of both the Railway Union and the 
Gold Coast TUC in 1947-49.
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chapter, which made for clerical worker moderation and a marked 
concern to do things "the correct way” - i.e. by emulation of 
British ways and institutions, as communicated to them of course, 
by the British in the Gold Coast. Viewed from their own pers­
pective, they were sufficiently well educated to understand the 
reasoning behind the model of strict separation of trade unionism 
from politics. In particular, they adopted the argument that, 
since not all Railway Union members were supporters of the 
Convention People*s Party, it would be undemocratic to stage 
strike actions in support of Nkrumah*s nationalist campaign.  ^
Most of the leaders of the new unions established in 
1943-50 might also be classified as clerical unionists and, since 
they owed their institution largely to the education and assist­
ance of the Labour Department, were similarly inclined to uphold 
the 'apolitical* model. By 1945, unions with a total paid-up 
membership of 6,030 were registered, and in that year the Railway 
Union took the initiative in establishing the first Gold Coast 
Trades Union Congress to co-ordinate their activities. The TUG 
central office was at Sekondi, and this fact, together with the 
greater experience and dynanism of the Railway unionists, assured 
them a large measure of influence over the trade union movement 
as a whole. In spite of the militancy and radical nationalism 
of the skilled worker rank-and-file, however, Railway Union 
leadership of the TUC did not make for direct involvement of 
the whole trade union movement in the nationalist struggle. 
Delegates from most other unions on the TUC Executive Council, 
including the first President, C. W. Techie-Menson (1945-48),
opposed such a policy: and the Railway Union Executive was
2
itself far from characterised by singularity of purpose.
1. Interview with David Sam, ex-clerical officer, Ghana 
Railways, 5th March 1971.
2. Frank Wudu, op.cit., p.8.
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The Colonial Labour Department succeeded, then, in 
raising considerable obstacles to trade union involvement in 
the Nationalist movement. And, although the militant nationalism 
of the skilled railway workers eventually gained expression in 
the "Positive Action" strike of January 1950, this requires 
explanation in terms of leadership politics as well as the 
strength of rank-and-file feeling.
Railwayworker Nationalism; Economics and Ideology.
The factors making for an upsurge of popular unrest and
nationalist consciousness in the immediate post-war period in
Ghana have received detailed and most satisfactory treatment 
1
elsewhere. Here it is necessary merely to point out certain 
salient features of the railway workers' conception of nationalist 
aims and the most important influences on their thinking.
In the first place, nationalism, for the railway workers 
as for most Ghanaian nationalists, was in large part an expression 
of acute economic discontent, a response to post-War conditions of 
rapid price inflation and falling real incomes. The Colonial 
Government signally failed to produce the increased prosperity 
or financial opportunities for Africans that had been expected.
In 1941, we have seen, the railway workers had been assured that 
their refraining from strike action during the war would be 
rewarded with improved conditions at its conclusion. But these 
did not materialise without the pressure of a major strike action 
(in 1947); and even the wage increase of that year proved only 
a temporary hiatus in the general pattern of declining real wage 
levels. This may be seen from the evidence presented by
1. Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-60, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), pp.49-103.
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W. B. Birmingham on fluctuations in the real value of the 
government minimum wage :
Table 2.1 : Fluctuations in the real value of the minimum
wage, 1939-50.
Date DailyWage
Money-Wage 
Index
Gost of Living 
Index
Real Wage 
Index
Food-Price
Index
May
1939
1/6 100 100 100 100
Nov
1945
1/10 122 186 66 202
Nov
1947
2/9 183 212 86 250
Dec
1948
2/9 183 227 81 264
Dec
1950
3/3 217 285 76 391
Source; W. B. Birmingham 'An Index of Real Wages of the 
Unskilled Labourer in Accra*, in Economic Bulletin of Ghana,
Vol IV, No. 3, (1960).
In such conditions of rapid inflation, as David Apter
has cautiously put it, rightly avoiding any simple equation of
the two, "the urban population suffered the most. It is in the
urban areas as well that the most aggressive feeling for indepen-
2
dence resides." More specifically, a number of groups were 
especially severely frustrated. Ghanaian businessmen, or would-be
1. Birmingham's Index can be accepted as providing a fairly 
accurate indication of fluctuations in the real wage levels 
of both skilled and unskilled workers in government employ­
ment, since these maintained a steady relation to each 
other throughout the period in question.
2. David Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition, (Princeton; 
Princeton University Press, 1955), p.69,
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businessmen, chafing at the virtual monopoly of trade enjoyed 
by European firms, were inclined to lay the blame directly on 
oppressive discrimination by the Colonial Government. The 
rapidly expanding class of elementary school leavers, finding 
themselves with little hope of employment in Government clerical 
service, were anxious for increased mobility opportunities, and 
therefore more rapid economic and political development. The 
skilled railway workers, while better off than many of their 
fellow elementary school leavers were still without the improved 
conditions of service and life-style, equivalent to those of the 
clerical workers, to which they had long aspired. Such frustr­
ation could be greater for those to whom the goal seemed nearer 
to attainment: and greater still when, with their situation
deteriorating, that goal started to drift ever further away. 
Living in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, moreover, the railway 
workers were very aware of the worsening situation and mounting 
discontent of other groups. Most disturbing was the growing
number of "pilot-boys", a semi-criminal group of unemployed
1young school leavers.
Indeed, several of the phenomena which Meyer Fortes
identified in 1945 as making for mounting unrest in the colonies
after the War, were to be found in particularly acute form in
2
Sekondi-Takoradi. The influence of foreign soldiers and
1. The *pilot-boys' were so termed because they earned a liv­
ing from acting as guides to sight-seers, and directing 
visiting sailors and soldiers to prostitutes. Many of them 
had "no settled place of abode", and also engaged in petty 
theft. Their numbers swelled during the War, when there 
were so many sailors and soldiers about in Takoradi, but 
there were still quite a number there in 1949: Busia and 
his assistants came into contact with 150 in the course of
a Social Survey. See K. A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey 
of Sekondi-Takoradi, (Accra: Government Printer, 1950), 
pp. 96-100.
2. Meyer Fortes, "The Impact of the War on British West Africa" 
in International Affairs, Vol.21, No. 2, (April 1945),
pp.206-20.
A
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sailors, calling in at the colonies, for example, was clearly 
most strongly felt in the harbour-towns. The British and 
American soldiers who drunkenly toured the brothels of Takoradi 
hardly conformed to the colonial stereotype of the dignified, 
self-disciplined white man, and might have done much to under­
mine respect for whites in general, (though it is unclear to 
what degree such a stereotype was still widely prevalent).
More important perhaps, the radically discontented mentality of 
the American negro troops seems to have had a considerable impact 
on many of the youths and workers of Sekondi-Takoradi, offering 
them a new social and ideological dimension in which to conceive 
their own situation and sense of grievance. Many of the older 
railway workers interviewed in 1971 spoke of exciting and influ­
ential meetings with some of these American blacks during the 
War years.
The nationalist activism displayed by Ghanaian ex-
servicemen has often been remarked upon.^ Recently, it has
been questioned whether they were, proportionately, much better
represented in the ranks of C.P.P. activists than any other
2section of the population. But the important point, for our 
purposes, lies in the influence which some of them, at least, 
had on the thinking of the railway workers. A number of ex­
railway workers and other inhabitants of Sekondi, after serving 
in the Allied Forces in 1943-45, were prominent in the organis­
ation of the Gold Coast Ex-Servicemen's Union. Many returned 
to Sekondi to communicate something of their sense of power 
and scorn for the fragility of British Colonial Government to 
friends still working in the Railway:
1. See, for example, Dennis Austin, op.cit., p.74.
2. Richard Rathbone, "Businessmen in Ghanaian Politics", in 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3., (April 
1973), pp.391-402,
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"I can remember when my friend Francis came to 
see us one Christmas-time, just after the War.
We were expecting just to celebrate, but after 
much 'akpoteskie' (local gin) he wanted to talk 
about how we were going to throw out the Govern­
ment. I can honestly say it astonished me, 
because I had started thinking politically but 
he had not been serious at all when he left us but 
just a cheerful sort of fellow. And when I asked 
him, 'How can we possibly throw out the British 
Government which has shown it can beat the Germans ?', 
he just said, 'There is an army of us here now who 
helped defeat the Germans, and we show the British 
our strength on our own land, with all the people 
behind us'." 1
It might appear, therefore, that railway worker nation­
alism was simply an extension of economic grievance, lent what 
ideological dimension it possessed by a growing sense of con­
fidence and of solidarity with other blacks against the white 
man. It is significant in this context that the personal 
qualities which, in the railway workers' view, distinguished both 
Nkrumah and their own great nationalist leader, Pobee Biney, 
were simply 'courage' - the courage to boldly act out their 
sense of grievance, challenging the colonial authorities directly
and 'understanding' "it was as though he could tell us our
2
thoughts before we ourselves knew them". At the same time, 
however, this identification with the courageous 'strong man* 
leader entailed defining the struggle as being against the 
'effete*, detached African educated elite, (as well as against 
the British). Progressively, it also involved a vision of a new, 
more brotherly and egalitarian order, 'self-government' meaning 
government by and for the 'common man' rather than a mere taking 
over of colonial structures.
1. Interview with J. Piadoo, railway artisan, 6th June 1971.
2. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, railway artisan and Union 
official, 10th June 1971.
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Some of the radical railway unionists conceived the 
struggle in overtly Marxist terms. J. S. Annan, for example, 
a member of both Railway Union and TUC Executive Councils, 
attended the 1945 World Federation of Trades Unions Conference 
in Paris, and returned to report:
"I believe that the time is now ripe when organised 
labour in the Gold Coast should commence to struggle 
against economic and socially militating forces: 
there should be no room for fear: we know these
reactionary forces - the might of Imperialist Capit­
alism that has exploited the working-^classes for 
years must be stayed. Let me say, however, that our 
struggle is not only against foreign capitalism and 
merciless exploitation - it is also against unbridled 
Capitalism of our own people, the Africans: we do
not intend to remove foreign Capitalism that exists 
to make excessive profits at the expense of African 
cheap labour and put similar Capitalism in black 
skin: our fight is directed against Capitalism of
any description that refuses to give fair and adequate 
remuneration to labour. Our slogan must be, ’’Workers 
of the Gold Coast Unite: You have nothing to lose but
your Chains”. 1
The influence of Marxist ideas with some of the railway
unionists can be traced back to the activity of Wallace-Johnson*s
West African Youth League in the mid-1930,s. Born in Sierra
Leone, and trained for a time in the Soviet Union, Isaac Wallace-
Johnson attempted between 1933 and 1937, to introduce a socialist,
2
anti-colonialist mass movement to the Gold Coast. To this end, 
he combined the articulation of radical anti-imperialist ideology 
with the representation of local grievances, (for example, 
miners' grievances over the lack of compensation for industrial 
injuries), making use of his contacts in the British Parlia­
mentary Left, By December 1936, the Youth League claimed a total
1. RUA, J. S. Annan's Report to the Railway Union Working 
Committee, 27th October 1945.
2. All details on Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth 
League are taken from A. B. Holmes, op.cit., pp.670-732.
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membership of 7,000. This was probably an exaggerated figure,
and the movement largely collapsed when Wallace-Johnson himself
was forced out of the country in 1937. But there can be no
doubting the continuing influence of his ideas and strategy on
many members of the Gold Coast sub-elite of skilled workers and
their leaders. In particular, Pobee Biney, the railway workers*
great nationalist leader, was a local organiser of the Yough
League, and the branch at Sekondi-Takoradi is reported to have
1
been one of the largest and most active.
Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of the history 
of the Youth League in the Gold Coast is its failure to attract 
a larger or more militant following. Admittedly, economic and 
political conditions in the mid-30's were, as we have seen, 
hardly propitious for self-confident political assertion. But 
one might also hazard the suggestion that, for many of the rail­
way artisans, with their love of ’plain speaking*, Wallace- 
Johnson’s Marxist rhetoric was more a handicap than an attraction. 
Certainly, Pobee Biney, though himself much influenced by Marx­
ism, found it necessary, when mobilising the railway workers in 
support of political action in the late *40*s, to speak in 
common words which the ordinary artisan could readily understand. 
This involved articulating the ’class* element in the nationalist 
revolution only in extremely vague terms, and playing down the 
differences between Biney himself and the right-wing of Nkrumah*s 
followers. Only after 1950 did the full extent of these dif­
ferences clearly emerge.
Biney*s * ideology* will receive more detailed treat­
ment later in this chapter. Here, the important point is that 
in the immediate post-War period, the * class* element in railway
1. A. B. Holmes quotes a report in the African Morning Post
of 28th April 1938 on a meeting of the W.A.Y.L. at which, 
’’Comrade Pobee Biney was charged with having misapprop­
riated the funds of his branch. He appeared to be guilty.11 
A. B. Holmes, op.cit. p.720.
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worker nationalism, though real enough, was generally speaking 
more implicit than explicit, and somewhat narrowly defined. 
Hostility to elitism was directed specifically against the 
existing educated elite and was primarily expressed in terms j 
of non-attendance at meetings of the United Gold Coast Conven-
i
tion. The two leading representatives of the U.G.C.C. in 
Sekondi were especially unappealing political figures from the 
railway workers' point of view. The lawyer R. S. Blay had on 
more than one occasion attempted to intervene with the railway 
unionists to persuade them of the advantages of official arb­
itration procedures, and was therefore cast (among the militants)
2
as a Government sympathiser. And the lawyer F. Awonowoor
Williams was well known locally for his extreme, and somewhat
eccentric, elitist views which, to his credit, he made no attempt
3
to conceal from the masses. Kwame Nkrumah was a startling 
contrast with this kind of politician. Nevertheless, he appears 
to have remained suspect with the railway workers so long as he 
remained within the fold of the U.G.C.C. It was not until 1949, 
when he broke with the elite, and came to speak to the railway 
workers in the streets of Sekondi (rather than the 'chambers' of 
the U.G.C.C.) that he made any great impact. ^ Only then did he
1. Interviews with R. S. Blay, ex-Sekohdi Branch Chairman of 
the United Gold Coast Convention, 2nd July 1971; and with
H. B. Cofie, J. C. Vandyck, ex-Railway Union officials,
5th June 1971.
2. Interview with J. C. Vandyck, 5th June 1971.
3. For instance, in a statement to the press, F. Awonowoor 
Williams expressed his view that "true Aristocracy after 
true religion is the great blessing a nation can enjoy - 
of the old school of politics were men of education and 
substance, and merchant princes, working in the interests 
of the country. Apart from one or two members of the 
Convention People's Party, their leaders and supporters are 
the flotsam and jetsam and popinjays of the country. It is 
therefore the bounden duty of every informed citizen to 
unite to save the social and political order." Cited in
E. Cowan, op.cit., p.102.
4. Interviews with Kofi Imbeah, railway artisan and Union off­
icial, 10th June 1971; and J. Piadoo, railway artisan, 6th . 
June 1971. ^
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come to express radical nationalist ideas, already current 
among the ’common men*, in sufficiently extreme form to give 
the impression of courageous and genuine leadership.
Interviews held with the older railway workers in 1971 
left little doubt that Nkrumah’s rhetorical ability endowed him, 
for a time at least, with truly ’charismatic1 status. Even some 
of the leaders of the 1961 strike against the Nkrumah Government 
described his impact in terms as rapturous, if not quite so 
poetic, as those of Ayr Armah's hero in The Beautyful Ones Are 
Not Yet Born;
”1 stood there staring like a believer at the man 
and when he stopped I was ashamed and looked around 
to see if anybody had been watching me. They were 
all listening. The one up there was rather helpless- 
looking, with a slight, famished body. So from where 
had he got this strength that enabled him to speak 
with such confidence to us, and we waiting patiently for 
more to come? Here was something more potent than 
mere words. These dipped inside the listener, making 
him go with the one who spoke." 1
Yet it would be wrong to over-emphasise Nkrumah's 
personal hold over the railway workers. The militant artisans, 
unlike most other Ghanaian social groups, already possessed in 
Pobee Biney a leader of their own of similar rhetorical power
1. Ayi Kwei Arraah, The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born, 
(London: Heinemann, 1969), p. 101. A. Y. Ankomah, a
prominent organiser of the 1961 strike against the 
Nkrumah Government, admitted that, "He (Nkrumah) had 
even me captured with his sugar-coated words in those 
days, and I've always been a straightforward man. There 
were no exceptions. It was irrational. He just swept 
you along with his determination. It was only later 
we discovered he wanted to be a dictator."
Interview with A. Y. Ankomah, 3rd August 1971.
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and equal charismatic stature to that of Nkrumah. Indeed, many 
of them came to hold the view that he was greater than Nkrumah, 
more courageous and more consistent to his principles. Certainly, 
his influence was mor continuous and direct, and his leadership 
was crucial to the success of the 1950 1Positive Action’ strike 
(from which, the railway workers claim, Nkrumah would have backed 
down had not.Biney forced his hand). Since his role in Railway 
Union politics in 1945-50 was so central, and illustrates vividly 
many of the continuing characteristics of rank-and-file attit­
udes, it is worth focussing on his part in these events. The 
following account presents the way in which Biney’s character, 
role and ideology were perceived, (or, more accurately, sub­
sequently perceived), by the skilled railway workers themselves. 
Although this runs the risk of over-emphasising his personal 
importance, and over-glamourising his real character and person­
ality, such an account is the more informative as to subsequent 
attitudes and behaviour. For the ’legend of Pobee Biney* still 
provides the ’ideal* model of Railway Unionism for many members.
Pobee Biney and the Politics of the 1950 ’Positive Action*
Strike.
Alfred Pobee Biney was born at Cape Coast on January 
13th, 1914.  ^ Educated at the Government Boy’s School there, 
he left in 1932 and took a series of jobs with the Mining Com­
panies before entering the training scheme for engine drivers 
in the Railways in 1935. He soon took an active interest in 
trade union affairs, becoming a member of the Enginemen’s Union 
Executive in 1941. Two years later, he appears to have been
1. The following account of Biney’s career and ideology is 
based on F, Wudu, op.cit., and interviews with many of 
the older railway workers in June-August 1971.
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influential in persuading the enginemen to re-amalgamate with 
the main Railway Union. His militant style of unionism was to 
earn him the nickname "Let Go the Anchor*' - a reference to the 
phrase he himself coined for declaring strike action, and inten­
ded to express the idea of downing tools (or 'dropping anchor'), 
thus bringing the Railways to a grinding halt.
His initial participation in trade union officialdom
was no doubt inspired by the ideological stimulation he received
from membership of Wallace-Johnson's West African Youth League,
and can be seen as clearly directed to building up a powerful
radical political following. But, even more clearly than
Wallace-Johnson, he was no mere ideologist but was rather
sincerely concerned to right particular grievances. From the
point of view of the skilled railway workers, his career is
seen as having developed from that of mere branch unionist to
major nationalist leader, and emphasis is placed 011 the fact
that he was not a 'politician* in the conventional derogatory
usage of the term, but a real workers' leader. To this is
often added the significant qualification, "He was a real
workers' leader, but not just the railway workers' leader,
rather a community leader. X should say he was a fighter for
1the suffering masses, a real humanitarian."
Biney initially developed this reputation as a 'fighter 
for the suffering masses' on the basis of his bold and success­
ful, if constitutionally improper, spokesmanship for the 
railwayworkers' grievances. As we have seen, the Railway Union 
emerged from the Second World War period as the Gold Coast 
Railway African Clerical and Technical Employees Union, its 
Executive dominated by clerical unionists who mostly accepted
1. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 10th June 1971.
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the British model of apolitical unionism and favoured a policy 
of peaceful negotiation rather than direct action in the settle­
ment of grievances. This policy proved markedly ineffective and, 
to many of the skilled worker rank-and-file, their officials 
seemed insufficiently concerned, urgent or courageous in their 
handling of grievances.
It was in this situation that Pobee Biney began to lead 
groups of aggrieved employees, skilled and unskilled, irrespective 
of their job category and proper channel of representation, to 
impromptu interviews with foremen and other supervisors to press 
for redress. He held no official Executive rank in the Union at 
this time: in 1945-49, he was merely Takoradi branch represent­
ative for the enginemen on the Working Committee, (with the 
exception of a brief period in 1946 when he stood in as Interim 
President on the retirement of S. Wood). But he is remembered 
as having been almost invariably successful in gaining some 
redressive action. His main resource for this role seems to 
have consisted simply of his personal qualities of persistence 
and "courage". He scorned red-tape and other (as he saw them) 
'delaying tactics1 of Management, and was able to over-awe even 
senior executives with "his huge magical frame" (Biney stood 
6 ft. 3 ins. tall and was extremely muscular). He was in a 
sense a bully, but a highly idealistic one.
"Soon his fame spread far and near and aggrieved 
railway employees would mob him during the brief 
spell his shunting engine stood in steam. They 
would state their grievances to him in great detail 
and retire, highly optimistic that their petition 
was in capable hands. Or they would travel to his 
residence from the farthest railway station to 
present their case and seek advice." 1
1. F. Wudu, op.cit., p.5.
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Apparently, these petitioners included unskilled and 
clerical as well as the skilled workers.
On the basis of this approachability and success, and 
his "stirring speeches at mass meetings, in which he advocated 
the correction of injustices merely from an impelling desire to 
see such injustices righted",  ^Biney*s stature was such as to 
enable him to intervene decisively in the strike of 1947. The 
skilled and unskilled workers had still not received the benefits 
promised them in 1941 and were feeling the sharp pinch of infla­
tion. Nevertheless, the Executive proved slow and shy to press 
their case. By February 1947, we are informed, "a rift is 
developing between the labouring and clerical classes, the 
former accusing the latter of resting content because of the
awards which they have gained under the recommendation of the
2
Han-agin Commission11. In October, the Executive was pressur­
ised into threatening strike action, and, on the 22nd, 5,900 
workers - the total skilled and unskilled labour force - went 
on strike.
After two days, the Provincial Council of Chiefs sent 
a delegation to Sekondi to request that the strikers return to 
work while negotiations were carried on. At a mass meeting, the 
Union President, A. K. de Veer, declared himself in favour of the 
Chiefs* suggestion. Biney stood up and expressed his contempt 
for such a back-down, attacking the Chiefs ("our little gods of 
times past, now become messenger-boys of the Colonial Govern-
3
ment") for attempting to interfere. On a virtually unanimous 
vote, the strike continued for thirteen more days. The official 
Executive was further embarrassed when, again largely at Biney* s 
instigation, the rank-and-file rejected the first draft
1. Ibid., p.6.
2. RAA, Burden to Korsah Committee, 20th February 1947.
3. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 10th June 1971.
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communique produced after negotiations with a Government-
appointed Commission, and they were compelled to return and
1
fight for certain amendments.
In spite of this demonstration of his substantive 
leadership of the rank-and-file, Biney was not elected to the 
Union Executive, until in 1949 the Enginemen broke away yet 
again, and Biney became President of the Railway Enginemen* s 
Union. (In the same year, he was also elected Vice-President 
of the Gold Coast TUC). There were two main reasons for his 
failure to achieve executive status. The Executive was selec­
ted by delegates from the various branches at the annual Con­
ference, and few of the disproportionately high number of 
clerical delegates admired Biney*s personality or ideological 
tendencies. Some of the skilled worker representatives, too, 
were secretly not enamoured of Biney*s somewhat demagogic 
behaviour, involving frequent improper excursions into their 
official territory of jurisdiction. Secondly, rank-and-file 
pressure for Biney*s election as President was reduced by 
general recognition of his possession of skills more suitable 
to the role of ‘leader in times of crisis* than the performance 
of continuous administrative functions.
Nevertheless, his reputation continued to grow with 
his leadership of demonstrations of discontent not only within 
the area of Management-Worker relations, but also in the wider 
field of Government-Community politics. An interesting example 
of this occurred in early 1949 during the funeral of an ex­
railway worker, a Mr. Banka. Several hundred workers were 
participating in the customary procession from Location to 
Sekondi city centre. In the words of one of them:
1. The Korsah Committee eventually awarded wage increases 
of some 50 per cent to Government manual workers.
See Table 2.1.
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"A white man came speeding along in his car with 
no intention of slowing down for the procession.
Pobee jumped in front and stopped the car and beat 
on it, telling him to show due respect. Some of us 
joined in. Unknown to us he was a Chief of Police.
He instructed his force to come and arrest the 
leaders in the procession. When we were brought to 
Court, we were fined £15 by the Magistrate, but 
Pobee Biney told us not to pay. We were not to pay 
the Government anything because we were in the right 
and we had the solidarity of the workers behind us. 
Realising this, the Government first reduced the
fine, and later dropped it altogether. This was a
great victory for Pobee.'1 1
During 1948-49, Biney organised several rallies in 
Sekondi to communicate his radical nationalism to a wider 
audience. Hundreds of railway workers would ride into Sekondi 
on a hi-jacked train, and disperse throughout the city urging 
people to come and attend the rally, thus expressing in practical 
form Biney's belief in the political vanguard role of the organ­
ised, enlightened workers. Biney's rhetorical skill is fre­
quently described in similar terns to those of Nkrumah: "We
always felt he was simply revealing our own thoughts and needs
to us. It was a though he was able to penetrate our conscious-
2ness and extract out of it the feeling of solidarity."
The ideology he communicated might best be termed 
"African Populism". He attacked the evils of Colonialism on
the grounds not only of economic exploitation but also of its
destructive effect on the traditional culture and social 
relations, the sense of brotherhood of the Ghanaian people.
The true "people" he defined as "the common people", as distinct 
from the elite of lawyers, civil servants, and other collabor­
ators with the Colonial regime. He derided the letter's cultural
1. Interview with J. K. Baaku, 21st July 1971.
2. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 10th June 1971.
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separatism, their "White African" dress and manners. He was
therefore strongly opposed to the United Gold Coast Convention
and its leadership of "lawyers who would not risk their wigs
for the sake of the common man". Accordingly, he was totally
unsympathetic to the view, prevalent among many Railway Union
and TUG officials in 1949-50, that staging a strike in support
2
of "Positive Action" would be to confuse trade unionism with 
party politics and to misrepresent those workers, mainly clerical 
staff, who favoured the U.G.C.C. rather than the C.P.P.
This did not mean that Biney wished to tie the Ghanaian 
labour movement to unconditional support of Nkrumah's Convention 
People's Party. He emphasised in his speeches the idea that the 
railway workers were fighting for a new, independent and more 
just society, not for the Convention People's Party as such. It 
is likely that he was already aware of the divergence between 
the skilled railway workers * aims (as he conceived them), and 
those of many leading members of the C.P.P. Accordingly, his 
notion of the vanguard vote of the organised, enlightened workers 
in leading the Ghanaian people to Independence involved the cor­
ollary that they should continue to act thereafter as defenders 
of the nationalist movement's aims, checking degenerative 
tendencies in the party-become-government. Admittedly, this 
implication became far more clear to the rank-and-file from 
Biney's speeches and behaviour after the "Positive Action" 
strike and the C.P.P.'s accession to a share of government 
power. In 1949-50, the issue of party commitment was not 
squarely faced. Nevertheless, it is the "conditional" nature
1. Interview with Isaac Adjey, railway artisan, 14th July 
1971.
2. For several months in 1949-50, Nkrumah advocated a pol­
itical strategy known as "Positive Action" in support of 
his demand for "Self-Government Now". This meant resort 
to boycotts, strikes and other forms of civil disobedience 
on the pattern of Ghandi's politics of non-violent protest.
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of railway worker support for the C.P.P. which deserves emphasis 
even during this early period.
In retrospect, it might seem strange that Biney was at 
all prepared to back the C.P.P., and the melange of social forces 
it represented. There was talk in 1949 amongst the radical rail­
way unionists of forming a separate "Labour Party" but this was 
rejected as being unrealistic.  ^ Of course, the full extent 
of Nkrumah1s willingness to compromise with the colonial 
authorities and the right-wing of his own party, could not have 
been apparent at this time. Nor could the weakness of the 
U.G.C.C. challenge have been fully anticipated. A further con­
sideration might have inclined Biney to throw his weight behind 
Nkrumah. It is possible that Turkson Ocran, personal secretary to 
Nkrumah for a time, and a close ideological associate of Biney, 
was influential in persuading the latter of Nkrumah*s sincere 
intention to back the radicals in the trade union movement.
Ocran, we shall see, was himself to pay dearly for so over- 
optimistic an assessment.
In any case, the immediate problem for Biney and the 
radicals in 1948-49 was to secure control of the Railway Union 
and the TUC. Of crucial importance here was Biney*s success in 
developing a close friendship and ideological accord with Frank 
Woode, himself a clerical unionist, and General Secretary of 
both organisations in 1947-49. The ascendancy which Biney*s 
political line had achieved on the Railway Union Executive by 
April 1949 (illustrated in the following communique) was due in 
considerable measure to Woode*s support and his influence with 
the clerical unionists:
1. RUA, Railway Union Working Committee Minutes, 3rd February 
1949; and Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 17th July 1971.
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"This Union wants it to be resolved at the Conference 
that the Trade Union Congress must force Government 
to reduce inflation. If the Government fails, the 
working class will back any Government who accepts 
this on principle. If the government-to-be (self- 
government) indicates better living for the working 
classes, there should be no alternative but to back 
it.
A responsible Government officer recently said that 
Trade Unions must not go into politics. This in our 
opinion is a deliberate attempt to make Trade Unions 
in West Africa impotent. Instances can be quoted 
from the West Indies where labour and politics have 
shorn a better way to the world.
We cannot stand out of politics. Our demand can 
serve as an avenue to lay pressure on the Govern­
ment in our legitimate demand for self rule.
Your faithful Brother Secretary,
F. Woode, " 1
By 1949, the position of the political unionists had 
also been strengthened on the TUC Executive Council in conse- 
quence of the "Big Six" episode. In response to the Accra 
riots of 28th-29th February 1948, the Colonial Government 
arrested six leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention.
Frank Woode, General Secretary, convened an emergency session 
of the TUC Executive which resolved to call a General Strike 
unless the detainees were released within three days. In sub­
sequent discussions with the Government, C. W. Techie-Menson, 
President of the TUC, and leader of the non-political unionists, 
accepted the Government's explanation for the arrests, and its
1. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Resolutions, 23rd 
April 1949,
2. The "Big Six" were: Dr. J, B. Danquah, Messrs. Kwame 
Nkrumah, William Ofori-Attah, Obetsebi Lamptey,
Ako Adjei, and Akufo-Addo.
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assurances that the Six would be released on the arrival of a 
Commission of Enquiry from Britain. He agreed to call off the 
strike, and Woode and the other militants, though unconvinced 
felt bound to demonstrate solidarity. Shortly afterwards, how­
ever, they made such an issue of Techie-Menson* s unrepresent­
ative leadership that he was forced to resign from the Presid- 
1
ency. This facilitated the election of Pobee Biney as Vice- 
President and Anthony Woode as General Secretary of the TUC 
in August of the same year.
Anthony Woode (no relation to Frank Woode), was just 
23 years old at this time. He had risen to sudden prominence 
in the trade union movement through his highly successful 
leadership of the Oil Storage Workers of Takoradi, gaining 
important benefits for his membership through aggressive bargain­
ing. He held radical nationalist views of similar complexion to 
Biney*s, and the two became close friends. Woode was also a 
good friend of Turkson Ocran. These three met regularly in 
Sekondi during 1949 to discuss and co-ordinate plans for a 
general strike, with Ocran acting as intermediary between 
Nkrumah on the one hand, and Biney and Woode on the other.
In spite of the predominance of radical nationalist 
views in both Railway Union and TUC Executives in 1949-50, anti­
political attitudes had not been totally overcome, and united 
support for an overtly political general strike could not be 
anticipated from either Executive. At the TUC level, the Mine- 
workers Union, most importantly, refused to be won over. Within 
the Railway Union, the President himself, J. C. Vandyck (who was 
also President of the TUC but delegated most of his duties to 
Biney), perhaps recalling his incarceration in 1941-42, was
1. For further details, see E. Cowan, op.cit. p.25.
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unprepared for such dangerous action as Biney was proposing,
1and resigned rather than involve himself in it. When the 
time came, therefore, Biney and Woode concentrated their efforts 
on the railwayworleers and other workers in Sekondi-Takoradi, and 
called the strike without even consulting the other members of 
the Executive or gaining formal approval at a mass-meeting.
The excuse for a general strike (and it was really little
more than that) came with the Governments dismissal of some 60
Meteorological Department workers for staging an illegal strike
in October 1949. Anthony Woode forwarded a telegram to the
Government on 13th November, protesting the dismissals, and
threatening general strike action. It seems probable that this
threat was conceived by most members of the TUC Executive as an
indication of concern rather than a serious expression of intent.
Biney and Woode had no intention of backing down, however, and,
at a meeting with the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs on 6th
January 1950, rather raised their demands to include ,f(a) the
withdrawal of the government circular concerning the political
activities of civil servants”, and "(b) the immediate granting
2
of Dominion status". On 6th January Pobee Biney announced a 
General Strike to start at midnight and called out the railway 
workers. On 8th January, Nkrumah announced the commencement of 
his "Positive Action" campaign.
There is evidence to support the railway workers’ con­
tention that Nkrumah was reluctant to go ahead with "Positive 
Action" but found his hand forced by Biney and Woode.
Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, Governor of the Gold Coast at the 
time, has written:
1. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 17th July 1971.
2, Cited in E. Cowan, op.cit., p.48.
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"The party leaders had been officially informed and 
were well aware that they had a perfectly constitut­
ional way of achieving power and gaining their 
objective, if their candidates at the forthcoming 
election were returned. I have good reason to 
believe that some at least of the party leaders 
would have preferred not to resort to "positive 
action" but to await the results of the general 
election, of the outcome of which they were fairly 
confident. But they found themselves enmeshed in 
the costs of their own propaganda. The tail wagged 
the dog...." 1
Reginald Saloway, the Colonial Secretary, has been even 
more explicit:
"Nkrumah publicly called off 'Positive Action* (and) 
tried hard to get the Trades Union Congress to call 
off the general strike, but the TUC no longer had any 
control over the wild men. (Moreover) Dr. Danquah 
taunted Nkrumah with having sold himself to the 
Colonial Secretary and thus infuriated the rank and 
file of the C.P.P. who forced Nkrumah to retract." 2
Railwayworker participation in the strike was virtually 
one hundred per cent solid and lasted until 20th January. Some 
intimidation was certainly used - Biney had groups of his most 
enthusiastic supporters stationed along all routes to the Rail­
way work centres in Sekondi-Takoradi to dissuade would be strike­
breakers, mostly clerical staff, from going to work. But the 
extent of spontaneous support for the strike was impressive. 
Workers in most parts of the country, on the other hand, part­
icipated for only a few days, and the mineworkers did not come 
out at all.
1. Charles Arden-Clarke, "Eight Years of Transition in Ghana11, 
in African Affairs, Vol.57, No.226, (Jan. 1958), p.32.
2. R. Saloway, "The New Gold Coast", in International Affairs 
Vol.32, No. 4, (Oct. 1955), p.471.
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Ideology and Significance of the 1Positive Action1 Strike,
The reasons for this difference have already been out- 
lined. The Railwayworkers* concentration in Selcondi-Takoradi, 
the characteristics and especial sense of grievance of the 
skilled workers, their direct relationship to Government as 
employer, all made for naturally strong, militant, and, in a 
sense, inevitably political, trade unionism. In addition,
Biney developed a large measure of personal control over the 
rank-and-file on the basis of his embodiment, in extreme and 
idealistic form, of the values of this militant union culture: 
and then asserted this control to stage the Positive Action 
Strike.
One further factor deserves brief mention here, though 
it will receive more detailed consideration in subsequent chap­
ters. Biney emphasised that, in challenging the Government, 
the railway workers were not just asserting their particular 
interests: they were rather acting as the vanguard, or the
'spokesmen of the people'. This notion was readily accepted 
by the skilled workers, and the 'heroic' element in such a 
self-image helps explain their determined resistance in the 
face of Government threats of reprisals. It is worth noting 
the situational considerations which lent tenability and wide 
currency to such a conception. Unlike the mineworkers, rela­
tively isolated in their rural locations, the railway workers 
lived of course fairly centrally in a large city, closely in 
touch with other discontented, disadvantaged groups (see Map 2).
In a city owing its growth almost entirely to the Railway and 
Harbour installations, the railway and harbour workers were, in 
a sense, the economic centre of the community. With the except­
ion of some of the clerical workers, they were also socially 
and culturally very much a part of the masses, or 'common people'.
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In contrast to most of the ‘common people', however, they 
possessed the organisation and strategic power to make a ser- 
ious impact on government. It was easy to conclude that they 
had almost a communal duty to assert this power.
There was, therefore, an important idealistic dimension 
to railway workers militancy. This dimension is perhaps most 
accurately characterised as "populist" in the sense in which 
Peter Worsley uses the term. That is to say, " 'Populism* 
is best conceived as a style of popular participation rather 
than a systematic ideology", but one involving "a high valuation 
of the virtues and culture of the uncorrupted, simple, common
folk, and a converse distrust of the wealthy, over-educated ....
2
and fundamentally corrupt urban elite." The social structure 
is conceived dualistically in terms of an Elite-Mass division 
and opposition. Often, populism is a form or style of national­
ism, in which the native elite are seen as the stooges of an 
external imperialist power.
Worsley's description of the typical structure of leader' 
follower relations in a populist movement is clearly applicable 
to the case of the railway workers and Nkrumah. The populist 
leader is generally a "charismatic" figure, and often charac­
terised by a "strong man" image and by acceptance of violence 
as a legitimate means of effecting political change. On assump­
tion of power, however, the leader is likely to be faced with 
the familiar problem, but in especially acute form, of "instit­
utionalising" a new, and in some ways, inevitably disappointing 
order. Increasing separation of leadership from rank-and-file 
and attempts to defuse the movement and substitute control for
1, Peter Worsley, "The Concept of Populism" in G. Ionescu and
E. Gellner (eds.), Populism, its meaning and national 
characteristics, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970),
pp.212-50.
2. Ibid., pp.243-44.
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orderly development are likely to be seen as a "revisionist" 
betrayal. This is particularly the case in view of the vague­
ness and/or diversity of the movement’s positive policy aims.
This provides important insights into the subsequent 
process of railway worker disillusionment with the Nkrumah 
regime. But, not to anticipate this process excessively, the 
important point here is that after the 1950 "Positive Action" 
strike, the railway workers naturally felt they had a right to 
expect much of the Nkrumah regime. This had, after all, cost 
them dearly. The Colonial Government declared a state of 
emergency and arrested a number of trade union leaders, includ­
ing Biney and Woode, as well as Nkrumah and several other C.P.P. 
leaders. These were brought before the courts, convicted, and 
sentenced, Biney to six months* imprisonment, Nkrumah to one 
year on each of three separate counts. All Government employees 
participating in the strike were dismissed and later re-employed 
only on conditions which entailed their losing long-service 
increment and other benefits. Understandably, many workers lost 
interest in trade union participation for several years to come, 
the TUC collapsed, and most of its constituent unions became 
moribund.
On the other hand, the General Strike was successful in 
intensifying determination for political emancipation in the 
country as a whole, in stirring the Colonial Government to 
more progressive policies, and so in hastening the C.P.P.’s 
accession to power. During 1950, the Coussey Constitution was 
formulated, giving Ghanaians a measure of self-government, and 
arrangements were made for a general election to be held in 
February 1951. At this election, the C.P.P. was successful in 
winning 34 out of 38 seats in the Legislative Assembly, and 
Nkrumah was released from detention to become leader of Govern­
ment Business.
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The beginnings of a new social order were therefore in 
sight, and the leaders and participants in the 'Positive Action1 
strike had high expectations of it. They expected, firstly, 
some recognition of their own contribution to the Nationalist 
cause, some reward for services rendered. Apart from individual 
rewards, this meant aiding the revival of the trade union move­
ment and according it an important role in the political life 
of the country. Nhile the railway workers expected a strong 
trade union movement to bring them benefits, and anticipated 
that their representatives would play a leading role in it, this 
was not desired out of purely selfish motivations. The aim of 
their nationalist participation had not been simply their own 
economic advancement, certainly not if this meant maintaining 
the existing socio-economic and political structure and simply 
stepping into the white man's shoes. The new order should be 
more egalitarian, more brotherly than that of the past: it
should be government in the interests of the common man. The 
political role of the trade union movement should be directed 
to ensuring that such a new order was in fact institutionalised.
//(
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CHAPTER THREE.
THE RAILWAYWORKERS1 RESPONSE TO C.P.P. SOCIALISM
In the ’Positive Action’ Strike of January 1950 the 
Selcondi-Takoradi railway and harbour workers demonstrated their 
enthusiastic support for Nkrumah*s nationalist campaign. In 
September 1961, they staged a seventeen-day strike against the 
Nkrumah Government's July Budget, a strike in which, according to 
St. Clair Drake (who was present at the time), "the Government 
saw its very existence implicitly challenged”, and which "drastic 
ally altered the entire character of political activity in 
Ghana".  ^ This latter strike action, while certainly motivated 
in part by economic grievances - most obviously, opposition to 
the Budget proposals for a Property Tax and a Compulsory Savings 
Scheme - was also undoubtedly informed by wider political motiv­
ations. It was not the action of an economically desperate 
working class. The most reliable statistics available suggest
1. St. Clair Drake and L. A. Lacy, "Government versus the
Unions: The Sekondi-Takoradi Strike, 1961", in G. Carter
(ed.), Politics in Africa: 7 Cases, (New York: Ilarcourt, 
Brace and World Inc., 1966), pp.67-118. Citations, p.115.
I am indebted to this excellent article for arousing my 
initial interest in Railway Union politics, and for the 
detailed account of the general economic and political 
background to the strike which it provides. It will be 
apparent to the reader, however, that my account differs 
from theirs in focus, conceptualisation, and interpretation 
Whereas St. Clair Drake and Lacy see the 1961 strike, and 
Railway Unionism more generally, as an instance of "conven­
tional trade union practice" informed by "an economist 
ideology" (p.116), my own research led me to emphasise the 
overtly political, 'populist', strain in railway worker 
ideology, and the close interrelationship of railway 
worker politics with the community structure and politics 
of Sekondi-Takoradi.
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that the skilled and unskilled workers enjoyed substantially 
improved living standards by 1961 relative to a decade earlier. 
Yet the staging of an illegal strike in so determined a manner, 
in opposition moreover to measures which the Government had 
made clear it considered essential to the achievement of its 
major objectives, and in what was politically an extremely 
sensitive moment - with Nkrumah out of the country visiting 
the Eastern Communist bloc, and widespread popular unrest in 
Ghana at the Budget*s austerity measures - these considerations 
suggest that, at the very least, the 1961 strike expressed a 
far-reaching disillusionment with the Nkrumah regime.
This opposition, it should be remembered, came from the 
former vanguard supporters of Nkrumah. If political allegiance 
in the Ghanaian nationalist movement entailed more than a purely 
immediate economic alliance, then the reasons for the railway 
workers* disillusionment merit extensive consideration. What, 
then, were the sources and nature of this disillusionment, and, 
in more positive terms, the aims, explicit or implicit, of the 
strikers?
As loan Davies has suggested, the 1961 strike was in 
part the reaction of an old established union - the Railway 
Union - against the takeover of the labour movement by C.P.P. 
bureaucrats with little or no supporting-base in the working 
rank-and-file.  ^ The previous chapter described the leading 
role played by the Sekondi-Takoradi railway and harbour workers 
in the pre-Independence development of a Ghanaian trade union 
movement. Between 1950 and 1961, the railwayworkers* leaders,
1. loan Davies, op.cit., p.109.
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and the role they conceived the labour movement should play in 
an independent Ghana, were both displaced by the dominance of 
C.P.P, officials in a Tnew structure* modelled on a very differ­
ent conception of *the proper role of labour*. In the second 
half of this chapter, it is intended to trace the development 
of this struggle between the Sekondi-Takoradi rank-and-file 
leadership and the C.P.P. loyalists, and to show that the 1961 
strike was primarily an episode - the * showdown* in fact - in 
this conflict.
But it would be mistaken to confuse the opposition of 
the Sekondi-Takoradi railwayworkers to the *new structure* with 
that of other * old-established* unions such as the Mines-worlcers 
Union or the United African Company Employees Union. The latter*s 
leaders were primarily concerned to defend the autonomy of their 
unions as essentially *consumptionist*, apolitical organisations. 
The railwayworkers of Sekondi-Takoradi rather adhered to a model 
which was openly political but ’oppositional-reformist*, in 
contrast to the *loyalist*, control-oriented model of the C.P.P. 
unionists. This conception informed their conflict with the 
C.P.P. unionists in the TUC in 1950-61 - though not, of course, 
in a social vacuum, or for purely historical reasons. Certainly 
the railway workers of Sekondi-Takoradi had reason to expect 
more from Independence than most other social groups. But they 
were also especially prone to disillusionment with the increas­
ingly oligarchical and autocratic nature of the C.P.P. regime 
for a number of structural reasons. The development of such 
tendencies within the TUC itself was, from this perspective, 
especially staunchly opposed but only a part of the matter. 
Obviously this was the politico-economic structure which most 
directly affected and involved the railwayworkers. But, in 
addition, it was Pobee Biney*s and his followers* conception 
that the trade union movement should be especially concerned to 
check such degenerative tendencies in the political system as 
a whole. Accordingly, some of the strike leaders went so far
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as to threaten to foribly disband Parliament. If this general 
notion of asserting the accountability of government was indeed 
the subjective significance of the 1961 strike action, then it 
is far easier to understand why the skilled railway and harbour 
workers, although formally protesting measures which would dir­
ectly affect only themselves and the higher-paid workers, con­
ceived themselves as acting f,on behalf of the people". As we 
shall see, they did in fact receive the active and/or moral 
support of virtually all the inhabitants of Selcondi-Takoradi - 
unskilled workers who would not be directly affected by the 
Budget measures, the market women, and even many of the unem­
ployed. Workers in other parts of the country, including the 
skilled railwayworkers of Accra and the ’up-country* branches 
participated, if at all, for only a day or two.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the struggle waged 
by the railway workers for control of the trade union movement 
in 1950-61, it is necessary, therefore, to consider those struc­
tural factors which created such intense and widespread local 
support for their efforts. Only then, is it possible to apprec­
iate the full range of issues which this struggle came to involve. 
These are two main factors to be considered here : the nature of 
Sekondi-Takoradi as a community together with the position occ­
upied by the railway workers within it : and, secondly, the 
development among the * common people* of Sekondi-Takoradi in 
general of a sense of pronounced social distance from, and 
economic exploitation by, the Accra-based C.P.P. elite.
Sekondi-Takoradi; A Working-Class Community.
Sekondi-Takoradi was (and remains) a predominantly 
working-class city (i.e. populated largely by * lower-paid* 
workers), in which most of the inhabitants were affected,
k
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directly or indirectly, by the level of real wages for these 
workers and hence by the politics and performance of the TUC.
Unlike Accra (Ghana’s administrative centre) and Kumasi 
(the trading centre), the city of Sekondi-Takoradi owes its 
growth almost entirely to industrial development, and more 
particularly to the location there of the Railway Workshops 
and the Harbour. The 1955 Household Budget Survey estimated 
that 90 per cent of earnings in Sekondi-Takoradi came from wage- 
employment, compared to 67 per cent for Accra and 22 per cent 
for Kumasi (see Table 3.2). In 1961, the skilled and unskilled 
workers employed in the Railway and Harbour installations con­
stituted approximately one quarter of the city’s total male 
labour force of 43,000. Another quarter were employed as skilled 
or unskilled manual workers by the City Council, the Government 
Departments (e.g. Public Works, Posts and Telecommunications) the
Shipping Companies, or in one of the several medium-sized manu-
1
facturing industries located there.
Taking into account also the junior clerical workers, this
means that approximately two-thirds of the total male labour
force were in the lower-paid worker category, earning less than
2
N05O per month. Approximately 12 per cent were unemployed.
1. In 1971, there were about fifteen large or medium-sized 
firms in Sekondi-Takoradi, manufacturing cigarettes, cocoa­
butter, paper products, minerals, furniture, household 
utensils, cement blocks, and boats.
2. The term, ’’lower-paid workers”, is used throughout this 
study to refer to those earning less than N$50 per month as 
at 1971 - i.e. all unskilled workers, skilled workers (with 
the exception of their Foremen and a few of the most senior 
amongst them), and junior clerical workers. This categor­
isation clearly comprises nearly all those who, in Britain, 
would normally be termed simply 'workers' or 'the working 
class', but, in view of the more vague and ambiguous usage 
of these terms in Ghanaian discourse, it was considered 
necessary to be more explicit. It is worth noting, however, 
that virtually all the railway unionists interviewed in 
1971 were agreed in identifying 'the workers' in accordance 
with this categorisation.
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The proportion of middle-class or elite elements was very small, 
(see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Composition of the Sekondi-Takoradi adult male 
labour force, I960 (percentages).
Employed a 78
Professional, technical 4
Managerial, administrative 2
Clerical 14
Sales 6
Farmers, fishermen 7
Transport, communications 
Craftsmen and production
12
process workers 25
Labourers and longshoremen 21
Service and sport ^ 9
Employers and self-employed 20
N 42, 691
Source: 1960 Population Census of Ghana, Special Report A.
3.
Those who did any work for pay or profit during 
the month preceding the census.
These are all included in the occupational 
categories above.
This occupational structure, with a much higher pre­
ponderance of lower-paid workers than in Accra or Kumasi, was 
reflected in the difference in average earnings between the 
three cities. In 1955, average earnings in Sekondi-Takoradi 
were £11.10 (or N028) per month, compared to £16.8 (or N$39) 
for Accra and £17.18 (or N#42) for Kumasi (see Table 3.2).
Sekondi-Takoradi was then a relatively poor urban 
community, dominated both numerically and in terms of general 
ethos, by lower-paid manual workers. Moreover, this labour 
force was relatively stable - a high proportion of workers 
were committed to urban wage-employment as a relatively perm­
anent occupation rather than short-term migrants.
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Table 3.2 Average Earnings and Expenditure in Ghana's
Three Cities.
Average
Family
Size
Average
Earnings
Wages as 
% of 
Earnings
Average
Monthly
Expenditure
Sekondi-
Takoradi
(1955) 3.98 £11.10 90 £12.9
Accra (1953) 4.24 £16.8 67 £15.24
Kumasi (1955) 4.15 £17.18 22 £14.2
Source : Gold Coast, Office of the Government Statistician
Sekondi-Takoradi Survey of Population and Household Budgets, 
1955, Statistical and Economic Papers No.4.
According to Margaret Peil's survey, 69 per cent of
Sekondi-Takoradi workers planned to stay in their jobs for at
least 3 years, compared to 36 per cent for Accra, or 43 per
cent for Kumasi: and almost as many in fact stayed for as long
as 5 years. Job stability amongst the skilled railway and
harbour workers was even higher than this in 1971, with 73 per
cent having been in their jobs for more than 5 years and 46 per
2cent for more than ten. These factors made for the develop­
ment in Sekondi-Takoradi of a strong sense of working-class 
identity and solidarity, stronger, most probably, than could 
be found in any other West African city. Even the casual workers, 
who in most countries and strike situations display little 
solidarity and are often cast as 'blacklegs', have in Sekondi- 
Takoradi generally been concerned to show solidarity with their 
'brothers' in direct actions. Maxwell was a casual labourer in
1. Margaret Peil, The Ghanaian Factory Worker: Industrial
Man in Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1972), pp.101-3.
2. Questionnaire Survey conducted by the writer. For details, 
see Chapter Seven.
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the Docks in 1961:
"Oh, yes, I joined in the strike and demonstrations.
I even carried a placard and led my fellow-workers. 
After all, the railwayworkers are my brothers, and 
we are all here for the same reason, to earn a liv­
ing wage, and we have to unite to tell the Govern­
ment what it should be doing to help us." 1
More generally, the predominantly working-class com­
position and ethos of Sekondi-Takoradi tended to foster the 
strong development of 'proletarian* attitudes - anti-elitist, 
anti-corruption, and anti-authoritarian - which were likely to 
become prevalent among lower-paid workers generally (i.e. in 
other cities) as correlates of their situation in the national 
politico-economy, but whose growth and articulation would be 
inhibited^ in less congenial environments.
Yet this ’working-class* identity was often conceived, 
especially by the skilled railwayworkers, not in terms of "the 
working-class versus employers" but rather of "the common people 
versus the big men in Government". As one railway artisan des­
cribed the background to the 1961 strike, "Us poor common people 
we were being cheated by those big men in Accra, and anyone who 
tried to speak up for us was detained or hounded out of the 
Party". The notion of acting as "the spokesmen of the common 
people" or "the eyes and ears of society" was no doubt in part 
conceived by the railwayworkers to strengthen their claim to 
represent a large body of opinion, and reflected their awareness 
of the minority and relatively privileged position of urban wage 
earners in the larger national society. But, judging from the
1. Interview with Maxwell Annobil, harbour-worker, 19th 
October 1971.
2. Interview with F. Awortwi, railway artisan, 29th August 
1971.
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support they received from other occupational groups in the 
1961 strike, this was not mere rhetoric. In so predominantly 
a working-class community, the unemployed looked largely to 
their worker fathers and brothers for assistance, and were 
therefore directly dependent on the workers* financial capacity 
to perform this social welfare function. Similarly, the market 
women and the small businessmen relied very largely on the trade 
of the workers, and therefore had an indirect, but clearly per­
ceived, interest in the lower-paid workers1 financial prosperity 
and in the politics of the TUC.
This sense of common interest was not, however, simply 
a matter of other local groups recognising their dependence on 
the railway workers. The growing hostility of the railway work­
ers to the C.P.P. elite was fuelled by resentment at abuses of 
power which hurt other sections of the ’masses* as much as them­
selves. And, since the railway artisans identified with Sekondi- 
Takoradi as a relatively permanent * second home*, they shared 
the general sense of disillusionment of the *common people* of 
that city with the conduct of C.P.P. officials and the lack of 
benefits accruing to the city (and the Gentral and Western 
Regions more generally) from the attainment of Independence.
Communal Grievances and the Elite-Mass Gap.
In the relatively small and poor urban community of 
Sekondi-Takoradi, the corruption and high living of C.P.P. 
officials was both highly visible and particularly provocative 
to the ordinary resident. A. Y. Anlcomah, a leading organiser 
of the 1961 strike, though earlier an enthusiastic supporter of 
Nkrumah and **his sugar-coated words”, described the process of 
his own disillusionment in terms similar to those used by nearly 
all railway worker interviewees:
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"We had union leaders imposed on us, men like
H. W. Mensah (Regional TUC General Secretary) 
with no trade union background. We heard they 
were buying Borgward cars with our money. They 
tried to persuade us the TUC was doing a good 
thing by establishing these shops for the workers, 
but the leaders took things on credit and never 
paid, so the shops had to close down. And they 
went with other peoplefs wives. Really, there was 
so much corruption and wife-stealing.
"Then there were the Brigade Officers coming home 
with cars loaded with foodstuffs, the Ghana women • 
held big, big parties every Saturday, and Young 
Pioneers were being flown to Russia for courses 
and indoctrination. Then rumours about corruption 
in the City Council started coming out through some 
of the junior officers. But the worst people were 
the Farmers* Council leaders. They would come into 
Takoradi and throw their money around in the bars, 
boasting about how they had cheated our brothers 
and sisters in the rural areas. This was too 
much.'9 1
One of the areas in which C.P.P. corruption most directly 
hurt the interests of the railway workers was that of housing. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the population of Sekondi-Takoradi almost 
doubled, (rising from 44 thousand to over 75 thousand), thereby 
exacerbating a serious housing shortage which dated back to the 
early part of the century. In 1912, the then Railway General 
Manager wrote that,
"Seccondee is an upstart town, practically the 
creation of the railway, and an ever-expanding 
institution requires constant additions to the 
staff. Houses are now almost impossible for new 
men to find, rents are exorbitant, and incident­
ally the cost of living is very h i g h  The
men live all over the place in wretched conditions." 2
1. Interview with A. Y. Ankomah, 15th August 1971.
2. Quoted by R. B. Davison, "The Story of the Gold Coast 
Railway", West Africa, (1956), p.587.
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Later, two railway villages were built, one at Ketan (on the
outskirts of Sekondi) and the other near the centre of Takoradi,
but these at no time provided accommodation for more than one
third of the railway employees. Busia's Social Survey of 1950
gave a vivid picture of the overcrowding which still persisted 
1
there , and the 1955 Survey revealed little improvement, with
an average of 3.3 families and 11.8 persons occupying each house.
In 1952, Takoradi landlords and tenants were complaining that a
law forbidding tenants to live in kitchens would result in thous-
2ands of people being homeless. Two years later, the Town 
Council, under the chairmanship of the popular I. K. Kumah 
(an ex-harbour worker and President of the Ghana Federation of 
Trade Unions), announced plans to build two housing estates, 
consisting of some 800 houses in all ("in the fbourjois* style" - 
i.e. two rooms and a hall), "to provide fitting accommodation for
3
our workers and their families". Soon after completion, how­
ever, these houses were taken over for allocation and adminis­
tration by the National Housing Corporation which, as the 1966 
Commission of Enquiry into its affairs clearly showed, proceeded 
to allocate them to local officials of the various C.P.P. wings 
and organisations, or those who could afford the bribes demanded 
by Corporation officials (which certainly did not include the
lower-paid workers), or even in some cases to Accra-based M.P.s
4and their girl-friends. In consequence the lower-paid workers
1. K. A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, 
(Accra: Government Printer, 1950), pp.31-50.
2. Ashanti Pioneer, 26th July 1952, p.6.
3. Daily Graphic, 5th March 1954, p.3.
4. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the
National Housing Corporation, (Accra: Government Printer, 
1967).
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of Sekondi-Takoradi found the housing situation deteriorating 
rather than improved, and were forced either to pay exorbitant 
rates for small rooms, or else to band together with relatives 
or friends to build or rent a house to accommodate several fam­
ilies .
Closely related to such abuse of power was a steady 
diminution in the channels of mass communication with the Gov­
ernment, both central and local. Indeed, it was this factor, 
the people of Sekondi-Takoradi*s lack of access to Government 
patronage or to channels for making their sense of deprivation 
known, rather than the extensiveness of bureaucratic irregul­
arity itself, which might be held to account for their especial 
sensitivity to the evils of corruption. The most important issue 
for the railway workers in this respect was the connection per­
ceived between the corruption of top officials and the growing 
disregard for democratic processes within the TUC. But the 
significance of this phenomenon was lent greater urgency and 
wider relevance by the operation of similar tendencies in other 
institutional areas.
The City Councillors, originally local people pushed 
forward as local representatives, became increasingly unapproach­
able and irresponsive to local needs. There was no change in 
the composition of the City Council between 1954 and 1960 with 
the exception of four new members out of a total of twenty-one 
in the 1959-59 elections. This certainly did not reflect satis­
faction with the representation the electorate were receiving. 
There were several instances of councillors* being dragged out 
of their houses at night by the local * young men* to "explain** 
what had happened to the money for facilities the Ward had 
promised. In fairness, the Council was not receiving the money 
it required for constructing much-needed roads and schools
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because of mutual distrust between it and the Ministry of
1Local Government. This fact, together with the Council's
loss of much of its authority and financial resources to the
District and Regional Commissioners, meant that there was no
longer much point to the C.P.P. ward meetings. Whereas in the
first half of the fifties, the fortnightly ward meetings had
been genuine mass forums, held out of doors, with opportunity
for the articulation of local needs and grievances in some
hope of remedial action, by the late fifties they had come to
consist of irregular, small, indoor meetings, largely conspir-
2atorial in nature.
Very few of the new industries established under 
C.P.P. rule were located in Sekondi-Takoradi. The people of 
that city felt, with some justification, that the Accra area 
benefitted disproportionately from Government-induced develop­
ment, while the Central and Western Regions were neglected. The 
available statistics suggest that .in fact, employment opport­
unities in the Eastern Region, (including Accra), rose by some 
56 per cent between 1956 and 1963, compared to a mere 16 per 
cent in the Western and Central Regions combined (see Table 3.3) 
Naturally, this lack of significant economic development in 
Sekondi-Takoradi was blamed on the ineffectiveness, or unconcern 
of the M.P.s and Commissioners for the area.
1. GNA Sekondi, Acc 158/6, Ministry of Local Government 
Report for Quarter Ended 31st December 1956, according
to which, "The Council has as much faith in the Ministry's 
promises as the Ministry has in the Council's accounting."
2. Interviews with J. Flynn (Sekondi businessman), Atta 
Hussaini (Municipal Councillor for Ward 5, 1954-60), and 
T. N. Kankam (Municipal Councillor for Ward 7, 1954-60).
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Table 3.3 Changes in Ghanaian Employment, by Region, 
1956-63.
1956 (thousands) 1963 Index of Change
(1956 - 100)
All regions 267.4 374.1 140
Ashant i/Brang-Ahafo 53.6 75.1 140
Eastern (inc. Accra) 105.7 164.6 156
Northern/Upper 13,4 21.4 160
Volta 10.3 15.5 141
Western/Central 84.3 97.5 116
Source: Norman Uphoft, "The Expansion of Employment Associated
with Growth of G.N.P.: A Projective Model and Its Implications
for Ghana", Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol.2., No. 4., (1972), 
p.9.
The Regional and District Commissioners generally 
proved unapproachable and extremely unpopular : "Go to see
them? - They would not even speak to you unless you were a big 
man in the party. And anyhow, how could you approach them as 
they flashed past in their big cars? They did not have time to 
throw a pesewa to a beggar." On the Parliamentary level, 
faith in the representative character of the Assembly was not 
strengthened by the expulsion of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers1 
outspoken heroes, Anthony Woode and Pobee Biney, nor by the sub­
sequent appointment of two women with little local standing,
3
support, or contact, as representatives for the Western Region. 
These were not the kind of people to voice popular discontent
1. The Regional Commissioner for the Western Region was 
J. K. Arthur, whose main claim to high status in the 
Party was the part he had played in ‘capturing* the 
Minesworkers and UAC Unions in 1950-58.
2. Interview with S. Smith, railway artisan, 7th August 1971.
3. These were Grace Ayensu, wife of the Vice-Chairman of 
Sekondi-Takoradi Council, J. W. Acquah: and Christina 
Wilmot, a telephonist in the Public Works Department.
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with the Government at any risk to their own positions. Dis­
satisfaction with the style and structure of Parliamentary 
politics was clearly expressed in the strike leaders* threat 
that, if Parliament did not give way to the demands of the 
people, they would disband that body by force.
This general issue of popular resentment at the widen­
ing socio-economic and communications gap between the C.P.P. 
elite and *the common people* who had brought them to power was 
not, of course, articulated as a formal issue in union politics. 
But it was much discussed in the bars of Sekondi-Takoradi in 
the months leading up to the 1961 strike, especially by Pobee 
Biney, whose political demise after 1956 came to symbolise the 
failings of the regime for many of the railway and harbour 
workers.
The Politics of Trade Union Re-organisation, 1950-58.
The repercussions of the ’Positive Action* strike of 
January 1950 virtually destroyed the Gold Coast TUC and many of 
its constituent unions. Particularly affected were those unions 
which had participated in the strike under the radical leadership 
of Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode. The Minesworkers Union and 
the United African Company Employees Union, having remained aloof, 
were less seriously disturbed, and the Colonial Labour Department 
decided to encourage the resuscitation of the TUC around these 
moderate, apolitical unions, with affiliation to the I.C.F.T.U. 
(the Western liberal trade union centre). The new headquarters 
were to be based in Accra rather than in troublesome Sekondi.
A new Constitution prohibited Congress from initiating general 
strike actions, and allowed the Labour Department supervisory 
powers over the use of Congress funds. In July 1950, J. N. Sam, 
the Minesworkers* President, became President of this resuscit­
ated Gold Coast TUC, and Charles Techie-Menson, former President
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and leader of the ‘moderates* in 1945-48, now stood in as 
General Secretary.
At the same time, the Convention People’s Party, 
under the direction of Komi a Gbedemah during Kwame Nkrumah * s 
detention, turned its attention to the Minesworkers Union for 
the purpose of ‘capturing* it and ensuring its participation 
in “Positive Action No. 2“. For, in 1950-51, Gbedemah and 
Nkrumah had little reason to think that the apparent failure 
of the ‘Positive Action* strike would soon become a glorious 
victory for them. They blamed what they saw as the dismal 
failure of that strike on Biney and Woode*s failure to bring 
out the Minesworkers, and, judging that a further, more solid 
bout of Positive Action was required, Gbedemah instigated a 
drive to capture the Gold Coast Mines* Employees Union. in 
a series of elections, the old officers were driven out, and 
staunch C.P.P. men such as D. K. Foevie and J. K. Arthur took 
over control. These men lacked sufficient prestige with the 
rank-and-file, however, to contemplate staging a strike action 
immediately. Moreover, the shrewd generosity of the Chamber of 
Mines in its negotiations with these new leaders hindered their 
attempts to whip up militant feeling. In the event this proved 
unnecessary since, by September 1951, ‘Positive Action No. 2* 
was cancelled. Nkrumah was out of prison and Leader of Govern­
ment Business, having decided to co-operate with the Colonial 
Government and its schedule for Self-Government.
This co-operation came to extend to the Labour Depart­
ment's re-organisation of the TUC into a more moderate, Accra- 
based labour movement. The C.P.P. leaders were now more inter­
ested in consolidating their newly acquired political power than
1. Chamber of Mines Report, June 1952, (mimeo).
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in continuing to develop a movement of opposition.
It was obvious to them that they could not immediately
fulfill all their campaign promises, and during this tricky
period of transition from nationalist agitation to executive
responsibility, Nkrumah had no more desire than Governor
Sir Charles Arden-Clarke to have to deal with serious industrial
disturbances. Party loyalists should now direct their efforts
to cooling down the unions. C.P.P. men were already in control
of the Minesworkers* Union, and in 1952, A. Allotey Moffatt, a
Kumasi railway unionist who was "closely linked to the Hon.
1
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah11 , was elected General Secretary of both 
the Railway Union and the Gold Coast TUC. It was to this Gold 
Coast TUC also that such able and ambitious C.P.P. organisers 
as John K. Tettegah (subsequently TUC General Secretary, 1954-59, 
and 1960-62) and Joe-Fio N. Meyer (TUC President, 1956-58; Chair­
man of the Executive Board, 1958-59; and Secretary-General, 
1959-60) directed their efforts - men with little initial sup­
porting base in the rank-and-file of the labour movement, but
close to Nkrumah, and possessed of very considerable political
2
and organisational abilities.
This sudden switch in official C.P.P. policy alienated 
the radical unionists and their followers, who had been pursuing 
a course of escalating opposition to the Colonial Government and 
now found themselves required to cool down and take a back-seat. 
Anthony Woode, for instance, had been continuing his efforts to 
stir up the Minesworkers, touring the Mines Townships in the 
summer of 1951 making inflammatory speeches. He attacked the 
leadership of the Gold Coast TUC and the G.C.M.E.U., in spite 
of the fact that C.P.P. men were already in control in the latter
1. RUA, Executive Council Minutes, 10th March 1952.
2. Tettegah*s practical trade union experience consisted of 
acting as Secretary to the small G.B.Ollivant Employees 
Union in 1951-53. Meyer had even less practical experience 
or rank-and-file support when he entered the service of 
the Gold Coast TUC in 1953. Indeed, he took this step, in
/continued overleaf
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organisation. Woode still believed that, ultimately, it would
be necessary to drive the British out and was therefore angered
by Nkrumah1s decision to co-operate. Pobee Biney, meanwhile, on
his release from goal in August 1950, similarly felt that further
'Positive Action* was required to force the Government's hand,
and organised the 'Ghana Calling Association', a group of ex-
servicemen, unemployed, and other militants in Sekondi who
apparently aimed to obtain explosives and initiate a terrorist
1campaign of property destruction. By October, the Sekondi 
Police had succeeded in goaling several of its members and dis­
banding the Association. Very few railway workers, it would 
appear, however radical in their aims, were prepared for such 
guerilla-type revolutionary activity. Here, as on several sub­
sequent occasions, the mass of railwayworkers perhaps proved 
more realistic in their political thinking, as well as more 
peaceable, than Biney himself.
During 1951, Biney assumed the seat in the Legislative 
Assembly with which the C.P.P. rewarded his nationalist contrib­
ution, and attempted to lobby his way back into the Gold Coast
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
his own words "only because my friend John Tettegah, whom 
I knew from the Accra C.P.P. meetings, asked me to help 
in the re-organisation. This was really a very difficult 
decision because I already had a good career in view in my 
company, but I agreed when Tettegah assured me that Nkrumah 
had promised his full financial and moral support for our 
efforts." Interview with Joe-fio N. Meyer, 9th October 1971.
1. Personal communication with Richard Rathbone.
According to one of the few railway worker informants who 
could recall anything about the 'Ghana Calling Association'. 
"We knew it was just the akpoteshie talking: Pobee went 
crazy for a while when he came out of prison." Interview 
with F. Piadoo, 23rd June 1971. Those who took it 
seriously certainly numbered no more than twenty or 
thirty.
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TUC. The reconstituted Congress rejected his approaches on 
the grounds that he was no longer employed in the Railways or 
a member of any constituent union. Nevertheless, he and 
Anthony Woode insisted on standing as candidates for President 
and General Secretary in the 1952 Congress elections, but were 
defeated by Larbi Odam and A. A. Moffatt, the former a moderate 
apolitical unionist and the latter a reliable C.P.P. loyalist.
It is difficult to judge whether Biney and Woode*s 
candidature in this election was serious, or simply intended 
to impress on the rank-and-file of the Railway Union and other 
workers in the Western Region that the resuscitated Gold Goast 
TUC was the work of imperialist intrigue. Certainly, this was 
the interpretation placed on the elections, with Biney and 
Woode*s encouragement, by many of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers, 
who continued to stand aloof from their official unions and to 
adhere instead to the leadership of the Gold Coast Unemployment 
Association, sometimes also known as the ’Dismissed Workers* 
Assembly*. This Association had originally been formed to 
campaign for the re-engagement of those workers dismissed after 
the Positive Action Strike, Having achieved this objective, its 
leaders, Turkson Ocran and I. K. Kumah, (an ex-harbour worker 
and later Chairman of the Sekondi-Takoradi City Council), dec­
ided to expand the aims of the organisation to those of opposing 
the resuscitated ’collaborationist’ TUC and developing an alter­
native radical trade union centre. In July 1951, its title was 
changed to that of the Ghana Federation Trade Union Congress, 
with Kumah as President and Ocran as General Secretary.
1. The total dues-paying membership of the Railway Union in 
March 1952 was 2,050, less than a third of its membership 
in December 1949. RUA, Delegates Conference Minutes,
25th March 1952.
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Anthony Woode and Pobee Biney, too, though not officials, were 
known to be closely linked with it. The G.F.T.U.C. policy pro­
gramme consisted primarily of pressurising for radical redis­
tribution in the existing wage structure, and switching the 
international and ideological affiliation of the Ghana trade 
union movement from the I.C.F.T.U, (the Western liberal centre) 
to the W.F.T.U. (the Communist centre).
The majority of the skilled railway workers had 
refused to rejoin, or participate in, their own official union 
after the election in August 1950 of A. T. Foley and F.K. Balfour 
as President and General Secretary respectively. Foley & Balfour 
were both moderate clerical unionists who denied personal 
involvement in Positive Action and were concerned to send "an 
assurance of co-operation and loyalty to the Colonial Secretary,
I
Accra". They further proposed to affiliate the Union to the
resuscitated Gold Coast TUC. At a mass meeting on 15th August
1950, the "Technical Men, Takoradi branch" resolved "that we are
unanimously not in favour of the new officers. The old officers
2
should function." Two weeks later, the Takoradi Branch Sec­
retary informed the General Secretary that, "The situation 
appears to confirm the desire expressed at certain quarters to 
split the union into two sections: Technical and Clerical".
In the event, no formal division occurred, but the majority of 
"Technical men" - the skilled and unskilled manual workers - took 
membership of the Ghana Federation Trade Union Congress on an 
individual basis or lent it their moral support.
Delegates Conference Minutes, 5th August 1950. 
2* RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 19th August 1950.
3, RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 1st September 1950.
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At a meeting in Sekondi in October 1951, Nkrumah 
accused the G.F.T.U.C. of "dividing the workers" and apparently 
gained the agreement of the Executive to its dissolution. At 
a mass meeting two days later, however,
"Hundreds of workers decided to oppose the dis­
solution of the Ghana TUG - ’We do not want any 
imperialist tactics - Nkrumah should come and 
tell us what good thing he wants to do for the 
workers* - The members decided to maintain the 
Congress and to await what would come out of  ^
the proposed conference of all trade unions."
Encouraged by this demonstration of rank-and-file support, the
G.F.T.U.C. leaders decided to stand their ground and fight the 
party bureaucrats for control of the labour movement. On October 
27th, they announced,
"The Ghana TUC has asked the Government to review 
all laws inimical to the interests of the workers 
in the country. The Congress would not be affil­
iated to any political party. This new Congress 
considers the existing Gold Coast TUC as lifeless 
because its officers are always under the influence 
of employers", 3
Turkson Ocran was able to use his personal influence with Nkrumah 
he was Nkrumah*s Personal Secretary in 1951-54 - to impress upon 
them the need to accommodate the Left-wing unionists if large 
numbers of the Western Region rank-and-file were not to be 
alienated from the official labour movement. In mid-November, 
Nkrumah publicly agreed with the Ghana TUC that the Gold Coast 
TUC was inefficient and suggested they form "one strong TUC 
which will be independent of Government interference". ^
1. Daily Graphic, 22nd October 1951, p.l.
2. Daily Graphic, 24th October 1951, p.l.
3* Daily Graphic, 27th October 1951, p.8.
Daily Graphic, 17th November 1951, p.l
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Nevertheless, the rivalry between the two TUC's
continued throughout 1952. This was against the wishes, it
must be said, of Nkrumah who was probably thinking in terms
of C.P.P. influence rather than formal control over the unions
at this stage. He was accordingly prepared to accommodate the
energies of the Left-wingers if only they would be more realistic
as to immediate requirements and possibilities. This union
rivalry was also against the wishes of growing numbers of the
Railway Union rank-and-file, whose confidence in Nkrumah and
his political strategy was revived (somewhat) by the publication
in April 1952 of the Lidbury-Gbedemah Commission Report recom-
1mending a large wage increase for the lower-paid. Many were 
also concerned to concentrate for the moment on Union re-unific­
ation and re-organisation. In short, there appears to have been 
considerable confusion amongst the skilled worker rank-and-file 
at this stage over whether to remain outside the official Rail­
way Union and adhere to the old Left-wing leaders or whether to 
rejoin the Union and at least displace the existent inefficient 
clerical leadership:
"I would say most of the men in my shop (one of 
the Location Workshops) were refusing to pay 
Union dues though we attended the meetings some­
times to see what they were proposing to do for 
us. The way we saw it, Pobee Biney had brought 
us a lot of progress, and the Unemployed Assoc­
iation people had tried to make sure we would not/cont
1. The Lidbury-Gbedemah Commission awarded an increase of 38% 
to unskilled labourers, 25% to skilled workers, and pro­
gressively smaller proportionate increases to higher-paid 
government employees. This was obviously well received 
by many of the lower-paid workers. But, since this was 
intended to be the permanent post-War settlement, Biney 
and Woode, (who sat oh the Commission), were dissatisfied 
with both the size of the increase for the lower-paid, 
which barely covered the rise in the cost of living since 
1950, and with the failure to make more radically egalit­
arian changes in the overall wages structure.
J
Ill
suffer for our part in it, so they were the 
people to be our union leaders just as Nkrumah 
was now the Prime Minister* And anyway they did 
not know anything about our problems or how to 
tell the Management what should be done*11 1
The feeling that someone who "knew about our problems" should
be elected to run the Railway Union, even if this were not
Pobee Biney or one of the G.F.T.U.C. leaders, was sufficiently
strong to induce many of the manual workers to rejoin the Union
and participate in the 1952 elections. John Eshun, an artisan
and an early organiser of the Union, was elected President ©n
the platform of "centralising all efforts on the betterment of
2the manual staff which forms the greater bulk of the Union".
One of the resolutions passed at the Delegates Conference was 
to the effect that there should be an increase in the represent­
ation of the Associations (as distinct from the Branches), and 
thereby in the number of 'technical* unionists (as distinct from ) 
the Branches), and thereby in the number of ‘technical* unionists 
(as distinct from 'clerical*), on the Working Committee. The J
1. Interview with Isaac Adjey, railway artisan, 14th July 1971.
2. RUA, Delegates Conference Minutes, 25th March 1951.
3. Formerly, each of the eight Union Branches had two rep­
resentatives on the Working Committee, while each of the
ten Departmental Associations, (e.g. Electrical, Marine,
Clerical), had one only. Since the 'up-country* branches
together with the Clerical and Stores Associations, gener­
ally elected clerical staff as their representatives, this
meant that 'clerical unionists* normally outnumbered 
'technical unionists' on the Working Committee. The reform
of 1952 provided for two delegates from each Association,
most of which were based in Sekondi-Takoradi and generally 
elected technical men as their representatives.
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new General Secretary, A. A. Moffatt, was an experienced branch 
and regional trades council organiser from Kumasi, who had been 
imprisoned for his part in the 'Big Six* protest of 1948, and 
was expected to be a 'forceful* leader. The primary issue in 
this election, therefore, was seen at the rank-and-file level as 
that of technical versus clerical Unionists, and of the lack of 
dynamism of the outgoing 'clerical' leadership.
There was considerable dismay later in the year, how­
ever, at A. A. Moffatt's acceptance of the General Secretaryship 
of the Gold Coast TUC, especially since this involved him stand­
ing against the candidature of Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode.
Biney and Woode attempted to interpret their defeat to the 
Railway Union rank-and-file as a work of "imperialist intrigue" 
on the part of Nkrumah in collaboration with the Colonial Govern^ 
ment, and thereby to force the issue of Left-Wing versus C.P.P. 
Moderates back into the forefront of Railway Union politics.
This strategy met with only limited success, since it would 
seem that at this stage Biney and Woode were outpacing majority 
rank-and-file opinion. Many of the railwayworkers were inclined 
to place more faith than they in the sincerity and good intentions 
of men such as Moffatt and Tettegah, and in Nkrumah's assurance 
of Government non-interference in trade union affairs. This 
division of opinion together with considerable confusion as to 
the real motivations and intentions of the leading actors was, 
we shall see, to persist at the rank-and-file level of the Rail­
way Union between 1952 and 1958, with first one view - i.e. 
confidence in the C.P.P. and its favoured union leaders - and 
then the other - i.e. identification with Biney's criticisms of 
the subservience of the C.P.P. unionists - gaining the ascendance. 
Ultimately, Biney*s view was to win out, but in 1952 the issue 
was not so clear, and tended to cross-cut that of Railway Union 
and Labour Movement re-unification.
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In attempting, therefore, to force the issue of C.P.P, 
Left-Wing versus Centre at both TUC and Parliamentary levels in 
1952-53, Biney and Woode were guilty of marked political inepti­
tude. After the rejection of his candidature for General 
Secretary of the Gold Coast TUC in August 1952, Anthony Woode 
accepted the Presidency of the Ghana Federation TUC in direct 
defiance of Nkrumah*s expressed wish that he should rather work 
informally for a merger of the two bodies. And both he and 
Biney, having failed to secure such far-reaching socio-economic 
reforms as they had hoped for through their membership of the 
Gbedemah Commission, mounted increasingly extreme and personal 
criticism of the Party’s loss of idealism and momentum from 
their seats in the Legislative Assembly. As Biney himself put 
it, he became "rapidly unamenable to the strange discipline and 
policies of this party**. While there was no doubt consider­
able justification for this view of the Party’s rapid degener­
ation, it was in the interests of neither Woode nor Biney, given 
the continuing loyalty to the C.P.P. of most of the Sekondi- 
Takoradi workers, (on whose support their prominence depended), 
to force an open split. Yet their criticisms became so extreme 
as to ensure they were not renominated by the Party in 1953 for 
seats in the subsequent Legislative Assembly. Partly in conse­
quence of this split, neither retained sufficient respectability 
even with their own ideological associates to gain any position 
of influence in the new Gold Coast TUC which was eventually 
forged out of an amalgamation of the old Gold Coast and Ghana 
TUC*s in July 1953.
1. F. Wudu, op.cit., p .3.
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The composition of the new Executive was as follows:
At the first Conference, a resolution disaffiliating 
the Gold Coast TUC from the I.C.F.T.U. was moved by John Tettegah 
and carried by the majority. The new TUC was to be neutral 
between the I.C.F.T.U. and W.F.T.U. It was also to remain 
strictly independent of the Government:
"The Trade Union Movement of this country shall 
always be free to formulate and advocate its own 
policies. In the future, as in the past, we shall 
continue to urge on the Government those policies 
which from our experience we believe to be in the 
interests of the country and we shall retain our 
right to disagree and publicly to oppose the ^
Government where we think it necessary to do so.*'
Nevertheless, the Railway Union rank-and-file remained
suspicious of Tettegah and the other ex-Gold Coast TUC leaders:
"He spoke what the workers were feeling in those 
early days, how the workers were being cheated 
by the colonialists and they should enjoy the 
fruits of their labour. At that time we thought 
the TUC was going to be independent. But we began 
to have our suspicions over the Ocran business. 
Tettegah was getting too ambitious." 2
In October 1953, the TUC Presidency announced that the popular 
Turkson Ocran had been relieved of his duties as General Secre­
tary of the TUC for being a Communist and a channel of W.F.T.U.
1, "Gold Coast TUC Policy Statement", 20th July 1954, (mimeo).
2, Interview with A. Y. Ankomah, 23rd August 1971.
President F. E. Techie Menson
Vice President 
General Secretary 
Asst. Gen. Sec.
Treasurer
I. K. Kumah 
E. C. Turkson Ocran 
John K. Tettegah 
J. C. Rudolph
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funds into the Ghanaian labour movement. This accusation may 
possibly have had some basis to it, (The W.F.T.U. has at times 
been generous in its aid to Ghana, not least to the Nkrumah- 
Tettegah inspiration, the All-African Trade Union Federation 
(AATUF). ) But the main reason for Ocran* s downfall (and 
that of several other alleged Communists) appears to have been 
Nkrumah*s desire to stage a Left-wing purge so as to increase 
his respectability and reliability in the eyes of the British. 
The British Government had recently suspended the constitution 
of British Guiana on the grounds that its nationalist leader, 
Gheddi Jagan, was following a Communist line. Nkrumah wished 
to ensure himself against the possibility of similar charges. 
This was, of course, a strategy commonly adopted by nationalist 
leaders in the ’collaborationist* phase of the movement, 
Houphouet-Boigny broke with the Communists in the Ivory Coast, 
for example, and Azikiwe with the Zikists in Nigeria, in similar 
circumstances and for essentially the same reasons.
Turkson Ocran was also in Nkrumah*s disfavour at this 
time for his over-sympathetic attitude towards strikers, and, 
more particularly, his handling of the September 1953 strike at 
the African Manganese Company in Awaso. On visiting the mine, 
Ocran did little to restrain the workers or their more militant 
speakers and, as a result of the continuation of the strike, 
several hundred workers were dismissed. Such incidents were 
extremely embarrassing to Nkrumah, who was thereby placed in a 
difficult position between the new Colonial Government on the 
one hand and Ghanaian working opinion on the other. There was a 
danger that further incidents of this kind would play into the 
hands of the Left-wing critics of the regime.. Hence his readi­
ness to clamp down on Ocran and the extremists.
1. For evidence of close financial links between AATUF and
the Soviet trade union centre, see Benjamin Bentum, Trade 
Unions in Chains, (Accra: TUC Publicity Department, 1967),
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In February 1954, the Gold Coast TUC reaffiliated
to the ICFTU with John Tettegah as its representative on the
Executive Board; and, soon afterwards, Tettegah was appointed
full-time General Secretary to the Congress, the headquarters
of which were accordingly transferred from Sekondi to Tettegah1s
1
town of residence, Accra. Pobee Biney was successful in inter­
preting these developments to the Railway Union rank-and-file, as 
a manoeuvre to assert party control over the trade union move­
ment. The railway workers were virtually unanimous in support­
ing Biney*s plan to obstruct such a development. A. A. Moffatt 
was pressurised to resign from the General Secretaryship of 
the Railway Union, and at the May 1954 Delegates Conference,
the Takoradi representatives, Bukari Moshie and I. E. Inkumsah,
2
nominated Pobee Biney for full-time President of the Union.
This motion was defeated at the time on the grounds of Biney*s 
non-employment in the Railways, and the lack of finances for a 
full-time appointment. One month later, however, in response 
to further rank-and-file pressure, John Eshun resigned from the 
Presidency and Biney was elected in his place.
From his base in the Railway Union, Biney then set 
about forming an alliance with those various and varied elements 
in the labour movement who were opposed to the leadership of 
the Accra-based C.P.P. loyalists. The minesworkers* leaders, 
like the railwayworkers, resented the dominance, and distrusted 
the intentions, of unionists with little or no mass base. But, 
unlike the railway workers, they appear to have been narrowly 
*consumptionist* in orientation, displaying little interest in 
developing any kind of political role for the labour movement.
1. The 1953 TUC Constitution stated that the headquarters 
should be located in the town of residence of the TUC 
General Secretary.
2. RUA, Delegates Conference Minutes, 12th April 1954.
A
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The United Africa Company Union, composed largely of clerical 
staff, whose members appear to have been strongly influenced 
by the Colonial Labour Department model of apolitical company 
unionism, was concerned to defend its autonomy against TUC plans 
for its incorporation in a more centralised structure. Some of 
its leaders appear also to have maintained close ties with the old 
United Gold Coast Convention politicians who were now prominent 
in the leadership of the N.L.M. These unionists were labelled 
as 'reactionaries1 by the C.P.P., and perhaps not without a little 
justification. Yet such a term was hardly applicable to the 
railway workers or the various other Selcondi-Takoradi unionists 
(most importantly, the dockworkers), who, alienated from the 
C.P.P. by the downfall of Woode and Ocran, now lent their support 
to Biney.
This somewhat disparate alliance worked out a complex 
voting strategy and attempted to overthrow the established 
leadership of the Gold Coast TUC at the April 1955 Conference. 
Having failed miserably - Tettegah got wind of their intentions 
and was easily able to 'whip1 the votes of delegates from the 
newly established unions, who were in effect his 'clients' 
six unions broke away to form a rival Congress of Free Trade 
Unions based at Sekondi. These were the Public Works Department, 
Hospital Workers', Maritime and Dockworkers, R, T. Briscoe,
2
Selcondi-Takoradi Municipal Council, and Railway Employees Unions.
Contrary to some accounts, the C.F.T.U. did not align itself
with the major opposition party during 1954-56, the Ashanti-based
3
National Liberation Movement. From one point of view, this 
antipathy might be explained in terms of the very different com­
munal interests which the N.L.M. and the C.F.T.U. represented.
1. Interview with Joe-fio N. Meyer, 15th November 1971.
2. Daily Graphic, 17th October 1955, p.12.
3. For example, loan Davies, op.cit., p.109,
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But there was also perhaps some truth to the railway workers* 
own explanation and that they were sufficiently clear as to 
their reformist aims to avoid involvement in oppositional party
politics, particularly when this opposition party consisted of
. . .  1the elitist and tribalistic N.'L*M. They were concerned at
this stage to press for reform of the G.P.P. and the TUG, (and 
of the relations between the two organisations), along the lines 
of a loose informal alliance providing for free expression of 
rank-and-file opinion and greater accountability of the leader­
ship. Recognising the need to work within the TUC to this end, 
one year after their protest disaffiliation the Railwayworkers
re-affiliated "in order to consolidate the forces of Trade
2Unionism in the emerging independent Gold Coast.**
However, Biney continued his personal campaign against 
(as he saw it) *C.P.P. degeneration* on the parliamentary front, 
standing as an Independent candidate for the Selcondi constituency 
in the 1956 General Elections. He clearly anticipated the full 
support of the railwayworkers, especially the skilled workers, 
for his campaign. But here again, as in 1952, he miscalculated 
the strength of their personal allegiance to him, or, more accur­
ately perhaps, the sophistication and realism of their political 
thinking. As one railway worker recalled,
**A11 the workers here (at Location) knew that 
the Election was very important for G.P.P. 
Self-Government, and as we were still strongly
G.P.P., we couldn*t vote for him (i.e. Biney).
We could see his reasons, and appreciated the 
truth in them, but it was the wrong time to 
contest the issue. Still, he remained very 
popular with us and we wanted him to remain our 
President, but then the C.P.P. became very 
annoyed with him and some of the union leaders 
started attacking him, charging him with being
/cont..
Interviews with Kofi Imbeah, 12th June 1971; and 
A. Y. Ankomah, 23rd August, 1971. For details of the 
N.L.M., its programme and sources of support, see Dennis 
Austin, op.cit., pp.253-81.
2* RUA, Delegates Conference Minutes, 5th May 1956.
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".. a drunkard and not attending to his duties.
Most of us did not believe this, (that he was 
not attending to his duties), but some did, and 
Pobee felt betrayed by us. He insisted on resign­
ing. It was a very sad day for us." 1
Biney*s failure to win the 1956 election for the 
Sekondi constituency, and his subsequent resignation from the 
Railway Union Presidency, marked the end of his formal political 
career. Yet his ideological and stylistic stance of persistent
(if drunken) opposition to autocratic and elitist tendencies in
the G.P.P. regime continued to exert a powerful influence on 
Railway Union politics. Biney epitomised that process of dis­
illusionment which was to culminate in the 1961 strike. This 
influence operated on several levels and by various channels.
He maintained *in person* communication with many of the railway­
workers in the houses and bars of Sekondi, leading the criticism 
of G.P.P. policies and elite behaviour in these informal (and 
often inebriated) political discussion groups. Moreover, the 
influence of Biney naturally increased as his interpretation of 
the direction of development of the C.P.P. proved ever more 
accurate. If in 1952 and 1956 his own views on C.P.P. degeneracy 
had outpaced those of the majority of the railwayworkers, by 
1958-61 Biney*s rejection by the party seemed to symbolise the 
failings of the regime: on the one hand, Pobey Biney, still
outspoken, still in touch with the ’common people*, still dressed 
in a simple traditional cloth and pair of sandals; on the other, 
the wealthy, party-subservient, incommunicative TUC bureaucrats. 
Biney, everyone knew, was a drunkard; but he was a popular 
drunk, a frequenter of the low bars of Essikadu and Katan, unlike 
the elite souses in their plush hotels. And, though it might 
appear to a more cynical outsider that Biney*s political and
1. Interview with Albert Johnson, Railway Union clerk 
(1954-69), 5th October 1971.
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financial demise was decreed rather than chosen, he nevertheless 
appeared to many of the railwayworkers as "a consistent spokes­
man for the suffering masses, for the aims of our Independence 
revolution - he was the only Ghanaian who had the courage to
1
stand up to Nkrumah, who could not be won over with bribes."
A third, less direct, channel of Biney1s influence
was through the continuing prominence of his followers and
apprentices in Railway Union politics in 1956-61. For this was,
relatively speaking, a highly stable labour force in which there
was no great expansion in size over the period 1950-61. The
annual labour turnover rate among the skilled workers was less
than 10 per cent. Even by 1970, 17 per cent of the Location
skilled workers could claim to have participated in the 1950
2
Positive Action strike. Equally important, a high degree of 
stability characterised the Union middle-level leadership between 
1955-56 and 1961. These branch and association officials who 
sat on the Working Committee, exerted a powerful influence on 
rank-and-file interpretation of events, and, as the 1961 strike 
was to illustrate, possessed a far greater degree of control 
over rank-and-file behaviour than did the top level leadership. 
These Sekondi-Takoradi middle-level leaders were likely to be 
forceful, opinionated personalities in the Biney mould. That 
was why they had been elected. Moreover, Biney had directly 
influenced the thinking of many of them during his own Railway 
Union career. Almost all of the middle-level leaders who staged 
the 1961 strike - i.e. V. K. Quist, W. N. Grant, A. Y. Ankomah,
J. K. Baaku, K. G. Quartey, S. Winful, T. Hagan, K. Imbeali, and 
T. Bentil - had become union officials during his Presidency and 
through his encouragement. Many still speak of the heroic status
1. Interview with J. Apprey, railway artisan, 23rd August 1971.
2. RAA, Railway Administration Staff List (1970). This gives 
details of the dates of original employment of all ’perm­
anent* staff, i.e. including the skilled and semi-skilled, 
but not the unskilled workers.
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he possessed in their eyes, and of the dominant influence he 
exerted on their understanding of trade union principles and 
methods:
"Biney taught me all I know about trade unionism.
I lived only a few doors from him in Essikadu, 
and we would often sit talking. He told me I 
had the right qualities for a union leader - 
boldness and being straightforward - and he 
persuaded me to stand for election in my Assoc­
iation. To my astonishment I was elected and 
he instructed me how to go about my duties, how 
I should always speak truthfully and stand up 
for what I believe in. I can truly say, he was 
a great humanitarian. Trade unionism and human- 
itarianism, they are the same thing.11 1
This is not to say that all Biney*s *apprentices * followed his 
example strictly, or maintained his distinction between left- 
wing reformism and party politics under the pressure of increas­
ing C.P.P. autocracy - though most were concerned to do so.
But it is hardly to over-estimate his personal influence to 
suggest that, in 1956-61, Biney*s movement of reformist oppos­
ition to the C.P.P.-TUC was carried on by others in his absence.
Immediately after Biney*s resignation, J. K. Bohann, 
Vice-President under Biney and a staunch C.P.P. loyalist, took 
over as President, but at the May 1957 Delegates Conference,
I. E. Inkumsah was elected in his place. Inkumsah was a long­
time friend and supporter of Biney*s, apparently possessed of 
a similarly forceful character, and it was expected that he 
would maintain the Union*s stance of opposition to the C.P.P.-TUC 
leaders and their plans for greater centralisation and party 
control of the labour movement.
By 1957-58, it should be observed, the railwayworkers* 
chances of successful resistance by constitutional means had
1. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 22nd August 1971.
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significantly diminished, and their policy alternatives were 
correspondingly restricted. By 1957, Ghana had 95 registered 
unions with 58,000 members, compared to 56 unions with a total 
membership of some 38,000 in December 1949, (see Table 1.1).
The majority of the new unions had been established on the 
initiative of the TUC leadership, (John Tettegah, Joe-fio N. 
Meyer, and others), and were officered by political clients of 
Tettegah and the C.P.P.-TUC elite. In many cases, membership 
figures were purely nominal, and rank-and-file interest and 
participation in union affairs virtually non-existent. In 
fairness, some of these new union leaders worked to very con­
siderable purpose and effect. For previously unorganised 
workers in the employ of private concerns such as the Lebanese 
Restaurants and Bakeries - termed, with some justification,
1 Sweated Industries’ by the TUC - the initiative shown by C.P.P.
activists in organising them and negotiating improved conditions
1
of service earned warm appreciation. The vast majority of 
Ghanaian unions in 1957 were, in any case, committed in advance 
to support any programme presented by the TUC leadership. And 
although the Railway and Minesworkers’ Unions still represented 
a large proportion, possibly a majority, of the ’active’ union­
ised workers, this strength was not reflected in voting terms
2
in the TUC General Council of Delegates.
Confronted with this situation, the railwayworkers had 
three possible alternatives. They could abandon their stances
1. For the TUC's organising achievements during this period, 
see E. Cowan, op.cit., pp.70-91.
2. Representation of National Unions in the Supreme Congress 
was proportional as follows:
Up to 500 members - 1 delegate 5,000 to 10,000 - 4 deleg-
500 to 1,000 - 2 delegates 10,000 to 20,000 - 6 "ates.
1,000 to 5,000 - 3 delegates Over 20,000 - 8 ”
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of overt opposition to the TUC leadership and attempt to work 
within the proposed "new structure" to make, as it were, the 
best of a bad job; they could retreat to an 'isolationist1 
stance of non-affiliation to the TUC, thereby evading the 
controls and demands of the "new structure", but giving up 
their struggle to reform the national labour movement; or 
they could turn to mobilising the 'active* rank-and-file of 
the movement in direct and open opposition to the "new structure". 
Collectively, the workers of Sekondi-Takoradi could bring the 
country's transport and communication system to a halt. For 
less narrowly practical reasons, also, the notion of a communal 
Sekondi-Takoradi protest-action possessed great relevance and 
appeal. However, the successful staging of such a protest 
would require the occurrence of a general and deeply felt issue.
The "New Structure of 1958".
Since its establishment in 1954, the Gold Coast TUC 
leadership of Tettegah and Meyer had been canvassing the idea 
of a highly centralised trade union movement with increased 
finances and authority at the top of the structure. Their 
reasoning had in principle much to recommend it.
"The fault of the incapacity of the TUC is due 
to its weak structure and the unfortunate reg­
istration of a multiplicity of Unions numbering 
over 80, some with membership of just over 50, 
and cannot therefore have any hope of providing 
any service to the membership except protecting 
them from dismissals and victimisations." 1
By 1957, the TUC Secretariat had succeeded in organising five 
centralised National Unions (in addition to the Railway and
1. "Report of the Committee on Trade Union Organisation to
11th Annual Congress of the Gold Coast TUC, September 1954." 
Cited in J. K. Tettegah, A New Chapter for Ghana Labour, 
(Accra: TUC Publicity Department, 1958), p.13.
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Minesworkers Unions) and almost doubling union membership, but 
severe problems remained.
"Despite all our efforts there are (sic) still too 
great multiplicity of Trade Unions in a small 
country like Ghana with a population of only 5 
million. We must now positively consider the 
feasibility of merging the various registered 
Trade Unions into the Trades Union Congress so 
that Congress could become a negotiating body. 
Departments can be created and a centralised 
Executive to direct our affairs throughout Ghana...
We must turn to something like the General Fed­
eration of Jewish Labour in Israel (Histradrut).
This is a new nation and we must build trade 
union machinery that can hasten the building of 
socialism and raise the living standards of the 
working people." 1
Tettegah*s recommendations for a 'new structure*, 
based closely on the Histradrut model, were adopted at the 1958 
Congress, and a new Labour Movement proclaimed. The exact form
I
of the Constitution was supposed to be worked out after a Special 
Committee had listened to suggestions or objections from the 
various Unions. These objections came primarily from the Mines­
workers*, Railwayman*s and U.A.C. Unions. The U.A.C. and Railway 
Enginemen*s Unions objected mainly to plans to incorporate them 
in larger national unions. The Minesworkers * Union and the main 
Railway Union were rather concerned as to the degree of central­
isation - financial and jurisdictional - envisaged for the TUC, 
which would effectively deprive them of negotiating functions 
and powers they had already shown themselves able to perform 
efficiently. Even more important, in the view of the railway 
unionists, was the question of party affiliation. Behind such 
objections lay a deep distrust of the sincerity (as workers*
1. Resolution adopted by 13th Annual Congress of Gold Coast
TUC, October 1956. Cited in J. K. Tettegah, op.cit., p.14.
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representatives) and financial probity of the TUC elite whose 
position would be the more firmly entrenched by such measures. 
None of these objections was met in the new Constitution estab­
lished by the 1958 Industrial Relations Act - indeed, they were 
not deemed significant enough to merit a formal reply. As far 
as the railway workers were concerned, there was little empirical 
justification for loan Davies* assertion that, **The 1958 Indus­
trial Relations Act was the result of four years of hard neg-
1
otiation with the Ghana unions. **
Under the Act, a Trades Union Congress was established 
with twenty-four constituent national unions (reduced in 1961 to 
sixteen, and in 1965 to ten) . All negotiations - for registr­
ation, failure of collective bargaining procedures, introduction 
of the 'union shop* and the 'check-off' - were to be conducted 
through the Ghana TUC, which was thereby responsible for the 
direct conduct of all major trade union affairs. To carry out 
these duties, a large permanent secretariat was to be established 
at the headquarters in Accra, and nine of these executive sec­
retaries, appointed by the Executive Board, were to sit, together 
with representatives from each Union, on the Supreme Congress, 
thus greatly strengthening the hand of the TUC bureaucrats.
While officials were in theory to be elected, a Cabinet Minister 
made it quite clear, that all senior posts were to be occupied 
by C.P.P. loyalists - "It is an ideological heresy for Party
members to elect a non-Party worker: as a leader of their organ-
2
isation - the C.P.P. and the TUC are one". In practice, the 
railwayworkers soon discovered, the freedom of election was 
further restricted by the presence of senior TUC and C.P.P. 
officials at the Delegates Conference, (where Executive members
1. loan Davies, op.cit., p.175.
2. Kojo Botsio, Secretary of Central Committee of C.P.P., to
Committee on Workers' Organisation, 11th January 1959. 
Cited in E. Cowan, op.cit., p.105.
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were elected by *open* voting), in order to ensure the appoint­
ment of a particular official candidate as General Secretary. 
Later (in 1961), Union membership cards were replaced by Party 
cards.
This extensive central organisation, including special
education and publicity departments, was to be financed by the
establishment of union shops and a check-off system according
to which virtually all wage-earners in Ghana were compelled to
become dues-paying members of the TUG (giving a total official
membership of some 500,000 in 1962). 45 per cent of membership
dues (2/- per month) were to go directly to the Ghana TUC, (with
40 per cent going to the National Union, and 15 per cent to the 
1local branch). The railway unionists pointed out that the 
requirement they should pay 5 per cent of their dues to a central 
TUG strike solidarity fund seemed a little unnecessary in view 
of the fact that they, together with other public sector employ­
ees, were to be prohibited from going on strike. But again their
2
objections were ignored. Strikes in the private sector were 
to be legal only after the exhaustion of an elaborate (and prac­
tically inexhaustible) negotiating machinery. A later Government 
document explained this policy toward strikes and wage claims:
1. J. K. Tettegah, op.cit., p.28. The TUG*s 45 per cent 
share was to be allocated as follows: 25 per cent to
General Administration and Regional Organisation, 5 
per cent to Strike Solidarity Fund, 10 per cent to 
Social Welfare and Insurance, 5 per cent to Business 
Enterprises. In practice, the TUG was not adequately 
financed by members1 dues and received various govern­
ment subsidies. For details, see The Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Ghana TUC, 
(Accra: Government Printer, 1967).
2 . RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 20th June 1958.
127
"In a socialist Ghana, the distribution of the 
national income can no longer be the chance 
outcome of a chaotic struggle between antagon- 
istic classes. Rather it should be based on 
scientific decisions regarding the utilisation 
of increases in the nation's wealth in such a 
way as to advance the welfare of the worker and 
the growth of the economy and to maintain an 
adequate level of employment within a framework 
of economic stability." 1
For workers in private industries, and especially 
those formerly ineffectively organised, this 'new structure* 
had something to recommend it. Prior to the 1958 Act, many 
private employers had refused to recognise workers' represent­
atives or meet them for negotiation. They were now compelled 
to recognise unions and negotiate industrial agreements with 
professional TUG officials. After several years of operation of 
the new structure, one independent observer concluded that,
"In the industrial relations field the Ghana TUG 
has acted with a considerable degree of respons­
ibility: its relations with the Ghana Employers' 
Confederation have developed well, and together 
these two organisations have agreed on important 
advances in the scope of collective bargaining 
and joint consultation." 2
The practical benefits of these new arrangements were 
not inconsiderable, A legal minimum wage was introduced in 1959, 
and its enforcement in the private sector, though far from 
universal, was doubtless more extensive than would otherwise 
have been the case. In the period 1960-66, moreover, TUC 
officials succeeded in negotiating substantial wage increases 
for many private sector employees which at least mollified the
1. Seven Year Development Plan, (1963-70), (Accra: Office of
the Planning Commission, 1964), p.171.
2. B. C. Roberts, "Labour in the Tropical Territories of the
Commonwealth, (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 
1964), p.145. For details of collective bargaining agree­
ments negotiated by the Ghana TUC in 1958-61, see In the
Cause of Ghana Workers, (Accra: TUC Publicity Department,
1962).
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effects of rapid inflation on real living standards.
For previously organised Government employees such
as the railwayworkers, however, the advantages of the 'new
structure* were far less clear. They lost the right to strike
absolutely, and, with this, a great deal of their bargaining
strength. They enjoyed no arrangement for regular negotiation
with their employer - the Government - and therefore depended
on TUG initiative for bringing attention to their grievances.
The TUG leadership argued that through its participation in the
top Government and Party decision-making bodies - (Tettegah was
to have a seat in the Cabinet as Ambassador Plenipotentiary) -
it could safeguard the workers* real interests bound up as these
were with the interest of the nation as a whole. The various
questions of housing, education, inflation, and unemployment
could be tackled far more effectively through TUC influence on
Government policy-making than by strike actions for higher wages
Anyway, the workers should be less concerned with immediate stan
dard of living increases than with working "consciously for the
development and strengthening of the new socialist sector of
the national economy", and acting as an ideologically-conscious
vanguard "to create a state based upon the socialist pattern of
2
society adapted to suit Ghanaian conditions".
In abstract, the railwayworkers* rejection of this 
•progressive* argument might well appear ’reactionary*; but 
such an interpretation would assume the existence of a sincere 
and credible national leadership. The railway workers viewed 
the TUC*s ’socialist* argument as little more than a confidence
1. See The Report of the (Mills-Odoi) Commission on the 
Structure and Remuneration of the Public Services in 
Ghana (T967T, (Accra: Government Printer, 1967), p.31.
2. J. K. Tettegah, Towards Nkrumaism; The Role and Tasks 
of the Trade Unions, (Accra: TUC Publicity Department, 
1962), p.14.
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trick, and, in retrospect, it appears that they were not 
entirely mistaken. Their distrust derived in part from their 
past experience that government generally, including the Nkrumah 
regime, had to be forcibly pressurised into considering its 
employees1 demands for improved conditions of service. TUG 
officials, who were also G.P.P. 'apparatchiks' would, it was 
thought, be less than enthusiastic to jeopardize their positions 
by pressing the Government too strongly. Recent experience 
provided confirmation for the view that the maintenance of the 
strike weapon (at least as a threat) was essential to the pro­
tection of workers' interests. During the summer of 1955, there
had been mounting pressure from lower-paid workers for Govern-
1ment to increase its minimum wage. The Lidbury-Gbedemah
award of 1952-53 had already been eroded by inflation. Several
powerful groups of workers, including the railway workers,
threatened strike action, but the TUG leadership refused to
voice support for their demands. Eventually, Nkrumah announced
the appointment of the Waugh Commission on the day immediately
following the minesworkers' commencement of strike action.
Neither they nor the railway workers were likely to be convinced
by TUC President Techie-Menson*s defensive assertion that "the
Prime Minister's statement is the outcome of the efforts of the
Gold Coast Trades Union Congress as a whole, and not of a single
2or individual union."
The introduction of so great a degree of centralisation 
and party control as the 'new structure* proposed could only, it 
was felt, result in an even more pronounced and corrupt sub­
servience of the leadership. No matter how good its original
1. Department of Labour Report, 1955-56, p.8.
2. Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, Issue No. 3,
(Nov. 1955), column 661.
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intentions, this would inevitably make a mockery of that 
leadership*s claim to represent the workers, and indeed of 
* socialism*, as that ideal was understood by the railwayman.
It would be mistaken to think that the railway unionists* 
concern was either purely economic or narrowly self-interested. 
The principle of democracy, both economic and political, was 
at stake. With the erosion of that principle in so many
institutional areas in 1957-61, the trade union movement rep­
resented, as it were, the last line of defence. W. N. Grant, 
a leading organiser of the 1961 strike, was quite clear about 
this:
"Tettegah tried persuading us about the advantages 
of his consolidation, and we had to agree with 
this, but we disagreed about party control. The
thing was we realised Nkrumah was becoming a
dictator. He was already trying to bribe workers* 
leaders to co-operate in muzzling the workers.
Everybody had been put into a frenzy of fear.
You couldn’t speak your mind. So it was all 
political really. But we had to be careful not 
to be too obviously political." 1
Herein lay an acute dilemma for the railway workers* leaders.
It was obvious to Grant and some of his fellow-unionists that 
their objections to the G.P.P.-TUC were so fundamental, and 
the logic of autocratic politics so inexorable, as to necessitate 
challenging the very existence of the Nkrumah regime if it was 
to be resisted at all. Yet an alliance to this purpose with 
the opposition United Party - a party whose leadership included 
precisely those elite elements of the old U.G.C.C. they had so 
vigorously opposed in 1948-50 - would be not only distasteful 
and highly dangerous, but ruinously divisive of railway worker 
unity.
1. Interview with W. N. Grant, 20th October 1971.
131
The Railwayworkers* Response - The Joint Council of Railway 
Unions and the 1961 Strike.
As we have seen, I. E. Inkumsah became President of 
the Railway Union in May 1957 on the platform of his determin­
ation to oppose the TUC leadership*s plans for extreme central­
isation and party affiliation. At the TUC Conference in Cape 
Coast on 25th - 26th January 1958, Inkumsah led the criticism 
of the proposed new structure, supported most prominently by 
representatives of the Minesworkers* and Public Works Depart­
ment Unions. Afterwards, he reiterated to the Working Committee 
his view that there were f*too many flaws in it to be accept- 
able*1. At the end of February, he gave his full support to 
the staging of a demonstration against the new structure. But 
on 15th June, Inkumsah and his fellow Executive officers atten­
ded an informal TUC meeting in Accra and on his return commenced 
arguing the case for a greater degree of co-operation with the 
TUC leadership and its plans. At a Location mass-meeting, he 
declared,
**that since it was to be a Government Bill, it 
will come whether you like it or not. He said 
the opportunity was there for discussing the 
clauses and make representation to Government 
before the matter reached Parliament, and he 
really felt that if they could not make good 
use of the chance, then whether or not they ^
like it, its tentacles would embrace the workers.**
This met with hooting and catcalls from the Location workers:
"We thought those TUC boys must have bribed him. Or else his 
cousin (A. E. Inkumsah, the Minister of the Interior) had
3
persuaded him to betray us*'.
1. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 13th February 1958.
2. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 24th July 1958.
3. Interview with A. B. Essuman, railway artisan and 
Location Branch Secretary (1962-70), 14th October 1971.
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This judgement may have been unfair. Certainly the
new structure offered an indirect bribe to the Presidents and
General Secretaries of national unions in the form of vastly
increased salaries of £840 and £750 per annum respectively.
But it is arguable that Inkumsah also had a firmer grasp than
the rank-and-file of political realities. His reconsideration
of the position did not, he stressed, lead him to support the
new structure unconditionally but merely to hold the opinion
"that it was better to be in there and have our views expressed,
and by the strength of our arguments to win them over to our 
1
viewpoint." His fellow Executive Officers, with the import­
ant exception of V, K. Quist, agreed with him. That Inkumsah 
was not "selling out" to the TUC was suggested by the attitude 
taken towards him by the TUC leadership which, as he pointed 
out, "was at the same time branding him as being reactionary 
and working against them in the interest of a political clique" 
(presumably, the ex-C.F.T.U. leaders). This distrust persisted 
right through to September 1961 when Inkumsah was detained in 
spite of his official stance of opposition to the strike; 
and on his release from detention, the TUC leadership pro­
hibited his re-instatement as President of the Union.
Still,' the majority of the Sekondi-Takoradi rank-and- 
file and their branch and association leaders would not agree 
to any compromise, and at the July Working Committee Meeting,
the Location branch submitted a resolution "disavowing the
2
leadership of Comrade Inkumsah". They listed five charges, 
of which the last and most important was that "he has committed 
this union to accept the Histradrut structure prepared by
3
Mr. John Tettegah" - (the use of *Mr* rather than 1 Comrade*
1. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 14th August 1958.
2. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 24th July 1958.
3. Ibid.
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here was clearly pointed). The Executive officers and 
1up-country* (i.e. non-Sekondi-Takoradi) delegates sided 
with Inkumsah, in conformity with an oft-recurring pattern 
in Railway Union politics, and carried the resolution that 
ffthere was no substance in the charges proferred against the
1President - and that the President should remain in office,**
But the Location representatives insisted that their stand
was irrevocable and that "although Comrade Inkumsah has the
personality for leadership and is bold, yet since the Location
masses do not appreciate his services they wish that he should
2
resign or they secede." At the end of September, having once 
more failed to win over a majority of Working Committee members, 
the Location branch of the Union did in fact secede, and, 
together with the Electrical and Traffic Associations (based 
at Takoradi), the Marine Association, which had broken away 
earlier in the year, and the Enginemens* Union, which was 
maintaining its opposition to incorporation in the central 
Railway Union, they formed a Joint Council of Railway Unions.
From the perspective of the structure of power and 
communications in the Railway Union, it is significant that 
the secession was limited to these groups. It did not include 
any of the *up-country* workers, with the exception of those 
in the Traffic Association, nor all even of the Takoi*adi 
workers. The *up-country* workers and their representatives 
were (and indeed remain) relatively insulated from those 
several factors making for especial militancy among the 
Sekondi-Takoradi workers. More particularly, the ease with 
which they have been controlled by the official Union leader­
ship derives from their relative isolation from the centre of
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
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Union activity, (all negotiations being carried on between
Association leaders and Departmental heads based in Sekondi-
Takoradi). In consequence, they tend to lack close familiarity
with Union affairs, and generally follow the official line as
communicated to them by branch representatives. These are in
turn easily cultivated by the Executive officers on their tours 
1
of the line. A different and more complex explanation is 
required in the case of the decision of many of the Takoradi 
workers not to join the secession. Highly Active*, well- 
informed, and independent-minded in their trade union particip­
ation, they could not so readily be controlled by union officials, 
whether * local* or ’national*. But in confused situations, 
where a difficult decision between conflicting aims and prin­
ciples had to be made, long-serving or particularly esteemed 
’local* leaders were often able to exert a subtle but decisive 
influence over rank-and-file behaviour through the respect 
accorded their opinions.
So, in 1958, although the Sekondi-Takoradi workers 
had been united in their opposition to the new structure, many 
were confused, when it came to the difficult question of seces­
sion, as to whether such a transgression of the basic principle 
and motto of the Union, (’’United We Stand, Divided We Fall”), 
could be justified. Xn such a situation, the rank-and-file 
tended to follow the line of their Association leaders, partly 
on account of patronage ties in the sense of gratitude for past 
services rendered, but primarily because the opinions and 
sincerity of their local leaders could, it was felt, be most 
trusted. As one ex-Association leader put it, with obvious 
sincerity, ’’The thing about the railwayworkers, especially here
1. Such ’cultivation* of up-country officials often takes 
the form of promising to arrange their transfer to 
Sekondi-Takoradi in return for * loyal* service.
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in Sekondi-Takoradi, is that you really have to persuade them 
with good arguments. You must never take their support for 
granted. But of course it helps a great deal to persuade 
them if they know you personally and have reason to respect 
you.” Whereas the Association and Branch leaders at Sekondi 
Location were united in their determination to,secede, and 
A. Y. Ankomah (Electrical Association Secretary), W. N. Grant 
and A. Y. Bello (Chairman and Secretary of the Traffic Assoc­
iation) persuaded their members to follow, no significant 
inroads were made among those Takoradi workers whose Association 
leaders refused to support the secession. This refusal appears 
to have derived very largely from their long-standing friend­
ship with Union President Inkumsah, who had been the Takoradi 
Branch Secretary for several years, though, as the secession­
ists claimed, lack of courage may also have had something to 
do with it.
The subsequent history of the Joint Council of Railway 
Unions was lucidly summarised in a Bulletin issued to the rank- 
and-file membership in July, 1959:
"At the 3rd Annual Conference of the Federation 
of Government Industrial Trade Unions held in 
Kumasi, we were invited to attend and discuss 
the new TUC structure. After a very lengthy and 
thorough research on the constitution of the 
structure we were able to extract 13 articles from 
it to which we objected and forwarded to the 
Secretary of the TUC for amendments - but 
he did nothing about it.
"Some time later, we received copies of the 
Industrial Relations Bill from the Minister of 
Labour, requesting us to study and submit our 
objections. We all welcomed this idea but the
/cont..
1. Interview with A. Y. A. Bello, Secretary of the Traffic 
Association (1956-61) and later Accra Branch Secretary, 
5th November, 1971.
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"..time given us was so limited we were
forced to sit one whole day to construe the 
whole Bill: this done, we further submitted
11 articles in the Bill which we found was 
straining the freedom of Trade Unionism, to 
the Minister of Labour and Co-operatives for 
necessary amendments to be made in the Bill.
He did not even reply to our letter sent to 
him, but all that we would hear was that the 
Bill had been passed into law by the Parlia­
ment.
"Later, the Prime Minister met us again to 
discuss some naughty points in the structure 
and the Bill. We did not however reach any 
vital conclusions - the next thing we heard 
was the inauguration of the new TUC.
"The four Unions in the Railway decided to 
stay out and operate as it was and in accord­
ance with a section in the same Industrial 
Relations Act which states: 'Unions not
affiliated to the TUC can meet their employers, 
provided the latter has no objection, but will 
have no legal bargaining power.'
".... But according to the General Manager, he 
has received a letter from the Government stat­
ing that it is now the Government policy to 
stop meeting all unions that are not affiliated 
to the TUC.
"We have sent a letter to the Minister of Labour 
to confirm whether this policy is correct. We 
are patiently waiting for a reply.
"I am asked by your leaders to thank you for 
your unflinching support you have given our 
march towards freedom of Trade Unionism." 1
The following month the secessionists received a 
reply from Nkrumah in person:
RUA, Misc./32, Joint Council of Railway Unions Bulletin, 
No. 1.
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"You must not think that I have forgotten the 
part you played in the struggle for Independ­
ence and the support you have given to me 
personally. Everything X am doing in connec­
tion with labour is meant to be in your interests.
I know your problems, your difficulties and what 
goes on in the Labour Movement and I know how to 
help you solve them." 1
After a brief discourse on the advantages of the new structure, 
the Prime Minister continued,
"Representations have been made to me that the 
TUG is extravagant in the use of its funds. I 
propose to take up this matter with the TUG and 
I want to assure all workers that I shall see 
to it that the funds are properly used and that 
the welfare services which have been promised will 
materialise.
"I now give my ruling: From now on I and my
Government recognise only two national unions 
in the Railway establishment - the Railway and 
Harbour Workers* Union and the Railway Engine- 
men* s Union.'* 2
Shortly afterwards, the Government passed an Amend­
ment to the Industrial Relations Act decreeing that no unions 
were permitted to exist outside the twenty-four constituent 
unions of the TUC.
Between then and the end of the year, the splinter 
groups formally re-amalgamated with the official Union, but 
the seriousness and bitterness of the 1958-59 division had 
been such as to prevent any real, lasting reunion, and the 
conflict between national and local (Sekondi-Takoradi) leader­
ship continued with scarce a respite. In October 1959, the 
National Executive officers were re-elected without change,
1. RUA, Misc./32, Prime Minister to J.C.R.U. General 
Secretary.
2, Ibid.
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having refused to allow the splinter unions' members to vote; 
and in January 1960, the ex-splinter union leaders were re­
elected to their positions in the Branches and Associations.
The latter resumed their attack on the top-level leadership 
by proposing a resolution that only the Associations, and not 
the Branches, should be represented on the National Executive 
Council (which would have assured them of majority control there), 
and that National officers should forfeit the right to vote on 
major issues since they were "officially classified as Govern­
ment back-benchers".  ^ This was, not surprisingly, over-ruled.
The National Officers countered by tabling .an amendment to the 
Union Constitution, recommended by the TUC leadership, according 
to which,
"Any member who endeavours to create dissension 
among the members; or who works against the 
interest and harmony of the Union or of any 
Branch Union or Departmental Association; or 
who circulates false rumours or makes slander­
ous charges or remarks about another member 
which he shall be unable to prove, shall upon 
conviction thereof be punished by expulsion 
from the Union." 2
This too failed to gain majority support - (it was considered
not to be conducive to the proper and peaceful working of the
Union) - though the President's disciplinary and executive
powers were vastly increased in the new model Constitution
adopted in February 1960, and the malcontents had to tread more
3
cautiously for a while.
1. RUA, Executive Council Minutes, 3rd March 1960.
2. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 2nd May 1960.
3. In this new 'model' Constitution, the President of the
Union gained the right to appoint all 'ad hoc* committees, 
to fill all temporary vacancies at the level of National
Officers with his own nominees, and "to suspend individual
members or offices of the Branch Unions or Departmental 
Associations where, in his judgement, their activities 
are in violation of the declared policies of the National 
Union." RUA, Executive Council Minutes, 8th February 1960.
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Below the surface of relative quiescence in the 
Railway Union in 1960-61, however, opposition to the TUC 
and the regime it served was growing amongst the rank-and-file, 
fuelled by further examples of the detachment and insensitivity 
of top-level officials. President Nkrumah*s presentation of a 
N$250,000 Hall of Labour to the TUC was perceived as a bribe 
to obligate TUC officials to restrain workers* wage demands, 
and as a symbol of their corruption and social distance from 
the working masses. The pseudo-Marxist ideology used by visit­
ing TUC officials, and by the speakers at TUC seminars, was 
not merely ineffectively communicated to the rank-and-file and 
their middle-level representatives. Rather, this "Soviet-ism 
nonsense**, as Pobee Biney termed it, was itself a positive 
irritant to unionists who valued, above all, the qualities of 
’straightforwardness* and ’plain-talking*. As one branch 
official recalled,
'*1 must be frank, we never understood what they 
were telling us, we were just following them 
blindly. The ideas seemed foreign to us, and 
although the speakers were obviously very bril­
liant, a lot did not know the workers* real 
situation. They would tell us, ’The workers of 
Ghana will never have any difficulty getting 
milk and margarine*, when there was a shortage 
in the market at the same time. If we had tried 
to talk that way to the masses - well, a few did 
and the workers just hooted i^ ith laughter over it.  ^
Especially the *isms*. Everything was with *isms*.**
In so far as the TUC ideologists * attacks on 
**bourgeois opportunists and self-seekers" were understood,
1. When questioned in July-August 1971 as to the most 
important qualities of a good trade unionist, 93 per 
cent of railway xvorker interviewees immediately res­
ponded, "He should be straightforward", or "plain- 
talking". Questionnaire Survey conducted by the xvriter.
2. Interview xdLth A. B. Essuman, 18th July 1971.
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they could only serve to highlight the hypocrisy of those 
making them. A student of the Ideology of the Nkrumah regime 
concluded from his interview with G.P.P.-TUC leaders: "For
mamy, socialism was not even a perspective within which to 
bring about modernisation, it was merely a means to rationalise 
the acquisition of power. Most tended to see socialism in a 
favourable light in terms of the expansion of their own depart- 
ments." The Sekondi-Takoradi railwayworkers were not slow 
to perceive this reality and to contrast the socialism of 
Tettegah and Meyer with that of Pobee Biney.
1. J. D. Holm, "Ideology and Socio-Political Development
in Nkrumah*s Ghana", (Ph.D. thesis, Chicago University, 
1966), p.311.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SEKONDI-TAKORADI STRIKE OF 1961.
The previous chapter traced the development in 1950-61 
of an increasingly bitter political and ideological conflict 
between, on the one hand, the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers 
and their local, middle-level leadership, and, on the other, 
the C.P.P.-TUC elite, (the national officials of the Union some­
times seen as being allied with the latter). The strike of 
September 1961 was essentially a further stage - the decisive 
encounter - in this struggle. In response to the July 'austerity1 
budget, the middle-level leaders seized on the issues of Com­
pulsory Savings and the Property Tax to publicly test the res­
ponsiveness of the top-level leadership to rank-and-file opinion. 
Implicit in this conflict, it has been suggested, was a wider 
protest against general characteristics of the Nkrumah regime, 
its corruption, autocracy, and economic elitism. Such tendencies, 
however, were generally apparent throughout the towns and cities 
of Ghana. One is therefore led to ask why they met with so 
exceptionally hostile and determined a reaction from the railway 
workers of Sekondi-Takoradi.
This is not, incidentally, to suggest that other 
Ghanaian workers were not also disturbed by the growth of such 
tendencies in the C.P.P. regime. It would seem that many workers 
in Accra and Kumasi were sympathetic to the railway workers' 
stance but lacked the courage or organisational solidarity to 
lend them support. Moreover, in as far as the Sekondi-Takoradi 
workers were simply in advance of working opinion in other parts 
of the country, it is perhaps readily understandable that dis­
illusionment should first set in amongst precisely those who, 
in the early days, had been the most militant and radical sup­
porters of the nationalist movement.
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Nevertheless, additional factors were clearly involved. 
Among the most important of these was the ideological influence 
of Pobee Biney and his followers. Yet the influence of Biney's 
views must be related to other, structural factors making for 
the growth and continuing vitality of a 'populist' political 
culture among the railway workers. One such factor was the 
singularly democratic structure and highly 'participant* ethic 
of internal Railway Union politics. It is a commonplace of 
'socialisation* theory that democratic values are likely to be 
held especially strongly by those accustomed to regular part­
icipation in effectively democratic secondary organisations.
In this respect, the railway workers' experience of union 
participation probably exerted a significant influence on their 
attitudes to the political system as a whole. There were even 
clearer reasons for their especial sensitivity to corruption in 
the C.P.P. regime. ('Genuine' hostility to corruption does, 
of course, require fuller explanation than is sometimes assumed 
by western commentators.) Executive and supervisory staff in 
the Railway Administration, as in the Civil Service generally, 
were often in a position to benefit from corruption (and pat­
ronage) through their control of public access to government 
services and facilities. This was not, however, the case with 
the skilled and unskilled railway workers, who enjoyed no such 
control or contact with the public (in their function as employ­
ees). Patronage ties of a very loose kind were often important 
in their initially securing employment in the Railways, but of 
marginal significance for gaining promotion or protection against 
dismissal, since the Union was fairly effective in checking 
favouritism and discrimination on the part of the Administration. 
They did, on the other hand, stand to lose a great deal, at 
least indirectly, from elite corruption - in the National
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Housing Corporation, for example; in the Railway Administration 
itself, where the corruption of senior executives was (and still 
is) often blamed for the Railway’s unprofitability, and the 
workers' consequent difficulty in justifying wage demands; and, 
most importantly, in the trade union movement where the rank- 
and-file suffered from having their leaders bought off by the 
Government.
These factors, then, considered together with the 
railway workers' economic frustration, tended to generate highly 
critical attitudes towards governmental autocracy and corruption. 
Of course, similar attitudes might be expected to characterise 
other Ghanaian manual workers to the degree that the same con­
siderations also hold for them. From this perspective, the 
railway workers' especial predisposition to democratic, populist 
values might be attributed to the singular historical development 
and activism of their union culture, and also to the congeniality 
of Sekondi-Takoradi's predominant 'working-class' ethos.
Yet it would be misleading to portray the 1961 strike 
as simply a manifestation of (relatively) highly developed class- 
consciousness. Implicit in the strike and the 'populist' con­
sciousness of its participants was a fairly strong communalistic 
element. The despised elite were, in the main, the 'big men' 
in, or from, Accra. The corruption of official institutions 
emanated, and was directed from there, to the exploitation of 
the people of Sekondi-Takoradi. Accra alone, it appeared, had 
benefitted from elite wealth and patronage, with its fine 
roadsteads and plush hotels. Sekondi-Takoradi had been con­
sistently refused development grants (with the single exception 
of that for a new market-centre), and seemed to lack any repre­
sentatives sufficiently influential with the Nkrumah Government 
to secure fair treatment for the city. Now (i.e. in 1961), the
]^/[ /l
Government was building a new harbour at Tema - 15 miles from 
Accra - to the inevitable disadvantage of Sekondi-Takoradi* 
Resentment at such relative deprivation sometimes found expres­
sion in openly regionalistic sentiments: "We Westerners espec­
ially, the Government doesn't mind us, yet we have all these 
industries, bauxite and gold and things, and we work much harder 
than all those office-workers in Accra, drawing their fat sal- 
aries. If they don't look out, it will be another Biafra."
The open expression of such sentiments is atypical, and even 
frowned upon in Railway Union culture, which is itself markedly 
free from tribalism, and generally disapproving of communalistic 
movements in national politics* Nevertheless, the Accra/Sekondi- 
Takoradi dimension certainly served to intensify the railway 
workers' sense of social distance between the 'big men' and the 
'common people', as well as to create widespread local support 
for the 1961 strike. Minister Tawia Adamafio's denunciation of 
the strikers as "Western Rats" was indicative of some well- 
grounded government feeling in this regard* As has generally 
been the case in the post-Independence politics of African 
states, an explosive situation resulted from the coincidence 
of class-type and communal lines of conflict*
The 1961 Budget.
For the Nkrumah Government, an austerity budget was
imperative in 1961 if it was not to abandon its development 
2
objectives. The Second Development Plan (1959-64) aimed at 
an ambitious programme of industrialisation, farm mechanization,
1. Interview with J. Dadson, railway artisan, 19th September 
1971.
2. For fuller details of the budget, and the general economic 
background, see St. Clair Drake and L. A. Lacy, op.cit., 
on which this brief account is based.
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and agricultural diversification designed to break the nation's 
excessive economic dependence upon cocoa, which it was estimated 
would require a total expenditure of Nf2980 million over a five- 
year period. Almost half of the required revenue was expected 
to come from the export tax on cocoa (about 40 per cent of the 
Government's annual revenue was secured from this tax up to 
1959) and from loans from the Cocoa Marketing Board - a public 
corporation which had its own invested reserves built up by the 
monopoly it held on buying the entire cocoa crop each year at 
a fixed price and selling it on the world market at a highly 
variable price.
In 1960, a sudden and drastic fall in the price for 
cocoa on the world market threatened to wreck these development 
plans. The Government's loan from the Cocoa Marketing Board 
was N#9 million less than had been anticipated because the 
Board had to pay out this sum to farmers who had been guaranteed 
a fixed price, while the world price had tumbled below that 
figure. Ghana's bumper crop of 1961, it became clear, would 
yield several million less than had a smaller crop the previous 
year - world production was at an all-time high and, in 1961, 
the world market price reached its lowest point in thirteen 
years. If a serious slowing down in the pace of development 
was to be prevented without resort to dependence on foreign 
loans and the further exhaustion of national reserves (which 
had already fallen from N0235 million in 1955 to about N#120 
million in 1961), then it was clearly necessary to increase the 
proportion of revenue from other sources.
With the agreement of the Ghana Farmers' Council, 
cocoa farmers were to be asked to contribute 16 per cent of the 
price owed them by the C.M.B. to the national coffers and also 
to accept a government bond, maturing in ten years, to cover
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10 per cent of the total sum owed them for their crop. The 
urban populace were to contribute their share to the develop­
ment effort through various measures introduced in the July 
Budget; a Property Tax on above-average sized houses (i.e. 
two rooms and a hall); a new Purchase Tax on durable con­
sumer goods, such as cars and refrigerators, and increased 
import duties on a wide range of commodities; and a Compulsory 
Savings Scheme suggested by the Cambridge economist, Nicholas 
Kaldor. Under this scheme, all persons earning over N0336 a 
year would have to accept 5 per cent of their wages or salaries 
in National Investment Bonds drawing 4 per cent interest and 
redeemable after 10 years. This figure was set so as to exempt 
the lowest-paid category of unskilled workers. Hardest hit 
would be the skilled workers, economically situated just above 
the exemption ceiling of N#336 per annum, and therefore least 
able to afford the Compulsory Savings exactions. However, as 
Kaldor saw it, "the advantage of the scheme as against straight­
forward taxation is that people are merely asked to postpone 
their consumption and not to forego it altogether.This 
overlooked the fact that the increasingly unaccountable character 
of the C.P.P. regime, together with the highly undiplomatic 
suggestion made by some C.P.P. leaders that patriots should be 
prepared to make their contribution without expectation of 
repayment, completely undermined confidence in the Scheme*s 
working according to plan. It was certainly generally regarded 
not as an investment but as a form, ('devious', perhaps, rather 
than 'straight forward') of direct taxation.
Nevertheless, relative to the sacrifices being 
demanded of the cocoa farmers, and to the skilled workers' own
1. Nicholas Kaldor, "Taxation for Economic Development", in 
the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.l, No.l, 
(March 1963), p.22.
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rise in prosperity in 1957-61, the level of exaction imposed
was not so high as to inevitably, or by itself, provoke such
stern resistance as was in fact encountered. The Government 
had some reason to anticipate its being accepted as reasonable. 
The Minister of Finance presenting the Budget to Parliament on 
July 7th, declared that,
"Any increase in burdens imposed by this budget 
will be small in comparison with the increase 
in incomes and living standards which the people 
of this country have enjoyed since Independence - 
as Osagyefo (Nkrumah) said in his speech, the
increase in the total wage and salary payments
since 1957 has been 49 per cent. Last year 
we granted a general wage increase of approx­
imately 22 per cent.” 1
Such figures say little, of course, about real wage 
levels, which, for the skilled and unskilled workers, appear 
to have risen by approximately 14 per cent in 1957-61. Over 
the whole period of the '50's these workers had enjoyed a rise 
of some 45 per cent in real incomes, (see Table 4.1).
This at least enabled skilled workers to meet the 
cost of basic necessities, but hardly provided a life of (even 
relative) luxury. The Sekondi-Takoradi Household Budget Survey 
of 1955 suggested that skilled workers and others, earning 
around £11 (or N027) per month, often experienced difficulty 
in living within their incomes, even though the average expen­
diture pattern included little in the way of luxury items,
2(see Table 3.2). If this was the picture in 1955, then by
1. Ghana, Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Vol.24,
(7th July 1961), column 133.
2. The average expenditure pattern in Sekondi-Takoradi was
as follows: Food - 57%, (Local Foods - 52.3%); Clothing -
14.8%; Drink and Tobacco - 5.1%; Fuel and Light - 6.0%; 
Services - 4.9%; Rent and Rates - 6.0%; Durable Goods - 
2.5%; Miscellaneous - 3.0%. Sekondi-Takoradi Survey of 
Population and Household Budgets (1955), (Gold Coast: 
Office of the Government Statistician, Statistical and 
Economic Papers, No.4).
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1961 the skilled workers should have been able to make ends 
meet fairly comfortably, though with little to spare or save. 
They were, of course, bound to be unenthusiastic about giving 
up most of what little economic progress they had achieved 
since Independence. And, with food prices rising by over 
40 per cent in the summer months, it is perhaps understand­
able that they should have been complaining of '*an already 
precarious financial situation; it is hard to make ends 
meet.1*  ^ They were, however, accustomed to this regular 
seasonal rise in food prices which therefore presented little 
cause for disquiet in itself (though the rise in 1961 was rather 
greater than in earlier years). It would seem reasonable to 
conclude that, while the Compulsory Savings Scheme was likely 
to impose some financial strain on skilled workers, this was 
hardly so great as to be unacceptable if the Government and its 
development plans retained any degree of popular confidence or 
enthusiasm. The commencement of the 1961 strike, though ration­
alised by its leaders in terms of opposition to the budget 
measures, in fact signified a far deeper disillusionment with 
the C.P.P. regime.
The Commencement of the Strike.
The budget measures were announced on the 15th of July.
On the 20th July, the railway workers* middle-level leaders 
manoeuvred the National Executive into supporting a resolution 
that:
**As that aspect of the Budget proposals dwelling on the 
National Development Bonds strikes at the very root of 
the income of the workers, we the members of the Work­
ing Committee acting on behalf of the National Executive 
of Railway and Harbour Workers hereby resolve that in 
view of the extreme hardship that the deductions are 
likely to throw on the workers at the end of this month
/cont..
1. Ashanti Pioneer, 5th September 1961, p.8.
149
and thereafter, the Government, through the 
TUC of Ghana, be approached to call for suspension 
of these deductions until such time that the workers1 
viewpoint of the whole Budget proposals has been 
heard". 1
Table 4.1 : Fluctuations on the Real Wage Level of Unskilled 
Workers, 1950-61.
Date Daily Wage Money-Wage Cost of Living Real Wage
Rate Index Index Index
Dec 1950 3/3 217 285 76
Dec 1951 3/3 217 333 65
Apr 1952 4/6 300 326 92
Dec 1952 4/6 300 324 93
Dec 1953 4/6 300 324 93
Dec 1954 4/6 300 324 93
Dec 1955 4/6 300 344 87
Apr 1956 5/2 344 351 98
Dec 1957 5/2 344 351 98
Dec 1958 5/6 367 354 104
Oct 1959 5/6 367 364 101
Dec 1960 6/6 433 367 118
Dec 1961 6/6 433 390 111
Source: Kodwo Ewusi, The Distribution of Monetary Incomes 
in Ghana, (Legon, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, Social 
and Economic Research, 1971), p.43.
It was most unlikely, the opposition leaders realised, 
that the TUC would support, or even reply to, this demand, but 
it at least maintained the appearance of following official 
procedures, and gave the TUC leadership an opportunity to redeem 
itself. When the TUC failed to reply, the Presidential Commis­
sion was approached directly, but by the end of August, "Members 
were dissatisfied with the attitude of the Presidential Commis­
sion for not replying to the letter aforementioned and they 
feared the masses would inevitably take a serious view of the
1. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 20th July 1961.
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situation at a Mass Rally tomorrow1*.  ^ The middle-level 
leaders had made their point and resolutions were adopted 
by the Sekondi, Takoradi, and Kumasi branches calling for 
secession from the TUG since "the TUC has definitely failed 
to express the true feelings of the working class." Inkumsah
and the other top-level leaders now stood revealed as 'ghost* 
leaders, having lost all control over the Sekondi-Takoradi 
rank-and-file. They could only go along with the forthcoming 
strike action, or else retire from the scene and make disap­
proving sounds from afar in order to avoid being held account­
able. The opposition leaders "pointed out that the absence of 
the National Officers at the Rally of 29th August was conspic-
3
uous and urged them to be present at the next one". None were,
and the Union Chairman, J. Appiah, capitulated entirely by 
handing in his resignation. On September 3rd, the strike leaders 
took over the Union offices - now deserted by the National 
Officers - to send out messages to the branches "to let go the 
anchor" - Pobee Biney's code-phrase for strike action. During 
the following seventeen days of strike activity, the National 
Officers made it clear to the Press that "the Railway Union as 
such has not officially declared a strike" and "did strongly 
appeal to the workers to work to enable immediate negotiations 
to be carried out" - but to no effect.
John Tettegah recognised that the strike was centrally 
concerned with the new structure and its leadership, and not 
simply Compulsory Savings. In the second week of the strike, 
he attempted to restore some measure of confidence in the TUC 
by appealing that "all outstanding grievances be forwarded to
1. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, 31st August 1961.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Daily Graphic, 8th September 1961, p.l.
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TUG headquarters without delay in order to seek avenues of 
redress and prompt actions”.  ^ The railwayworkers certainly 
had a plethora of job-related grievances going back many years - 
their conditions of service had been brought up to date, and 
the Africanisation programme implemented, only in a piecemeal 
fashion which gave rise to scores of inconsistencies and 
injustices and left them disadvantaged (for example) relative 
to workers in the new corporations. Such grievances were an 
important factor in generating allegiance to forceful local 
leadership which ’’really understood their situation and prob­
lems”, and conversely alienation from the Accra-based TUC 
officials. But Tettegah underestimated the depth of this 
alienation if he seriously thought that such a gesture could 
restore the railway workers’confidence in the TUC. In any case, 
the railway workers’ expression of opposition to the TUC elite 
had become part of a wider political struggle, attracting the 
active or moral involvement of other social groups: ”The support
we received from all the people here (i.e. in Sekondi-Takoradi) 
was so tremendous, we realised we could not back down even if we
had wanted to. People felt it was a burning issue to the 
2
community.”
Subjective Significance of the Strike: Class-consciousness
and Communalism.
The sources of conflict between the railway workers 
and the C.P.P.-TUC elite have already been delineated in the 
preceding chapter. Attention was also drawn there, in very 
general terms, to the way in which the economic welfare of 
other sections of the populace - the unskilled workers, the
1. RUA, Working Committee Minutes, Tettegah to Railway Union 
General Secretary, 12th September 1961.
2. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, railway unionist, 4th 
June 1971.
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unemployed, and the market-women - was directly or indirectly 
dependent upon that of the class of skilled workers. The 
unskilled workers were, of course, most directly involved in 
the railway artisans' conflict with the TUC elite. One of the 
central issues in this political struggle was that of reform 
of the wage and salary structure inherited from the colonial 
period. The C.P.P., though apparently committed to such reform 
in 1949-51, had failed to carry it through. The Lidbury- 
Gbedemah Report of 1951-52 had made only half-hearted reforms 
in this direction, and it was on this issue primarily that 
Pobee Biney and Anthony Woode had found cause to criticise the 
party and its leadership. Many of the unskilled railway workers 
also felt, (and still do feel), very strongly about this:
"It all depends on cheating. There are so many 
people being paid fat salaries without working.
I didn't go to school but I know my work. If
an educated man comes along to sit in an office
and he's given so much more pay than myself, I 
have to challenge the Government and find out 
what is happening." 1
The skilled railway workers' association with a militant reform­
ist stance helps to account for the fact that, in 1961, they 
received the solid support of the unskilled workers, even though 
these would not be directly affected by the Compulsory Savings 
exactions.
Many of the unemployed of Sekondi-Takoradi also joined 
in the strikers' demonstrations. Some of these were, of course, 
sons or other relatives of the skilled workers on whom they 
depended for food and accommodation. They were therefore part­
icularly concerned to unite with the strikers in attacking the
1. Interview with Moses Braimah, Secretary of Permanent 
Waymen's Association, 3rd October 1971.
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proposed Property Tax. The preceding chapter described how 
a serious shortage of housing for the lower-paid in Sekondi- 
Takoradi had been exacerbated by corruption and party favour­
itism in the National Housing Corporation. In consequence, 
most workers had either to pay exorbitant rates for privately- 
rented accommodation, or else to band together with relatives 
or friends and struggle to save enough to build a house for 
several families. In either case, they generally felt obliged 
to provide accommodation for unemployed relatives, which added 
to the strain on their incomes and the overcrowded state of their 
living conditions. It was small wonder then that the 1961
strikers demanded that the Property Tax "be amended to suit the
1
ordinary worker” , since they feared that it would be passed 
on to those renting accommodation and would inhibit private 
building where more was needed. It also seemed grossly unfair 
to impose a tax on 'family houses' in which workers provided 
free accommodation for the unemployed. As one railway worker 
put it,
"The Government had done nothing to solve our 
housing problems at all, rather they had cheated 
us to please their girlfriends. And then, when 
we struggled to build our own houses, they tried 
to tax us again, forgetting we were already over-  ^
burdened with relatives who could not find work."
The Property Tax issue illustrates how, in Sekondi- 
Takoradi in 1961, grievances which might superficially appear 
to have been particular to the so-called 'labour aristocracy' 
of skilled workers, together with the higher-paid wage-earners, 
took on the character and significance of a 'mass' communal 
protest against the C.P.P. elite. In part, this reflected the
1. Interview with T. B. Ward, railway unionist, 6th June 1971.
2. Ibid.
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dependence of other groups on the economic welfare and pol­
itical assertiveness of the skilled railway and harbour workers. 
But it was also indicative of the high degree of identification 
which these workers had developed with the communal interests 
of Sekondi-Takoradi. The skilled railway workers saw themselves, 
and were generally seen, less as a * labour aristocracy1 than 
as the protectors and leaders of a working-class community.
The reasons for the development of a sense of communal 
deprivation amongst the people of Sekondi-Takoradi have already 
been treated in some detail. It is worth drawing attention here, 
however, to the particular grievances of the Sekondi-Takoradi 
market-women, since they were amongst the most ardent, and 
certainly the most valuable, supporters of the railway workers 
during the course of the strike, encouraging them to hold out, 
and raising morale, by supplying them with free food. Victims 
of C.P.P. oligopoly in the market-trade, they closely identified 
with the railway workers' struggle against similar centralising 
tendencies in the TUC. Alice Koomson, the leading organiser of 
the market-women, explained why they had become so disillusioned 
with C.P.P. rule:
"In the early days, all the market-women were 
crazy for C.P.P. and joined the Women's Organis­
ation, but once the Women's officials had gained 
control of the distribution of foodstuffs in the 
market - they used this monopoly to make them a 
packet. Essie Eluah, the leader of the market- 
women here (she was actually Vice-President of 
the Sekondi-Takoradi Ghana Women), she organised 
it. She gradually moved from selling foodstuffs 
to cloth and other things. Then she got a pass­
book for G.N.T.C. (the Ghana National Trading 
Corporation), the largest wholesalers here in 
Ghana, so that she could obtain goods on credit, 
and later recommended her closest friends for 
pass-books. We found that some of our sisters 
were moving to bigger things while the rest of 
us were crippled.
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"So during the summer of 1961 I travelled round 
even to Kojokrom (a village some five miles out 
of Sekondi) to tell the other market-women I was 
prepared to stand and fight against this, I told 
them, -I have only two children and nothing to 
lose so I will organise it,' When the strike came, 
they were all ready to help the railway workers.
We spent all the money we had saved on giving them 
free cassava, and then, as we were running out, 
Kwesi-Lamptey brought us some more from Danquah 
and those people (the leaders of the opposition 
United Party)." 1
It is clear, then, that the motivation of those 
involved in the 1961 strike went far deeper than that of oppos­
ition to the budget measures. Even the Compulsory Savings 
Scheme issue was of as much symbolic as material significance 
in the sense that, "We knew they were trying to fool us, they
would not pay us back, and we didn't trust them to spend it
2
properly. You couldn't believe what they said any more."
The central issue was initially conceived by the railway workers 
as that of working masses versus the TUC elite. But the sub­
jective significance of the strike rapidly became even wider 
in that it concerned, implicitly at least, the structure and 
performance of Government as a whole, not merely the TUC. This 
issue united virtually the whole Sekondi-Takoradi community in 
support of the strike.
"By midweek practically every activity in the 
port was closed down. Municipal bus drivers 
had joined the strike, as had the city employees 
who collected the sewage daily. Market women 
dispensed free food to the strikers at municipal 
bus garages and other strategic points. Red 
head-bands and a m  bands were in evidence every­
where; they were symbols worn in former days 
by Fanti tribal fighting men to mean, "We are 
ready for War". Ships were pulled away from
/cont..
Vi* Interview with Alice Koomson, 15th August 1971.
2. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 4th June 1971.
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the docks and anchored in the roadstead 
for fear of sabotage. There was an air of 
excitement and pride throughout the city over 
the fact that they, the people of Sekondi- 
Takoradi, had brought business to a standstill, 
had stopped train service to all of Ghana, and 
were displaying solidarity in the fight against 
the budget. Morale was high. The railwayworkers 
were heroes... W. N. Grant a prominent strike 
leader, told the crowd that if parliament did not 
give way to the demands of the people, they would 
disband that body by force." 1
The United Tarty Involvement.
The Government took an extremely serious view of the 
strike and,two days after its commencement, declared a state of 
emergency in the city. This was partly because such strike 
actions were now illegal under the 1958 Industrial Relations 
Act, and also because the measures which the railway workers 
were (formally) protesting were considered essential to the 
achievement of the Governments major objectives. In an Evening 
News editorial earlier in the year, for example, the Government 
had warned that,
"Those who have not the heart for the sacrifices 
which the Party and Nation will call forth will 
be swept by the wayside by the wind of change... 
Ghana’s economic Independence can be achieved only 
if the party is able to mobilise the masses in town 
and countryside to tighten their belts, so that a 
greater proportion of our national income is diverted 
to financing the construction of the means of pro­
duction - machines for making machines." 2
But the Government's disquiet also derived from suspicions that 
the sinister hand of the United Party opposition was at work 
behind the strike.
1. St.Clair Drake and L. A. Lacy, op.cit., p.93.
2. Evening News, 1st May 1961, p.4.
The United Party had been inaugurated on 3rd November
1
1957 at a rally in Accra presided over by Dr. Kofi Busia. Its 
executive was drawn from its component groups - the National 
Liberation Movement, the Northern People's Party, the Moslem 
Association Party, the Togoland Congress, the Anlo Youth 
Organisation, and the Ga Shifimo Kpee. Executive members 
included Dr. J. B. Danquah, Obetsebi Lamptey, Ashie Nikeo,
J. Kwesi Lamptey, Joe Appiah, M. K. Apaloo, Attoh Okine, and 
K. Y. Attoh, in addition to Dr. Busia. In short, the United 
Party consisted of an alliance of the major communalistic 
movements in Ghanaian society under the leadership of intel­
lectuals who had consistently opposed the C.P.P. since U.G.C.C. 
days, or, as in the case of Kwesi-Lamptey and Ashie Nikoe, had 
broken with the C.P.P. in 1951-53. At its inauguration in 
1957, it could claim the support of 32 members of Parliament. 
However, after a series of election defeats, the defection of 
a number of northern M.P.'s, and the 'preventive detention' in
1958 of some thirty-eight party members, including the executive
members Attoh Okine and K. Y. Attoh, the United Party was, by
2
1960, a much weakened parliamentary and electoral force. Its 
only hope of displacing the C.P.P. regime, or even preserving 
its own existence (and keeping its leaders out of prison), 
appeared to lie in the use of violent measures. This might,
1. For fuller details of the United Party, see Dennis Autin, 
op.cit.» pp.384-94.
2. Of the 32 opposition members at Independence, 3 were 
being held in detention, 1 in exile, and 12 had crossed
to the government side by 1960. It is difficult to assess 
the true extent of the U.P.'s electoral support since 
malpractices in the conduct of the 1960 plebiscite appear 
to have been widespread. See Dennis Austin, op.cit., 
pp.393-93.
158
of course, take the form of a coup d'etat, or an assassination 
attempt, such as Apaloo and Amponsah were alleged to have plan­
ned in December 1958. It seems probable, however, that there 
was little basis to this latter charge and that, in general, 
the U.P. leaders were less prepared for the direct use of 
violence than the C.P.P. liked to suggest. A more appealing 
strategy lay in the incitement of civil disturbances by fuelling, 
or playing on, the intense and growing popular hostility to 
the C.P.P. regime which existed in many parts of the country.
In any case, the leaders of any movement of opposition to the 
C.P.P. were likely to be drawn into flirtation with the United 
Party, at least in the sense of seeking its financial support.
This undoubtedly occurred in the case of the Sekondi- 
Takoradi strike. Danquah and other United Party leaders met 
with a group of railway unionists in August and sought to con­
vince them that the budget measures were not only harsh and 
unfair but signalled an impending economic crisis."^ It is also 
clear from the testimony of Alice Koomson that she and her 
husband, A. Y. Ankomah, the railway unionist, had developed 
close links with Kwesi Lamptey, the United Party's leading 
representative in Sekondi-Takoradi, and arranged for him to 
channel money to the market-women to aid the workers' strike
effort. Ankomah and his wife were, on their own admission,
2
firmly committed by 1961 "to spoil the Government". Yet it 
is far from clear that the mass of strikers knew anything of 
this United Party involvement, and quite manifestly untrue 
that the United Party actually incited the strike (as a sub­
sequent Government White Paper claimed), or was capable of 
doing so. On the contrary, it is clear from a consideration of
1. Interview with A. B. Essuman, railway unionist, 14th 
August 1971.
2. Interview with A. Y. Ankomah and Alice Koomson, 15th 
August 1971.
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the background to the strike that the United Party's role was 
marginal, much as its leaders may have attempted to capitalise 
on an existing conflict between the railway workers and the 
C.P.P. Indeed, the most notable characteristics of the railway 
workers' hostility to the C.P.P. was their consistent refusal 
to translate this into support for the United Party. As late 
as the plebiscite of 1960, while Danquah and the United Party 
succeeded in winning 35 per cent of the vote in Accra, their
electoral support was virtually non-existent in Sekondi-
1
Takoradi. This antipathy to the United Party cannot be
adequately explained in terms of identification with different,
opposing communal interests since, by 1960-61, the U.P. was far
more (though also less) than an Ashanti-based movement. The
reason was rather that, although the railway workers' conflict
with the C.P.P. was fuelled by a certain communalistic sentiment,
this was, for the most part, consciously conceived in class, or
mass versus elite, terms. Railway worker ideology was even
nationalistic in the sense that overtly tribal or regional
movements were regarded as regressive. The United Party still
tended to be seen as an opportunistic extension of the old
U.G.C.C. and the class of "lawyers who would not risk their wigs
2for the sake of the common people". In addition, since the 
central issue in the railway workers' campaign against the TUC 
elite had been that of party control, many were genuinely con­
cerned, for the sake of consistency, to resist too close an 
alliance with, or manipulation by, the opposition party.
Consequently, those railway unionists who had been 
led by their disillussionment with the C.P.P. regime to develop 
ties with the United Party - A. Y. Ankomah, V. K. Quist,
1. Dennis Austin, op.cit., p.393.
2. Phrase attributed to Pobee Biney. Interview with
Kofi Imbeah, 4th June 1971.
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W. N. Grant, and K. G. Quartey - were extremely concerned to 
keep this association secret. The majority of railway workers 
and their middle-level leaders conceived the strike as a non­
partisan reformist protest, and appear either to have been 
unaware of the United Party involvement, or, when they learned 
of it, highly disapproving. At the beginning of the third week 
of the strike, when President Nkrumah gave assurances of future 
reforms, and ordered the release of all persons arrested in 
connection with the strike, a split developed between the 
intransigents - Ankomah, Quist, Grant and Quartey - who wanted 
to hold out in the hope of precipitating an army coup, and the 
‘reformists' who felt that, with the President's conciliatory
response, the main objectives of the strike had been attained
1as successfully as could be expected. The reformists were 
in a majority amongst the middle-level leaders - A. Y. Bello,
K. Imbeah, J. K. Baaku, T. B. Ward, T. S. Bentil, T. Hagan,
S. Onyina, G. Essiel, and J. Ashielfie were all reformists 
rather than U.P. supporters - but had difficulty in convincing 
the rank-and-file that their proposal for a return-to-work did 
not amount to a back-down. Lacking clear majority support, 
they were unwilling to undermine the solidarity which had been 
maintained so impressively until then. By the middle of the 
week, however, virtually all the rank-and-file had come round 
to supporting a return-to-work for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the President's warning, on Wednesday of that week, that the 
strike had taken on an insurrectionary character, and that 
maximum force would be used if necessary to restore the Railway 
and Harbour to normal operation on Friday, intimidated the 
railway workers into returning on that day. But, in addition,
1. Interviews with Kofi Imbeah, 12th June 1971; and 
J. K. Baaku, 7th October 1971.
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the spread of rumours that some of the strike leaders had 
indeed accepted money from the United Party to continue the 
strike action undermined the intransigents' support amongst 
the rank-and-file, who felt they were now being used against 
their will by the U.P. Hence the aims of the strike became 
more clearly defined - to awaken the C.P.P. to popular dis­
content at its increasingly corrupt, autocratic, and elitist 
character, but without dabbling in subversive party politics.
Reprisals and Achievements.
Soon after the men had returned to work, their leaders 
and a number of market women were arrested. On 3rd October, 
Danquah, Joe Appiah, and Victor Owusu were detained, together 
with some fifty members of the United Party opposition. The 
Government's White Paper on the strike insisted that it was 
planned from the start as a United Party plot to topple the 
regime, and paid little attention to the genuine grievances of 
the strikers. ^
Yet Nkrumah's actions in the month following the 
return-to-work clearly indicated that he privately recognised 
the central importance of anti-elite feeling in the strike's 
causation. In consequence, it was not only the strike leaders 
and the United Party opposition but many members of the C.P.P. 
'old guard' who were to suffer from its occurrence. Admittedly, 
the President's awareness that all was not well with the Party's 
image pre-dated the strike. In April 1961, when preparing for 
the necessity of an austerity budget, and considering the prob­
able obstacles to its popular acceptability, Nkrumah decided 
to deliver a 'Dawn Broadcast to the Nation'. In this, he 
criticised the self-interestedness of some members of the party
1. Statement by the Government on the Recent Conspiracy, 
(Accra: Government Printing Office, Dec.1961).
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"who by virtue of their functions and positions are tending to 
form a separate new ruling class of self-seekers and careerists".'*' 
This was "working to alienate the support of the masses and to
n 2bring the National Assembly into isolation . He went on to
announce measures to curtail the allowances and perquisites of
government officials and to compel them to declare their assets
3
and sever their ties with private business. Such a ‘clean­
up’, he insisted, was being demanded by those who were being 
asked to sacrifice for development goals.
The Sekondi-Takoradi workers were generally unimpres­
sed with the effectiveness of these measures, however, and the 
September strike brought home to the President the persisting 
loss of popular confidence in the sincerity of the regime. In 
an attempt to remedy this, he purged the party of a number of 
its leading figures on the grounds that they had abused their 
position by amassing too great a fortune. On September 29th, 
one week after the strikers had returned to work, the Evening 
News announced:
"OSAGYEFO’S IMPLEMENTATION of ’DAWN BROADCAST*.
Six Ministers to Resign. ” 4
1. Evening News, 8th April 1961, p.l.
2. Ibid.
3. The limits that Nkrumah tried to impose on his followers*
accumulation of wealth were in themselves an indication 
of the fortunes already amassed. It was ruled from the 
president*s office that party members should not own:
(a) more than two houses of a combined value of
£20,000;
(b) more than two motor cars;
(c) plots of land (other than those covered by (a)
above) with the present total value greater than 
£500.
Dennis Austin, op.cit., p.405.
4. Evening News, 29th September 1961, p.l.
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These included such prominent and long-time party leaders as 
Komla Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, and Krobo Edusei, popularly renow­
ned for the episode of his wife's purchase of a gold bed. A 
number of other leading officials, including A. E. Inkumsah 
(Minister of the Interior), E. K. Bensah (Minister of Works), 
and J. E. Hagan (Commissioner for the Central Region), were 
asked to surrender property in excess of the limits laid down 
earlier in the year. To this degree at least, the 1961 strike 
was successful, and its significance appreciated in governing 
circles.
The 'intransigents* among the railway unionists were 
nevertheless to be proved correct in their belief that such 
reforms as materialised would be of short-lived effectiveness, 
and that the major result of any protest action which stopped 
short of ‘spoiling the Government' would be an intensification 
of repressive measures. The new men who rose to replace the 
'old guard' of the C.P.P., if marginally less corrupt than their 
predecessors, possessed an even more 'regimented' conception of 
'popular mobilisation'. The main modification in the structure 
and operation of the TUC after 1961 was the introduction of 
additional measures to inhibit the occurrence of rank-and-file 
rebellions. Essentially, the conclusion of the 1961 strike 
signified the final defeat of the railway workers' attempt to 
reform the TUC, at least for as long as the C.P.P. regime 
remained in power.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION
MOVEMENT
The Sekondi-Takoradi workers’ hostility to the TUC, 
as expressed in the 1961 strike, derived in part, it has been 
argued, from particular historical and structural factors. 
Several other groups of workers expressed their support by 
striking for a day or two, and tacit sympathy for the protest­
ers was possibly quite widespread, but, generally speaking, the 
TUC was firmly in control in the rest of the country. The final 
attempt of. the Sekondi-Takoradi workers to reform the structure 
and orientation of the trade union movement appeared to have 
failed.
Yet, in 1966-71, the Ghana TUC was remodelled along 
very much the lines advocated by the railway unionists. There 
were important similarities between Pobee Biney's conception of 
the ideal role and structure of the labour movement and that 
of Benjamin Bentum, Secretary-General of the TUC during the 
whole of this latter period. To be sure, Bentum was a more 
moderate and cautious leader than Biney, and his policy more 
closely geared to the practical requisites of both economic 
development and institutional survival. But, for Bentum, as 
for Biney, the labour movement should be an independent polit­
ical force, in the vanguard of the struggle for social justice 
and the defence of democracy. For Bentum too, if rather less 
clearly than for Biney, the unions should perform the role of 
populist spokesmen, looking to, and responsible for, a larger 
constituency than the unionised workers alone.
Certainly, the majority of the railway and harbour 
workers perceived such a similarity and regarded Bentum's TUC
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as an approximation to the ideal for which they had consistently 
fought. This was especially the case in 1970-71, as Bentum 
became even more radical in his criticisms of Government and 
the socio-economic ’status quo*. A substantial minority 
splinter-group in the ranks of the railway workers clearly took 
a different view, since they seceded from the TUG and establi­
shed a separate union and a rival trade union centre. An 
analysis of the sources and significance of this division will 
be presented in a subsequent chapter. For the moment, however, 
the important point to recognise is that the lack of consensus 
amongst the railwayworkers in 1970-71 did not imply any lack of 
enthusiasm for Bentum*s TUG on the part of the majority who were 
members of the ’official* or ’mother* union. With the relatively 
minor exception of this splinter railway union, moreover, the 
labour movement was solid in its support for the ’new model* 
of trade unionism developed under Bentum*s leadership. One of 
the most significant developments in Ghanaian politics during 
this period was the attainment of a high degree of working-class 
unity in support of that independent, reformist model of trade 
unionism which the railway workers had consistently advocated 
There is, at present, an almost total lack of pub­
lished accounts of this development, and it is therefore nec­
essary to provide a fairly detailed account here. Consequently, 
the focus of attention in this and the succeeding chapter shifts 
away temporarily from the railway workers themselves toward the 
TUC and the Ghanaian unions in general. In Chapter Seven, the 
focus returns to internal Railway Union politics, and the role 
played therein by divergent rank-and-file attitudes to the TUC 
leadershipvof Benjamin Bentum,
Bentum summarised the orientation of his *new model* 
as one of "independent and democratic, but responsible trade
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1unionism1*. The TUC was to be independent of Government, 
and strictly non-partisan with respect to party politics. It 
was to be relatively decentralised in structure and committed 
primarily to representing the interests and grievances of the 
union rank-and-file, (rather than simply to controlling or 
restraining them). It was also to be "responsible*1, in the 
sense of acknowledging the damaging effects of strike actions 
on the fragile national economy, and seeking to educate the 
rank-and-file in this reality. Strikes were to be officially 
condemned except where they were the workers* last resort in 
the face of Management's or Government's refusal to negotiate 
or implement agreements. Nevertheless, while maintaining imp­
artiality with respect to party politics, the TUC was to lay 
claim to a major voice in national decision-making, pressing 
for egalitarian reform of the national wage and salary struc­
ture, and articulating policy alternatives on virtually the 
entire range of governmental issues. The basis for this claim 
was partly the idea that workers could only be expected to 
forego strike action if they had other means of securing the 
effective representation af their interests. And, in practice, 
the TUC leadership tended to adapt its policy on strikes accord­
ing to Government's sensitivity to the lower-paid workers* 
situation and its responsiveness to the demands of the TUC.
But there was also a strain of populist ideology in the Biney 
tradition informing the TUC's drive to political self-assertion. 
This became increasingly pronounced during the Progress Party 
regime of Dr. Busia (October 1969 - January 1972). The workers
were to see themselves, as the "watchdogs'* or "the eyes and
2
ears of society". The creation of a real democracy in Ghana
1. "Report of the First Biennial Congress of the TUC of 
Ghana", 5th - 7th June 1966, (TUC, mimeo), p.3.
2. This phrase was frequently used by speakers at Sekondi- 
Takoradi District Council of Labour meetings which the 
writer attended in June-August, 1971, and by workers in 
interviews conducted during the same period.
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depended on their fulfilling, and being allowed to perform, 
this role. It was tacitly assumed that Government tended to 
be elitist, authoritarian, and favouritistic, and that the 
'official' parliamentary opposition provided no direct or 
effective representation for the 'common people*. The unions 
were the only genuine mass organisations, and, in consequence, 
the TUC felt justified in aspiring to perform the checking, 
counter-balancing role of a kind of official, but radical, 
opposition.
This was, in a sense, a spontaneous development, 
reflecting a general reaction against the C.P.P. experience of- 
party control; the impulse to political self-assertion of a 
relatively well-educated and informed 'artisan' class, geo­
graphically and structurally close to the national political 
centre; and also the radicalising effects of a steady widen­
ing of the elite-mass gap in Ghanaian society during the 1960*s, 
involving a strong downward pressure on the socio-economic
position of the skilled workers which forced them more clearly
1than ever before down toward the ranks of the urban poor.
Yet the actual process of political development was more com­
plex than such generalisations suggest. One must take cogniz­
ance, firstly, of the institutional and political pre-requisites 
for the democrat is at ion of the trade union movement, and here 
not only the importance of the ousting of the G.P.P. regime in 
February 1966 but also the initiative and diplomatic skill of 
Benjamin Bentum in effecting such a major reform of the TUC's 
structure and role in the face of governmental opposition. 
Secondly, although the development of the policy and ideology 
of the Ghana TUC in 1966-71 was, viewed in retrospect, consis­
tent, there was an important shift of emphasis, and change of 
tone, in this ideology between the National Liberation Council
1. See Chapter 8, pp.303-5.
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regime (Feb. 1966 - Oct. 1969) and the Progress Party Govern­
ment (Oct. 1969 - Jan. 1972). Under the NLC, the TUC generally 
appeared willing to settle for relatively minor 'incremental' 
gains and official acknowledgement of its claim to a major 
advisory role in governmental decision-making. When this 
moderate, 'responsible' strategy proved ineffective under the 
P.P. regime, however, it sought to lead popular criticism of 
the 'status quo* and to attract the support of a wider urban 
mass constituency for a radical political programme.
This did, it should be stressed, represent a shift 
of emphasis, not a sudden or complete change in policy. Bentum 
was concerned both to restrain the tendency to resort to illegal 
strike actions and to voice his criticism of conservative 
economic policies under each of these regimes. Moreover, it 
was a shift of emphasis which, while motivated in part by grow­
ing personal antipathy to the Progress Party leaders, was also 
a consistent response to the growing socio-economic elitism and 
authoritarianism of that regime. Nevertheless, the move from 
moderate reformist criticism to overt political confrontation 
was clearly a major step, and one that threw many workers and 
their leaders into a state of confusion which vitiated the 
solidarity of active support for the TUG. In September 1971, 
the workers of Sekondi-Takoradi again found themselves virtually 
alone in responding to the call for a General Strike.
The confused and varying nature of this reaction 
illustrated a fundamental ambivalence in the orientation of the 
Ghanaian labour movement. This orientation cannot properly be 
described either as elitist 'bread-and-butter* unionism in 
accommodation with the 'status quo', or as ideologically radical, 
revolutionary unionism. It was rather a liberal reformist 
orientation, relatively radical in the Ghanaian political context, 
but aiming at establishing itself on a regular institutional 
footing. The ambivalence within it derived partly from the
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familiar conflict between ideal aims and the requisites of 
institutional continuity, or, for the individual worker, the 
basic need to keep a job in a situation of growing unemploy­
ment. To some degree, it also reflected the existence of 
factors making for identity, as well as conflict of interest, 
between government and unionised workers. In other words, 
government and labour were very much opposed over the issue of 
social justice, but few groups of workers were prepared for an 
open confrontation when this meant putting their means of live­
lihood at risk. It was also possible to rationalise political 
passivity, in some cases quite sincerely, in terms of recogn­
ition of the damaging effects of strike action on economic 
reconstruction. This community of interest with government 
could be widely perceived, of course, only on the assumption 
that lower-paid workers did have some considerable stake in 
the existing social order. Correspondingly, the ambivalence of 
the labour movement's ideological orientation derived, ultim­
ately, from the intermediate position of skilled workers - rightly 
described by local unionists as "the backbone of the Ghanaian 
trade union movement" - between the urban poor on the one hand, 
and the middle class proper on the other.
The C.P.P. regime and the Unions; 1961-66.
Between September 1961 and the coup d'etat of 
February 1966 disillusionment with the C.P.P. regime spread 
to virtually all groups of workers throughout Ghana, This 
was indicated by the large demonstrations of labour support 
for the soldiers' intervention in Accra, Kumasi, and Sekondi- 
Takoradi, during the week following the coup.'*’ It is possible, 
but unlikely, that these were stage-managed or unrepresentative 
of the feelings of other workers. In any case, there were more
1. Ghanaian Times, 27th February 1966, p.l.
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reliable indicators: the fact that the new regime felt it
necessary to remove from office only certain TUC officials 
and the General Secretaries of the national unions, it being 
confidently assumed that support for the displaced regime 
extended no further; the intensity and uniformity of pressure 
from both union rank-and-file and their leaders for a "demo- 
cratic and independent” trade union movement; and their 
determined unity thereafter in defence of this democratic and 
independent structure against any attempt to force or forge a 
party political alliance. The experience of 1961-66 had instil­
led in Ghanaian workers a profound and lasting revulsion against 
any suggestion of governmental or party political interference 
in trade union affairs.
Two main factors accounted for the spread of anti- 
C.P.P. feeling even to those workers who owed their union 
organisation to the initiative of C.P.P. unionists, and who, 
in September 1961, had generally sided with the C.P.P.-TUC 
leadership. Firstly, the rapid price inflation of 1962-66, 
combined with the Government's refusal to raise the minimum 
wage, had a severely depressant effect on the real wage levels 
of lower-paid workers. The TUC did not appear especially con­
cerned to protest this deterioration in its members' living 
standards. The Real Minimum Wage Index for these years shows 
a decline of some 42 per cent between 1961 and 1966, from 111 
to 64, (see Table 5.1). This figure overstates the actual 
decline by some 4 per cent in the case of public sector employ­
ees, since in 1965 the Government acceded to TUC demands to 
pay their daily-rated employees for 27 instead of 26 days per 
month. It is reasonable to assume an equal decline in the 
average real incomes of skilled workers in the public services. 
The fall in real incomes of most private sector employees was 
considerably less severe, owing to incremental benefits gained
171
through the negotiations of collective agreements with their
employers. According to the calculations of the Mills-Odoi
Commission, average real wage levels in the private sector
declined by some 20 per cent between 1960 and 1965, compared
1to 40 per cent in the case of the public sector. It is only 
fair to recognise here the contribution of TOC officials who, 
within the limits imposed on their freedom of action by accept­
ance of the Governments development strategy, worked hard to 
achieve what they could on behalf of Ghana’s lower-paid workers, 
utilising the compulsory collective bargaining machinery estab­
lished by the 1958 Industrial Relations Act.
Table 5.1 : Fluctuations in the Real Value of the Minimum Wage, 
1960-68.
Year Minimum Wage Index of Accra Retail Index of Real 
(pesewas) Minimum Wage Price Index Minimum Wage
1960 65 (6/6d.) 433 367 118
1961 65 433 390 111
1962 65 433 426 102
1963 65 433 446 97
1964 65 433 502 86
1965 65 433 643 67
1966 65 433 672 64
1967 70 467 623 75
1968 75 500 685 73
Source: Kodwo Ewusi, The Distribution of Monetary Incomes
in Ghana, (Legon, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, Social,
and Economic Research, 1971), p.43.
To be fully objective, one should also take into account 
the implicit wage benefits conferred on lower-paid workers by 
such policies as the abolition of school and hospital fees, and
1. Report of the Commission on the Structure and Remuneration 
of the Public Services in Ghana (1967), (Accra: Government 
Printer, 1967), p.29. Hereafter cited as the Mills-Odoi 
Report.
172
by the C.P.P. regime's continuing commitment to expansion 
of the level of employment even in the face of the crippling 
budgetary situation of 1962-66. The TUC leaders were among 
the foremost advocates of these measures, and one might wish 
to point out in retrospect that succeeding regimes withdrew 
some of these concessions to the idea of a welfare state 
society. Ghana’s workers could hardly be expected to appreciate 
this at the time, however. Both public and private sector emp­
loyees suffered a serious decline in living standards during 
these years, and resentment at this impoverishment clearly 
informed their growing hostility to the TUC leadership. This 
was exacerbated by the high living of TUC leaders and by sus­
picion that TUC dues were being misappropriated - suspicions
X
which post-coup revelations abundantly confirmed. It does 
not seem necessary to elaborate this point further.
What does require emphasis is rank-and-file antipathy 
to the growing authoritarianism of the TUC leadership and its 
increasing resort to police-state techniques of control. This 
extended to the use of party spies and the deliberate incul­
cation of an atmosphere of fear at the local level so as to 
inhibit any open expression of criticism of the TUC or the 
Government. This strategy was resented partly because of the 
obstacles it raised to pressure for wage improvement. But it 
produced a sense of humiliation which went far deeper than this, 
and an attachment to liberal values relatively independent of 
considerations of economic interest.
An important factor in the adoption of such author­
itarian techniques of control was the removal of Tettegah in 
1962 from the TUC to the All African Trade Union Federation,
1. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Funds of 
the Ghana TUC, (Accra: Government Printer, 1968).
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This meant that the TUG lost its one prominent leader who 
combined organisational expertise and rhetorical ability with 
a substantial rank-and-file political following (especially in 
Accra). Magnus-George (TUC Secretary-General, 1962-64), and 
Kwaw Ampah (TUG Secretary-General, 1966-66) attempted to com­
pensate for their own lack of any such following with a form 
of ideological emanation which, as Tettegah himself realised, 
was wholly inappropriate for Ghana's workers, being far too 
"academic" and Soviet-based, and with the adoption of a 
"regimentation" strategy, Kwaw Ampah, (a member of Nkrumah's 
tribe, the Nzima, and a former district commissioner) was per­
haps less "regimental" in his style of leadership than had been 
Magnus-George. But there was little perceptible difference in 
spite of the introduction of an Amendment to the Industrial 
Relations Act in May 1965 which, Ampah claimed, aimed at "the
complete removal of all control exercised over workers' organ-
2
isations by the Government or other bodies". He suggested 
that the reason for this Amendment was that, "The Party feels 
sufficiently convinced that the working people of this country 
would not misuse their freedom of action to disrupt the speedy 
implementation of the nation's industrialisation programme."
But a rather different rationale was proved by the Minister of 
Labour in his speech to the National Assembly. The Amendment 
was intended'
"to enable Ghana to conform to the code of inter­
national labour standards adopted by the Inter­
national Labour Organisation - It is my well 
considered view that the success of the organis­
ation of the All-African Trade Union Federation
/cont..
1. Interview with Joe-fio N. Meyer, 15th November 1971. Also 
see Benjamin Ben turn, Trade Unions in Chains, (Accra: TUG, 
1967), pp.9-16.
2. Editorial, The Worker, 5th July 1965.
3. Ibid.
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is dependent largely on the prestige of 
the Ghana TUC, This means the Ghana TUC has 
to do everything possible to attract as much 
following and support throughout Africa, and 
its organisational machinery built up as a 
model to be followed by other trades union 
movements in Africa. The Ghana TUC must 
therefore be free from criticisms internation­
ally, and the draft Bill is aimed at achieving 
this." 1
The alterations embodied in the Bill were the minimum necessary 
to serve this purpose. The TUC technically became more independ' 
ent through removal of the provisions for State control of TUC 
activities and finance embodied in the 1958 Act. But all the 
provisions of the existing law were retained with respect to 
compulsory arbitration, the illegality of strikes in the public 
sector, and TUC authority over the national unions. Indeed, the 
centralisation of the structure of the trade union movement was 
carried even further by a reduction in the number of national 
unions from sixteen to ten. And given the party*s continuing 
control over the appointment of TUC officials, the supposed 
independence of the labour movement remained purely technical.
There was considerable variation in the extent to 
which police-state techniques of control were, or could be, 
effectively implemented in the various unions and branches.
This depended largely on the degree of corporate resistance 
encountered. In the majority of unions, officials could resist 
the pressure to report on fellow-officials only at their own 
peril. A Branch Secretary of the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers* Union confessed:
"Oh, there was a great deal of bitterness, but 
we were too afraid to oppose the party line.
After some of our officials were dismissed from 
their jobs and one was detained, we realised 
that certain people were acting as spies. But
/cont.,
1. Ghana, Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Vol.39 
Col.189, (25th May 1965).
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,f.. later it was not so much that they had 
special spies, we all became spies. Even I 
was prepared to be a stooge, I must admit it.
What else could one do to look after oneself?" 1
In the Sekondi-Takoradi branches of the Railway Union, in 
contrast, TUC leaders found it impossible to control the rank- 
and-file's middle-level representatives by such techniques 
and were therefore driven to abolish the Working Committee.
2
Later, in 1965, the holding of mass-meetings was prohibited.
An example of Railway Union resistance to outside control was 
recounted by Joe-fio N. Meyer, Chairman of the TUC Executive 
Board at the time of the incident (1962)i
"I went down to Sekondi with the Minister (of 
Labour) to talk to the railway workers - we 
wanted to explain our development plans to 
them and to warn them against agitators on 
the Union Executive - and we told the 'announcer* 
to beat gong-gong to assemble them together.
But he claimed to have misplaced it, and we 
couldn't persuade him to re-discover it until 
he was sure that the Executive knew about our 
being there." 3
More generally, as one railway unionist remarked, "You wouldn't
find anyone willing to spy for the Government here. The sense
of solidarity is far too strong. And anyway they wouldn't last 
it 4long. Nevertheless, the general atmosphere of repression 
which prevailed during this period, together with the prohibition 
on mass-meetings, presented formidable obstacles to any attempt 
at concerted opposition. Subsequent claims that, when the Army 
intervened to displace Nkrumah, preparations were already in 
train for an unofficial strike must be treated with a certain 
scepticism.
1. Interview with John Abakah, Secretary of the C.F.A.O.
branch of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, 
3rd September 1971.
2. See Chapter Seven, pp.260-1.
3. Interview with Joe-fio N. Meyer, 15th November 1971.
4. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 17th July 1971.
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It is important to stress the depth of feeling in 
the unions against G.P.P. authoritarianism because of its influ­
ence on worker attitudes to the NLC and Progress Party regimes. 
Generally speaking, Ghanaian workers were favourably disposed 
to these regimes, in spite of their obvious elitist character, 
because, (or in as far as), they were relatively liberal regimes, 
willing to tolerate a certain measure of trade union democracy 
and independence. As workers frequently remarked even in the 
summer of 1971 (when Government-Union relations were extremely 
strained), "At least one can speak one's mind." It is worth 
pointing out that there was, potentially at least, a negative 
aspect to this belief in "free, independent trade unionism", a 
lack of any more positive sense of unity and purpose. In react­
ing against the compulsory controls of the C.P.P. regime, there 
was a tendency amongst some unionists to regress to a fragmented 
"bread-and-butter" style of trade unionism, displaying little 
appreciation of the advantages or pre-requisites of labour 
movement unity. In spite of their many failings, the C.P.P. 
unionists made a valid point when they emphasised the need for 
trade unions to act as a united political force exerting a 
significant influence on governmental decision-making in order 
effectively to advance the interests of labour. After the 
coup d'etat of February 1966, some unionists proved disinclined 
to recognise this, or to accept the fact that, if the TUC was 
to attain a measure of influence with government, it had to be 
able to exert some considerable degree of control over the 
activities of its constituent unions. For their part, the 
National Liberation Council and Progress Party regimes equally 
failed to recognise the need to make concessions to the pro­
gramme of the TUC if its leadership was to enhance its prestige 
with, and capacity to control, the union rank-and-file. The 
fact that the Ghanaian labour movement gradually developed a 
broader sense of unity in 1966-71, and a positive conception 
of its role, at once more responsible and more radical than
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that of "bread-and-butter" unionism, was due in large measure 
to the leadership of Benjamin Bentum, (TUC Secretary-General, 
February 1966-September 1971).
Benjamin Bentum*s political background and orientation.
In three main respects, Bentum*s leadership was 
crucial to the development of the Ghanaian trade union move­
ment in 1966-71. In the first place, it was on his initiative 
rather than the Government’s that the structure of the TUC was 
decentralised and made more democratic. In appointing him as 
Secretary-General, the National Liberation Council expected him 
to maintain a relatively centralised, control-oriented TUC rather 
than one geared to the expression of rank-and-file aspirations.
Yet he chose to court the regime*s disfavour and to introduce 
democratic reforms, partly in response to rank-and-file pressure 
but also in accordance with his personal predilections and beliefs. 
Secondly, to effect this shift in the orientation and structure of 
power of the trade union movement without provoking a Government 
clamp-down required very considerable political and diplomatic 
skills on Bentum*s part. Thirdly, while the *new model* devel­
oped under Bentum*s leadership was in a real sense democratic, 
he personally remained very much the leading formulator and 
spokesman of TUC policy and ideology, possessed of something of 
the valued 'strong man* image. The particular ideological form­
ulation he gave to the nation of "free and independent" trade 
unionism was a creative achievement and a major unifying force.
That one can realistically talk of the emergence of a sense of 
national working-class identity in Ghana during these years - 
a remarkable achievement considering the situational factors 
militating against any such development - was due in large part 
to Bentum*s personality and his convincing articulation of
178
labour's rights and responsibilities. As the Progress Party 
Minister of Labour, Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah, was to lament;
"You ask a worker which union he belongs to, and nine times 
out of ten he replies simply, 'Bentum's TUC'."
Since Bentum's role in the events of 1966-71 was so 
crucial, it is worth taking a brief look at his personal back­
ground and political career prior to the military coup of 
2
February 1966. He was born on the 29th April, 1931, at Elraina 
in the Central Province of Ghana, the son of a clergyman of the 
Methodist Church Mission. Educated at the Catholic Mission 
School at Berekum, and later the Methodist School in Agona- 
Swedru, his hopes of attending secondary school were dashed by 
the death of his parents in a car crash, but he continued his 
studies at his uncle's home and managed to gain several *0' 
level G.C.E. passes. On this basis, he was awarded a scholar­
ship to take an Agricultural Science course at the Agricultural 
Training Centre in Rumasi and later at the Kumasi College of 
Science and Technology.
From there he went to the West African Cocoa Research 
Institute at Tafo where he formed the first trade union for 
agricultural workers within a year of his arrival in 1950. With 
the registration of the union in 1952 and Bentum's success in 
gaining several improvements in wages and working conditions, 
the membership steadily increased from some 50 to more than a 
thousand members (out of a total work force of approximately 
two thousand) by 1959. In that year, the West African Cocoa 
Research Institute Workers* Union was merged into the Agricul­
tural Workers' Union of Ghana, and Bentum was elected the 
National Organiser of the new body. Within two years, the 
A.W.U. had a paid-up membership of almost 50,000 agricultural
1. Interview with Minister of Labour, Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah 
11th November 1971.
2. Personal details provided by Benjamin Bentum in private 
correspondence, 14th August 1973.
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wage-earners, and in 1962 Bentum was elected the Union's 
General Secretary, a post which he occupied until becoming 
Chairman of the Executive Board of the TUC in 1964.
As Chairman of the Executive Board he rapidly came 
into conflict with Ampah and other TUC leaders over the issue 
of the extent of party control over the TUC. He objected to 
the manner in which major decisions concerning the running of 
the TUC were taken by the Central Committee of the Party, of 
which Ampah alone of TUC leaders was a member, and then simply 
handed down to the TUC Executive Board. He argued for the 
inclusion of more far-reaching reforms in the 1965 Amendment 
to the Industrial Relations Act than Ampah and the party were 
prepared to consider. In February 1965, this conflict came 
into the open, and Ampah secured his dismissal from the Chair­
manship by authority of the Central Committee of the C.P.P.
For six months he was unemployed and devoted most 
of his time to travelling around the country with the Director 
of State Farms, acting as an unofficial assistant to the latter. 
President Nkrumah was informed of Bentum's continuing display 
of dedication to his country's development and was duly impres­
sed. In September 1965, he created a Ministry of Forestry to 
which he appointed Bentum as the first Minister, much to the 
surprise, no doubt, of the latter's ex-colleagues in the TUC.
It is possible, however, that Nkrumah made a serious error of 
judgement with this appointment, mistakenly identifying Bentum's 
dedication to his country with loyalty to himself. It is 
commonly believed that Bentum worked from inside the C.P.P. 
regime to promote the 1966 coup d'etat, and although the truth 
of this allegation must be open to doubt, it was certainly 
significant that he was the only C.P.P. Minister to be retained
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in senior office by the N.L.C. regime.
In any case, it is apparent that Bentum was one of 
the few C.P.P. leaders sufficiently sensitive to the excessive 
centralisation and party subservience of the TUC to take a 
stand on the issue. He apparently felt that, in spite of the • 
organisational achievements of the C.P.P.-TUC, the grievances 
of lower-paid workers were not receiving adequate representation 
or consideration in 1962-65. It is not the intention here to 
portray Bentum as a staunchly dedicated labour leader of unwav­
ering principles. The course of his career under the C.P.P. 
regime, and, even more clearly, his conduct of the leadership 
of the TUC under the N.L.C. and Progress Party regimes, rather 
suggest a highly skilful and pragmatic politician, an extremely 
agile survivor, reacting with fine sensitivity and judgement to 
pressures from both above and below. But the Ghanaian trade 
union movement needed skilful, compromising leadership of this 
kind if it was to hold together as an independent movement in 
the political and economic circumstances of 1966-71. And it 
would mean committing an all-too-common error to equate a well- 
developed sense of political pragmatism with a lack of any sense 
of principle or social purpose. Within the limits imposed on 
his freedom of action, Bentum’s TUC leadership can be seen as 
consistently directed toward the development of the labour move­
ment as a self-conscious force for greater social justice in 
Ghana. Ambitious and calculating politician that he was, Bentum 
was also a sincere liberal-democrat. It would perhaps be wrong 
to dismiss as mere rhetoric his choice of a quotation from 
Abraham Lincoln to conclude his statement on the recommendations 
of the Mills-Odoi Commission.
1. After the 1966 coup, of course, many ex-C.P.P. officials
claimed, frequently without any justification, to have been 
secretly working against the regime from within; but there 
is some fairly convincing evidence to suggest that this was 
true of Bentum. For instance, according to an interview 
which Richard Pratt held with Police-Inspector Harlley, a
/cont.overleaf
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MIn as much as most good things are produced 
by labour, it follows that all things ought 
to belong to those whose labour has produced 
them. But it has happened in all ages of the 
world that some have laboured and others, 
without labour, have enjoyed a larger pro­
portion of their fruits. This is wrong and 
should not continue. To secure for each 
labourer the whole produce of his labour as 
nearly as possible is a worthy object of any 
good Government.” 1
With the progressive deterioration in the financial 
situation of Ghana’s lower-paid workers in 1966-71, Bentum was 
to become an ever more insistent advocate of a radical redis­
tribution of national wealth.
Bentum’s TUG and the N.L.C. Regime
Bentum was appointed Secretary-General of the Ghana TUG
within forty-eight hours of the military coup d’etat of 24th
February 1966, and he immediately led a demonstration of workers
in Accra in support of the intervention by the Army and the 
2
Police. He alone of the ex.C.P.P. Ministers was retained in 
senior office by the National Liberation Council, and several
Footnote 1 cont. from previous page.
.. leading instigator of the coup, ’’Mr. Harlley had 
briefed Bentum on the 1966 coup some time in advance... 
and had advised him to gather support in the unions”.
R. Pratt, ’’Political Opposition in Ghana, 1966-72”,
(M.A. thesis, S.O.A.S., 1973), p.16.
1. ’’Statement issued by the Executive Board of the TUC
on 'The Report of the Commission on the Structure and 
Remuneration of the Public Services in Ghana’ ”, Annexure
1, Report of the (Mensah) Committee on Review of Salaries 
and Pensions in the Public Services of Ghana (1969), (Accra: 
Government Printer, 1969), p.66. Hereafter cited as 
Mensah Report. Quotation attributed to Abraham Lincoln in 
his First Annual Message to Congress, 3rd December 1861.
2. Ghanaian Times, 27th February 1966, p.l.
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groups of workers, including most prominently the Sekondi-
Takoradi railway workers, protested against his appointment
and requested that a new, more trustworthy Secretary-General
be elected. But a Railway Union delegation was assured by
NLC leaders that they had every reason to believe Bentum
1
would prove a capable and dependable leader of the TUC.
From the point of view of the NLC leaders, Bentum's 
(initial) dependence on their favour for his political survival 
was one of the attractions of his appointment as Secretary- 
General. Ideologically and politically they were committed 
to a liberalisation of the nation*s political structures, yet 
it was crucially important that such liberalisation did not go 
so far as to jeopardise their administrative control. Their 
ousting of Nkrumah had been rationalised in terms of liberating 
the nation from tyranny, and an upsurge of popular pressure for 
the restoration of civil freedoms was naturally to be expected. 
They were happy and prepared to accede to this pressure up to 
a point. Mostly educated in British police and military train­
ing schools, the NLC leaders were liberals of a somewhat 
'Whiggish' variety. Conscious of their own inadequacies and 
inexperience as policy formulators and administrators, they 
were prepared to rule very largely according to the advice of 
various committees and commissions. These consisted in the
main of civil service experts in various fields and represent-
2
atives of the country's major pressure groups.
As far as the trade union movement was concerned, 
'liberalisation* meant that there would be little overt inter­
ference in the affairs of the TUC, that the legal provisions 
against strike actions, although formally retained,, would be
1. RUA, Railway Union Working Committee Minutes, 4th March 
1966.
2. For a fuller description of the character and style of 
government of the N.L.C. regime, see Robert Pinkney, 
Ghana under Military Rule, 1966-69, (London: Methuen, 
1972).
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less severely administered, and that the Secretary-General 
of the TUC would be accepted as the Government's leading 
adviser on industrial relations. But to the surprise of
many who, like the Editor of the Ghanaian Times, called on
1
the NLC leaders to "give the TUC a fresh charter" , the NLC 
leaders proved unwilling to dismantle the centralised control 
structure inherited from the C.P.P. regime. They clearly did 
not envisage securing voluntary industrial peace by meeting 
the demand of unionised workers for substantial wage increases. 
There were a number of considerations involved here. In the 
first place, the immediate need was obviously for a period of 
economic retrenchment rather than of additional government 
expenditure. In the second place, what development funds 
did become available were to be directed toward rural develop­
ment. Thirdly, they were in no sense social radicals, and did 
not feel committed to any major reform of the national wage 
and salary structure. The requisites of economic reconstruction 
and political stability clearly argued, then, for strict limits 
to union democratisation, and, with a reliable acolyte in charge, 
the inherited TUC structure and anti-strike provisions suited 
their requirements perfectly.
They did not entirely suit Bentum however, and the 
NLC leaders had seriously underestimated his determination and 
ability to pursue an independent course. After weeding out 
C.P.P. militants in the TUC Secretariat (and retaining other 
officials he thought reliable in order to utilise their expertise), 
he arranged for the election of new General Secretaries for the 
national unions and set about introducing democratic reforms in 
the structure of the TUC. His objective was lucidly expressed 
in the programme he presented for adoption to the June 1966 
Congress:
1. Ghanaian Times, 8th March 1966, p.6.
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"The first task which the trade union movement 
in Ghana should tackle is to transform itself 
into an organisation that has meaning for the 
workers, and responsibly advances their interests 
in the social and economic spheres* The only 
form.of organisation that can do this with any 
measure of success is one which draws its 
authority and its power from the workers them­
selves, and is responsive to their aims and 
aspirations. In order to properly translate 
the workers' wishes into action, the movement 
should be self-reliant, and should in particular 
stay away from party politics, as the past 
has abundantly shown, and yet be free to determine 
its own policy, which may, but does not neces­
sarily, run parallel to a particular political 
demand. Thus the trade union movement should 
always promote political democracy and defend it 
against threats from any quarter....
(2) It shall be necessary to press without delay 
for the overhaul of the restrictive labour legis­
lation imposed by the previous regime. The TUC 
shall therefore, as soon as possible, make prop­
osals to the Government on how it wishes to have 
the Industrial Relations Act changed to be in 
keeping with the new-found spirit of liberty and 
to allow the trade unions a role in society which 
reflects their new potential,
(3) The Trade Unions shall pledge their co­
operation to Government and employers in all 
genuine efforts to improve and stabilise indus­
trial relations. Any agreements in this field 
that trade unions may enter into should contain 
adequate provision for the settling of industrial 
disputes through conciliation and arbitration 
where collective negotiations break down, but 
should not interfere - and the same goes for any 
legislation - with the right of the workers in 
the last resort to xtfithhold their labour by 
concerted action.
(4) The trade unions should do whatever is in 
their power to stimulate economic development and 
workers' productivity; help in creating employment 
opportunities; encourage the establishment and 
expansion of co-operatives, promote efficiency at 
the workplace, always provided that the workers 
will also adequately benefit from progress in 
these fields.
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The trade unions shall support unreservedly 
all forms of economic planning aimed at viable
economic units and an increase in the people's
standard of living. But it wishes as closely 
as possible to participate in such planning 
preferably through representation on the com­
petent statutory bodies: in any case it expects
to be consulted by local and central government 
on all matters affdTbting the economic and social 
interests of its membership." 1
Further items in this programme included: the
establishment of efficient machinery for reviewing the minimum 
wage; pressing for an increase in provision for workers' hous­
ing and for the widest range of social provisions by the State;
ensuring that "workers should not be asked to make financial
2sacrifice beyond a reasonable level" ; advising the Government 
on how to solve the unemployment problem; "defending the rights 
of trade unions against encroachment by political parties or
3
other forces" ; disaffiliation from the All-African Trade Union 
Federation (affiliation with other international trade union 
centres was to be considered, but did not in fact materialise); 
and organisational reforms to ensure the maintenance of maximum 
contact between leadership and rank-and-file.
In October the TUC Executive introduced changes in 
the TUC constitution which lent some substance to the rhetoric 
of democratisation. Authority for conducting collective bar­
gaining and settling industrial disputes were returned from the 
TUC Executive to the national unions. The right of the TUC to 
intervene in disputes was restricted to instances where an 
impasse had clearly been reached, or where TUC intervention
1. "Report of the First Biennial Congress of the TUC of 
Ghana", 5th - 7th June 1966, (TUC, mimeo), pp.3-4.
2. Ibid., item (10).
3. Ibid., item (13).
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was formally requested by the Union concerned. This provision
was consistently observed thereafter by the TUC leadership,
and this should be borne in mind when considering Government
accusations that Bentum was slow to intervene in industrial
disputes out of political motivations. A further provision
declared that, "A vote of non-confidence by a two-thirds
majority of delegates shall be required to demand the resig-
2
nation of the Seeretary-General.” This was an important
innovation since there had been no such provision for demo­
cratic accountability of the Secretary-General in the C.P.P.- 
TUC Constitution. Early in 1967, it was announced that free 
elections would be held for the post of Secretary-General at 
a special Delegates Conference to be held in the summer.
Bentum was attempting, then, to establish himself 
as the elected leader of a genuinely independent and democratic 
TUC, and the NLC leaders naturally looked on this move with 
considerable suspicion and disfavour. At the 1967 Congress, 
held in Tamale, John Alex Hamma’s candidature for the Secretary- 
Generalship received the backing of several NLC leaders. The 
final voting, however, provided eloquent proof of Bentum’s 
success in winning over to his support even those unionists
who had originally protested his appointment. Bentum received
3
88 votes, Hamma 13. That the NLC refrained from taking more 
forceful action to remove or discipline Bentum was due to 
several considerations. Police Inspector Harlley, the NLC
1. TUC Executive Board Resolutions, Article VI, 2, 7th 
October 1966, published in Ghana Workers1 Bui1etin,
Vol.l. No. 4, (October 1966).
2. Ibid., Article XII, 2 (b).
Ghana Workers* Bulletin, Vol.l. No. 9, (August 1967), p.3.
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leader with the closest personal association with Bentum, 
was convinced of his continuing dependability. Those who 
wei*e less certain had no wish for a confrontation with labour, 
partly because they did not feel their position to be suf­
ficiently stable, partly because they were concerned to main­
tain a liberal image abroad (especially in Britain). Moreover, 
Bentum did appear to be genuinely committed to restraining 
workers from abusing their new-found freedom through unnec­
essary illegal strike actions, and to keeping his criticisms 
of the regime within the bounds of the non-subversive. They 
were therefore prepared to tolerate him.
In fact, Bentum maintained a censorious attitude to 
illegal strikes for as long as there seemed some chance of 
gaining concessions to the demand for increased social justice, 
or, as he put it, "a bridging of the wages gap between the 
lower and higher income groups.11 Early in 1967, the Mills- 
Odoi Commission was appointed to make recommendations on the 
structure and remuneration of the public services, and, although 
its Report proved extremely disappointing to the lower-paid 
xvorkers, Bentum was appointed to the Mensah Commission to 
consider this Report and formulate a government incomes policy 
for the future. Until the beginning of 1969 Bentum retained 
some hope of gaining special concessions for the lower income 
group, (i.e. the skilled and unskilled manual workers) and 
during this period he went along with the Government in con­
demning strikes, and concurred with the imposition of fines 
on the leaders of illegal strikes. In response to the Rail­
way Permanent Waymen's strike of September 1968, one of the 
most serious the NLC regime had to deal with, he took an extrem­
ely tough line. He expressed his support for the Government’s 
arrest of the ringleaders, announced a new disciplinary code
1. "Statement issued by the Ghana TUC on the ’Report of the
Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public 
Services in Ghana* ", Annexure 1, Mensah Report, p.64.
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to be operated against unofficial strike leaders, and warned
the National Executive of the Railway Union that unless they
took steps ”to dismiss the undesirables (from the Union) I will
be compelled to recommend to the Executive Board of the TUC to
1
review your affiliation with the Congress.” He went on to
remind Ghana*s workers, in terms of which the Government no
doubt wholeheartedly approved, that "much of the salvation of
the large unemployed population and the economic progress of
the country lies on the shoulders and efforts of those who are
now working to increase productivity and help to improve and
expand industry.. The working people have the responsibility
to ensure that there is industrial and political stability.**
He concluded, rather sadly, **I do not want to be a Secretary-
2
General who only breaks strikes.”
Bentum*s attempt to reduce the incidence of strikes 
by persuasion (and, occasionally, threats) rather than actual 
repression could, however, hardly be said to have succeeded by 
the end of 1968. In the two and a half year period preceding 
the 1966 coup d*etat, the Ministry of Labour recorded a total 
of 22 strikes, involving some 10,000 workers, and a loss of 
68,000 man-days, (see Table 5.2). This was probably an inac­
curate, understated figure but not so inaccurate as to invalidate 
the reality of the contrast with the immediate post-coup period. 
In April 1966 - December 1968, there were 108 strikes, involving 
66,138 men and a total loss of 166,005 man-days. The N.L.C.*s 
reaction was to become increasingly impatient with strike part­
icipants, and to resort to lock-outs and dismissal of striking 
workers.
1. Speech reported in the Ghanaian Times, 19th September 
1968, p.l.
2. Ibid.
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This policy provoked a public protest from Bentum,
who increasingly took the position that strikes could only
properly be condemned if Government recognised the deplorable
financial situation of the lower income group and took effect-
ive measures to "bridge the gap". There appeared to be little
hope of this by the beginning of 1969. The Mensah Commission
had approved the recommendation of the Mills-Odoi Commission
for an across-the-board increase of 5 per cent in wages, the
only special concession to the lower-paid workers being the
introduction of incremental scales for the daily-rated which
would give them, on average, an effective increase of 7-8 per
cent per annum over the following three years. This barely
compensated the lower-paid for the impact of inflation on
their real incomes since the 1966 coup, and did nothing to
redress the impoverishment they had suffered in the first half
of the decade, (see Table 5.1). Moreover the Mensah Commission
was now advocating a Government wages policy which would restrict
the wage growth rate to a maximum of 5 per cent per year, again
without distinguishing between the lower and higher income 
2groups.
Angered at the insensitivity of these proposals,
Bentum tendered his resignation from the Incomes Commission in 
March 1969, and published a scathing critique of Government 
policy. This first referred back to the TUCfs criticisms of 
the Mills-Odoi Commission Report in May 1968:
1. For instance, in an article in the Pioneer on 16th July 
1969, Bentum argued that three main factors were respons­
ible for the high incidence of strikes in Ghana; "(a) Man­
agement and Government’s lack of understanding of indust­
rial relations and of the value of the work done by the 
TUC... (b) There will be no industrial peace without a 
bridging of the wages gap... (c) The high cost of food."
2. Mensah Report, p.28.
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Table 5*2 : Recorded Labour Strikes, Workers Involved, and 
____________Man-Days Lost in Ghana, 1944 to 1971._________
Year No. of Strikes
_
Workers
Involved Man-Days
U ^  f •
Lost
1944-45 2 700 n.d.
1945-46 3 7,750 n.d.
1946-47 7 946 n.d.
1947-48 37 48,865 n.d. - (inc.37 day strilc
1948-49 27 7,650 n.d. by minesworkers)
1949-50 54 38,557 123,311 - (not including 
Positive Action 
general strike)
1950-51 19 5,482 11,017
1951-52 39 15,404 38,185
1952-53 83 32,548 129,676
1953-54 65 25,529 125,927
1954-55 35 7,263 29,107
1955-56 23 1,039 13,191
+ 2 29,216 2,479,224 - (Minesworkers1 
strikes)
1956-57 45 11,858 33,005
1957-58 64 18,964 41,020
1958-59 49 8,875 21,673
1959-60 50 10,101 12,788
1960-61 26 4,404 6,459 - (Excludes 1 day 
commercial 
worker s s trike)
1961-62 10 3,240 6,482 - (Excludes Sek.- 
Tak. strike)
1962-63 7 820 1,390 (Understated)
1963-64 9 3,033 1,477 (Understated)
1965-3/66 13 6,802 66,508
3/66-6/66 17 5,685 4,208 - (G.P.P. ousted by 
N.L.C. 2/66)
7/66-7/67 26 11,228 15,854
7/67 - 7/68 52 40,441 113,104
7/68-12/68 13 8,784 32,839
1969 51 28,369 148,404 - (Busia regime
1970 55 21,376 123,000 9/69)
1/71-7/71 46 25,159 49,115
Sources: all data are as recorded by the Department of Labour,
which, after 1961 during the Nkrumah regime, excluded reports on 
certain (illegal) strikes. The data are to be found in:
J. I. Roper, Labour Problems in West Africa (London, Penguin, 
1958), for years 1944-50* Reports of the Labour Department, 
annual reports, 1950-51 to 1967-68; and Ghana, Par1iamentary 
Debates, Vol.8, no.29, column 1604, for 1969-71.
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"We do not accept the conservative and biased 
economic arguments advanced by the Commission 
in arriving at its conclusions... The Commission 
has not recommended a living wage for the lowest 
paid workers, and at the same time has been most 
generous in its treatment of the more highly- 
paid employees... By its report the Commission 
recognises that 88 per cent of the total employed 
labour force was earning less than N$50.00 per 
month. By the use of the Governments own 
figures (on minimal nutritional requirements) 
this means that 88% of the total employed labour 
force cannot afford a balanced diet even if they 
spend theix~ entire income on food alone... They 
have been asked to wait even though the main 
cause of low productivity in Ghana is poor manage­
ment.... We strongly wish to state that we 
expect the man at the top to bear more of the 
national burden and not the labourer who is 
already carrying too much.
"In our original submission to the Commission and 
in our comments on the 5% general increase to 
civil servants we emphasised the already existing 
anomalous pay ratio between the lowest and highest 
paid employees of the public service which was 
1:22. This is the most unfortunate heritage of 
colonialism. It is surprising that even though the 
report speaks primarily about the small increases 
granted to the lower level of public servants, the 
effect of the total recommendations is to increase 
the ratio from 1:22 to 1:39.” 1
To this Bentum now added the further charge that a 
rigid incomes policy restricting wage increases to 5 per cent 
per year could not possibly be acceptable unless it also cov­
ered all membei^s of Ghana*s socio-economic elite, such as
1. "Statement issued by the Ghana TUG on the ’Report of the 
Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the 
Public Services in Ghana* ", Annexure 1, Mensah Report, 
p. 65.
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lawyers, judges and doctors:
"The NLG or any civilian government should 
consider whether it is social justice for the 
ordinary worker to be controlled in the sharing
of the national cake whereas the *big-shots* and
other sections of the society are not similarly 
controlled. ** 1
This growing friction between the TUC and the NLC
regime was further aggravated in the summer of 1969 by two
strike incidents. In the first, a strike of minesworkers at
Obuasi, police opened fire on a crowd of demonstrators, killing
2
several people. In the second, a strike of doclcworkers at 
Tema, all 2,000 strikers were dismissed from their jobs.
Bentum demanded an official enquiry into the first incident, 
and led a delegation to the International Labour Organisation 
to protest the second. It was clearly only the prospect of
a change of government in the near future - general elections
for a return to civilian rule were scheduled for September 
1969 - that prevented the development of a more serious con­
frontation between the TUC and the NLC regime at this time.
1. Article in the Pioneer, 5th April 1969, p.7.
2. For details, see the Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into Obuasi Disturbances (1969), (Accra: Government 
Printer, 1970).
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CHAPTER SIX
BENTUM* S TUC AND THE PROGRESS PARTY GOVERNMENT
As leader of the TUC under the Progress Party 
Government, Bentum pursued essentially the same line that 
he had taken in relation to the N.L.C. If there was any dis­
cernible difference in policy prior to the summer of 1971, this 
consisted in the more frequent, public expression of the TUC*s 
views, especially with respect to wage reforms, and the develop­
ment of the regional and district councils of the TUC as highly 
active forums for the discussion of national affairs by local 
unionists. All this could, and probably should, be seen as 
simply part of the attempt to make a reality of political demo­
cracy in Ghana, the TUC being conceived as having a major role 
to play in this experiment. Initially, relations with the new 
Government appeared to be cordial. Yet, during the course of 
1971, they became strained to a point where an open confront­
ation seemed unavoidable, and, at the beginning of September, 
Bentum announced his support for workers* demonstrations in 
protest against the Government’s policies.
There can be little doubt that Bentum*s criticisms of 
the Government, and his general conduct of the TUC leadership, 
enjoyed the enthusiastic support of an overwhelming majority of 
the rank-and-file. But the planning of the September 1971 strike 
was poorly co-ordinated, and Bentum*s announcement of its com­
mencement found many union leaders surprised and unprepared. 
Consequently, only a minority of union branches came out on 
the first day of the strike, and when 500 government workers in 
Accra were instantly dismissed for stopping work, others were 
effectively dissuaded from taking the risk of active particip­
ation. Only the Sekondi-Takoradi workers felt strong enough
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to maintain a stand against the Government, and 8,000 workers 
in that city stayed out for a week until there was clearly no 
hope that others would join them.
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the 
sources of this confrontation, it is worth remarking on the 
close similarities, and also certain differences, between the 
Sekondi-Takoradi strikes of 1961 and 1971. In both instances, 
the respective regimes faced what were perhaps the most serious 
(civilian) challenges they were to experience from any quarter; 
and this from a group of workers who had been amongst the most 
enthusiastic and politically influential supporters of these 
regimes at the beginning of their periods in office. The 1971 
strike proved to be not so protracted a challenge as that of 
1961, but it might well have been had not poor planning and 
internal divisions amongst the railwayworkers undermined the 
strikers* morale. In any case, its implications were equally 
serious. Indeed, perhaps more clearly than that of 1961, it 
heralded the imminent downfall of the regime. Just four months 
later, in January 1972, with the economic situation deterior­
ating even further, and the disillusionment of many farmers 
added to that of the workers, the army intervened to displace 
the Progress Party government.
In each case, the objectives of strike action were 
very similar, to protest the imposition of additional taxation 
which seemed unfair in view of the excessive wealth and high 
living of the politico-administrative elite, and which lacked 
credibility as a genuine developmental measure. For some at 
least, the aim was consciously conceived as protesting the 
development of gross socio-economic inequalities in Ghanaian 
society, and the authoritarian style of government to which 
each regime increasingly had to resort partly in consequence
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of popular unrest at these inequalities. In more positive 
terms, the strikers asserted the claim of the trade union move­
ment to a regular and major voice in national decision-making 
in order to check elitist and authoritarian tendencies in 
government. The majority of strikers and their leaders were 
concerned to distinguish these objectives from 'mere party 
politics* or 'subversive motivations', not only for the benefit 
of Government but also out of the desire to act consistently 
with their purpose - i.e. to assert and demonstrate the legit­
imacy and political viability of a certain type of trade union 
movement (democratic-reformist), and thereby to establish it 
on a permanent footing (or defend it, once established).
In 1971, as in 1961, Government characterised the 
strikers as a relatively privileged labour elite pursuing self­
ish interests to the detriment of the real poor, the unemployed 
and the rural populace. There was perhaps some validity to this 
accusation in the sense that the additional taxation which the 
strikers protested was, theoretically, to be used for the benefit 
of these groups. And the skilled workers who led the strike 
were, of course, better off than the unemployed and some, though 
certainly not all, of the rural populace. Yet, essentially, 
this was a calculated attempt to displace a major source of 
social conflict on to a minor one, to emphasise the relatively 
slight differentiation within the ranks of the poor, while 
ignoring the primary and immense gap between the masses and 
the elite. There was greater validity to the workers* claim to 
be acting as the "spokesmen of the people", since, with the 
suppression or buying off of opposition parties, the unions 
and/or strike action represented the only means of institutional 
expression of popular discontent. It was difficult to assess 
the extent or group-location of public sympathy for the 1971 
strikers with any precision. But, in addition to the impres­
sionistic evidence of interviews, it was significant that 
during the last quarter of the year there was much talk amongst
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aspirant politicians in the Central and Western Regions of 
forming a Labour Party, with Bentum in its leadership, aiming 
to attract the support of the unionised workers and the urban 
poor more generally. This was at least indicative of the 
judgement of men with their fingers on the pulse of public 
opinion that sympathy for the aims and stance of Bentum* s 
TUC had been widespread.
The fact that such ideas were most prevalent in the 
Central and Western Regions of Ghana was, again significant.
In 1971, as in 1961, there was a communal dimension to the 
anti-Government feeling of Sekondi-Takoradi workers. The 
Progress Party regime was perceived as favoritistic to Ashanti 
and Brong-Ahafo. Workers from the Central and Western regions, 
as were the majority in Sekondi-Takoradi, were the less willing 
to sacrifice for rural development since they doubted that their 
home-areas would receive an equal share of such development. 
Workers in Kumasi, in contrast, had good reason to perceive 
very real benefits for themselves and their relatives in the 
budget proposals. 1970-71 witnessed the disintegration of the 
Akan (Ashanti-Fanti) alliance which Dr. Busia had cultivated 
during 1969, and the re-emergence of that Ashanti-Coastal Town 
conflict, dating back several centuries, which had informed the 
struggle between the C*P.P. and the opposition (i.e. the Congress 
Party, and later the National Liberation Movement) during the 
1950 * s.
It would, nevertheless, constitute a misplacement of 
emphasis to attribute more than marginal significance to this 
communal dimension in the September 1971 confrontation. The 
major issues were the general, national ones of the elitism of 
the Progress Party regime, and of the legitimacy of the role 
which Bentum had attempted to develop for the TUC. On this
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occasion, unlike 1961, (or certainly more clearly than then), 
the Sekondi-Takoradi strikers were ideologically at one with 
the TUC and with the vast majority of workers throughout the 
country. It is this unity and sense of solidarity of Ghanaian 
workers during 1971 which deserves emphasis. One could almost 
speak of the emergence of a sense of national working-class 
identity at this time. Certainly, the Government-TUC con­
frontation in September, though unsought and undesired, served 
to strengthen rather than undemine rank-and-file confidence 
in the legitimacy of Bentum1s ’’independent and democratic” 
style of trade union movement.
The 1969 Election and the victory of the Progress Party.
With a General Election scheduled for September, the 
issue of the labour movement’s stand in relation to party politics 
was again raised at the June 1969 Congress of the TUC. The sug­
gestion was made that the TUC might form or sponsor a labour 
party, possibly in alliance with the Labour Party of Frank Wudu 
(formerly Frank Woode, General Secretary of the Railway Union in 
1947-49), but this proposal received little support from the 
leadership or the assembled delegates, and the policy of strict 
neutrality in party politics was re-affirmed. ^
While there are no means of determining the voting 
pattern of unionised workers in the 1969 Elections with any 
precision, interviews conducted in 1971 suggested that the large 
majority of rank-and-file members and union officials in Sekondi-
Takoradi had voted for the victorious Progress Party, led by
2Dr. Kofi Busia. It would seem likely that a similar pattern
1. West Africa, 7th June 1969.
2. Out of 90 workers interviewed, 44 per cent claimed to have 
voted for the Progress Pax^ ty, 20 per cent for one of the 
other parties, and 36 per cent not to have voted in the 
elections. It is possible that a number of those who 
claimed not to have voted were simply reluctant to reveal 
their party affiliation.
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occurred throughout the country, except possibly in toms in 
the Volta Region, and in Accra, where the Progress Party won 
only 3 out of 8 seats. In the country as a whole, the Progress 
Party won 105 out of 140 seats in the new Legislative Assembly, 
with 29 going to the National Alliance of Liberals, led by 
Mr. Komla Gbedemah. The Progress Party also carried all the 
Regions, in most cases with an overwhelming majority of seats, 
with the sole exception of the Volta Region, where the Ewe 
people voted NAL candidates into almost every seat.
Mr. Gbedemah was himself an Ewe, as were most of the 
prominent figures in his party. The final results therefore 
give the impression of a fairly straight tribal contest between 
the Ewe people on the one hand, and an *Akan* alliance of 
Ashantis, Fantis, Akwapim, and other Akan cultural groups, on 
the other. Yet, in many parts of the country, and especially in 
the southern coastal towns, the issues in the election were far 
more complex than this suggests, and the seats more closely 
contested.
The National Alliance of Liberals attracted the sup­
port not only of the Ewe people but also of many ex-G.P.P. 
enthusiasts and of others who, although disillusioned with the 
Ikrumah regime during the 1960's, had looked favourably on the 
C.P.P. in its earlier days. Komla Gbedemah had been one of 
Nkrumah's most senior lieutenants up until 1961, and was credited 
with much of the organisational work that had gone into develop­
ing the Convention People's Party into so powerful a force in 
the 1950*s. From the more particular point of view of 'labour* 
appeal, Gbedemah could claim personal association with the 1952 
Wages and Salary Commission which, disappointing as it was to 
Biney and the radicals, did more than any other commission, 
before or since, for Ghana's lower-paid workers. In his election
j
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campaign speeches in August-September 1969 he proclaimed his
sympathy for the programme of Bentum*s TUC, promising that
efforts would be made "to bridge the gap between the rural
farmer and the city industrialist, and between the children
of the senior civil servant in Accra and those of the small
1blacksmith in Mamprusi." T The Progress Party, in contrast, 
made no such commitment to egalitarian reforms.
An important question-mark hung over the character 
of Mr. Gbedemah, however. In 1961, he had fled into exile 
under the threat of imminent detention. According to his own 
account, this was because he was attempting to right the 
abuses and check the excesses of the Nkrumah regime from within, 
but, according to President Nkrumah, because he was guilty of 
embezzlement on a huge scale while Minister of Finance. He 
was, therefore, free of association with the authoritarianism 
and economic failures of the G.P.P. regime in 1961-66, but a 
figure of some controversy as to whether his disassociation was 
voluntary or forced, based on principle or venal self-interest. 
(The Jiagge Commission in fact found him guilty of past fin­
ancial irregularities and he was debarred from taking up the 
seat he had won in the Legislative Assembly.  ^^
The Progress Party leadership played on the theme 
of Gbedemah*s financial untrustworthiness to considerable 
effect. At a rally in Takoradi, one P.P. speaker remarked:
**If Gbedemah offers you money to vote NAL, then accept it and
feel free to vote P.P. It was your money anyway before he 
3stole it.** ; and the slogan, '*Say NAL and Vote Progress"
1. Quoted in The Birth of the Second Republic, (Accra:
Editorial and Publishing Services, 1970), p.47.
2. Report of the (Jiagge) Commission to enquire into the
assets of specified persons, (Accra: Government Printer,
1969).
3. Interview with Samuel Essien, Takovadi correspondent of
the Ghanaian Times, 7th September 1971.
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1became widely current during the last weeks of the campaign. 
According to most interviewees in Sekondi-Takoradi, it was this 
issue, not that of alleged Ewe tribalism, that persuaded them 
to vote P.P. rather than NAL.
There were other reasons for the Progress Party's 
electoral victory, some of them, it must be said, reflecting 
(strictly speaking) irregular advantages it held over other 
parties. Mr. Joe Appiah, leader of the United Nationalist 
Party (which won only 2 seats), claimed that, "certain persons 
have been going about the country indulging in a vile propa­
ganda that the NLC will not hand over power to civilians if
2the Progress Par-ty is not voted into power." Whether or not 
this was strictly accurate, it was certainly the case that 
Brigadier Afrifa toured the country in August-September advis­
ing the chiefs to use their influence to secure a P.P. victory, 
and that he openly threw all his prestige as the youthful hero 
of the 1966 coup behind Dr. Busia. According to one newspaper 
report, he even announced that he owed the inspiration for the
coup to Busia and therefore hoped the "Prof" would some day be
3
taking over from himself and his military colleagues.
In addition, the NLC regime provided Dr. Busia with 
special assistance of an organisational nature by appointing 
him Chairman of the Centre for Civic Education in February 1969. 
This was supposed to be a non-party political organisation, 
designed to help educate the electorate in their democratic 
rights and responsibilities, and to stimulate discussion of 
major national issues on a non-partisan basis. But, in practice, 
Busia was able to use the C.C.E., and his trips by state heli-
1. The Birth of the Second Republic, op.cit., p.82.
2. , The Pioneer, 5th July 1969, p.3.
3. The Spokesman, 22nd May 1970, p.l.
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copter on C.C.E. business, to lay the foundations of his party, 
developing political contacts throughout the Regions, and pro­
viding jobs in the Centre*s organisation for men of talent who 
could later be mobilised to run the Party*s campaign in their 
areas. This was at a time when other politicians had no chance 
of openly soliciting for support, since the NLC's ban on party 
political activity was not lifted until May.
In spite of its possession of these advantages, and 
the distinctly mediocre quality of its rivals, it would be wrong 
to suggest that the Progress Party leadership possessed no more 
positive electoral appeal. In addition to the obvious attraction 
of self-advancement for its organisers and 'enthusiasts*, the 
Progress Party promised to provide honest, democratic govern­
ment, a promise lent more credibility than that of other parties 
by its leadership's record of opposition to the Nkrumah regime. 
For this leadership consisted essentially of a regroupment of 
the old United Party leaders, who claimed to be ,fthe champions 
of democracy" in Ghana, together with a new crop of professional 
men and intellectuals who had surfaced in the political vacuum 
created by the 1966 coup. Dr. Busia himself, J. Kwesi Lamptey,
S. D. Dombo, W. Ofori-Atta, R. R. Amponsah, Jate£ Kaleo and 
Victor Owusu had all suffered preventive detention or exile 
under the C.P.P. regime for their oppositional activities. It 
was a well-calculated strategy to emphasise the 'democratic* 
element, and divert attention from the tribalistic and elitist 
tendencies in this group's political record, by launching the 
Progress Party in Sekondi-Takoradi (rather than Kumasi, the 
'heart' of the old National Liberation Movement). Dr. Busia 
specifically appealed to the railwayworkers, as natural allies 
in the fight for democracy, to help vote the Party into power; 
"Some in Nkrumah*s government, I am told, called you 'Western 
Rats' for going on strike. Today we salute you as Western
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heroes, for you rose to resist tyranny .... We will strive 
constantly to merit your support and confidence.” This 
appeal did not go unheard. Some of the railwayworkers were 
among the leading Progress Party activists in Sekondi-Takoradi, 
and the Railway Union Executive had to issue a warning that the 
Union*s platform should not be used for party political propa­
ganda .
Beyond the vague commitment to democratic Government, 
and to recognising and protecting the independence of the 
trade union movement, the Progress Party did not go in defining 
its community of interest with the lower-paid workers. This 
was not necessarily because it had already formulated, with 
any clarity, a policy programme unfavourable to labour. More 
probably, it was simply because, with the addition of several 
young intellectuals of varying ideological complexion to an 
original leadership, itself united more by common opposition to 
the Nkrumah regime than by positive beliefs, the Progress Party 
high-command was something of a hotch-potch of conflicting 
ideas. Together with some of the most extreme and eccentric 
of Ghanaian conservatives - men such as Victor Owusu and 
R. R. Ampansah - were to be found several young welfare-state 
liberals, such as Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah, K. G. Osei-Bansu and 
Dr. Jones Ofori-Atta, and even the former young radical,
J. H. Mensah, author of the C.P.P.*s Seven-Year Development 
Plan. Such a gathering dictated that the identification of 
ideological aims be muted, a strategy made the more feasible 
by the failure of rival parties to engage the Progress Party in 
a meaningful ideological debate.
1. Ghanaian Times, 19th June 1969, p.l.
2. RUA, Railway Union Working Committee Minutes, 14th 
September 1969.
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Yet, in a sense, this disinclination to present 
definite programmes itself constituted a distinctive ideol­
ogical self-projection, that of the rule of experts or "the 
best brains in the country". The Progress Party had succeeded 
in attracting to its senior ranks the majority of the nation*s 
intellectual figures, including, it seemed, almost the entire 
indigenous staff of the University of Legon, and, presiding 
over them, Ghana*s most famed academic, Professor K. A. Busia. 
Were not such men best fitted, even essential, to sort out the 
economic mess into which the Nkrumah regime had plunged the 
country, and to find the path to progress? As Dr. Busia him­
self put it:
"The Progress Party has power to overcome - 
power to overcome the heritage of debt, 
corruption, inefficiency and poverty.
Power to overcome the present unemployment, 
the low standard of living, disease, and 
poverty, and the humiliation of our nation 
and of the Blackman.... The solution to these 
problems will be based on carefully collected 
data.** 2
This was an argument of some force with the electorate, 
and certainly of great influence on the Progress Party leader­
ship’s image of itself and actual conduct of government. But 
it is important to note a certain ambivalence in the reaction 
of the urban populace to this assertion of an educational right
1, Dr. Fynn, a University history lecturer and a Progress 
Party candidate in the elections, explained that, "many 
university graduates have decided to do politics because 
it is irritating to see incompetent and dishonest men 
running the affairs of the nation.15 The Pioneer,
13th August 1969, p.3.
2 . Quoted in The Birth of the Second Republic, op.cit,, p.34.
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to rule. The intellectual arrogance which led Dr. Busia to 
claim he was the only man fitted to rule Ghana was liable to 
be perceived as a gross insult to the abilities of her ordinary 
citizens if academic expertise failed to produce the promised 
economic progress. It was the intellectual elitism which 
characterised the P.P. regime’s conduct of government and 
its attitude to critical voices, at least as much as the 
conservatism of its socio-economic policies, which was res­
ponsible for the rapid deterioration of relations between the 
regime and the Ghanaian labour movement. The development of 
an open confrontation with the P.P. regime, within just two 
years of its accession to power, derived from frustration not 
only of the economic expectations of the union rank-and-file, 
but also of that aspiration to an effective and acknowledged 
political voice which, for union leaders and the skilled worker 
class more generally, was central to the notion of democratic 
trade unionism.
Economic policies of the Progress Party regime.
The Progress Party came to power without a clearly 
formulated economic programme, and no such programme was system­
atically presented to the country prior to the Budget of 30th 
July 1971. Before this date, the regime simply proclaimed its 
commitment to ’privatisation' of the State sector, appealed 
for an increase in National Discipline and Self Help, and made 
vague avowals of its especial concern for the poorest sections 
of the national community, the rural populace and the unemployed. 
It will later be argued that it was, in part, this failure to 
present and implement a consistent and dynamic programme of 
action more speedily which encouraged workers to resort to 
strike actions to impress their demands on Government.
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This, in turn, was largely responsible for aggravating the
friction between Government and the TUC to the point where
it finally escalated into head-on-conflict. In the interests
of objectivity, however, and in order not to prejudge the issue,
it is here intended to describe the regime’s economic programme
as presented in its most systematic and appealing form in the
July 1971 Budget. It is then proposed to describe the reactions
and objections of the majority of skilled and semi-skilled
workers to that Budget programme. This presentation is based
on structured interviews with 90 railwayworkers in Sekondi-
Takoradi during August 1971, the results of which, though they
cannot be assumed to be typical of the views of other groups of
workers in any strict sense, are certainly indicative of labour
1
reactions more generally. Such a presentation will help to 
assess the degree to which the strikes and demonstrations of 
September 1971 were motivated by opposition to the Budget prop­
osals, and to what degree by other considerations or sources of 
conflict. More particularly, since these interviews were con­
ducted in the months of July and August, (i.e. before Bentum 
began to mount his attack on the Budget), this will go some 
way to showing in which sense, and to what degree, Bentum was 
thereby representing rank-and-file opinion or alternatively 
seeking to create an 'artificial* conflict.
The first priority and cornerstone of the P.P. regime's
economic strategy was the focussing of resources on Rural Develop 
2
ment. There were really two aspects to the rural development
1. For further details of the questionnaire and its admin­
istration, see Chapter Seven.
2. J. H. Mensah's budget statement was reproduced in full in 
the Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, 27th - 30th July 1971. 
In addition, both of these newspapers published special 
supplements on 17th August, explaining its rationale in 
somewhat simpler terms for the benefit of the mass audience.
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programme, the one of particular concern and benefit to the 
rural populace, the other conceived rather in terms of the 
general interest of rural and urban dwellers alike. The former 
aspect consisted in the provision of pipe-borne water, elec­
tricity supply, and medical centres for the rural areas so as 
to reduce the disparity between urban and rural standards of 
existence. This was presented by the Government as an essent­
ially altruistic, compassionate policy, calling for self- 
sacrifice on the part of the politico-administrative elite and
the urban populace more generally, though the motivation was
1
clearly not lacking an element of electoral interest. The 
second aspect was that of encouraging the production of suf­
ficient food to sustain Ghana* s growing population, thereby to 
reduce the cost of living in the urban areas and also to improve 
the nation’s balance of trade position. Other advantages were 
claimed for this programme: that of increasing employment opport­
unities in the rural areas, for instance, and so reducing the 
flow of young migrants to the cities where sufficient job open­
ings simply could not be provided. The Government hoped to 
stimulate this agricultural revolution by constructing more 
'feeder* roads between the rural areas, the towns, and the cities,
1. The somewhat peculiar combination of elitist and populist 
ideological tendencies which characterised the Progress 
Party leadership was well illustrated by a remark of 
Dr. Busia*s reported in the Daily Graphic on 31st August 
1971. Dr. Busia explained his decision to cut his own 
and other cabinet minister’s salaries as the result of a 
trip he made to a village where the drinking water was 
visibly filthy. On returning to his home, he apparently 
thought to himself, "I can sit in Accra and the water I 
use in my toilet is cleaner than the water my fellow- 
countrymen are drinking."
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by educating Ghanaian farmers in more advanced agricultural 
techniques, and by setting the National Service Corps to work 
to extend the area of land under cultivation.
The Governments second major priority was described
by the Minister of Finance, J. H. Mensah, as "the launching of
a frontal attack on the problem of unemployment." This was
to be tackled partly through the expansion of rural employment
opportunities, but also by embarking on a massive programme of
housing and public works construction in the urban areas. This
would also have the beneficial effect of "stemming the rise in
rent which is placing such a burden on the finances of the lowest 
2
paid workers". It was by means of reducing the cost of food, 
housing and transport in the urban areas, rather than by award­
ing wage increases, that the Government aimed to relieve the 
financial position of the lower-paid workers.
As to whether any wage increases at all could be anti­
cipated the Government was somewhat vague and vacillatory.
During its first eighteen months In office, the P.P. regime 
consistently refused to consider raising the minimum wage in 
spite of the fact that the financial position of lower-paid 
workers continued to deteriorate seriously under the impact of 
inflation. In May 1971, however, the Minister of Labour and 
Co-operatives, Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah, declared that the Govern­
ment recognised "that the gap between the lower and higher income 
groups was becoming too wide and needed bridging", and announced 
the appointment of the Campbell Commission "to look into this 
problem and the conditions of service of employees of the public
1. Budget Statement, Ghanaian Times, 30th July 1971, p.6 .
2. Ibid.
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service with a view, primarily, to bridging this gap." ^
Workers* hopes were obviously raised. Yet, in his Budget
speech on 30th July, J. H. Mensah announced that:
"Upon a careful examination of the information 
and advice offered by the Commission, govern­
ment has come to the conclusion that it would 
require very large proportionate increases in 
the wages of the lower paid public officers to 
compensate them for the changes in the cost of 
living since the last increase in wages, or to
bridge the gap between their incomes and those
of the higher paid officers. Such a scale of 
wage increases for the lowest paid servants, 
even if not promulgated as an increase in the 
national minimum wage, would inevitably lead to
repercussions in other parts of the income
structure. In the face of the existing inability 
of the country to provide more food, housing, 
transport and any of the other goods and services 
which the workers would wish to buy, a general 
increase in money wages would undermine the 
stability of the whole economy. It would also 
be self-defeating.11 2
It seemed then that the Government was not contemplat­
ing increasing wages in the near future. Moreover, its decision 
to embark on an ambitious and expensive rural development pro­
gramme, in spite of the nation's weak balance of payments pos­
ition and huge external debt, necessitated that new tax measures 
should be introduced. These included a National Development 
Levy "which will require every employed person to help the 
development effort." The imposition of additional taxation 
on even the lowest paid workers was justified on the grounds that,
"in Ghana there are two classes of people who can 
be said to be relatively poor: those who live in 
the big towns and cities but have no work to do, 
and those who live in the villages and can only 
afford the bare necessities of life. By compar­
ison to these groups, anyone with a regular job, 
even at the minimum wage, is well off." 4
1* Daily Graphic, 10th May 1971, p.4.
2. Budget Statement, Ghanaian Times, 30th July 1971, p.6 .
3. Budget Supplement, Ghanaian Times, 17th August 1971, p.6 .
4. Ibid, p.7.
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Many lower-paid workers no doubt found it difficult to accept 
this assessment of their situation; but the Government later 
qualified its position by announcing that those earning less 
than N034 per month would be exempt from the Levy. Furthermore, 
the Levy was to be scaled according to income level, rising
from a 1 per cent tax on incomes below N#1,000 per annum to
5 per cent on the chargeable incomes of corporations. This 
was hardly as steep a scaling, perhaps, as the demands of social 
justice might require, but then the higher paid were to make 
additional sacrifices in the form of losing various perquisites 
and allowances. Car and entertainment allowances were to be 
abolished, for instance, and the subsidised rents for govern­
ment bungalows raised to a more realistic figure. Taken together, 
these measures could perhaps be interpreted as a negative form 
of "bridging the wages gap". i
Labour's reaction to the Budget.
The equitable character of the budget, taken as a 
whole, was not lost on Ghana's lower-paid workers. The large 
majority approved of it in most of its aspects and general
orientation. But they were concerned, firstly, to question
certain items, and secondly to distinguish between the theory, 
or stated objectives, of the budget and what they believed it 
would mean in practice. The idea of rural development appealed 
very strongly, partly because they recognised that the rising 
price of foodstuffs was the major burden on their wage packets, 
but also because the persistence of strong ties between most 
workers and their rural (or less urban) homes, whether practical 
or more vaguely emotional, inclined them to support plans for 
improving rural living standards. As one interviewee commented,
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“Every man living on the coast has some village people living
in wretched conditions. And this will enable them to produce
more food and bring it to us." And another, of slightly
different perspective, remarked “Up in those rural areas, they're
still living very darkly and savagely. Therefore, they should
deduct just a bit of our pay to polish them, because they are
2so dark over there." Similarly, the idea of temporary sac­
rifice in order to help create jobs for the unemployed appealed 
to both altruistic and self-interested motivations, mixed as 
they generally were. The burden of supporting relatives who 
could find no work was a major drain on many workers' incomes. 
Questioned more generally as to the primary objectives which 
the trade union movement should be pursuing, 70 per cent rated 
“helping to solve the unemployment problem" as being of the
3
highest priority.
However, many workers were sceptical as to what would 
actually materialise from these programmes. As far as the 
creation of new industries and job opportunities was concerned, 
the P.P. regime had so far been all talk and no action. More 
important perhaps, Government aid for rural development seemed 
so far to have been allocated on a regionally favoritistic basis. 
Rural development had meant development for the Ashanti and 
Brong-Ahafo Regions, the home areas of the majority of Progress 
Party leaders, and, to a lesser extent, for the Volta Region 
where the Party was concerned to win over the Ewe people to its 
support. As Dr. Busia had announced on 21st November 1969, “The 
Progress Party Government has within barely two months of
1. Interview with railway worker, 23rd August, 1971.
2. Interview with railway worker, 21st August 1971.
3. See Chapter Seven, Table 7.3.
211
assumption of office, voted approximately N05.6 million for 
development projects in the Ashanti Region alone.”  ^ It is 
doubtful whether the Central and Western Regions received as
2
much as this during the first two years of Progress Party rule.
Workers who originated from these Regions, as did the majority
in Sekondi-Takoradi, and many in Accra-Tema, were therefore
sceptical as to what rural development would mean for their
relatives: ”Rural development is good, but not if there is too
much concentration in one area. We have yet to see any in 
3
Atlanta.” The influence of this communal divison on the deter­
mination of workers' attitudes to the budget (and to the regime 
more generally) became apparent when considerable numbers of 
workers in Kumasi proclaimed their support for the National
Development Levy and disassociated themselves from the TUC's
A /critical stance. (With the exception of the members of the 
Confederation of Labour, the rival trade union centre, they 
were the only workers in Ghana to do this.) Nevertheless, this 
communal dimension was of marginal significance relative to 
other factors in generating labour opposition to the budget.
More important by far was the Government's apparent 
refusal to make any positive concession to the demand for an 
increase in wages, or to the idea of bridging the gap between 
lower and higher income groups* The need for sacrifice was 
generally recognised, the argument that wage increases tended 
to be self-defeating without a concomitant increase in food 
production widely appreciated. But, as the Government itself 
admitted, it would be some years before the agricultural revol­
ution was sufficiently advanced to produce a fall in prices or 
before the problem of unemployment could be significantly reduced.
1. The Pioneer, 21st November 1969, p.l.
2. This, at least, was the impression of the Senior Community
Development Officer for the Western Region. Interview with
H. Bossman, 2nd August 1971.
3. Interview with railway worker, 28th August 1971.
4. Ghanaian Times, 17th September 1971, p.l.
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In the meantime, the lower-paid workers were having to provide 
for the unemployed, and, with basic foodstuffs costing at least 
50 per cent more by the summer of 1971 than at the time of the 
Progress Party's accession to power, many were finding it quite 
impossible to make ends meet. They survived only by further 
reducing their consumption of staple foods, such as yam or 
"fu-fu", or else turning to "gari","a food formerly considered 
fit only for pigs", according to one elderly Ghanaian, and 
certainly of very low nutritional value. Whether conceived in 
terms of social justice or of the preconditions for raising 
productivity, some increase in the minimum wage was surely 
justified, even if it offered only relatively temporary relief. 
This could be financed by severe cuts in the salaries of higher- 
paid wage-eamers and the political elite. As one speaker argued 
at a Railway Union mass-meeting, "We want to take at least 
N02OO off all those rich men. How can one man possibly eat
3
thirty-nine times as much as another?" - a perspective of
1. This (admittedly very rough) estimate of the increase in
price of local foodstuffs is based on conversations with 
market-women and customers in Sekondi market on 13th 
August 1971.
2* Interview with Joseph Ansah, 8th July 1971. It is worth
quoting in full the remark of this 75 year old Sekondi 
inhabitant, who was private secretary to the famous pan- 
Africanist, J. Caseley Hayford, in the 1920's, the uncle 
of P.P. Minister, J. Kwesi Lamptey, and in no sense a 
'radical':"Our workers are now having to eat food, this 
'gari', formerly considered fit only for pigs in the old 
days, food not fit for Ghanaians. And meanwhile the 
Government carries on playing 'moneytics'. I really would 
not wish to live much longer to see my beloved Ghana in 
the days of bloody revolution that are coming."
3. Speaker at a Railway Union mass-meeting on 26th August
1971 at which the writer was present.
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distinctly radical implications. Host workers remained quite 
unconvinced by J. H. Mens ah1 s argument as to the impractical ity 
of attempting to 'bridge the gap'; and perhaps rightly so, 
since this was not necessarily an argument for refusing to 
make any concession at all in that direction. Certainly, to 
raise workers* hopes of some concession by appointing the 
Campbell Commission only to dash them three months' later was 
politically inept in the extreme.
This served to bring to the surface a great deal of 
simmering resentment at the wealth and insensitivity of the 
Progress Party elite. "Why should we shoulder more of the
1
burden when they are not attempting to sacrifice at all?"
This was perhaps not strictly accurate, since in August 1971
Prime Minister Busia announced that, in order to "set an example
of making sacrifice", his salary was to be cut by N06,OOO,
that of Cabinet Ministers by N04,OOO and that of Ministerial
2Secretaries and Regional Chief Executives by N02,OOO. But 
such a lead was long, perhaps too long, overdue. On its assump- 
tion of office, the P.P. regime had set the salaries and allow­
ances of its Ministers and Regional Chief Executives at levels 
almost twice as high as those enjoyed by their equivalents in
3
the C.P.P. regime. The Prime Minister was to receive Nf2l8,000, 
Cabinet Ministers N#14,000, Ministerial Secretaries and Regional 
Chief Executives Nf£l0,000, while the allowances for which they 
were eligible raised their total emoluments several thousand 
cedis above these figures. These awards provoked jealousy 
among ordinary M.P.'s who began pressurising in May 1970 for
1. Interview with railway worker, 17th August 1971. This
sentiment'^was expressed, in similar words, by virtually 
all railway worker interviewees.
2. Ghanaian Times, 28th August 1971, p.l.
3. At the end of the C.P.P. period, Ministers received
salaries of N#9,000 per annum.
4. The Spokesman, 18th May 1970, p.l.
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substantial increases in their allowances, and in July most 
of their demands were granted, giving them total emoluments 
of some N#7,000 per annum. It was clearly hypocritical to 
to the point of being ludicrous, therefore, to characterise 
Bentum1 s demand for an increase in the minimum wage from 
N#0.75 to N#1.00 per day as "a very high level to set workers' 
demands" and "calculated to incite workers against the govern­
ment by making demands which Mr. Bentum knew were impossible."  ^
Rather, these early measures of the P.P. Government had made it 
extremely difficult for Bentum to restrain workers' demands at 
that level.
There were further examples of such insensitive 
behaviour during the following twelve months. Mention will 
here be restricted to those instances to which workers specifi­
cally referred in interviews in August 1971. It rapidly became 
obvious during 1970 that many Progress Party leaders were build­
ing up very considerable commercial empires for themselves. In 
December, Lt.-General A. K. Ocran, a leader of the 1966 coup 
who retained a great deal of popular respect, especially in the 
Western and Central Regions of Ghana, wrote to the Speaker of 
the National Assembly and the Presidential Secretary expressing 
his disappointment that many members of the Legislature had not 
yet declared their assets as they were required to do under 
Articles 67 and 89 of the Constitution. Instead of meeting this 
criticism squarely, the Progress Party's General Secretary 
accused Lt.-General Ocran of being "only concerned with creating 
sensation and publicity for himself." In consequence of this,
1. J. H. Mensah, quoted in the Ghanaian Times, 11th September
1971, p.2.
2* The Star, 18th December 1970, p.l.
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according to one newspaper report, "Both at Gape Coast and 
Takoradi party officials were admitting that they are going 
to have a tough time overcoming the effect of 'Mr. da Rocha's 
tactless and arrogant statement'11.
Then, in March 1971, there was further disquiet over 
the Government's announcement that, in spite of the continuing 
economic crisis, it had been spending N02.8 million on the 
construction of rest-houses in the regions for members of the 
Government. A month later, it was decided to allow judges to 
retire on full salary. And shortly afterwards the Government's 
image was hardly improved by Dr, Busia's admission that (him­
self excluded, of course), "There is not a single honest person
2in my Cabinet."
It was hardly surprising, then, that the lower-paid 
workers were reluctant to heed the Progress Party Government's 
call for National Discipline and voluntary sacrifice, or to 
refrain from strike action in support of their demands; or 
that by July-August 1971 they were inclined to view Mensah's 
austerity budget with scepticism, although admitting to approval 
of most of its stated objectives, Bentum was therefore expres­
sing general rank-and-file opinion when he began criticising 
the National Development Levy and Government's failure to do 
more to bridge the wages gap in the first week of September.
But there was more to the TUC's confrontation with Government 
than this, in the perception of rank-and-file as well as leader­
ship.
Bentum*s TUC and the P.P. regime: the sources of confrontation.
In the first week of September, Bentum toured the 
District Labour Councils criticising the budget on various
1. The Spokesman, 5th January 1971, p.l.
2. The Spokesman, 25th May 1971, p.l.
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particular points and more generally the Government's refusal 
to listen to the TUC's objections. Government leaders saw 
this, quite correctly, as an incitement to direct action for 
other than strictly economic aims; yet, within the broader 
context of Government - TUC relations, it was a defensive 
rather than aggressive move, a last determined protest against 
the regime's known intention to amend the Industrial Relations 
Act so as to emasculate the TUC. This was the culmination of 
a progressive deterioration of relations between the TUC and 
the Progress Party regime since October 1969, a process which 
derived from several sources and levels of conflict.
The strike-incidence issue.
At one level, conflict centred on the continuing high 
level of strike actions, and the issue of whether or not the 
TUC could, or could properly, do more to prevent them. Relations 
with the P.P. regime began well with Dr. Busia agreeing to find 
jobs for the 2,000 Tema dockworkers dismissed by the NLC regime.'*' 
But friction developed as the TUC leadership proved unable to 
lower the level of strike incidence. In 1970, there were 55 
strikes, involving a loss of 123,000 man-days, a level showing 
no improvement on that occurring under the NLC regime, and quite 
unacceptable to the new Government, (see Table 5.2). The TUC's 
official position on strikes remained essentially unaltered from 
that adopted under the NLC regime:
"We are not happy with the limitations which are 
imposed under the law on the right to strike... 
nor with the long and complicated procedures for 
the resolution of industrial disputes which exist 
in the present law.... But we are willing to accept 
these and work within them as our contribution to 
the national task of reconstruction. We feel..
1. Daily Graphic, 3rd December 1969, p.3.
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"..that our nation faces an emergency in this 
respect which is almost as great as if it 
were in a state of war - war against internal 
and external enemies, and war against the 
numerous social evils and economic hazards 
that plague our society today," 1
This position was implemented through a code of conduct 
instructing the national unions to take disciplinary measures 
against officials or members resorting to unauthorised strike 
action. At District Labour Council meetings and seminars 
organised by the TUC, local officials were consistently admon­
ished to follow the official procedures for settlement of 
disputes, and impressed with the need for harmonious industrial 
relations in the cause of national economic reconstruction.
At the same time, however, Bentum made public his view that 
the dilatory and inadequate procedures for dispute-settlement, 
often deliberately exploited by management, together with the 
widening income gap between lower-paid, manual workers and the 
top-level salariat, were primarily responsible for the high 
level of strike actions. Until these basic sources of conflict 
were remedied, he suggested, it would be useless and improper 
for the TUC to take a sterner line against strikers. And as 
the real incomes of lower-paid workers continued to decline in 
1970-71, and the P.P. regime failed to respond to the demand 
for a 'bridging of the gap', there was a shift of emphasis in 
the TUC line from condemnation of strike actions to criticism 
of government's inaction.
The Government's position, as enunciated by Dr, Busia 
in August 1970, was that ''the unions have the greatest respon­
sibility to raise our productivity", that strikes served no 
purpose except to hurt the whole community, including the 
workers themselves, and that virtually all recent strikes had
1. The Light, 31st March 1971, p.l.
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been unnecessary and illegal: "In all these strikes the pro­
cedure laid down for settling disputes was not used.... some 
of the reasons for the strikes could hardly bear examination." 
The regime was not, however, united on the issue of how to deal 
with this problem. There was mounting pressure from the right 
wing of the Progress Party to introduce amendments to the 
Industrial Relations Act so as to stiffen the anti-strike pro­
visions. But up until June 1971 this was resisted by the first 
P.P. Minister of Labour, Mr. Jatoe Kaleo (later Minister of
Transport and Communications) who insisted that "strikes are
2
human problems and they can’t be solved by legislation"} and 
also by his successor, Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah who, while often 
critical of the inability of union leaders to control their 
rank-and-file, displayed considerable appreciation of the 
difficulties involved, and a desire to appease rather than 
confront the unions. As late as 10th May 1971, Dr, Bruce-Konuah 
publicly acknowledged that "strikes and demonstrations among 
employees of the public services can be attributed to the cumber1 
some and complicated procedures for dealing with the workers' 
grievances", and that "the gap between the lower and higher
3
income groups is becoming too wide and needs bridging," 
Accordingly, he established commissions to recommend solutions 
to these problems.
But this show of action came too late to avert a 
series of major strikes which disturbed the country in June- 
August 1971. The sanitary workers and Public Works Department 
employees in Accra, dockworkers in Tema, and the railway engine-
1. Dr. Busia's speech to the TUC Congress of August 1970,
reported in the Ghanaian Times, 1st August 1970, p.3.
2. The Spokesman, 30th June 1970, p.l.
3. Ghanaian Times, 10th May 1971, p.5.
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1men in Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi all went on strike. All
resulted from management's refusal or tardiness to implement
agreed or stipulated conditions of service. But they coincided
with, and, reinforced, growing pressure from the Party's right-
wing to take a stiffer line against strikers. Some of these
extremists went so far as to promise that all participants in
illegal strikes would be dismissed and replaced by party sup-
2
porters amongst the unemployed. Partly, no doubt, in deference 
to this pressure, Dr. Bruce-Konuah ordered the dismissal of 400 
striking dockworkers when they failed to respond to a govern­
ment ultimatum to return to work, supported the laying-off of 
150 striking P.W.D. workers, and issued a similar return-or- 
be fired ultimatum to the railway enginemen.
The leadership of the TUC condemned these dismissals 
and threats of dismissal as "arbitrary, wicked, degrading, and 
indeed a flagrant violation of the Industrial Relations Act", 
and demanded that they be rescinded or else "the co-operation 
which the TUC has given to the Ministry of Labour and Co-oper-
3
atives will have to be reconsidered." The Government was 
warned that, by intervening directly and arbitrarily in disputes 
which should rather be settled by unions and management, it ran 
the risk of being "drawn into head-on collision with the 
workers." ^ Yet Bentum clearly did not relish the prospect of
1. The sanitary workers went on strike from 10th-15th June;
the dockworkers from 20th-24th June; and the railway
enginemen from 3rd-13th July. For details of the rather 
sordid background to the sanitary workers' strike, see 
Chapter Eight, p. 316.
2. See, for example, reports of speeches by Victor Owusu,
Stephen Krakue, and Dr, Aboagye in The Spokesman, 11th 
May and 22nd June 1971.
3. Daily Graphic, 28th June 1971, p.5.
4. Ibid.
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a destructive confrontation with the Government, and accordingly- 
put out peace-feelers. Early in July, he wrote to the Minister 
of Transport and Communications, Mr. Jatoe Kaleo expressing his 
"dismay at the way the labour situation in the country is deter­
iorating as a result of recent methods of handling strike 
actions"; assuring him of "the assistance of the Congress and 
its affiliated unions in bringing about peace and harmony"; and 
requesting the Minister's intervention as an impartial authority 
in the railway enginemen*s and other disputes, "using your good
offices to invite the managements and the unions to settle the
1
issues amicably." This resulted in talks between the Minister, 
the Railway Enginemen's Union Executive, and a TUC delegation, 
which succeeded in resolving the dispute and getting the strikers 
back to work a few hours before expiry of the Government's ult­
imatum. Yet, instead of building on this successful initiative 
in the improvement of Government-Labour relations, Minister Kaleo 
immediately returned to the attack, accusing union leaders of 
being primarily responsible for "the issuance of ultimatums and 
threats that have crept into our industrial relations", and
expressing bafflement at Bentum's "apparent silence and seeming
2
indifference" with regard to many recent strike actions. There 
were to be further indications during the following months of 
the ascendant influence of the right-wingers over the P.P. regime's 
labour policy.
Trade unionism and party politics.
The industrial disturbances of June-August 1971 played
1. Ghanaian Times, 9th July 1971, p.8 .
2. Ghanaian Times, 14th July 1971, p.l.
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into the hands of those right-wing elements in the Progress 
Party who wished to curtail the independence and undermine 
the strength of the Ghanaian trade union movement. Yet the 
pressure for such measures did not originate with those dis­
turbances but rather dated back to the earliest days of the 
regime and derived from other sources of conflict. At the 
first Congress of the TUC to be held under the Progress Party 
regime, certain P.P. Ministers, most prominently R. R. Amponsah, 
backed a bid by K. A. Ossei-Mensah, General Secretary of the 
Petroleum and General Transport Workers* Union, to displace 
Bentum as Secretary-General of the TUC. Ossei-Mensah, it was 
felt, would prove more easily controllable than Bentum since he 
originated from Dr. Busia*s home area and had close links with 
the Party leadership. In the event, Bentum defeated Ossei&
Mensah by 94 votes to 17, and gained a public assurance from 
Dr. Busia that he disassociated himself from any attempts to
intrude party politics into trade unionism or to check the
1
freedom of trade unions. Government support was nevertheless
forthcoming for the attempt to develop an alternative trade union
centre, the Confederation of Labour, during the first half of 
2
1971. And in July-August of that year, Amponsah, Owusu,
1. Ghana Workers* Bulletin, Vol.3, No. 9, (September 1970),
p.2 .
2. The Ghana Confederation of Labour required the Government*s 
special assistance even to exist, since, according to the 
Industrial Relations Act of 1958, (still in force, though 
amended in 1965), only one trade union centre, the TUC, 
was permitted legal identity in Ghana. Similarly, the 
main force behind the G.C.L., the splinter-Railway and 
Harbour Employees* Union, had required Government's special 
intervention to gain registration, since it did not possess 
the membership - 40 per cent of the total labour force in 
an industry - legally required for the establishment of a 
second union within that industry. In addition, overt 
support was provided for the new centre by ministerial 
statements in the national press. See, for example, the 
statement of the Minister of Labour in the Daily Graphic, 
28th August 1971, p.3.
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Kwow Richardson, and other right-wingers, succeeded in fuelling
the conflict between Government and the TUG with inflammatory
public statements, and in winning over a majority of Progress
1
Party leaders to a policy of confrontation and repression.
The hostility of these right-wingers to Bentum seems 
to have derived partly from the (somewhat irrational) fear of a 
possible recrudescence of support for the former President,
Dr. Nkrumah. Bentum, they believed, was still secretly a Nkrutnah 
supporter, or at least a Soviet-trained Communist who would take 
every opportunity to exploit labour unrest for subversive pol­
itical purposes. This was in spite of the fact, obvious to 
virtually everyone in the labour movement, that as far as 
strikes and wage demands were concerned, Bentum had consistently 
played a moderate, restraining role. At the July 1970 Congress, 
for instance, the delegates’ decision to press for a rise in the 
minimum wage from NJZS0.75 to N^l.50 per day entailed their reject­
ing the recommendation of the Committee on Resolutions, and a
passionate appeal by Bentum himself, to retain the N^l.OO 
2
demand. Bentum later came round to supporting the N$1.50
demand as the impact of inflation further undermined the real
value of wages in 1970-71, and, in his ’Proposals to the Campbell
Commission', he pointed out that N#2.50 would be a more realistic
3
figure according to the Government's own statistics. (Allowing 
for the ideal character of the Ministry of Health statistics, 
and possibly a slight exaggeration in the food prices used by 
the TUC in its calculations, the finding that a balanced diet 
for a family of man, wife, and two children, would cost Nf£3.30 
per day was strikingly indicative of the inadequacy of the
1. For example, see the speeches reported in the Ghanaian 
Times, 4th August 1971, p.l; and Daily Graphic, 28th 
August 1971, p.5.
2. The Spokesman, 28th July 1970, p.l.
3. "Proposals submitted by the TUC (Ghana) to the Salary 
Review Commission (1971)", (Accra; TUC, mimeo).
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existing minimum wage of N#0,75). But, in setting the TUC's 
demands at steadily higher levels, he was continually resisting 
pressure from middle-level unionists to raise them even higher.
It is worth noting, moreover, that, whatever Bentum*s personal 
feelings about the Progress Party, the large majority of both 
top and middle-level unionists were P.P. supporters, at least 
in the sense of having voted P.P. in the 1969 elections, and 
certainly held no lingering affection for the C.P.P. regime. 
Richard Baiden, for instance, the General Secretary of Maritime 
and Dockworkers Union, and Acting Secretary-General of the TUC 
during Bentum*s absences, had ties with the Progress Party leader­
ship extending back to his role as a United Party *agent pro­
vocateur* in the 1961 Sekondi-Takoradi strike; yet he became 
far more scathing even than Bentum in his criticisms of the 
regime’s economic and labour policies in the summer of 1971.^
As far as strike actions were concerned, Bentum had 
a remarkably successful record of intervention in labour dis­
putes to negotiate compromise agreements between Unions and 
Management, and so persuade strikers to return to work. The 
Obuasi minesworkers* and railway enginemen*s strikes were 
perhaps the most notable instances, in that either might have 
developed into major political crises had it not been for Ben­
tum* s intervention. Admittedly, he generally delayed intervening 
until strike action had actually commenced and an impasse between 
Union and Management had clearly been reached, so provoking the 
Government to accusations of dilatoriness on his part. But 
this was the course of action required by the constitutional 
provisions of the TUC. And it was largely because he faithfully 
observed these provisions for protecting the powers of individual 
unions, and made apparent his sympathy with workers* grievances,
1, See, for example, Baiden*s speech reported in the 
Daily Graphic, 28th June 1971, p.3.
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that he was able to perform the role of 'conciliator* so 
effectively.
The Progress Party right-wingers' hostility to Bentum 
was, in this sense then, irrational. But, in seeking to displace 
him, they were also representing a strong pressure (neither 
rational nor irrational) from within the ranks of the Party, 
like all parties something of a bandwagon, to maximise the 
advantages that being in power might give it. Many of the 
Party's core-following, and especially those with a personal 
interest involved, resented the fact that avowedly pro-P.P. 
unionists, such as Quist and Quartey of the Railway Union (i.e. 
the leaders of the splinter-Railway Union and of the Confeder­
ation of Labour), had not succeeded to the positions of TUC 
leadership they were thought to deserve. More generally, they 
disliked the fact that a major centre of power should remain 
outside the Party's grasp. It is unlikely, however, that 
Dr. Busia would have given in to this pressure had it not been 
for the emergence of more genuine grounds for anxiety as to the 
likely political consequences of Bentum's leadership of the TUC.
After all, the Prime Minister had largely resisted similar
1pressure to intrude the Party into the Civil Service. But in 
the summer of 1971 he united with the right-wing over the issue of 
the TUC's claim to a larger voice in national decision-making, 
and supported, not a party take-over of the TUC, but its dis­
solution.
The TUC's concept of "democratic participation".
Benjamin Bentum was ideologically committed to an 
extremely assertive, participant conception of political
1. In fact, Dr. Busia dismissed 608 civil servants within 
one month of taking office, but he was apparently under 
pressure to go further than this in sacking 'suspects' 
and replacing them with party loyalists. See The Times 
(of London), Supplement on Ghana, 30th September 1971.
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democracy, and more particularly of the role of the trade union
movement within such a democracy. Progress Party Ministers
preferred to suggest that he had an exaggerated sense of his
own wisdom and self-importance. Yet since this personal drive
to political influence was so closely geared to the interests
and opinions of the union rank-and-file, these amounted in
practice, to very much the same thing. Bentum's leadership
of the TUG was not an especially radical political force, and
certainly not intentionally subversive. It could perhaps have
been quite easily accommodated, and even constructively utilised,
by a regime more genuinely democratic in spirit, or simply more
sensitive in its handling of criticism. Unfortunately, the
leadership of the Progress Party regime was characterised by
an extreme intellectual arrogance which made it unwilling to
compromise its expertly formulated programmes, and intolerant
of the criticisms of its policy voiced by Bentum, and encouraged
by him in the local forums of the TUG. It was, moreover,
undoubtedly the case that, confronted with this intolerant and
intransigent attitude, Bentum was inclined to mount increasingly
radical and open attacks on the policies of the regime. Given
the prevalence of urban unrest at these policies, and Bentum's
immense prestige with the rank-and-file of the labour movement,
he was capable thereby of transforming the TUC into what was
less a pluralist pressure-group than a powerful oppositional
party or movement. Certainly, this tendency in the TUC presented
a far more serious challenge to the standing of the regime than
that posed by the official parliamentary opposition, the Justice
Party, (an amalgam of KAL and the other minority parties), whose
leaders were generally as detached from the urban masses as those
1
of the Progress Party.
1. If the local organisation of the Progress Party was some­
what skeletal by 1971, that of the Justice Party was non­
existent. The J.P.'s leading representatives in Sekondi- 
Takoradi consisted of a young lawyer, of absolutely no 
local standing or renown, who spent most of his time in 
the expatriate-dominated Golf Club, and confessed that he
/cont. overleaf
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Indeed, it was partly because of the lack of an effective, 
responsive opposition party that many urban dwellers looked 
to the TUG to perform the function of expressing ’mass* griev­
ances. The populist tendency in TUG ideology reflected sensit­
ivity to this pressure as much as Bentum*s personal political 
ambitions.
During the first twelve months of the Progress Party 
regime, Bentum had announced various measures to further 
decentralise the TUG and, at the same time, extend the effective 
reach of the TUC*s educational programme beyond middle-level 
officials to local officials and the union rank-and-file. The 
District Labour Councils were to be strengthened both financ­
ially and in terms of personnel so that they could organise
regular educational programmes and seminars for the workers in 
1their areas. These seminars did in fact materialise, unlike 
most of the schemes of the G.P.P.-TUG, and proved to be remark­
ably active and well-attended. They were designed partly to 
instruct the rank-and-file and inexperienced local officials 
in the proper procedures to be followed in labour disputes,
Footnote 1 continued from previous page.
... wasn*t much interested in politics; and a building- 
contractor, ex-C.P.P. Chairman of the City Council, who 
was totally discredited politically as a result of his 
reputation for fraudulent practice.
It was significant that, shortly after the military 
coup of 6th January 1972, several Justice Party leaders 
were detained along with Progress Party officials, and 
the new.government leader, Colonel Acheampong "blamed 
some members of the former opposition for compromising 
their positions by obtaining big government loans, thus 
laying themselves open to political blackmail."
West Africa, 25th February 1972, p.12.
1. TUC Secretariat Statement published in the Spokesman 
24th July 1970.
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and in the advantages of peaceful negotiation over direct, 
disruptive action. But they also provided for discussion of 
national political and economic issues along lines which were 
often extremely critical of the 'status quo* and Government's 
inaction. The workers, as speakers from TUC headquarters 
repeatedly stressed, must act as the "watchdogs" or "the eyes 
and ears of society", speaking out against injustices and abuses. 
An extract from an introductory lecture given by Richard Baiden 
to the Sekondi-Takoradi District Council of Labour will serve 
to illustrate this theme:
"We must challenge the economy as presently 
structured and administered.... We are still 
operating an obsolete colonial work structure 
and educational system, geared toward the pro­
duction of administrative personnel, when the 
need is rather for providing incentives and 
training opportunities for technicians and 
skilled workers. It is the duty of workers to 
speak out against this and against other 
stupidities and injustices. A labour movement 
must be bold and free to express our views, 
make our criticisms. It is only the trade 
unions which can check these things - corruption, 
waste of public money, the irresponsibility of 
those in authority. The labour movement should 
participate in economic development not only 
through hard work, but through contributing to 
the necessary re-thinking of our national prior­
ities. We must concern ourselves not only with 
the worker but with everything in our community 
life, for bad men can only prosper while good 
men do nothing." 1
Such calls to political participation met with an enthusiastic 
response from the type of person who generally took an especial 
interest in union affairs, became a local official, and attended
1. Speech delivered by Richard Baiden to a meeting of the 
Sekondi-Takoradi District Council of Labour on 7th July 
1971, at which the writer was present.
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these TUG seminars. These were mostly young (in their twenties
or early thirties), and extremely active people. Many were
’leaders’ in several other organisations apart from their trade
unions. Generally educated to ’middle-school' level, many had
taken, or were taking, correspondence courses to further their 
1
education. For such people trade union participation was
motivated by something more than a desire to protect a particular
group of workers; by a desire for self-improvement certainly,
but also by the ideal of actively contributing to the creation
of a wealthier, and more just society.
At the national level, also, Bentum pursued the line
that, ’’nation-building is not the responsibility of Government
alone but also that of the citizens... politicians should consult
the workers on all matters affecting them before a decision is 
2
taken.” In addition to pressing the demand for a radical re­
structuring of the national wage and salary structure, he was 
continually tendering his advice to the Government, through the 
national press and the TUC’s own organs as well as in private, 
on virtually the entire range of national policy issues: unem­
ployment, the external debts problem, reform of the educational 
system, the siting of new industries, assistance for the fishing 
industry, etc. Most crucially, he claimed that the TUC had a 
right to be consulted in the formulation of the budget. ’’The 
Congress cannot accept the principle that the destiny of the 
country should be determined only by a chosen few, neither can
1. Out of 24 'local* officials of the Railway Union who
attended a TUC course on Industrial Relations in June 
1971, 16 were under 35 years of age, 22 were educated 
to middle-school level, and 9 had taken further courses 
of some kind to improve their education, (i.e. not 
including apprenticeship or specifically trade union 
courses).
2. The Pioneer, 17th November 1969, p.3.
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we accept that wisdom and knowledge is with a few.” ^
The Progress Party regime did not take kindly to 
such criticisms and claims. A relatively moderate statement 
of the Government's objections was provided by Dr. Bruce-Konuah 
in a private interview:
"The idea that we should practice democracy like 
America today is absolute nonsense. Did America 
have developed trade unions when she was fifteen 
years old? No, she had slave labour... This idea 
that the workers should act as the "watchdogs of 
society", we don’t accept it at all. What is the 
proportion of workers to the rest of the population? 
They are just a minority. It's all wrong for them 
to say, 'The Government must consult us'. The 
trouble with Bentum is that he has such an inflated 
idea of his own importance. He has never really 
adapted himself from NLC days to a civilian govern­
ment. Under the NLC, of course, he was the leading 
spokesman and adviser on labour affairs, and he is 
still trying to lay down the line." 2
Whatever the validity of the Minister of Labour's 
argument, it was politically unwise for Progress Party leaders 
to display their scornful disregard of Bentum's opinions and 
demands so openly. During the summer of 1971, several Ministers, 
in conjunction with the editorials of the Daily Graphic, (to all 
intents and purposes the Government's mouthpiece), made ever 
more frequent and hostile attacks on "the impudent claim of 
the trade union leaders to represent the people in matters which
3
do not concern them." This only served to incline Bentum to 
more vociferous criticism of the regime's policies and to swing 
the rank-and-file more solidly behind him. To describe Bentum*s 
demand for a rise in the minimum wage from N$0.75 to N$1.50 as
1. Ghanaian Times, 3rd September 1971, p.5.
2. Interview with Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah, Minister of Labour,
11th October 1971.
3. Daily Graphic, 7th September 1971, p.2.
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1"outrageous and politically instigated", for instance, carried
no conviction with union members who were well aware that he
was doing no more than pressing the minimal demands of their
own delegates, and that "it is an old trick of governments to
charge the unions with playing politics as soon as they stand
2up for their rights," During July and August, several of the 
District Councils of Labour passed resolutions calling on the 
Prime Minister "to advise his Ministers and Ministerial sec­
retaries from attacking the TUC unnecessarily on political plat­
forms . ” ^
The confrontation of September 1971.
These various sources and levels of conflict came to 
a head in mid-August when Dr. Bruce-IConuah alleged that the 
TUC contained too many politicians "who had identified them­
selves with trade unions in order to use them for their pol­
itical ends." ^ He announced that the Industrial Relations Act 
was to be amended in the current session of Parliament so as
"to remove anomalies in the Act and bring it in line with the
5provisions and spirit of the constitution." This was inter­
preted by TUC leaders, quite correctly as it proved, as a 
reference to the demand of Victor Owusu and Oheneba Kwow Richard­
son for the abolition of the "check-off" system, which they
Ghanaian Times, 27th August 1971, p.l.
2. Interview with Kofi Baaku, railway worker, 4th September 
1971.
3. Daily Graphic, 17th August 1971, p.4.
4. Ghanaian Times, 17th August 1971, p.l.
5. Ibid.
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claimed '“smacked of Communism".  ^ The compulsory check-off 
system, introduced by the 1958 Industrial Relations Act, was 
an arrangement by which union dues were deducted at source from 
workers' wage-packets and distributed, according to the stip­
ulated proportions, to the TUC, national union, and local branches. 
In some industries, but not all, workers could contract out of 
this arrangement if they so wished. The "check-off" was cer­
tainly a major source of strength and unity for the Ghanaian 
trade union movement, assuring the unions of financial viability, 
and freeing officials from the arduous task of dues-collection.
It also reduced the opportunity for, and occurrence of, fraudu­
lent practices at the level of local officialdom, and thereby 
contributed to an improvement in quality of that officialdom.
Some Progress Party Ministers, however, together with the leaders 
of the Confederation of Labour, claimed that the system gave too 
much power to the TUC and national union leadership, and freed 
them from the necessity of regular contact with, and account­
ability to, the rank-and-file. While there was doubtless some 
validity to this argument, (as the C.P.P. experience had shown), 
it is difficult to see how good communications between union 
leadership and rank-and-file could be fostered better by a con­
tinuous preoccupation on the part of union officials with the 
business of collecting dues than by directing their time and 
energy to grievance-handling and other more positive functions.
Bentum published a reply to the Minister of Labour's 
statement, pointing out that the check-off system was operated in 
England and many other non-communist countries, and reminding 
him that a sub-committee of the Labour Advisory Council, repre­
senting the TUC and the Employers' Association, was at present 
finalising its recommendations to the Government on the proposed
1. Ghanaian Times, 4th August 1971, p.l.
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amendment of the Industrial Relations Act. "At our last meeting
of the Labour Advisory Council, a firm decision was taken that
the report of this Sub-Committee be submitted and the Council
given the chance of examining it before any move to amend the
1Industrial Relations Act is taken." He further rejected the 
Minister’s charge that union leaders were playing politics, and 
described it as "a mere cover for you to escape from facing the 
realities and the challenges of an independent labour movement 
in our present-day democracy."
Confronted with this threat of legislative action to 
undermine the strength of the Ghanaian labour movement, Bentum 
was hardly inclined to play down his objections to the Govern­
ment’s July budget. During the first half of August he had 
maintained silence on the budget proposals apart from remarking 
that the National Development Levy exactions made some increase 
in the wages of lower-paid workers all the more necessary. In 
private, however, he had written to the Minister of Finance on 
two occasions, requesting a meeting so that the TUC’s views on 
the budget should be made known to the Government. On the 
21st August, he published a letter to the Minister in the 
national press, deploring the fact that no reply to these app­
roaches had been received and criticising the implementation of 
the National Development Levy at a time when workers were still
waiting for the publication of the Campbell Commission Report
3and hoping for an improvement in their wages. Still no reply 
was received, and, in the last week of August, Bentum began a 
tour of the District Councils of Labour, declaring that, "the 
TUC will not be disturbed by threats or intimidations from con-
1. Ghanaian Times, 21st August 1971, p.5.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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tinuing to fight for the rights of the workers... the TUC
will not be a rubber-stamp to the Government... No Government
1in the world can succeed without the workers.” He still
refrained from calling an official General Strike, but, early
in September, declared his support for proposals to stage
demonstrations against the National Development Levy.
The Government reacted by warning workers that any
strike against the Levy would be regarded as a political strike
and ”treated in a way different from the way in which we treat
2
genuine strikes”. It claimed to be aware ”that for two years 
some people have tried to use the labour movement for political
3
purposes.” On the 8th September, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Mr. N. Y. B. Adade, announced, ”We*ll stop Bentum” and
4
issued a notice freezing the assets of the TUC. Within two 
days, an Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bill was rushed through 
the National Assembly, abolishing the check-off system and the 
legal status of the TUC, and stipulating that a ninety-day cool­
ing-off period be observed in the event of threats of strike 
5
action. By the end of the week, 8,000 workers in Sekondi- 
Takoradi were out on strike.
Demonstrations of opposition to the Levy and support 
for Bentum were staged in Accra, Tema, and other industrial 
centres, and it looked as though the Sekondi-Takoradi strikers 
would be joined by workers throughout the country. There were 
a number of reasons why this failed to materialise. In the 
first place, the Government instantly dismissed 500 State Trans­
port Corporation workers for stopping work, and this deterred
1. Ghanaian Times, 1st September 1971, p.5.
2. Ghanaian Times, 27th August 1971, p.l.
3. Ibid.
4. Ghanaian Times, 8th September 1971, p.l.
5. Daily Graphic, 10th September 1971, p.l.
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other groups from risking a similar fate.^ But it was possible 
for the Government to pick off strikers in this manner only 
because they did not come out simultaneously in solid, concerted 
action. Bentum* s failure to call and co-ordinate an official 
General Strike must therefore be considered a major blunder.
As it was, his declaration of support for demonstrations against 
the Government's policies threw the responsibility for taking 
strike action onto the leaders of the individual unions, most of 
whom, having earlier been informed of Bentum*s opposition to the
idea of a General Strike, were now found surprised and unpre-
2
pared. In addition, although his relations with the General
Secretaries of the national Unions were mostly very good, some
had recently become jealous at the extent of Bentum's personal
3
popularity with their own rank-and-file.
Nevertheless, the near universality of labour support
for Bentum's stand was indicated by the immediate resolution of
all the national unions, with the exception of the Seamen's Union,
to join in forming another trade union centre with Bentum as 
4
leader. The only instances of dissent from this stance were:
1. Ghanaian Times, 15th September 1971, p.l.
2. Private communication with Jon Kraus, who interviewed five
General Secretaries of the national Unions in the summer 
of 1972.
3. Private communication with Richard Pratt, who interviewed
three General Secretaries of the national Unions in the 
summer of 1973.
4. This resolution did not in fact materialise in a new TUC,
owing largely to the organisational chaos into which the 
unions were thrown by the Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Act of 9th September 1971.
235
the National Seamen*s Union, whose General-Secretary, Smith- 
Mensah, had recently been involved in a bitter dispute with 
Bentum and Baiden over the jurisdiction of his union; a group 
of some 700 railwayworkers in Kumasi, almost half the railway 
labour force of that city, who expressed their support for the 
budget measures and agreed with the Government in seeing Bentum* s 
opposition as politically motivated, (presumably in the sense of
3_
being designed to topple the P.P. regime) ; and, finally, the 
leaders of the Ghana Confederation of Labour, the rival trade 
union centre, who were also the leaders of a splinter-group of 
Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers, now formed into the Railway 
and Harbour Employees Union. (The Ghana Confederation of Labour 
consisted at this time of the R. & H.E.U. and the Manufacturing 
and Commercial Allied Workers* Union, a small Takoradi-based 
splinter-group from the Industrial and Commercial Workers*
Union.)
But, although support for Bentum was so widespread, 
and the Ghana Confederation of Labour failed to make any sig­
nificant inroads among the TUC*s membership, it was again the 
Sekondi-Takoradi workers who alone were prepared to maintain a 
forceful stand against the Government. 8,000 workers in that 
city stayed out on strike from the 12th to the 17th September.
The strikers* placards suggested, (and interviews confirmed this), 
that the issues as far as they x^ ere concerned, were two-fold: 
"Suspend Development Levy, it is unjust", and "We still recognise 
Mr. Bentum as TUC boss". “ A further placard slogan provided 
deeper insight into these grievances: "An End to P.P. false 
aristocracy". The interrelation xtfas clearly articulated by one 
railway unionist: "We must stand by Mr. Bentum’s effort to speak 
up for us poor people and tell those big men what sacrifices
1* Daily Graphic, 17th September 1971, p.4.
2. The writer was present at the strikers* demonstrations.
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1
they should be making”. Interviews conducted during the strike 
also indicated a great deal of sympathy from other groups for 
Bentum and the strikers* stance, though this was more apparent 
among middle- and lower-middle class groups such as the market- 
women, middle-ranking executives and teachers, who stood to be 
directly affected by the Levy and other budget provisions, than 
amongst the unemployed.
For most participants, the aim of the strike was simply 
to impress on Government their opposition to the Levy exactions 
and their confidence in the TUG leadership and its stated objec­
tives. Some certainly hoped to displace the regime. In the 
outspoken atmosphere of the Sekondi akpoteshie bars, workers 
could sometimes be heard speculating that, **¥6 * 1 1 show this
Government and its Development Levy. If the military are sent
2in to stop the strike, it could bring the Government down.”
But in general, the whole point of the strike was rather to 
refute the suggestion that they had been misled by a politically 
subversive union leadership, while standing by the TUC*s demand 
for reform of the wages structure and its view that popular 
criticism of the regime*s policies was an essential element in 
real democracy. The majority of strikers and their leaders 
were P.P. voters, (some, indeed, were officials of the Party*s 
ward committees), and it was precisely such *real democracy* 
that the Progress Party had stood for, in their eyes, in the 
1969 elections.
It was partly the disinclination to go beyond making 
this point that led the strikers to return to work after five 
days. Robert Mensali, Chairman of the Takoradi Branch of the 
Railway Union, expressed the views of many when he observed,
1 . Interview with B. T. Nahr, railway unionist, 13th 
September 1971.
2. Conversation overheard in Sekondi *akpoteshie* bar, 
15th September 1971.
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"I tell you, the workers are the eyes of the 
country. They know what is going on, and you 
should not try to treat them like trees. If 
only the Government had co-operated with the TUC 
in educating them, it would have been good for 
Ghana. But this attack on the TUC does not make 
for stable government. We want to impress this on 
the Government, but we also want to make it clear 
we are not after political ends. So it is best to 
cool the situation now we have made our point.” 1
The strike leaders' decision to return to work was greeted with 
hisses and boos when it was first put to the assembled strikers 
on Thursday, 16th September. But Mensah eventually convinced 
them with the promise that, "We will never let you down. The 
struggle has reached a new phase and we must react accordingly. 
But if those of our leaders who have been arrested are not
2released by next Monday, then we will resume the strike."
The arrest of these union leaders had resulted from 
violent confrontations with members of the splinter-Railway 
and Harbour Employees Union who insisted on attending duty.
This was the second reason for abandoning the strike action.
Some wished to take it to a more decisive conclusion, but the 
railwayworkers1 front was far from solid; and, with such division 
in their ranks, the morale of the strikers was relatively low. 
Approximately one-third of the railway and harbour workers were 
members of the break-away R.H.E.U., and nearly all of these 
abided by their leaders* decision not to strike against the 
Levy. An analysis of the reasons for this decision, and of the 
sources of division within the Railway Union rank-and-file, will 
be presented in the following chapter. Here, the important point
1. Interview with Robert Mensah, 15th September 1971.
2. Speech delivered by R. Mensah to a meeting of strikers 
on 16th September 1971, at which the writer was present.
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to note is the practical significance of this conflict in 
the situation of September 1971 as an example of successful 
’divide and rule' tactics on the part of the Progress Party 
regime; and one which illustrated government leaders* apprec­
iation of the crucial importance of control of the Sekondi- 
Takoradi workers in the politics of Government-Labour 
relations.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE RAILWAY WORKERS DIVIDED : THE SOURCES AND STRUCTURE OF 
____________ POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE RAILWAY UNION.______
Introduction.
At a mass-meeting of the Sekondi Location Branch of 
the Railway and Ports Workers* Union on the 21st January 1970, 
a majority of the assembled workers resolved to secede and to 
form themselves into a new union. This splinter-group, offic­
ially terming itself the Railway and Harbour Employees* Union, 
but known in local parlance as the "Biafrans" (in distinction 
from the "Federalists'*) explained their action in terms of the 
fact that, "There has been no improvement whatsoever in the 
administration of our former union since we passed a vote of 
no confidence in the national officers in May 1967." Almost 
two-thirds of the Location manual workers, (i.e. some 900 out 
of a total of 1,580) became members of the new union, and they 
were soon joined by approximately a quarter of the workers 
employed at Takoradi Harbour, (i.e. some 1100 out of a total 
labour force of nearly 5,000), together with small groups in 
Tema and Kumasi.
The leadership of the new union, (hereafter referred 
to as the *splinter-union* in distinction from the *mother-union* - 
terms also used by the railway workers themselves), then pro­
ceeded to extend the object of its criticisms to the leadership 
and structure of the Ghana TUC. In June, its General Secretary,
K. G. Quartey, called on the Government to repeal the Industrial
Relations Act (inherited from the C.P.P. regime) and to pro-
2scribe the TUC. In September 1970, the union was granted 
official registration, and in August of the following year, its
1. Ghanaian Times, 23rd January 1970, p.8 .
2. Ghanaian Times, 22nd June 1970, p.3.
240
leaders launched a new national trade union centre, the Ghana 
Confederation of Labour. The other affiliates of the G.C.L. 
consisted of the Manufacturing and Commercial Allied Workers* 
Union, a small splinter-group from the Industrial and Commercial 
Workers* Union, and the Co-operative Distillers* Union.^ These 
developments clearly had the tacit backing of the Progress Party 
Government, without whose special assistance the R.H.E.U. could 
not even have gained official registration. In September 1971, 
the Government reaped the reward of its sponsorship when the 
splinter-unionists proclaimed their opposition to the strike 
of mother-union members, and remained on duty, so undermining 
the aims and morale of the strikers.
Apart from its practical political significance in 
the situation of September 1971, this major division in the 
ranks of the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers raises serious 
questions as to the validity of the argument developed in 
previous chapters of this thesis. Bentum*s leadership of the 
TUC, it has been argued, succeeded in developing an unpre­
cedented level of unity and sense of solidarity in the Ghanaian 
trade union movement. The appeal of its programme and ideology 
was especially powerful for many of the railway and harbour 
workers of Sekondi-Takoradi, strongly attached as they were to 
the norma of trade union solidarity, independence from govern­
ment, and self-assertion in opposition to elitist tendencies in 
Ghanaian society. But what degree of support and solidarity, 
one must ask, did Bentum* s TUC really achieve in view of the 
secession and criticism of this splinter-group of railway workers? 
How accurate is the depiction of the railway workers as sub­
scribing, with remarkable consistency over time, to a unifying 
political culture? This alleged ideological continuity, and,
1. Ghanaian Times, 24th August 1971, p.8.
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more particularly, the idea that Bentum1s TUC represented an 
approximate realisation of an ideal model of trade unionism 
for which the railway workers had long been fighting, surely 
requires substantial qualification. One's reservations must 
be augmented by the knowledge that the leaders of the splinter- 
union were precisely those people who had led the 1961 strike 
action.
In response,it should first be admitted that the 
general interpretation thus far propounded does constitute a 
simplified presentation of a far more complex reality; though, 
in defence, one might also point out that a certain degree of 
over-simplification might well be justified, and indeed be 
necessary, in the interests of a clearly intelligible analysis. 
It is the writer's view, moreover, that the complexities and 
inconsistencies which came into play in creating the split of 
1970-71 can, and should, be acknowledged as integral and long- 
dating elements in the structure of Railway Union politics 
without undermining the essential validity of the general inter­
pretation thus far presented.
Turning to more particular points, it has already 
been emphasised that Bentum's leadership was extremely popular 
with the supporters of the mother-railway union, the criticisms 
of the splinter-union leaders (which were far from universally 
shared by their own supporters) not withstanding. But Bentum's 
popularity, and the relatively high degree of unity he brought 
to the Ghanaian trade union movement, derived from, and were 
dependent on, a more complex set of factors then mere direct 
ideological rapport. For instance, he was generally very adept 
in his handling of relations with both the general secretaries 
and middle-level leaders (Branch and Association officials) of 
the national unions, and in accommodating their ambitions, satis 
fying their aspiration to a certain autonomous status, within 
the reformed and rejuvenated TUG. This was a crucial factor 
in labour movement unity since these middle-level unionists,
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acting as communicators and interpreters to their rank-and-file, 
generally possessed a great measure of control over the percep­
tions and behaviour of their constituencies. But, in the case 
of the Railway Union, it proved impossible to accommodate the 
ambitions of all the Union’s middle-level leaders, partly because 
there were simply too many aspirants for the available positions, 
partly because the ambitions of certain of these leaders were so 
grandiose, extending to leadership of the national trade union 
movement as a whole. This situation of a superabundance of men 
experienced in union officialdom, and determined to retain or 
accede to the limited number of positions available, was espec­
ially likely to occur in a union, such as the Railway Union, 
where leadership was so highly valued; but it was exacerbated in 
this particular instance by a most singular set of historical 
circumstances shortly to be described.
Further, the relative unity of the trade union movement 
in 1966-71, while reflecting the rank-and-file's common experience 
of seriously declining living standards, was greatly facilitated 
by the Government's general failure to exploit potential sources 
of division within the working classes. But here again the rail­
way workers were an exception to the general rule. The severely 
depressed financial situation of the lower-paid workers during 
these years exerted a double-edged effect, increasing the poten­
tial for labour solidarity and radicalism under a sufficiently 
united and responsive leadership, but, at the same time, intens­
ifying rank-and-file desperation for whatever benefits it seemed 
possible to gain, and consequently their susceptibility to div­
isive 'carrot-politics'. This susceptibility was exploited with 
uncharacteristic skill by the Progress Party regime in the case 
of the Railway Location 'tradesmen*, through the agency of mal­
contents among their leadership.
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Thirdly, ideological differences as to the degree of 
co-operation which should be extended to the Government’s 
economic policies constituted an additional dimension of the 
Railway Union split. It is worth pointing out here that there 
was ample room for genuine differences of opinion in this regard 
irrespective of party political allegiances, and within a common 
commitment to independent, reformist trade unionism. In the 
previous chapter, an attempt was made to depict the peculiar 
mixture of elitist and populist, liberal and authoritarian, 
tendencies characteristic of the Progress Party regime. This 
gave considerable scope for differences of interpretation and 
opinion among union leaders, as to the merits of Progress Party 
rule, slight in themselves perhaps, but of potentially serious 
political consequence. The fact that Benturn generally succeeded 
in subsuming these differences again illustrated his very con­
siderable political and rhetorical skills.
Nevertheless, one is bound to ask, did not the Railway 
Union split of 1970-71 illustrate the relative weakness, or 
certainly a weakening, of the norm of solidarity amongst this, 
historically the most solid, of groups of Ghanaian workers? To 
some degree this was certainly so. But the fact is that the 
railway workers* history of solidarity in action has always 
been achieved only through subsuming potentially serious sources 
of division. Indeed, the very 'activism* of railway unionism 
has made for strong divisive tendencies. We have seen how the 
railway enginemen, for instance, determined to ensure the best 
possible representation of their grievances, have several times 
broken away from the main Railway Union. Furthermore, in so 
powerful a union, and so active a union culture, positions of 
leadership, being so highly prestigious, have naturally been 
keenly fought over. Consequently, leadership factionalism, too, 
has frequently proved especially divisive. As regards the ideol
244
ogical consistency which, it has been argued, the railway workers 
have displayed right through from the era of Pobee Biney to that 
of Benjamin Bentum, this is admittedly, an accurate depiction 
only of the dominant tendency in Railway Union politics, that 
which has generally won out in the end (and become, in a sense, 
the 'official* interpretation of the historical principles of 
railway unionism). A divergent tendency for some railway workers 
and union leaders to seek to involve the union in party politics, 
whether the control-oriented politics of the governing party or 
the subversive aims of opposition parties, has been a common 
feature of the Railway Union political arena. Biney and his 
followers had to battle to overcome the influence of G.P.P. loy­
alists in the union in 1954-61. And, in the course of the 1961 
strike action itself, a conflict developed between those leaders 
allied with the United Party interest and those seeking to limit 
the objectives of the strike action to a non-partisan reformist 
protest. In 1970-71, these several sources of division - leader­
ship factionalism, economic sectionalism, and ideological dif­
ferences over the issue of union-government relations - all 
coincided to undermine the solidarity of the railway workers to 
a quite unprecedented extent. An analysis of the various sources 
and levels of this division will serve to illuminate the complex 
reality of Railway Union politics, the mediation of general ideo­
logical tendencies and issues through particular structures of 
power and communication, and so provide a necessary corrective 
to the simplified presentation of previous chapters.
It nevertheless appears justified, as regards the 
correct weighting of emphasis, to conceive Railway Union history 
in terms of the directing and unifying influence of a strong 
proletarian/populist political culture, and to interpret the 
1970-71 splinter-union as an exceptional (and temporary) deviant
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case. Two main reasons might be adduced for this interpretative 
standpoint. In the first place, many supporters of the splinter- 
union, unlike those of the mother-union, tended, in interviews, 
to be markedly defensive as to the legitimacy of their position, 
recognising its inconsistency with the Railway Union*s historical 
principles of worker solidarity and strict independence of party 
political ties. Some of these in fact ’crossed the floor* back 
to the mother-union during the crisis of August-September 1971. 
Moreover, in order to retain what support they possessed, the 
leaders of the splinter-union were very much concerned, In their 
speeches at mass-meetings, to try to justify their stand in terms 
of the railway workers* historical experience, and to emphasise 
their independence of Government influence, (though they were 
equally concerned to emphasise their influence with the Govern­
ment). In other words, the dominant culture of railway unionism 
continued to exert a significant re-unifying influence on the 
rank-and-file, and imposed severe limitations on the position 
which it was politic for the leaders of the splinter-union to 
take.
Secondly, this split in the ranks of the railway workers 
resulted, and, it might well be argued, could only have resulted, 
from a situation in which divisive forces were of quite exception­
al intensity and tended to coincide very closely. Ideological 
differences, factional conflict between union leaders, sectional 
jealousies as to the respective conditions of service of dif­
ferent job categories, these were all familiar aspects of the 
Railway political scene. But, as the following account will 
make clear, each was present in especially intense form in 
1970-71 for particular historical reasons. And while these 
various issues and lines of division cross-cut in a minority of 
individual instances each other, they generally tended to coincide 
and interrelate so as to re-inforce the division into two camps.
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Indeed, from the point of view of analysis, this close inter­
relation of divisive factors makes it extremely difficult to 
clearly separate and weigh their respective influence in the 
determination of allegiances. This is especially the case with 
respect to the important question of the relative significance 
of sectional economic interests, on the one hand, and ideological 
differences, (including here differences of perception as to the 
sincerity and wisdom of particular union leaders), on the other. 
The majority of supporters of both unions appeared, in July- 
September 1971, to attach great importance to the differences 
in the stance of the rival unions, and to believe sincerely in 
the positions taken by their own leaders. Yet, again in the 
majority of cases, union allegiance followed the lines of sect­
ional economic interest very closely. It is necessary to recog­
nise that the ideological issues must have exerted a significant 
influence on behaviour in order to account for the quite numer­
ous instances of deviation from this dominant pattern. But, 
generally speaking, they should doubtless be seen as rational­
isations of positions essentially dictated by considerations of 
practical (economic and political) self-interest. This is not 
to deny them importance. It was precisely the ability to develop 
quite seriously tenable ideological justifications of divergent 
perceptions of economic interest (and of different approaches to 
their promotion) which served to weld the two groups into rel­
atively solid, opposing camps.
Sources and Utilisation of Data.
The following analysis of the Railway Union split is 
based on several sources of data: official records of the
mother-union for 1961-71, direct observation of union mass-meet- 
ings and of day-to-day interaction between union officials and 
rank-and-file, interviews with officials of both unions, and a
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questionnaire survey of the workers employed at the Sekondi 
Location Workshops, This survey was designed with the purpose 
of ascertaining what pattern of correlation existed between 
individual allegiance to either of the rival unions and other 
group identifications: party political allegiances, for example, 
or membership of particular age, tribal, occupational, or 
educational groups. These various allegiances were then related 
to divergent attitudes on various topics which appeared to be of 
especial relevance to the ideological differences between the 
leaderships of the two unions. These topics may be stated, in 
brief, as comprising the following: (a) the ideal qualities of 
a union leader, and the degree of commitment of individual work­
ers to following a particular leader; (b) the goals of highest 
priority for union activity; (c) the main causes of the high 
incidence of strikes in Ghana, and the "legitimate1* occasions 
of resort to strike action; (d) the ability, honesty, and 
preparedness to sacrifice of Ghana's politico-administrative 
elite; (e) the merits and demerits of the Progress Party Govern­
ment's economic policy, and more particularly of the Budget of 
July 1971.
The questionnaire, (reproduced in Annexure A), con­
sisted firstly of several 'introductory' questions as to the 
interviewee's age, job category, union membership, etc.; and, 
secondly, a series of questions as to his attitudes on both 
particular and more general 'political' issues. This latter set 
of questions were sufficiently precise as to demand replies which 
could be fairly easily and meaningfully tabulated and analysed 
in statistical terms, but were administered in such a way as to 
elicit fairly full 'in-depth* responses rather than simple snap 
answers of the 'Yes/No* variety. Each interview lasted approx­
imately 40 minutes so that the respondent could be asked to
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explain why he held certain views, and encouraged to talk at 
length about the topic in question. The aim of adopting this 
relatively open-ended approach was to develop some understanding 
of how the respondents themselves formulated or structured the 
topics being investigated. Prior notice had been taken of 
M. Brewster Smith1 s exhortation to avoid "the pollster*s undue 
reliance on categorical statements of preference about pre­
formulated issues, and the tendency of much academic attitudinal 
research to reduce attitudes to the scalable dimensions of dir­
ection and intensity.** ^
The chief disadvantage which this approach is commonly
held to entail lies in "the formidable task of systematizing
2the analysis of cognitive structure." In this instance, how­
ever, no such sophisticated analysis was to be attempted, the 
aim being merely to gain some fairly general insight into the 
interviewees* understanding and perceived inter-relation of 
various issues, and of the most important variations in this 
regard. A more serious problem in interpreting the survey data 
was that of judging in which direction particular correlations 
(primarily) operated. For example, members of the splinter- 
union tended to hold a rather more favourable view of the honesty 
and performance of the Progress Party Government than did sup­
porters of the mother-union. But it was impossible to assess, 
from the survey itself, whether a favourable view of the Progress 
Party preceded (or helped determine) attachment to the splinter- 
union, or, alternatively, whether the sympathetic presentation of 
Government policies by splinter-union leaders influenced their 
rank-and-file toward a favourable image of the Progress Party
1. M. Brewster Smith, "Opinions, Personality, and Political 
Behaviour", in Dahl and Neubauer (eds.), Readings in 
Modern Political Analysis, (New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs, 
1968), p.361.
2. Ibid., p.362.
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regime. Granted that the interrelation was to some degree 
two-way, which was the stronger direction of the flow of 
influence? Insight into such questions was provided by a 
consideration of the historical origins and process of develop­
ment of the splinter-union. It was also with questions such as 
this in mind that the structure of communication within the 
unions was studied, both through direct observation and through 
long and frequent interviews with union leaders.
The survey was administered to a 'random* sample,
(using this term, technically, in a rather loose sense), of 
90 workers at Sekondi Location. The original intention was to 
interview 1 in 12 of the Location labour-force, the highest pro­
portion which could be attempted given the limited resources of 
finance and personnel (the writer and a research assistant).
The procedure adopted for the selection of interviewees was simply 
to map out a set course of the Location Workshops, and then to 
walk along this course interviewing every twelfth individual at 
work along it. Obviously, this was not so strictly 'random* as 
other possible techniques, (selecting names on a statistical 
basis from the labour-force roll, for instance), but it was felt 
that the attendant advantages of this approach outweighed tech­
nical considerations of reduced representative validity. If 
respondents were able to observe for themselves that their sel­
ection was random, and that their names were unknown to the 
interviewer, they would, it was felt, be more at ease in answer­
ing the questionnaire, more inclined to honesty and outspoken­
ness. (In fact, many insisted that their names be noted.) The 
noisy and familiar atmosphere of the shop-floor was also likely 
to be more congenial in this respect than that of an office in 
the executive buildings. It was partly with the aim of estab­
lishing a relationship of openness and trust between interviewer 
and respondents that the writer had previously spent a great deal 
of time wandering around the Workshops in conversation with the 
leaders of both unions, thereby establishing himself as a fam­
iliar and non-partisan figure. Moreover, the leaders of both
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unions had requested their members at mass-meetings to lend 
their full co-operation to the research project. The vast 
majority of respondents did in fact prove willing to talk 
frankly, and at considerable length, (though, as already 
suggested, members of the splinter-union tended to be rather 
more guarded than those of the mother-union).
Clearly, however, the resultant sample was not ’random* 
or representative in any strict sense. All job categories except 
the ’artisans* were under-represented in the sample relative to 
the numbers of each employed at Location (see Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 : Representative Status of the Sample, by Job Category.
Location Labour-force Numbers Inter- %
viewed.
Artisans 370 30 8.1
Tradesmen 690 34 5.0
Apprentices 270 15 5.5
Labourers 250 11 4 , 4
Total 1,580 90 5.7
This was, however, only partly due to inadequacies in the selec­
tion technique. More important, it proved necessary to bring the 
survey to a premature close, before the Carriage and Wagons Depart­
ment, in which all the workers were tradesmen, labourers, or 
apprentices, had been fully covered. By the first week of Sept­
ember, it was apparent that a major confrontation between the 
Government and the TUC was looming near, probably to be supported 
by strike action on the part of the R.P.W.U. members. In this 
situation of mounting political tension, the writer accepted the 
Railway Management’s advice that the survey be discontinued. In 
consequence, only 5 per cent instead of the proposed 8 per cent 
of tradesmen, labourers, and apprentices, were in fact interviewed.
251
The representative status of the survey was obviously 
impaired thereby, and in consequence it is not possible to claim 
validity for the findings to any great degree of statistical 
precision. For the purposes of this analysis, however, no great 
degree of precision seemed necessary. Certain general patterns 
were clearly indicated by the high degree of correlation between 
variables, (a minimum score of 0.5 by Yule's Q measurement of 
association being considered clearly indicative ). Beyond this, 
the strength and significance of these patterns could be assessed 
by reference to other sources of information, especially the 
actors' own expressed perceptions of the situation, rather than 
by precise statistical measurement.
Leadership Factionalism in the Railway Union.
The rewards, motivations, and norms of leadership.
W, N. Grant, a prominent leader of the 1961 strike
and an interested observer of the Railway Union split of 1970-71,
considered that, "The cause of all this trouble is a mad scramble
2
for leadership," Many others held a similar view, including 
the Progress Party Minister of Labour, Dr. W. G. Bruce-Konuah, 
who remarked that, "This division seems to me to be the only 
solution, since all those railway people are determined to be
1. Yule's Q equals 1 when the association between two varia­
bles is complete, but a score of 0.5 is generally taken to 
indicate a clearly significant degree of correlation. For 
an explanation of the theory and usage of Yule's Q, see 
J. H. Mueller and K. F. Schuessler, Statistical Reasoning 
in Sociology, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp.242-51.
2. Interview with W. N. Grant, 20th October 1971.
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leaders." Before proceeding to an analysis of this ‘mad 
scramble', it is worth considering, in general terms, just why 
positions of leadership in the Railway Union should be, and 
were, so keenly sought.
There were several possible reasons, and the motiv­
ations of different aspirants varied considerably in emphasis.
But, generally speaking, leadership of the railway workers was 
highly valued in itself rather than as a stepping-stone to 
positions in other (e.g. professional or party) hierarchies. 
Historical experience had shown that prominent Union officials, 
usually 'clerical' unionists, had sometimes gone on to senior
managerial appointments, but such cases were really extremely 
2
rare. More commonly, branch and association officials were 
appointed Junior Foremen soon after their election to union 
office. The connecting link between advancement in these two 
hierarchies seemed, however, to consist in the exceptional 
organisational talent and intelligence displayed by certain 
individuals, rather than in any deliberate managerial strategy 
of buying off 'dangerous' union leaders. As frequently as it 
led to professional advancement, serving as a union official 
appeared to prejudice an individual^ chances of job promotion
beyond a certain level. Certainly, it was almost unheard of for
3an active unionist to be appointed a Foreman. Generally speak­
ing, therefore, prominence in the Union tended to constitute an
1. Interview with Dr.W.G.Bruce-Konuah, 11th November 1971.
2. The General Manager of the Railways Administration in 1971, 
Mr.P.O.Aggrey, had been Clerical Association Secretary of 
the Railway Union in the late *40's, and his Principal Sec­
retary, J.S.Appiah, had been Vice-Chairman of the Union in 
1958-61; but, so far as the author could discover, these 
instances were quite unique.
3. Nearly all of the union officials at Location in 1961-71 
were Junior Foremen, but instances of officials being 
appointed Foremen were extremely rare. Out of 36 Foremen 
at Location in 1970-71, only 2, John Eshun and E. Class- 
Peters, had ever been prominent officials (i.e. National 
Officers, or Branch or Association Secretaries or Chairmen).
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alternative channel of advancement to that of the professional- 
managerial hierarchy - clearly an important factor in accounting 
for the strength of corporate solidarity among the railway 
workers.^
As regards the connection between mobility in union 
and party hierarchies, there had, as we have seen, been a close 
but far from simple or consistent interrelationship under the 
G.P.P. regime. The Party had felt obliged to reward such as 
Biney and Woode for their contribution to the nationalist 
struggle, but had rapidly realised the unsuitability, from 
Government's point of view, of such relatively committed and 
radical labour champions. Thereafter, Party leaders had looked 
to more reliable, if less prominent or popular, unionists as 
possible material for recruitment to administrative positions. 
These included not a single railway unionist during the whole 
G.P.P. period (if one excepts the somewhat farcical appoint­
ment of Biney as a security agent in 1963-65). The fact that 
the Railway Union rank-and-file largely succeeded in maintain­
ing their democratic powers of election, and were increasingly 
disinclined to vote for known party enthusiasts, meant that 
extremely few reliable party supporters ever attained official 
positions in the Union, either through election or imposition. n 
Even if, once ensconced in senior positions, railway unionists 
were tempted towards greater co-operation with the official 
party line by the prospect of advancement in the interlocking
G.P.P.-TUG structures, they faced severe problems, on the one 
hand of maintaining their control over the rank-and-file and, 
on the other, of gaining the trust of party leaders. The downfall
1. For comparative purposes, see the lucid analysis of the 
effect of alternative mobility opportunities on union 
leaders * attitudes and behaviour presented by Robert Bates 
in his study of the Zambian Minesworkers, Unions, Parties, 
and Political Development, (New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1971), pp.91-97.
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of General-Secretary Inkumsah in 1961 was an obvious case in 
point.
The ideological complexion of the Progress Party Gov­
ernment was hardly such as would incline it to recruit trade 
unionists into senior positions in the party or administrative 
structures. Several railway unionists in fact acted as officers 
of the party*s ward branches, but this was more an onerous duty
than a privilege or an opportunity for further promotion. One
railway unionist, IC. G. Quartey, had been a Progress Party can­
didate for election to the Legislative Assembly in the 1969
General Election, only to be persuaded to step down at the last
1
minute in favour of a future Minister, Harona Esseku. And, 
as the following account will make clear, K. G. Quartey, together 
with a group of followers amongst the railway unionists, aspired 
to take over the leadership of the Railway Union, (and even of 
the national trade union movement) with Progress Party encour­
agement and assistance. In part at least, the motive was to 
strengthen the political control and stability of the P.P. regime* 
In return, they probably anticipated and received financial 
tokens of appreciation, and, more important, increased security 
against the return of the Nkrumah regime, a possibility which, 
after their experience of detention and professional demise 
under that regime, they understandably viewed with some hysteria. 
Yet it seems likely that most of these unionists were primarily 
committed to leadership, and, as they saw it, genuine represent­
ation of the interests of their railway worker constituency. The 
point is admittedly debatable, and indeed constituted a major
1. Esseku, appointed Minister of Transport and Communications 
on the Progress Party*s accession to office, replaced 
Quartey as candidate for the Effutu-Awutu Senya constit- 
uencyyGf the other Sekondi-Takoradi railway unionists,
T.B. Ward was appointed a member of the City Council 
Management Committee, and J.K. Baaku and T.C.Bentil 
served as local ward officials for the Progress Party, 
in 1969-71.
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issue of disagreement between supporters of the two unions in 
1970-71. But certainly the fundamental, and vigorously asserted 
Railway Union ethic of primary commitment to the corporate 
interests of the rank-and-file exerted a powerful influence on 
the attitudes and behaviour of even these 'party political1 
unionists. For the majority of officials in both unions, the 
high status accorded by the rank-and-file to an effective and 
faithful representative constituted the basic motivation to 
leadership.
The financial rewards of office-holding, whether 
official or unofficial, were generally speaking of strictly 
secondary importance. The General-Secretaryship of the Union 
had been a well-paid position since G.P.P. days. But the large 
majority of 1 local* and ’middle-level' officials did not ser­
iously entertain any hope of ever succeeding to that position, 
and, as association or branch officials, received annual 
'honoraria' so small as hardly to compensate them for the work 
and responsibility entailed in such office-holding.  ^Instances 
of embezzlement of Union funds, or other forms of corruption, 
appear to have been extremely rare in the history of the Railway 
Union, except perhaps during C.P.P. days at the top-level of
the Union. Only three instances have been officially brought
2
to light during the past twenty years. A more reliable
1. As at 1971, Railway Union officials received the following 
salaries or "honoraria": Nff per month
General Secretary 170
National Chairman 16
Deputy General Secretary 18
National Vice-Chairman 12
Trustees 10
Branch Secretaries 5
Branch Chairmen 4
(N$l = £0.42)
2. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 13th August 
1952 and 23rd March 1966.
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indication, perhaps, is provided by the fact that rank-and-file 
interviewees could recall only two additional instances of sus­
pected embezzlement or bribery by Management. The Railway Union 
rank-and-file did not consider 'corruption' to be widespread 
amongst Union officials, or to constitute a significant moti­
vation to office-holding, which was rather conceived in terms
of "fighting for one's brothers" or "the honour of receiving
1
the trust of one's fellow-workers". Such lack of cynicism as
to officials' motives and conduct may be suggestive of a real 
situation if only in view of its rarity (at least in Ghana, and, 
it would seem, in Africa more generally).
This is perhaps not so surprising or idealistic as it
might seem. Attaining the respect of a close cultural sub-
community of some 8 , 0 0 0 workers, a sub-community moreover which
accords its very highest laurels of prestige to great labour
leaders, is no small personal ambition. And the experience of
socialisation in Railway Union culture has inclined many to
aspire to that goal. Others have noted that Ghanaians typically
seek material wealth primarily as a means to the high social
2status which its dispensation brings. Within Railway Union 
culture, a culture which automatically associates corruptibility 
with undependability, to seek personal financial gain through 
the typical extra-Union expedients of "corruption" would be to 
prejudice one's chances of attaining the desired high status.
In any case, virtually all officials sincerely share the rank- 
and-file's repugnance at the closed, corrupt style of extra- 
Union (government) politics, and their corresponding determin­
ation to maintain an open, responsive 'clean* system within the
1. Sample Survey Interviews, August 1971.
2. Maxwell Owusu, for example, argues that, "Both wealth and 
power are related means to the supreme social value - high 
status, social recognition, and social dignity." Maxwell 
Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), p.5.
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Railway Union itself.
A word of clarification is required here however. 
Various particular meanings might be attached to the general 
notion of "representation of rank-and-file interests", and it 
is important to define this more clearly than simply in terms 
of its distinction from extra-Union careerism or party political 
allegiance. In the first place, such representation does not 
generally take the form of patron-client type relations between 
particular Union leaders and particular groups of workers. An 
element of patronage, or sponsorship, certainly does play a 
minor role in the structure of leader-follower relations, and, 
more importantly, some unionists have tended to identify them­
selves especially closely with the interests and grievances of 
particular occupational groups. But, generally speaking, Union 
leaders have not been in possession of regular, reliable clien­
tele followings. The extent of their support has depended on 
their continuing to display their dedication and effectiveness 
as rank-and-file representatives, and on their being able to 
present a strong case in support of whatever policies they might 
advocate.
Secondly, "representation" does not generally signify 
the simple pursuit of immediate economic interests, by any means 
possible or irrespective of wider considerations. The majority 
of railway workers are not so naive as to fail to recognise the 
complexity of considerations affecting their real, long-term 
interest. More particularly, they do generally recognise the 
interrelation of their own interests with those of other groups, 
the unemployed especially, and even with the national economic 
interest (conceived in terms of bettering the lot of the "common 
people"); the importance of fighting to create or maintain a 
democratic political system, and more particularly a democratic 
trade union movement, through which they can make their griev­
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ances heard; and, above all, the importance of maintaining 
solidarity within their own ranks - "United We Stand, Divided 
We Fall", as the Union motto has it. Certain situations, how­
ever, are likely to entail varying degrees of conflict between 
these considerations and considerable difficulty of interpret­
ation as to the wisest course of action. The rank-and-file 
therefore tend to look to their Union officials, and especially 
the more experienced amongst them, to act as ’interpreters* and 
opinion-leaders, rather than representatives in the simplest 
sense. Moreover, they expect such interpretation to be informed 
by a wide political perspective on the issue at hand, and by the 
lessons of historical experience.
Xn a sense, then, railway unionists are, and are 
expected to be, 'politicians1. But their political perspective 
should be as far as possible non-partisan, and oriented prim­
arily to the development of the Union, and the labour movement, 
as a powerful and 'progressive* (i.e. democratising) political 
force. There has, of course, been considerable variation in the 
degree to which Union leaders have lived up to this ethic of. 
leadership. It is arguable, and was argued, by mother-union 
supporters, that leaders of the 1970-71 splinter-union were 
involved in betraying this ethic, in exploiting immediate sect­
ional grievances for their own and the Progress Party's benefit. 
But the fact that they were very concerned to rationalise their 
course of action in terms of non-partisan considerations and 
the historical principles of Railway Unionism at least testified 
to the continuing influence of this ethic with their own sup­
porters. Moreover, the rationalisation they presented was far 
from being untenable.
The "scramble for leadership" in the Railway Union, 1961-71.
The origins of the Railway Union split of 1970-71 were
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ultimately to be found in the political aftermath of the 1961 
strike. The strike-leaders1 had then been placed in preventive 
detention for periods ranging from five months to two years, 
and their company in the detention camps included several United 
Party leaders (later to become Ministers in the Progress Party 
regime), most notably J. Kwesi-Lamptey, Victor Owusu, and 
R. R. Amponsah. However tenuous or opportunistic the ties 
between these U.P. leaders and the strike leaders before deten­
tion, they were immeasurably strengthened by the experience of 
fellowship in imprisonment. V. K. Quist, K. G. Quartey,
A. Y. Ankomah, T. B. Ward, T. C. Bentil, J. K. Baaku, and Kofi 
Imbeah were all to become keen Progress Party supporters in 
1969-71, though, as we shall see, they were also to diverge in 
their interpretations of the obligations of this party allegiance.
In the meantime, the Railway Union was placed under the 
direct supervision of a TUG Administrator, J. C. Hansen, and an 
Interim Management Committee, composed of two representatives from 
each of the Branches. These were not hand-picked G.P.P. men, but 
rather the existing Branch Secretaries and Chairmen, and, in the 
case of Selcondi Location and Takoradi, junior officials who 
stepped into the positions left vacant by the detainees. The 
Location representatives were A. B. Essuman and A. E. Forson, and 
there is little reason to doubt the sincerity of their explan­
ation that they co-operated with the new executive simply to 
keep the Union running and press for the early release of the 
detainees.^
Many of the 'up-country' representatives, on the other 
hand, saw this as their opportunity to accede to positions of 
leadership in the Union, and call a halt to the Union's domin­
1. Interviews with A. B. Essuman, 15th June 1971, and 
A. E. Forson, 27th June 1971.
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ation by the Sekondi-Takoradi militants. When the TUC Executive 
Board announced in November 1962 that it was prepared to allow 
the ex-detainees to stand for election at the forthcoming Dele­
gates Conference, the Interim Management Committee voted almost 
unanimously against the proposal, with only Forson and Essuman 
voting for it. F. C. Separa-Grant, the 'official1 C.P.P. 
candidate, was elected General-Secretary at the Conference, and
all the other positions on the Executive Council went to 'up- 
2
country' men. These new officers then proceeded to concur with 
various measures introduced by Separa-Grant to reduce the power 
and stifle the voice of the Sekondi-Takoradi rank-and-file. The 
most important of these measures were the abolition of the Work­
ing Committee, previously the effective day-to-day decision­
making body, and generally dominated by the Sekondi-Takoradi 
Branch and Association representatives; and a decision to allow 
voting for the election of national officers by equal represent­
ation from all nine branches, rather than as previously by pro­
portional representation (i.e. proportional to the numerical 
strength of each branch). Since the Sekondi-Takoradi branches 
comprised approximately half the total Union membership, this 
decision greatly reduced their influence over the selection of 
national officers, (see Table 7.2). A. B. Essuman protested 
these measures and persisted in calling for the re-introduction 
of the Working Committee at virtually every Executive Council 
meeting up to June 1965, (when he was replaced as Branch Secre­
tary by Kofi Imbeah), but to no avail. He also led criticism 
of the Executive's failure to gain wage increases for the manual 
workers at a time when the Railway Administration was making 
large annual profits, and especially deplored their inaction
1. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 20th 
November 1962.
2. kUA, Railway Union Delegates Conference Minutes, 24th 
February 1963.
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over the tradesmens grievances, (to be dealt with at length 
in a later section of this chapter). He was supported in these 
criticisms by the other Location and Takoradi delegates, and, 
to a lesser degree, by A. Y. A. Bello from the Accra Branch, 
and W. A. Thompson from Kumasi. At the October 1963 Executive 
Council meeting, "a mob from Location with placards of various 
inscriptions came and demonstrated for 30 minutes11. They 
dispersed only after handing in a petition calling for Separa- 
Grant' s resignation, and for the reform of the structure and 
voting procedures of the Union "so as to reflect the true feelings 
and aspirations of the rank-and-file". The National Officers 
refused to consider these requests, and, by the middle of 1965, 
discontent was running so high at Location that Separa-Grant 
prohibited the holding of further mass-meetings there, "because
3
he found the meetings were generating subversive motives".
According to some unionists, preparations for an unofficial
strike were in train when the Army and Police intervened to
4
displace Nkrumah in February 1966,
Displaying quite startling insensitivity to the feelings 
of the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers, representatives of the 
deposed President attempted to bribe them to stage a strike 
against the new regime. Their leaders' response was unambig­
uous :
"We vehemently denounce the vain bluff of the 
deposed Dictator Kwame Nkrumah calling the 
railway workers to go on strike, as our Union 
suffered the most under his wicked and ....
-*-• RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 17th
October 1963.
2. Ibid.
3. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 15th
June 1965.
Interview with A. B. Essuman and A. 0. Wiafe, 15tli
June 1971.
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”... capricious rule, and we are the people ^
from whom he should expect the least support."
But while there was no question of the railway workers1 loyalty
to the National Liberation Gouncil, they were, initially, less
than enthusiastic about Benjamin Bentum's appointment as
Secretary-General of the TUC. A. Y. Ashielfie and Kofi Imbeah,
on behalf of the Location workers, petitioned the Chairman of
the N.L.C. to rescind Bentum's appointment, and were forced to
apologise for this indiscretion at the April Executive Council 
2
meeting. Apart from their objection to Bentumfs C.P.P. back­
ground, the Sekondi-Takoradi workers considered that a new 
Secretary-General should be selected from amongst the 1961 
strike leaders, men possessed of far better credentials than 
Benturn (at this stage, at least) as champions of democracy. In 
particular, they favoured V. K. Quist, Pobee Biney1s successor 
as the ‘strong man* of Location, who, on his release from deten­
tion had stayed with Dr. Busia in London. Ashielfie was regarded 
as Quist's agent, having acted as personal messenger for the 
latter during the 1961 strike action. Imbeah, too, had been 
closely associated with this most fiery of railway unionists, 
and he had been detained for his supporting role in the strike's 
organisation. Ashielfie and Imbeah could, it was felt, be relied 
upon to press Quist's candidature for the General Secretaryship 
of the Railway Union, and, more optimistically, for the leader­
ship of the TUC. It was largely for this reason that they had 
been elected Chairman and Secretary of the Location Branch in 
March 1966.
Bentum's appointment had frustrated the more grandiose 
of these ambitions, but it was still confidently expected that
1. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 8th 
March 1966.
2. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 30th 
April 1966.
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Quist would be elected leader of the Railway Union at the July 
Delegates Conference, This expectation was rudely shattered 
when the result of a secret ballot was announced as 10 votes 
for W. A. Thompson, 5 for A. Y. A. Bello, 2 for T. B. Ward, 
and only 1 vote for Quist,  ^ The main reason for Thompson’s 
victory was quite clear. The failure to reconstitute the 
Union’s voting procedures before this election meant that the 
'up-country* delegates retained control. They had obviously 
felt reluctant to hand over the running of the Union to the 
most militant of Sekondi-Takoradi militants, and preferred to 
play safe politically with their own man, the more cautious 
W. A. Thompson. But the most shocking aspect of the result, 
from the point of view of the Location rank-and-file, was the 
fact that only 1 of the 4 Sekondi-Takoradi delegates had voted 
for Quist. T. B. Ward, the Takoradi Branch Chairman, and an 
ex-detainee, who had been expected to campaign for Quist, had 
apparently pressed his own candidature. And, more treacherous 
still, Ashielfie, it appeared, had done a deal with Thompson 
in order to secure his own election as Deputy Chairman.
"From that time on", K. G. Quartey explained, "we
were looking for an opportunity to get rid of Thompson and
Ashielfie. It came when Thompson failed to present the workers'
2grievances to the Mills-Odoi and Quarshie Commissions."
Quartey was himself elected Takoradi Branch Secretary in July 
1966, and Quist the Branch Chairman at Location, They were 
supported in their campaign to displace Thompson by virtually 
all the Sekondi-Takoradi representatives, most prominently Kofi 
Imbeah and T. B. Ward, A. Y. Ankomah, (another ex-detainee, and
1, RUA, Railway Union Delegates Conference Minutes,
5th July 1966.
2* Interview with K, G. Quartey, 30th June 1971.
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Secretary of the Electrical Association), and A. B. Essuman 
and A. 0. Wiafe (Chairman and Secretary of the Carriage and 
Wagons Association, and sometimes of the Location Branch)*
A. E. Forson (Clerical Association Secretary) and A. Y. A. Bello 
(Accra Branch Secretary) joined in supporting many of the crit­
icisms of Thompson's leadership, but sought to play a moderating 
role, so as to prevent this factionalism from disrupting the 
efficiency and solidarity of the Union. And, although the 
Sekondi-Takoradi unionists were united in opposing Thompson's 
Leadership, they were divided amongst themselves as to who would 
prove the most suitable and capable successor. Only Quartey, 
Ankomah, Essuman, and Wiafe were really solidly in support of 
Quist. Imbeah, Ward, Forson, and others, could not be counted 
dependable allies, either because they aspired to the position 
of General-Secretary themselves, or because they entertained 
genuine doubts as to Quist's possession of the necessary skills. 
Moreover, some were already suspicious of the motivations under­
lying Quist and Quartey's determined (and at times ruthless) 
drive to take over leadership of the Union. The feeling grew 
that they were perhaps motivated by excessive personal ambition, 
and were too closely allied with politicians such as Dr. Busia 
and J. Kwesi-Lamptey. As Imbeah remarked, "it seemed to us that 
Quartey*s trade unionism had too much of a political flavour".
Essentially, then, the situation was one of a surfeit 
of experienced and ambitious unionists resulting in especially 
fierce conflict for positions of leadership. And, while init­
ially this factional conflict followed the lines of the long- 
dating Sekondi-Takoradi - 'up-country* division, the Sekondi- 
Takoradi unionists were in competition amongst themselves and
1. Interview with Kofi Imbeah, 14th June 1971.
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proved unable to unite effectively in support of a single 
candidate for the post of General-Secretary. In the 1968 
elections, as in 1966, Ward stood against Quartey (who had 
now assumed Quist*s mantle, the latter having been seconded to 
the Centre for Civic Education), thus again dividing the
1
Sekondi-Takoradi vote and facilitating Thompson’s re-election. 
And in 1970, Quartey*s faction, realising that the opposition of 
Imbeah, Forson, Ward and others was likely to prevent their 
winning the forthcoming election, determined to establish a 
break-away union under their own leadership. At the same time, 
however, this scramble for leadership was informed by real 
ideological differences and issues of principle.
In the first place, Quist, Quartey and their followers 
could make out a very strong case against Thompson for serious 
negligence in the performance of his responsibilities. The 
appointment of the Mills-Odoi Commission in 1967 provided the 
railway workers with their first official opportunity in ten 
years to argue their case for improved wages and conditions of 
service. Thompson set about formulating his proposals to the 
Commission without even consulting the Union's Association 
officials - i.e. the experts in grievances held by the various 
categories of employee. He finally produced a document which 
the latter were unanimous in considering seriously inadequate. 
Quartey and Ward demanded that Thompson's proposals be withdrawn, 
and an alternative set, formulated by themselves in consultation 
with the Association repx-esentatives, substituted in their place. 
A fierce argument over this issue was eventually settled by 
acceptance of the compromise suggestion that Ward and Quartey's 
proposals should be submitted in supplementary form to the
1. RUA, Railway Union Delegates Conference Minutes, 13th 
October 1968.
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original document. Nevertheless, Thompson was later blamed, 
and with some justification, for the Commission’s failure to 
redress the most pressing grievances of the Railway Union rank- 
and-file. In particular, the Commission formally recognised the 
justice of the ’tradesmen's' claim for parity of status with the 
'artisans', but declared that it felt unable to make definite 
recommendations owing to the insufficiently systematic nature
of its information. The Pay Research Unit, it suggested, should
2be detailed to enquire further into the matter. An important
opportunity to secure redress of this much-resented anomaly had
been lost, and another (i.e. the investigation of the Pay Research
3
Unit) would prove to be long awaited.
Then, in February 1968, the Quarshie Committee was 
appointed to make recommendations on the existing system of job 
categorisation in the Civil Service. While it was sitting, the 
Committee's terms of reference were widened to include the 
question of relative wage scales, but Thompson failed to bring 
this fact to the attention of the Branch and Association offic­
ials or to submit any memoranda of his own on the matter.
Realising that yet another opportunity for presenting their 
demands had been wasted, the Sekondi-Takoradi unionists accused
Thompson of gross negligence of duty, and presented resolutions
A
from the Branches calling on him to resign. Thompson refused,
1. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 3rd 
April 1967.
2. Report of the Commission on the Structure and Remuneration 
of the Public Services in Ghana (1967), (Accra, Government 
Printer, 1967), para.168.
3. The Pay Research Unit eventually reported, (favourably), 
on the tradesmen's case in November 1971.
4. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 6th 
August 1969.
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arguing that he had been attending the Constituent Assembly 
(charged with formulating a new Constitution for the return to 
civilian rule) at the time that the communique on the Committee's 
revised terms of reference had arrived at Union headquarters.
The TUC subsequently appointed a Committee to investigate this 
dispute, which found Thompson guilty of minor negligence in 
having failed to make proper arrangements for the Union's 
administration during his absence, but decided that these 
were "inadequate" grounds for his dismissal. The malcontents 
would therefore have to wait until the next Delegates * Confer­
ence, (some nine months away), to secure his replacement by a 
more capable man.
The Sekondi-Talcoradi unionists were unanimous in 
deploring these examples of Thompson's inefficient, and incom­
municative, running of the Union. But several of them refused 
on principle to support his replacement by Quist or Quartey.
It was perfectly obvious, for instance, that Quist and Quartey 
had set out to find fault with Thompson's leadership irrespective 
of his real merits or demerits, and had attempted to stir up 
feeling against him amongst the Sekondi-Takoradi rank-and-file 
on what were sometimes quite bogus charges. This unprincipled 
agitation was partly to blame for the poor quality of communic­
ations between Thompson and the Sekondi-Takoradi xrorkers, and 
the deplorable state of the Union's administration. Moreover, it 
was increasingly apparent that Quist and Quartey were prepared to 
utilise their ties with national politicians to further their 
campaign in the Railway Union, and even to involve the Union, 
in a covert and dangerous manner, in the personal manoeuvres of 
these politicians. The most disturbing example of this was the 
role played by V. K. Quist in the 1968 Permanent Waymen's strike.
1. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 6th 
January 1970.
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The permanent waymen are those workers employed by 
the Railway Administration to service, extend, or re-route the 
railway track (the ’permanent way'). In 1968, these consisted 
of almost 1,500 semi-skilled 'trackmen*, some 500 unskilled
1
labourers, and nearly 800 men in various supervisory positions.
Approximately two-thirds of these were illiterate northerners,
a fact which, according to the Secretary of their Association,
accounted for the situation that "our submissions to the Man-
2
agement are never considered". At the beginning of August 1968,
the Association petitioned Management to up-scale certain grades
of work, to increase the numerical strength of 'gangs', and to
improve their working conditions by providing rain-coats and
gum-boots for all. When, after waiting 21 days, they had
received no reply to their petition, the permanent waymen staged
a sit-down demonstration which rapidly escalated into a full-
scale strike. In the course of the strike, which lasted for
four days, several sections of track were removed, resulting in
the derailment of an engine and injuries to its crew. The NLC
leaders regarded the strike as a "gigantic conspiracy to topple
3the present military regime", arrested several officials of 
the Permanent Waymen's Association, and issued instructions to 
the Railway Management to dismiss all the strikers, (though 
they later rescinded this decision under pressure from the 
Management).
While the strike had clearly arisen out of genuine 
job-related grievances, and Ghanaian governments commonly resort 
to conspiracy theories to explain major strike actions, there 
are good grounds for thinking (with Bentum amongst others) that
1. RAA, Acc. 106/32, Item 37.
2. Ibid.
3. Ghanaian Times, 9th September 1968, p.l.
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this particular incident was, in a sense, ’’politically inspired 
and directed”.  ^ The Quist-Quartey faction tried to blame 
General-Secretary Thompson for its occurrence, arguing that if 
he had raised the matter of the permanent waymen* s petition at 
the August Executive Council meeting, they could have intervened 
to prevent it. Yet it would seem that Quist in fact played a 
major role in instigating the strike, stirring up resentment 
amongst the P. W. Association leaders at Management’s unrespon­
siveness, and assuring them of the support of the Location 
workers. Certainly, some of the detained strike leaders informed 
the Government to this effect, and, in October, Quist was him­
self arrested on suspicion of being the *masterbrain* behind it. 
The case was never proved against him, and in February he was 
released, and seconded from the Railways to the Centre for Civic 
Education. Nevertheless, it would seem significant, considering 
the close links between Quist and Dr. Busia, that the strike 
occurred at a time when Busia was becoming openly impatient at 
the NLC’s tardiness in handing over power to a civilian govern­
ment, and was attempting to impress on its leaders their declin­
ing ability to control the country.
If there was some room for doubt as to the role of 
Quist-Busia collaboration in the 1968 strike, there could be 
none as to the influence of the Quist-Quartey faction in secur­
ing the dismissal of Thompson and Ashielfie in December 1969. 
Thompson and Ashielfie were among 608 civil servants summarily 
dismissed from their positions, without grounds being given by 
the new Progress Party Government. Quartey argued that since 
they no longer held jobs in the Railway Administration, they 
could not continue to serve as officers of the Railway Union,
1. Ghanaian Times, 19th September 1968, p.8.
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and fresh elections should be held immediately. At last, it 
seemed, the 1961 strike leaders would accede to their rightful 
positions as official leaders of the Railway Union. But by now 
many of the Sekondi-Takoradi unionists, including some of those 
detained in 1961, were extremely perturbed at this prospect.
With the party political allies of Quist and Quartey now in 
power, it seemed inevitable that the Railway Union (and TUC) 
principle of strict independence of government would be seriously 
compromised under their leadership. Consequently, although Ward, 
Forson, Imbeah, Bello, and others retained little affection or 
respect for Thompson personally, they supported an Executive 
Council decision to retain him in office until the forthcoming 
Delegates Conference (in June 1970). They argued that the 
General-Secretary, as a full-time official, did not have to be 
a Railxvay Administration employee, and that the General Manager*s 
refusal to recognise, or negotiate with, Thompson constituted
2
**a gross interference in the internal affairs of the Union". 
Eventually, since the General Manager stood by his position, it 
was decided to appoint an interim management committee, headed 
by Forson and Bello, to carry on the administration of the Union.
1. Motivations of career self-interest possibly influenced 
these unionists* behaviour, T. B. Ward had been advised 
by Bentum that he was in line for the post of TUC Regional 
Secretary, and clearly did not want to prejudice his chances 
by associating with the splinter-unionists. Forson and 
Bello were perhaps playing for time to discredit the 
Quartey faction and mount their own campaigns for election 
as General Secretary. But it was certainly‘also the case 
that Forson, Bello, and Imbeah, were acting in line with 
the stance they had consistently taken since 1967.
2. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 13th March 
1970.
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At the June Delegates Conference, Forson was elected General 
Secretary by 10 votes to Bello1s 9. ^
By this time, Quartey, impatient at the Executive 
Council’s refusal to hold fresh elections earlier in the year, 
had decided to establish a break-away union. The leadership 
of this new union included A. Y. Ankomah, A. B. Essuman, and 
A. 0. Wiafe. However, T. C. Bentil and J. K. Baaku, ex-detainees 
and up till now strong supporters of Quist and Quartey, refused 
to go along with the break-away. Bentil stayed on as an official 
of the mother-union, and Baaku sought to work as an intermediary 
between the two camps so as to engineer a re-unification. As 
Baaku explained:
“*We were trying to overthrow Thompson for the 
Progress Party and ourselves, and because we 
thought P.P. was best for the workers. When 
Thompson was dismissed we saw we had our chance, 
and X thought we would come together to win the 
next election. But those TUC boys are clever, 
you know, and saw what we were up to, and started 
to campaign against us. Quartey and Ankomah 
thought that because the mother-union still had 
the majority along the line they might lose the 
elections. So they started their own union and 
refused all efforts to re-unite the two groups.
This was when I left Quartey*s side. It had 
become a selfish personal interest. I am very 
strong P.P., but it is not right that the Railway 
Union should be divided and ruled by two leaders.
United We Stand, Divided We Fall. The moment you 
divide the workers, that moment you give access 
to Management and the Government to rule the 
workers. And if you mix politics with trade 
unionism too much then that will not make for 
stable government.** 2
1. R.UA, Railway Union Delegates Conference Minutes, 15th 
June 1970.
2. Interview with J. K. Baaku, 28th August 1971.
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The subsequent development of the splinter-union, 
the R.H.E.U., has been outlined at the beginning of this chapter. 
It is now necessary to proceed to a more detailed analysis of its 
ideological stance, and the sources and bases of its support.
The R.H.E.U. Leadership's Ideological Stance.
The new Union's policy position, as enunciated by its 
General Secretary, I<. G. Quartey, was opposed to that of the TUC 
and the mother-union on two main issues. Firstly, Quartey 
argued that Bentum's TUC, formally constituted and structured as 
it was in line with the Industrial Relations legislation of? the 
C.P.P. regime, was basically undemocratic. In particular, he 
objected to the procedure of elections within the trade union 
movement, by which the Secretary-General of the TUC was first 
elected, then the General Secretaries of the national unions, 
and finally the local branch and association officials. '’Such a 
practice," he claimed, "enables the Secretary-General to influ­
ence the elections of the national unions, particularly in the 
choice of General Secretaries," Bentum, he implied, had been 
able to maintain Thompson in power against the wishes of the 
Railway Union rank-and-file.
In response, the leadership of the mother-union pointed 
out that there had been no interference from Bentum in the Rail­
way Union's elections, unless his refusal to dismiss Thompson 
in 1969 were to be construed as such; that Bentum had in fact 
supported the reform of the Union along more democratic lines 
by re-instituting the Working Committee; and that, at the TUC 
Congress of 1967, Quartey himself had concurred with the majority
of delegates that to reverse the order of elections would unfor-
2
tunately be financially and procedurally impracticable. If the
1. Ghanaian Times, 7th May 1970. p.3.
2. Interview with A. E. Forson, 2nd October 1971.
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elections for local officials were to be held first, then when 
a branch official was subsequently elected as a national officer, 
fresh elections would have to be held to fill the vacated post. 
Nevertheless, Quartey certainly did have a point as regards the 
failure to reform the procedure for election of national officers. 
The G.P.P. institution of equal representation for each branch 
was still official procedure, and this clearly did not provide 
for adequate representation of the wishes of the Sekondi-Takoradi 
rank-and-file, who constituted more than half the Union’s total 
membership.
Table 7.2 ; Railway Union membership, by branches (June 1969).
Sekondi Location 3,000a Kumasi 380
Takoradi 3,200 Nkawkaw 320
Tarkwa 360 Accra 360
Achiasi 300 Tema 1,200
Dunkwa 390
Total: 9,510
Source: RUA, Delegates Conference Minutes, 17th June 1969. 
a
This figure includes more than one thousand clerical workers and 
permanent waymen who were officially attached to the Location 
Branch although not, strictly speaking, part of the Location labour 
force.
Quartey's second major criticism of the TUC leadership 
was that, often, it lent its tacit support to strike actions, in­
stead of insisting on utilisation of the available procedures for 
peaceful negotiation. This was not so much a question of support­
ing the Government line, he emphasised, as recognising the gen­
eral failure of strike actions to attain the desired improve­
ments in wages or conditions of service. Truly resourceful and 
energetic union leaders should be able to secure redress of the 
workers' most pressing grievances through the existing negot­
iation machinery. Of course, this assumed that Government/ 
Management was essentially well-intentioned toward the workers.
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Quartey and his fellow union leaders admitted to having a great 
deal of faith in the ability and good intentions of the Progress 
Party regime. "But if it doesn't rule very well, if it does 
nothing good for us, then certainly we will consider strike action 
and decide to vote for another party at the next elections."
Part of the attraction of Quartey*s leadership lay in the fact 
that he had close ties with Progress Party Ministers, and could 
hopefully use these to secure redress of outstanding grievances, 
in particular through pressing for a speedy investigation into 
the tradesmen's case by the Pay Research Unit. But it was at the 
same time crucial to the retention of his support to maintain a 
convincing image of relative independence of government, and of 
primary commitment to rank-and-file interests and opinion.
A. Y. A. Ankomah, who tended to speak more passionately and openly 
of his allegiance to the Progress Party, had sometimes to be 
hushed up by his colleagues at mass-meetings for just this reason. 
And, as we shall see, Quartey was to experience great difficulty 
in controlling his rank-and-file in September 1971, owing to his 
failure to maintain a consistent line over the Budget and the 
consequent spread of doubts as to the location of his primary 
allegiance. It was indicative of the bases and of the limits of 
his support that mother-union members generally charged the 
splinter-union rank-and-file not with being P.P. enthusiasts, but 
rather with being easily misled ("since they are mostly illit- 
erates") by party politicians among their leadership.
The Sources and Bases of Support for the Two Unions.
By the end of 1970, the splinter-union could claim the 
support of almost two-thirds of the Location rank-and-file, and
1. K. G. Quartey's speech to a mass-meeting of the R.H.E.U.
on 5th August 1971, at which the writer was present.
2. Sample Survey Interviews, August 1971.
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approximately a third of the workers employed at Takoradi 
harbour.’*' Thereafter there was little alteration in the situ­
ation, until, in September-October 1971, some splinter-union 
supporters started drifting back to the mother-union.
Slightly more than half the splinter-union supporters 
claimed to have voted for the Progress Paz~ty in the 1969 elect­
ions. But this was also the case with almost half of the mother 
union supporters (see Table 7.3).
2
Table 7.3 : Electoral affiliations of Location labour-force.
Progress Party 44% (40)
Other Parties 20% (18)
Non-voters 36% (32)
By Union membership:
R.P.W.U. R.H.E.U. Non-members
Progress Party 41% (17) 56% (18) 31% (5)
Other Parties 26% (11) 13% (4) 19% (3)
Non-voters 33% (14) 31% (10) 50% (8 )
There was no strong or simple correlation, therefore 
party and union allegiance.
, between
1. According to statistics provided by the Railway Personnel 
Manager, the registered memberships of the two unions as 
at January 1970 were as follows:
R.P.W.U. 6,870 R.H.E.U. 2,716
The bulk of support for the R.H.E.U. came from some 900 
workers at Location and 1100 at Takoradi.
2. In this and all succeeding tables in this chapter, figures 
in brackets refer to absolute numbers of interviewees. It 
should be noted that, of the 90 interviewees, 42 were mem­
bers of the R.P.W.U. (the mother-union), 32 were members of 
the R.H.E.U., and 16 were members of neither union. The 
R.H.E.U.'s numerical predominance at Location is not 
reflected in these figures owing to the fact that the 
’tradesmen1, who provided the bulk of its support, were 
under-represented in the sample.
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Nor, as Table 7.4 makes clear, did members of the two unions 
differ greatly in their conceptions of union purpose and prior* 
ities.
1
Table 7.4 ; Perceptions of Union Priorities
R.P.W.U.
members
R.H.E.U.
members
Non­
members
(a) Obtaining improved conditions 
of service and promotion 
opportunities. 55%a 48% 88%
(b) Bridging the wages gap between 
the lower and higher-paid. 63% 59% 25%
(c) Obtaining more influence in 
the administration of the 
industry. 10% 15% 25%
(d) Developing more union spirit 
and solidarity among workers. 32% 37% 18%
(e) Improving the education and 
discipline of the workers. 47% 63% 75%
<f) Making workers more politic­
ally conscious. 6% 4% 0%
(g) Establishing a fuller pro­
gramme of social activities 
and facilities. 10% 0% 6%
<h) Helping to provide employment 
for the jobless. 77% 74% 63%
Interviewees were asked to select from 8 alternative goals the 
three which they considered of highest priority for the Ghanaian 
unions. Percentages therefore refer to number of interviewees 
selecting e.g. (a) as one of their three highest priorities.
1. This questionnaire was modelled on one administered to a 
sample of Chilean unionists by Henry A. Landsberger. See
H. A. Landsberger, "The Labour Elite: Is It Revolutionary?1', 
in S. M. Lipset and A. Solari (eds.), Elites in Latin America, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.273. The results 
are very similar for the Chilean and Ghanaian samples. The 
present writer would wish to dissent from Landsberger1s 
interpretation of these results, however. A predominant 
concern with gaining economic concessions rather than "making 
workers more politically conscious" is not necessarily a 
non-ideological orientation as Landsberger suggests. Among 
other considerations, it is likely that many interviewees
/continued overleaf
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The most obvious difference in this respect was between members 
of both unions, on the one hand, and non-members on the other.
The latter were far more concerned than union members with 
promotion opportunities, workers* discipline (or productivity) 
and education, far less concerned with wage levels as such or 
with union solidarity. The splinter-union supporters, also, were 
more concerned than mother-union members with productivity and 
education, but on all other questions were in substantial agree­
ment with the mother-union members. That is to say, they attached 
the highest priority to helping reduce the unemployment level, 
and bridging the wages gap between higher and lower income groups.
It did appear to be the case, however, that, as at 
July 1971, a significantly higher proportion of splinter-union 
supporters held favourable views of the P.P. regime*s character 
and economic policies. Almost half of them considered that the 
country’s politico-administrative elite were reasonably honest, 
and that they were genuinely attempting to set an example of 
self-sacrifice, whereas extremely few mother-union supporters 
believed this, (see Table 7.5).
Table 7.5 : Political attitudes of Location labour-force.
% giving positive response
R.P.W.U. R.H.E.U.
Do you think Ghana’s political 
leaders and senior civil ser­
vants are:
(a) mostly fairly honest, 22% (9) 38% (12)
(b) setting an example of
sacrifice, 11% (5) 36% (11)
(c) improving the country’s 
economic situation. 38% (16) 61% (19)
footnote 1 continued from previous page.
.... interpreted "political consciousness11 as meaning 
’party political involvement*.
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Moreover, in spite of the fact that most of the splinter-union 
members were agreed with the mother-union members in opposing 
the introduction of a National Development Levy, there was a 
significant difference in the proportion who granted their 
general approval to the July 1971 Budget, (see Table 7,6). The 
more favourable attitude adopted by the splinter-union supporters 
appeared to derive not from any difference of opinion as to the 
merits of the rural development programme (which nearly all 
agreed to be a good thing), but from the expectation that they 
would soon be compensated for the Development Levy exactions 
by a wage award from the Campbell Commission or the Pay Research 
Unit.
Table 7.6 ; Attitudes to the 1971 Budget.
% giving positive responses.
Questions:
(a) Do you generally approve
R.P.W.U. R.H.E.U.
(b)
of the recent budget?
Do you think the National 
Development Levy is
38% (16) 61% (19)
(c)
justified?
Do you agree that the 
Government’s first priority 
should be rural develop­
14% (6 ) 38% (12)
(d)
ment?
Do you expect to gain any 
wage increase from the C.C.
91% (38) 93% (30)
or the P.R.U.? 36% (15) 85% (27)
It would appear, then, that the leaders of the splinter-union 
had succeeded in presenting the P.P. regime’s policies and 
future intentions to their rank-and-file in a more credible 
and attractive light than that in which they were viewed by the 
majority of mother-union supporters. Whereas virtually all of 
the latter, including those who had helped vote the Progress 
Party into power, had become rapidly and seriously disillusioned
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with the regime, the splinter-union leaders had conducted 
something of a holding operation with their own supporters 
through performance of this * interpretative' function. It is 
important to stress, however, that this was never more than a 
difference of degree, that the majority of splinter-union mem­
bers were cynical as to the honesty of the regime, and that for 
few, if any, did sympathy for the P.P. regime entail willing­
ness to entertain a close alliance with it.
Support for the splinter-union leaders initially and 
primarily derived from sources other than common party political 
allegiance, or shared general attitudes toward the Government's 
policies. Quist, Quartey, and Ankomah had proven themselves 
champions of labour through their sustained and courageous 
opposition to the Nkrumah regime, and through their outspoken 
criticisms of Thompson's inefficiency as General Secretary.
Quist, in particular, enjoyed immense popularity at Location, 
and especially among the 'tradesmen* in the Carriage and Wagons 
Department, whose case for parity of status with the 'artisans' 
he had insistently pressed. An element of patronage also tied 
the tradesmen to his support, since he was apparently always 
willing to help them out with a Cedi or two when in especially 
difficult financial straits. A number of illiterate interviewees 
gave as their main reason for supporting the splinter-union the 
simple fact that they had always followed Quist. Although he 
was not present in person on the Railway Union scene in 1969-71, 
Quartey was seen as his chosen successor, and Essuman and Wiafe 
had taken up his spokesmanship of the tradesmen's case.
As this formulation implies, however, the following 
of the splinter-union leaders derived from a combination of 
respect for their general qualities and past records, together 
with their identification with the grievances of particular
280
groups of workers. And this latter identification was generally
decisive in influencing workers* attitudes towards the course of
action Quartey advocated and pursued in 1970-71. Most of the
artisans and apprentices at Location concluded that, “Although
Quartey is a strong trade unionist and we would have liked him
1
to be our leader, he became too politically ambitious.'* The 
Quist-Quartey faction retained their credibility as champions 
of the rank-and-file primarily amongst those groups of workers 
who had special reason to trust in their determination and 
ability to redress particular, sectional grievances. Hence, 
the large majority of tradesmen at Location supported the 
splinter-union, and indeed most of its support came from workers 
in this particular job category, (see Table 7.7).
Table 7.7
a long-standing issue in Railway Union politics, Thompson's 
greatest 'sin* as General Secretary having been his failure to 
secure government action on the matter through the Mills-Odoi 
Commission. There were two main grievances involved. Firstly, 
those machinists and fitters in the Location Workshops classified 
as 'tradesmen* (i.e. fully skilled but not having taken the 
Railways' own apprenticeship course) did not enjoy parity of 
status with the 'artisans' (i.e. those who had taken the course), 
even though they performed very much the same type and standard 
of work. This meant that they neither enjoyed equal opportunities
1. Interview with B. Maurice, apprentice, 7th August 1971.
Artisans Tradesmen Apprentices Labourers 
100% (15) 36% (4)
28% (3)
36% (4)
RiP.W.U. 57% (17) 18% (6 )
R.H.E.U. 23% (7) 65% (22)
Neither 20% (6 ) 17% (6 )
As previously indicated, the tradesmen's case had been
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for promotion to supervisory grades, nor qualified for the 
various perquisites of pensionable staff, such as free travel 
on the Railways and a special vacation allowance. The second 
major grievance consisted in the anomaly that many of the fit­
ters in the Carriage and Wagons Department were not classified 
as tradesmen, even though they had taken the Ministry of Labour’s 
trade test. This should theoretically have entitled them to 
tradesman status, but the Railway Administration insisted on 
considering them 'semi-skilled*. In consequence, they received 
rates of pay considerably lower than those of the artisans and 
classified tradesmen.'*’
As early as 1963, the strength of feeling over these 
anomalies was apparent from reports that, "the tradesmen have 
refused to train the apprentices, and they (the apprentices)
are even debarred from using the tools which belong to the 
2
tradesmen." In spite of persistent pressure from Quist, 
Essuman, and Wiafe, the Union’s Executive had failed by January 
1970, to gain more than a vague government assurance that the 
Pay Research Unit had been detailed to enquire into the matter. 
The tradesmen hoped that Quartey would be able to use his per­
sonal contacts with Jatoe Kaleo, Minister of Transport and 
Communications, to speed up the P.R.U.'s enquiry and secure 
early government action on the report. This was clearly the 
main reason why they supported his break-away from the ineffec­
tual mother-union. At the same time, however, Quartey*s general 
stance of opposition to strike action and his emphasis on the
1. In 1970-71, the ’semi-skilled’ Carriage and Wagon fitters, 
Grades I and 2, received basic daily rates of N01.72 and 
NjZSl.62, compared to those of N^1.88 and N01.74 for Trades­
men, Grades I and 2. RAA, Railway Staff Manual (1970), 
para. 169a.
2. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 18th 
February 1963,
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advantages of peaceful negotiation carried some real conviction 
with a group of workers whose particular grievances the Govern­
ment had declared itself prepared to consider* A policy of 
peaceful negotiation offered little prospect of demand-satis­
faction for those such as the artisans, in contrast, who were 
rather concerned to fight for general wage increases for the 
lower-paid workers (i.e. skilled and unskilled manual workers, 
earning less than NJZS50 per month) in the face of Government’s 
apparent unwillingness to make any such general concessions.
The apprentices, like the artisans, tended to respond 
enthusiastically to Bentum’s call for a major reform of the 
national wages structure, since, as trainee-artisans, they 
obviously had a keen interest in the future pattern of rewards.
It is not to belittle their enthusiasm for Bentum*s general 
stance to point out that they also had particular grounds for 
hostility to the splinter-unionists, (as their absolutely 
unanimous support for the mother-union might lead one to suspect). 
Essuman and Wiafe, as Branch Chairman and Secretary at Location 
in 1968-70, had displayed little sympathy for the apprentices' 
protest against the threatened introduction of examinations. 
Rather, they had openly supported Management's plan to make them 
sit an examination at the end of their five-year course, consid­
ering it unfair that only the tradesmen should have to pass some 
form of trade test. Thompson, Forson, and Imbeah, however, suc­
cessfully opposed this plan, and thereby earned the gratitude
X
and solid support of all the Location apprentices.
To some degree, the pattern of division of allegiance 
between the two unions followed similar lines at Takoradi Harbour. 
Although precise figures were impossible to obtain, both sets of
1. Interview with U. I. Viala, Apprentices* Association
Secretary, 15th August 1971.
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union leaders agreed that the splinter-union was especially 
strong amongst workers in the Electrical and Marine Departments. 
Approximately three-quarters of the Electrical Department workers 
(or some 70 out of 94) followed their long-serving Association 
Secretary, A. Y* Ankomah, into the break-away group. Ankomah 
had built up a strong personal following in his Association 
’constituency*, primarily through his record of grievance- 
handling, but also through the assistance he had given to some 
of his members in gaining employment in the Railways, and in 
helping them to pass their trade tests. Nevertheless, the fact 
that some of the Electrical Department workers stayed with the 
R.P.W.U. demonstrated that even Ankomah could not claim to possess 
a totally reliable bloc of personal followers.
In the Marine Department, some two-thirds of the 300 
workers employed there left the mother-union out of anger at its 
leadership’s inability jjor refusal) to redress their grievance 
over the ’salvage case’. In 1968, a Nigerian ship had run aground 
just off Takoradi harbour, and the Marine Department’s tug and 
launch crews had been called out on a salvage operation. The tug 
crews played the largest part in this operation, but the launch 
crews involved were understandably aggrieved xvhen only the former 
received the special salvage allowance, their own efforts going 
completely unrewarded. B. T, Nahr, the Marine Association Sec­
retary, was suspected of favouritism in his handling of this 
matter, (very probably, quite unfairly), since he was himself a 
tug crewman. All the launch crew joined the splinter-union when 
Quartey assured them that he would intervene with the Attorney-
I
General, Victor Owusu, to secure a more just settlement.
1. Interviews with K. OforrjL (R.H.E.U. Marine Association
Secretary), 9th September 1971; and B. T. Nahr, (R.P.W.U. 
Takoradi Branch Chairman and formerly Marine Association 
Secretary), 12th September 1971.
284
Yet these two groups of workers (in the Electrical 
and Marine Departments) accounted for only a minority of the 
splinter-union's total support at Takoradi harbour, (approx­
imately 300 out of 1100 members)* Quartey enjoyed the support 
of a number (though generally a minority) of workers in all of 
the Departments there, most of which were numerically very much 
larger than Electrical and Marine. There was no indication that 
sectional economic grievances or patron-client type followings 
played a major role in determining the allegiance of these workers. 
In the opinion of virtually all interviewees at Takoradi, the 
division centred on the issue of whether or not Quartey (whose 
past record as Takoradi Branch Secretary was universally respec­
ted), was now seeking to intrude party politics into trade union­
ism; and, related to this, whether it could possibly be justified 
to secede from the main Railway Union and so divide the railway 
and harbour workers. In addition, the majority of mother-union 
members expressed great admiration for Bentum and found Quartey's 
criticisms of the TUC quite unjustified. There seems no reason 
to doubt that these ideological differences constituted the real 
determinants of allegiance in the case of the majority of workers 
at Takoradi harbour.
It is worth noting, however, that mother-union sup­
porters frequently explained the apparent blindness of Quartey's 
followers to the merits of Bentum, and the dangers of Quartey's 
brand of 'political unionism', in terms of their illiteracy. 
Although precise figures on the proportion of illiterates in 
each following were not obtained, it was indicative that many 
splinter-union members acknowledged the existence of this 
'educated-illiterate' division, even if they interpreted its 
significance rather differently from the mother-unionists:
"We illiterates must stick together since those tricky people
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(Bentum, Nahr and Thompson) did nothing for us." It was also
significant in this respect that Quartey deliberately recruited
several illiterates to positions of officialdom in his union.
None of the mother-union officials, in contrast, were illiterate,
and they were often to be heard complaining, "Most of our rivals
are uneducated, and we find great difficulty in reaching them
2
since those illiterates are all so stubborn.** More generally, 
illiteracy did perhaps constitute an obstacle to the communic- 
ation of Bentum*s views and activities, and thereby contribute, 
in a negative manner, to his relative lack of popularity with 
R.H.E.U. members.
The significance of the *educated-illiterate * division 
was also frequently remarked upon at Sekondi Location, but, there, 
its importance as an independent variable was difficult to assess 
owing to the fact that it largely coincided with job category 
divisions, (see Table 7.8).
Table 7.8 : Educational characteristics of Location labour-force.
Job categories. % educated beyonel * elementary* 
level.
Artisans 100% (42)
Apprentices 100% (15)
Tradesmen 59% (19)
Labourers 27% (3)
The only empirical indication that it may have been a significant
factor was provided by the fact that, of the six tradesmen inter­
viewees who supported the mother-union, five (or 83%) were
educated to ’middle-school * level. The representative validity
1. Interview with K. Mensah, crane driver, 28th August 1971.
2. Interview with J. E. Annan, R.P.W.U. Marine Association 
Secretary, 18th July 1971.
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of so small a sample must, however, be regarded as dubious.
Far more clearly than at Takoradi harbour, the basic 
pattern of allegiance at Location followed the lines of sectional 
economic differences. Yet there were quite numerous exceptions 
to this pattern which indicated the additional influence of 
ideological factors. These were it must be stressed, relatively 
minor ideological differences, perhaps more accurately described 
as differences of perception and of degrees of confidence in 
particular union leaders. They were operative within a general 
consensus on the legitimate principles of trade unionism. The 
important point to emphasise here, however, is that such dif­
ferences of perception, while generally following the lines of 
division between sectional economic interests, did constitute 
an additional dimension of some force, and sometimes led indiv­
iduals to act at variance with the general pattern. Twenty- 
three per cent of the artisans interviewed at Location, for 
instance, supported the splinter-union, generally out of personal 
admiration for Quist and Quartey. As one of these explained, 
"They (Quist and Quartey) have always talked straight with us 
and said things boldly. If it’s no good, they say so. But if 
they lead us to expect something, we know it will materialise.
That Thompson was too tricky, and the new lot are not much 
1
better."
On the other hand, 18 per cent of tradesmen inter­
viewed remained in the ranks of the mother-union. All of these 
expressed admiration for Bentum*s leadership of the TUC, and
scepticism as to the wisdom of "moving so closely with the
2
Government as Quartey appears to be $oing". Some tradesmen
Interview with F. K. Awortwi, artisan, 7tli August 1971.
2. Interview with J. H. Amissah, tradesman, 24th August 1971.
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(17 per cent) also followed J. K. Baaku in turning back from 
support of Quartey when he proved ready to split the railway 
workers into two unions:
"There could be no reason for this except 
selfish political interest. I will not 
become a member of either until they come 
together, but I attend the meetings of both 
and hit from outside." 1
The Railway Union split of 1970-71 derived basically, 
therefore, from the exploitation (or claim to representation) 
of divergent sectional economic interests by competing leader­
ship factions, (though it might be argued that the interests 
represented by the splinter-unionists were more distinctly 
Sectional*, less fgeneral*, than those of the mother-unionists) 
Yet ideological differences, very loosely defined, constituted 
an additional, and far from superficial dimensionj and, related 
to this, the prestige and interpretative role of particular 
union leaders. This was especially apparent in the case of 
workers at Takoradi, where attitudinal differences seem to have 
been related to a certain friction between literates and illit­
erates. Tribal.differences, it should be noted, played no 
perceptible role in the determination of lines of division and 
allegiance. The leadership cadres of both unions were tribally 
heterogeneous but predominantly Fanti, as were their rank-and- 
file followings, (see Table 7.9).
Table 7.9 : Tribal composition of rival union followings.
Tribe R.P.W.U. R.H.E.U.
Fanti 25a 18
Ahanta 6 7
Nzima 3 1
Ashanti 3 3
Akwapitn 3 -
Ewe - 3
Others 2
aAbsolute numbers of interviewees.
1. Interview with A. J. Odonkor, tradesman, 14tli August ]
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These various dimensions of the split, though in many individual 
instances cross-cutting, tended generally to coincide with, and 
thereby re-inforce each other. This coincidence of several 
sources of division helps account for the creation and main­
tenance of so critical a split in the ranks of a group of workers 
previously renowned for their exceptional solidarity.
The Re-unification of the Railway Workers.
It is important to stress the fact that a certain 
communality of political attitudes and perceived economic interest 
continued to characterise the railway workers in 1970-71, in 
spite of their division into competing camps. The large majority 
of supporters of both unions were extremely cynical of politicians 
as a class, and inclined to blame Management and Government for 
low productivity and the necessity for resort to strike actions. 
They were also determined to assert the ethic of leadership 
accountability to the union rank-and-file and their independence 
of Government (in distinction from the Government viexv that the 
primary responsibility of union leaders was to "explain'1 Govern­
ment policies to their rank-and-file). Admittedly, the splinter- 
union supporters displayed a somewhat more sympathetic attitude 
to the economic difficulties and policies of the P.P. regime, and 
proved ready, through desperation for some financial relief, to 
connive at their leaders' cultivation of ties of friendship with 
Progress Party Ministers. But they immediately reacted, perhaps 
a little unrealistically, against any indication of the rep­
resentative responsibilities of these leaders being distorted 
or compromised by their party political loyalties. K. G. Quartey 
faced a crisis of credibility over this issue in his handling of 
rank-and-file opinion on the July 1971 Budget.
At a Location mass-meeting on 5th August, Quartey argued 
that, by seeking to relieve the unemployment problem and reduce
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food prices, the Budget should bring substantial benefits to 
the workers. Several of his rank-and-file members, while not 
dissenting from this, insisted that the National Development 
Levy imposed an excessive burden on them, and should be modified 
to exempt the lower-paid (i.e. the skilled and unskilled manual 
workers). Quartey, in turn, agreed with this, but pointed out 
that the Campbell Wages Review Commission was due to release 
its report very soon, and would hopefully award them a more sub­
stantial wage increase than the amount due to be deducted by 
the Levy. He promised to travel to Accra to request Minister 
Jatoe Kaleo for an assurance on this matter. If this was not 
forthcoming, then they would protest against the Levy. "No 
money come, no money go,” he shouted, and was enthusiastically- 
cheered.
Just one week later, however, he reported back to 
the rank-and-file:
"The Minister has told me that there is no money 
in the country, and so there will be no increase 
for us. But he will be sending the Pay Research 
Unit very soon, so you must tell the workers to 
pay the Levy as requested. If you want promotions 
you should not follow the advice of people who say 
to go on strike." 2
This was not at all well received. The first speaker from the 
floor expressed the widespread feeling of disenchantment:
"You have been to Accra just to see your girl­
friends and have brought us back unwanted 
messages. You have not been able to do what we 
wanted. We are very fed up with your speech. It 
is making us very angry. I tell you, General ..
1. K. G. Quartey*s speech to a mass-meeting of the R.H.E.U. 
on 5th August 1971, at which the writer was present.
2.' K* G. Quartey*s speech to a mass-meeting of the R.H.E.U. 
on 12th August 1971, at which the writer was present.
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"..Secretary, if money is deducted from my pay 
next month, I will go on strike even if I have 
to do so on my own." 1
Another rank-and-file member followed up xtfith the charge that
"These politicians are asking us to tighten our 
belts while they are filling their own pockets.
We all know the ins-and-outs of it. The same 
thing will happen to this regime as to the old 
one if they are not more careful. When will the 
Pay Research Unit come? We demand to know. If 
they do nothing for us, it will be the same as 
1961." 2
Quartey sought to pacify his followers by assuring them that if 
the Pay Research Unit had not arrived at Location within three 
weeks, then he would call them out on strike. Fortunately for 
him, and perhaps for the Progress Party regime, the P.R.U. 
officials met with the leaders of the two unions within this 
time limit. Most of the splinter-union*s members were thereby 
persuaded to stay on duty during the September strike. They 
received their due reward with the announcement in November that 
the tradesmen's grievances would be redressed and that several 
categories of employee were to receive increases in their 
incremental scales. All the same, two or three hundred of the 
splinter-union members did join in the strike, and approximately 
half of these * crossed the carpet* back to the mother-union, 
dismayed at the realisation that they were being used as a 
counter in the Government's campaign against the TUC.
Others simply refused to re-register with the splinter- 
union - (the Industrial Relations Act of September 1971 required 
all unions to re-register their members) - and, together with 
J. I<. Baaku and others who had refused to join either union, set
1. Unidentified speaker at the R.H.E.U. mass-meeting on 
12th August 1971.
2. A. Rockson, tradesman, speaking at the R.H.E.U. mass- 
meeting on 12th August 1971.
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out to work for the re-unification of the railway workers. The 
leadership of the splinter-union refused to consider this prior 
to the military coup of January 1972. But, in March of that 
year, partly under pressure from the new regime, the National 
Redemption Council, they agreed to form an Interim Management 
Committee, composed of representatives of both camps, and to 
participate in the election of officers for a reformed, re­
unified Railway Union. According to the admission of one of 
the ex-splinter union leaders, "There was much relief amongst 
our members at this news." ^
1. Private correspondence with A. B. Essuman, 10th April 
1972.
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SECTION TWO 
CLASS, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY.
The purpose of this section is to take up the general 
questions raised in the Introduction to this thesis and con­
sider them in a more systematic, theoretical manner than has 
been attempted hitherto. The previous section has already demon­
strated the importance of the railway workers as a group in the 
Ghanaian political arena. It is now proposed to analyse the 
sources of this exceptional political strength and assess the 
significance of its being wielded with such relative consistency 
in opposition to post - as well as pre-Independence governments. 
One central question which must obviously be considered here is 
that of how illuminatingly a Marxian model of class-conflict can 
be applied to railway worker political behaviour. In more general 
(and less preconceived) terms, the primary theoretical concern of 
this section is with the interrelationship of socio-economic 
position, ideology, and political action. That is to say, what 
role might be attributed to ideological factors in determining 
railway worker political behaviour, and how does the railway 
workers* ideology (or ’political culture*) reflect their socio­
economic situation. It is clear that an assessment of the sig­
nificance of railway worker political activity should in turn 
take into account its *class* implications, (though, as will be 
argued subsequently, this is not the only perspective from which 
it might be judged).
It is worth noting at the outset, however, that a 
classical Marxist interpretation of the politics of African 
labour is far from generally accepted even in left-wing academic 
circles. More influential by far at the present time is the 
*Fanonist* thesis of John Saul and Giovanni Arrighi, which por­
trays unionised workers economically as a privileged 'labour 
aristocracy' relative to the 'peasantry', and, politically, as
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an essentially non-radical force.^ The high status generally 
accorded this interpretation is, in the present writer's view, 
seriously misjudged. It is nevertheless worth outlining it at 
some length here in order to provide, as it were, a tableau 
against which the argument developed in this section might stand 
out in greater relief.
The literary origins of Saul and Arrighi's view of the 
class position and political orientation of unionised labour in
Africa are to be found in the writings of Frantz Fanon, most
/  2
particularly in Les Damnes de la Terre. For Fanon, whose pro­
phecy of the emergence of an immense Elite-Mass division cer­
tainly has proved accurate:
"The workers, now that they have their 'indepen­
dence', do not know where to go from there. For 
the day after independence is declared the trade 
unions realise that if their demands were to be 
expressed they would scandalise the rest of the 
nation: for the workers are in fact the most 
favoured section of the population and represent  ^
the most comfortably off fraction of the people."
Elaborating this view in more systematic and academic form, Saul 
and Arrighi see the peasantry as the main, even the sole, pro­
ductive force in African societies. The available surplus they
1. This thesis is developed in two articles written conjointly 
by Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul: "Socialism and Economic 
Development in Tropical Africa", in The Journal of Modem 
African Studies, Vol. No. 6 , 2, (1968), pp.141-69; and 
"Nationalism and Revolution in sub-Saharan Africa", in
R. Miliband and J. Saville, The Socialist Register, 1969, 
pp.137-88. I am indebted to Adrian Peace for bringing my 
attention to the current fashionability and thought- 
provoking character of the argument developed in these 
articles.
2. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (London:
Macgibbon and Kee, 1965).
3. Ibid., p.98.
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produce is expropriated and drained away as the repatriated 
profits of overseas firms or consumed by self-indulgent domestic 
elites, and the generation of a larger surplus thereby dis­
couraged. This explanation of the obstacles to increased pro­
ductivity and economic development in underdeveloped societies 
has now passed into the realms of acceptable economic and socio­
logical orthodoxy. But of more immediate concern here, and, it 
is suggested, of more doubtful validity is the position which 
Saul and Arrighi see unionised labour as occupying in this 
pattern of expropriation.
Beginning in the colonial period, but developing in 
more extreme form after Independence:
"Higher wages and salaries.... foster the 
stabilization of the better-paid section of 
the labour force whose high incomes justify 
the severance of ties with the traditional 
economy. Stabilization, in turn, promotes 
specialization, greater bargaining power, and 
further increases in the incomes of this small 
section of the labour force, which represents 
the proletariat proper of tropical Africa.
These workers enjoy incomes three or more 
times higher than those of unskilled labourers 
and together with the elites and sub-elites in 
bureaucratic employment in the civil service 
and expatriate concerns, constitute what we 
call the labour aristocracy of tropical Africa.
It is the discretionary consumption of this 
class which absorbs a significant proportion  ^
of the surplus produced in the money economy."
In contrast to the classical Marxist theory of increasing class 
conflict between ruling class and working class as economic 
development proceeds, Saul and Arrighi see the ruling class and 
the unionised workers developing an ever more solid complement­
arity of interests, both economic and political. The main
1. Arrighi and Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in 
Tropical Africa", op.cit., p.149.
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polarisation of interests occurs between two modes or sectors of 
production, urban and rural, rather than within one mode of pro­
duction. Minor differences of interest and opinion might develop 
within the urban elites. For example, "Where wage restraint began 
to be demanded of the junior partners to the 'aristocracy', its 
imposition was made difficult by the unambiguously privileged
position of its other members, the politicians and the sal- 
1ariat." Yet such differences are of slight consequence along­
side the overriding consensus.
Saul and Arrighi do, however, acknowledge one major 
source of differentiation within the wage-earning class which 
is of considerable importance here:
"The wage-working class is polarized into two 
strata. Wage workers in the lower stratum (i.e. 
unskilled, migrant workers) are only marginally 
or partially proletarianized as, over their life 
cycle, they derive the bulk of the means of sub­
sistence for their families from outside the 
wage economy. We feel therefore justified in 
considering wage workers in the lower stratum
as part of the peasantry....... this lower
stratum, consisting of workers and unemployed 
who retain strong links with the peasantry has 
in fact interests which are antagonistic to 
the present order.” 2
In a qualified manner, the authors suggest that Fanon*s vision 
of the lumpen-proletariat acting as the urban spearhead of the 
peasant-based revolutionary movement may have considerable rele­
vance here.
Before moving to a critique of the Saul-Arrighi pos­
ition by setting it against the Ghanaian experience, one can 
point to certain merits. Firstly, they have attempted to develop
1. Ibid., p.162.
2. Arrighi and Saul, "Nationalism and Revolution", op.cit., 
p.169.
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generalisations of a systematic, comparative nature, relating 
the pattern of economic development to the structure and sig­
nificance of political action. In themselves, such perspectives 
merit attention since they are by no means characteristic of 
commentaries on the nature of economic and political under­
development. Further, the labour aristocracy thesis does attempt 
to offer an explanation of the behavioural tendencies character­
istic of unionised labour in a fairly wide range of African 
states - the general lack of sustained trade union militancy, 
the apparently passive incorporation of most unions into the 
one-party state system - without resorting to the all-too-common 
official or semi-official fallacy of the essential unity of these 
societies in the struggle for development.
Nevertheless, the labour aristocracy thesis has severe
failings and limitations, some of a broad theoretical nature,
others the result of over-generalising from particular empirical
instances. Empirically, their interpretation of the class position
of unionised workers, while no doubt valid for administrative
staff, and possibly for skilled workers in certain industries
and countries, is quite misleading as to the real income levels
of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers in the cities of Ghana 
1
and Nigeria. Theoretically, Saul and Arrighi, following Fanon, 
operate with a naively over-simple conception of the relation­
ship between class position and political action. The skilled 
railway and harbour workers of Sekondi-Takoradi constitute a 
clear and important exception to the labour aristocracy thesis, 
both as regards their class position and the political orient­
ation they have (partly in consequence) developed. On the inter­
1. For the case of Nigeria, see Adrian Peace, "Industrial
Protest in Nigeria", in E. de Kadt and G.P. Williams (eds.), 
Sociology of Development, (London: Tavistock Press, 1973).
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pretation presented here, there can be no doubting the sin­
cerity or radicalism of their reformist orientation. Moreover, 
the failure (and apparent improbability) of a peasant revol­
utionary movement, or any kind of concerted 'mass' resistance 
to government to materialise, lends to the railway workers' 
oppositional activity far greater significance than might be 
attributed to it in a different political context. The present 
Ghanaian political context in turn sets limits to the goals and 
strategy which the railway workers can realistically pursue, 
and it is this rather than their (allegedly 'privileged') class 
position which accounts for their reformist rather than 
revolutionary political orientation.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CLASS
The concept of 'class1 is currently used in a number 
of rather different, if related, senses. It was originally 
employed by Marx to denote a group of persons occupying the 
same position in the structural relations of economic product­
ion. This, however, was conceived as merely a minimal definition 
of 'class*. Marx laid great stress on the importance of a 
subjective awareness of common interests as a precondition for 
organising a class as an economic and political force.'*' Among 
the processes by which workers developed this sense of common 
identity and solidarity, two were seen as being of particular 
importance. The first consisted in the experience of regular 
conflict over the distribution of economic rewards between classes. 
Secondly, a sense of class identity was fostered by easy and 
regular communication between individuals in the same class 
position such as was facilitated by the increasing concentration 
of workers in the towns of nineteenth century Britain.
The term 'class' is often currently employed to refer 
to major and relatively distinct divisions in the pattern of 
socio-economic stratification in a society. Although this is a 
rather looser usage than that generally employed by Marx, it is 
one which clearly enters into his analysis of the development of 
class-conflict. It perhaps also provides a more appropriate 
starting-point for the analysis of political conflict in societies 
where the emergence of distinct classes (on a national scale) is, 
at most, only incipient. Similarly, the common sociological
1. See R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, "Marx's Theory of Social
Classes", in R. Bendix and S.M.Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, 
and Power, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953),
pp.6-1 1 .
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usage of the term to refer to cultural and other barriers to 
social intercourse between members of different strata can be 
i 1 luminatingly applied here, if in a somewhat wider-than-Marxist 
manner* It is proposed to consider these several Objective1 
dimensions of 'class' structure in this chapter, while reserv­
ing a specific discussion of the 'subjective* consciousness of 
the railway workers for Chapter Ten.
Whichever of these three dimensions of 'class' is 
considered - economic interrelations, socio-economic stratific­
ation, or patterns of social intercourse - Saul and Arrighi's 
notion that skilled workers form a 'labour aristocracy' seriously 
misrepresents their position in Ghana's developing social struc­
ture. (As previously noted, it is the skilled workers who are 
generally recognised as constituting "the backbone of the 
Ghanaian trade union movement".) In the first place, it is far 
too simple to suggest that only the 'peasantry' produce any 
significant economic surplus, and that all urban wage-earners 
take part in expropriating this surplus. If the term 'peasantry' 
is interpreted to refer to all 'farmers', (a very loose usage 
but the only one which seems to make sense in terms of this 
argument), then it is certainly true that the Ghanaian economy 
is highly dependent on the production of cocoa. But the trans­
port and service industries are hardly less important to cocoa's 
arrival on the international market than its actual cultivation. 
The Saul and Arrighi interpretation of the pattern of production 
and expropriation in African societies represents, of course, a 
major deviation from the classical Marxist interpretation, and 
there is something to be said for this change of emphasis, 
recognising as it does the radically different politico-economic 
structures of industrialised and underdeveloped societies. But 
it is simply perverse to suggest that skilled manual workers, 
even if in government employment (as distinct from executive 
officials in the state bureaucracy and enterprises) are essen­
tially non-productive. A more balanced interpretation should
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recognise the existence of serious economic conflict within 
both urban and rural sectors of production as well as between 
them. If the rural producers are most directly exploited by 
the buyers and distributors of agricultural produce, the urban 
poor also suffer indirectly from excessive profit-making on the 
part of rural-urban entrepreneurs. More important, as this 
chapter will show, Ghana’s manual wage-earners, including the 
skilled workers, are in a position of serious conflict with 
the politico-administrative elite over the pattern of distrib­
ution of the national surplus, and over the failure to curb 
corrupt practices by state officials, to the detriment of both 
rural producers and urban poor.
The Pattern of Economic Stratification in Ghana.
With what justification can the skilled workers be 
regarded as part of the urban poor? Saul and Arrighi include 
them in that class which enjoy incomes "three or more times 
higher than those of unskilled labourers".  ^The first point to 
be noted here is that this generalisation is based on East 
African experience. In Kenya and Uganda, the large majority 
of skilled workers are employed in capital-intensive, multi­
national manufacturing enterprises, which, as Saul and Arrighi 
rightly point out, are so technologically structured as to allow 
of a relative lack of emphasis on keeping wage rates as low as 
possible. The ability and willingness of these enterprises to 
pay high wages to attract and stabilize a skilled labour force 
results, they suggest, in a spiral process ensuing, with African
governments becoming increasingly concerned to win over skilled
2workers from one sector to the other.
1. Arrighi and Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in 
Tropical Africa", op.cit., p.149.
2. Giovanni Arrighi, "international Corporations, Labour 
Aristocracies and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", 
in S. I. Rhodes (ed.), Imperialism and Underdevelopment;
a Reader, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp.220-67.
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In Ghana, in contrast, a majority of the country's 
skilled workers have been employed in government industries or 
public corporations. In the absence of a serious labour short­
age, the private industries have tended to follow government's 
lead in keeping wage rates down, (though the wage rates for 
skilled workers in large-scale private enterprises have still 
been slightly higher than for government employees^). Conse­
quently the differential ratio between skilled and unskilled 
workers' wage rates has not significantly widened since the 
1920's and remains at something less than 2:1. In the Railway
Administration in particular, the average earnings of skilled
2workers stood at N#39 as at 1970 , compared to the national 
minimum wage of 1S$21 and the actual average earnings for unskil­
led railway workers of approximately N#24, (see Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 : Rates of Pay in the Railway Administration.(per day)
1910 1930 1950 1970
Labourers 1/- 1/6 3/6 7/6a
Artisans 2/- to 2/6 to 6/- to 12/- to
3/- 5/- 10/- 2 0/-
Source: RAA, Railway Administration Staff Lists,
aAfter 1968 many unskilled workers received considerably 
more than the basic (i.e. national minimum) wage of 7/6 , or 
75 pesewas, per day, in accordance with the Mills-Odoi Com­
mission's recommendation that incremental scales be intro­
duced for unskilled workers in government employment.
1. According to the 1967 Mills-Odoi Report, the average 
earnings of skilled and unskilled workers in the private 
sector "appeared to be between 20 per cent and 25 per 
cent above those in the Public Sector". The Report of the 
Commission on the Structure and Remuneration of the Public 
Services in Ghana, (Accra: Government Printer, 1967), para. 
184. Hereafter cited as the Mills-Odoi Report.
2. Calculated from data on incomes provided in the Railway 
Administration Staff List (1970), RAA.
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Secondly, there is an important difference to be noted between
East Africa and West Africa in the criteria used for assessing
the minimum wage by both colonial and post Independence admin- 
1rstrations. In East Africa, where the creation of a surplus 
wage labour force has proved a considerable problem for admin­
istrations and employers, and that of a stable, skilled labour 
force even more so, the minimum wage rate was calculated from 
the start to take account of the costs for maintenance of 
workers* wives and children and various other obligatory and 
socially desirable expenditures. In Nigeria and Ghana, in 
contrast, countries which have generally not been characterised 
by problems of labour shortage, the minimum wage rate was cal­
culated to cover no more than the basic subsistence costs of 
the individual worker. Successive wage commissions did no more 
than raise the minimum wage in correspondence with rises in the 
cost of living. Often, in fact, they did less than this on the 
grounds of preventing the emergence of significant urban-rural 
income differentials. Whenever the more radical members of 
wage commissions suggested that a more generous notion of "need** 
should be utilised making recommendations, this was invariably 
rejected by other members and by the administration of the day 
(with the partial exception of Biney and Woode’s influence on 
the relatively generous Lidbury-Gbedemah Award of 1952). The 
rates of pay for skilled workers in Ghana, unlike Kenya and 
Uganda, have generally been kept down in steady relation to the 
minimum wage. This further helps to account for their much lower 
(relative) incomes compared to those of skilled workers in East 
Africa.
1. See John F. Weeks, "Wage Policy and the Colonial Legacy - 
a Comparative Study**, in The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, Vol.9, No. 3, (1971), pp.361-87.
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In consequence of the reluctance of Ghanaian wage
commissions to compensate workers fully for rises in the cost
of living, the real wage levels for both skilled and unskilled
tended actually to decline between 1939 and 1971, and so far as
one can calculate, very seriously at that (see Table 8.2). The
1950's provided a temporary exception to this tendency, with
real wage rates rising back to the 1939 level and slightly above
it by 1961. But two points should be noted here. Firstly, the
1939 level was hardly considered 'aristocratic' for skilled
workers, or even 'the bare minimum' for the unskilled, by those
best qualified to judge. Captain J. Dickinson, the Colonial
Government's first Labour Officer, estimated that the 1939 level
"is now on the level of 1914, and it is certain that the cost
of living has risen since then."’*' The wage rate for unskilled
workers was, theoretically perhaps, the bare minimum for an
adequate diet, but "since the labourer, like anyone else, spends
a certain proportion of his wages on luxuries, cigarettes, for
example, or visits to a lover, he thereby does not reach the
2
standard but lives in a sort of secondary poverty." Secondly, 
it is worth repeating the point (for which evidence was presented 
in Chapter Three) that the 1950's wage increases were largely the 
product of successful pressurising activity by the unions on a 
relatively weak pre-Independence government. The railway workers' 
feeling that the maintenance of the strike weapon was essential 
to the protection of their interests was amply borne out by 
developments in 1960-66.
During these years, the unskilled workers experienced
1. Quoted in W. B. Birmingham, "An Index of Real Wages for
the Unskilled Labourer in Accra", in Economic Bulletin of 
Ghana, Vol.4, No. 3, p.16.
2. Ibid.
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Tab l e 8 .2; One Index of the Real Minimum Wage, 1939-1968,
Year Minimum Index of 1 Accra Retail Index of
Wage Minimum Price Index Real Mini-
Wage mum Wage
1939 15 100 100 100
1941 18 122 151 81
1942 18 122 159 77
1943 18 122 168 73
1944 18 122 168 73
1945 18 122 186 6 6
1946 21 139 198 70
1947 27% 183 212 8 6
1948
CM 183 227 81
1949 31% 211 243 87
1950 32% 217 285 76
1951 32% 217 333 65
1952 45 300 326 92
1953 45 300 324 93
1954 45 300 324 93
1955 45 300 344 87
1956 51% 344 351 98
1957 51% 344 351 98
1958 55 367 354 104
1959 55 367 364 101
1960 65 433 367 118
1961 65 433 390 111
1962 65 433 426 102
1963 65 433 446 97
1964 65 433 502 8 6
1965 65 433 643 67
1966 65 433 672 64
1967 70 467 623 75
1968 75 500 685 73
Source: Kodwo Ewusi, The Distribution of Monetary Incomes 
in Ghana, (Legon, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, Social
i   a 11 ■■ in im i rmii m  i i ' ' ^  .
and Economic Research, 1971), p.43,
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a fall in their real wage levels way down below what could
reasonably be considered a subsistence level even for a single
man. The Mills-Odoi Commission estimated a decline of 45 per
cent in the value of the minimum wage between 1960 and 1966, and
acknowledged that the living standards of unskilled labourers in
the latter year were "distressingly low". It is doubtful whether
their real incomes compared favourably with those of hired farm
labourers, the poorest section of the rural populace (at least
2in the southern half of Ghana) . Yet the Commission felt unable
to award more than a 5 per cent wage increase on the grounds of
"the futility of trying to improve living standards by wage
increases which are not related to ability to pay measured in
3
terms of national productivity,"
During 1968-71, government's refusal to grant any 
further increase in spite of continuing inflation meant a fur­
ther deterioration in real incomes for the lower paid wage-earners. 
Some indication of the unskilled labourer's plight as at 1971
was provided by the TUC's calculation of a minimum living wage
4m  its Proposals to the Campbell Commission. Employing stat­
istics on basic nutritional requirements provided by the Ghana
1. Mills-Odoi Report, op.cit., par.186.
2. The Mills-Odoi Commission concluded, on the basis of a
Ministry of Agriculture Sample Survey, that "it is feasible 
to calculate a daily-hired farm labour imputed income (i.e. 
converting income in kind into cash) of approximately 70 
New Pesewas - that is, the present minimum daily rate in 
the wage sector of employment.” Mills-Odoi Report, op.cit., 
para.208.
3. Ibid,,para.183.
4. "Proposals submitted by the TUC Executive Board to the
Campbell Salary Review Commission", (1971, mimeo.).
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Ministry of Health, together with a list of food item prices 
drawn up by TUG officials from observation of market prices in 
Accra, it was estimated that the cost of a balanced diet for a 
single worker would be N01.O5 per day. The minimum wage of 
N0O.75 would not even cover the worker's basic food costs, and 
the skilled workers' average income of N|2l.30 would barely suf­
fice. Moreover, the great majority of skilled workers, and an
increasing proportion of the unskilled, had wives and children
2
living with them in town. Few had any additional source of 
income except for the small amounts their wives might make from 
petty trading. The TUC calculated that the cost of a balanced 
diet for an average family (i.e. man, wife, and two children) 
would be N#3.30 per day. Allowing for a certain (perhaps wilful) 
idealism in the Ministry of Health statistics, and some slight 
exaggeration in the TUC's list of food item prices, it is never­
theless clear that, taking into account additional obligatory 
expenditures on housing, clothing, transport, etc., something 
in the region of N03.5O per day would constitute a minimum liv­
ing wage for a married worker. Yet not even the most senior 
skilled workers received this amount, and the average was less 
than half this figure. One might well ask, "How could the 
skilled and unskilled workers survive on such inadequate in­
comes?" The TUC's answer was clearly rhetorical, but far from 
ridiculously exaggerated:
1. Ibid., p.19. The TUC's example of a 'balanced diet' con­
sisted of: Breakfast - Akasa (a light porridge) with bread; 
Lunch - Palmnut soup with 'fufu* (a dough made from yam 
and cassava, and the staple meal of most Ghanaians);
Supper - Garden egg stew with 'banku' (another kind of 
dough). This is a fairly typical day's fare for skilled 
railway workers. Quantities were calculated to provide a 
total of 3000 calories.
2. 89 per cent of the workers interviewed at Location had 
wives living with them in town, and 78 per cent had at 
least one child also. In'Margaret Peil's sample of Ghanaian 
factory workers, skilled workers had, on average, 2.28 
children living with them in town, and unskilled workers..
/continued overleaf
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"The answer is simple. The worker has not lived 
a full life. He has only existed by a contin­
uous chain of private borrowing,crediting of 
food and consumer goods, and where these fac­
ilities are exhausted he has to compulsorily 
subject himself to self-denial of the essential 
needs of life and live below the level of human 
standards, only to exist to work, and not to 
work to live." 1
It becomes even more clear when one attempts to cal­
culate the relative real incomes of local farmers that the notion 
of the skilled workers constituting a * labour aristocracy* is 
absurd in the case of Ghana. They have generally enjoyed incomes 
almost twice as high as the imputed incomes of hired farm lab­
ourers, but lower than those of many (perhaps most) independent 
farmers. It is, of course, extremely difficult to generalise 
about rural real incomes, partly because of the shortage of 
reliable data on the subject, partly because what data we do 
have indicates immense differences in income between large and 
small farmers, and between average incomes in the different 
regions.
Polly Hill's research has clearly illustrated the
thoroughly capitalist structure of Ghanaian cocoa production,
and the early development of a large, imported, hired-labour
2
force to work on the cocoa farms. In consequence, economic 
differentiation within the rural populace has already proceeded 
to a degree where the notion of a single peasant class is
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
1.24 children. Margaret Peil, The Ghanaian Factory Worker; 
Industrial Man in Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1972), p.196.
1. "Proposals submitted by the TUC Executive Board to 
Campbell Salary Review Commission", op.cit., p.21.
2. Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
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transparently inappropriate. Some indication of this is pro­
vided by Kodwo Ewusi*s calculation of the distribution of 
income among cocoa farmers in 1963-64, (see Table 8.3).
1
Table 8.3 ; Distribution of Income of Cocoa Farmers, 1963-64.
Income Class, N$. Percentage of Farmers Total Income,
N0.M.
1-60 18.0 1.7
60-120 20.0 4.2
120-240 22.0 9.1
240-600 25.0 22.2
600-1200 10.0 19.1
1200 and above 5.0 25.7
N.B. Not including imputed income from consumption of 
own food.
This clearly reveals the development of a class of extremely 
large, wealthy farmers, some of whom, according to Ewusi, earn 
as much as N012,OOO per annum. One quarter of the cocoa farmers 
might be categorised as "middle peasantry", (i.e. those earning 
N$240-600 per annum), and 60 per cent as "poor peasantry", (to 
perseverewith Saul and Arrighi*s term).
It is also worth noting here that these different 
classes of agricultural producer tend to be located in different 
regions of the country, (though, obviously, producers of vir­
tually all types and size are to be found in every region).
Most of the large, wealthy cocoa farmers are to be found in the 
Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions, and, to a lesser extent, in 
the Akwapim area of the Eastern Region. In the Central and 
Western Regions, in contrast, the majority of farmers would
1. Reprinted from Kodwo Ewusi, The Distribution of Money
Incomes in Ghana, (Legon, Ghana; Institute of Statistical 
Social and Economic Research, 1971), p.75.
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have to be classified as 'poor peasantry with a sprinkling of 
'middle-peasants'.
This regional differentiation is reflected in a recent 
study for the International Labour Organisation, in which 
Dr. Blair Rourke reports that:
"incomes of farmers were assessed to be highest 
in Brong-Ahafo Region. In 11 out of the 19 sub­
districts covered in that region more than one- 
half of the farmers were estimated to have cash 
incomes above NJ&500. Incomes were relatively 
high in Ashanti Region, followed by Eastern Region, 
Northern Region, and Volta Region. Farmers in the 
Western and Central Regions were considered to be 
relatively poor but not as poor as those in the 
Upper Region. In the Upper Region, 11 out of the 
18 sub-districts covered did not have one-quarter 
of the farmers receiving income in excess of 
N05OO." 2
If we take the Eastern Region as the median, however, information 
on the relative incomes and expenditures of rural and urban house 
holds is provided by a recent household survey of that region
3
undertaken by Mr. Dutta-Roy. Mr. Dutta-Roy calculated an 
average imputed income (i.e. including the imputed value of 
consumption of one's own produce, but not that of rent) for 
rural families of N#33.08 per month, compared to one of N#37.54 
for urban families. This latter figure is marginally higher than 
the median monthly wage of skilled workers calculated by Margaret
1. See K. Ewusi, op.cit., p*78.
2. Blair Rourke, Wages and Incomes of Agricultural Workers 
in Ghana, (Legon, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, Social 
and Economic Research, 1970), p.82.
3. D. K. Dutta-Roy, The Eastern Region Household Budget Survey 
(Legon, Ghana: Institute of Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research, 1968).
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Pell on the basis of a sample survey conducted in the same 
year (1967) as Dutta-Roy1s. This suggests that most skilled 
workers are slightly better off than most farmers, though the 
difference is small and such generalisations are necessarily 
very rough indeed. Some would argue that in calculating urban 
real incomes it is necessary to take into account the "implicit 
wage supplement" conferred on families by social overhead expen­
ditures on schools, medical services, sanitation, etc. In 
recent times, however, with successive governments committed to 
rural development as a first priority, the implicit wage sup­
plement to rural incomes has been as substantial in many cases 
as that to urban incomes. When one further adjusts both rural 
and urban incomes for the effect of unilateral transfers from 
the urban to the rural areas, it becomes very doubtful whether 
the skilled wage-earners can be considered a privileged group 
in any sense. According to Margaret Peilfs survey, 72 per cent 
of skilled workers regularly remitted part of their wages to
relatives in the countryside. The average amount sent was
2
N#36.64 per year, or N$3.05 per month. The institution of 
'family parasitism' effectively wipes out any significant dif­
ference between the real incomes of skilled industrial workers 
and the majority of farmers.
Some indication of the factory workers' own perception 
of their economic position relative to that of the 'peasantry*
3
is provided by Dr. Peil's survey of status perceptions. The
1. Dr. Peil found that the median monthly wages of skilled
workers in the various cities of Ghana were as follows:
Accra - N028.94; Kumasi - N#38.57; Takoradi - N036.43. 
M. Peil, op.cit., p.76.
2. Ibid., p.210.
3. Ibid., p.118.
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large majority of her interviewees, she points out, equated 
status ranking with relative income levels. Factory workers 
placed "farmers" 1 0th on the ladder of occupational prestige, 
"fitters" (i.e. skilled workers) 2 1st, "farm labourers" 33rd, 
and "building labourers" 34th, out of a total of 35 occupations. 
Of course, the perceptions of other groups might be expected to 
differ considerably from those of the factory workers them­
selves, and there are no grounds for thinking that the letter's 
perceptions are any more objective than others. But none of the 
urban populace at all in touch with realities could imagine that 
skilled manual workers enjoy an 'aristocratic* standard of liv­
ing. They are obviously better off than the unskilled and unem­
ployed, most importantly in that they enjoy relative security of 
employment. But none of the unskilled workers interviewed by 
this author considered that the gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers' incomes was excessively great. Virtually all unskilled 
workers agreed that the greater training and skills of the 
artisans justified their being paid considerably higher wages. 
Some even conceded that this was especially necessary in view 
of the greater job stability of the artisans and the additional 
financial burden involved for them (but for very few unskilled 
workers) in supporting a family in the city.
Moreover, the difference in income levels between 
skilled and unskilled workers could not but appear trivial in 
the light of the huge and growing gap between the lower paid 
(i.e. all manual wage-earners) and the elite of politicians 
and the salaried classes. In 1962, Professor J. E. Isaacs pre­
pared a report for the International Labour Organisation in 
which he made international comparisons of the differential 
above the rate of the unskilled worker of thirteen occupations.
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In almost all cases, (the skilled workers being one exception), 
the differential in Ghana was among the highest.  ^ By 1968-71, 
as the Ghana TUG leadership frequently pointed out, the dif­
ferential ratio between the lowest- and highest-paid employees 
in government service was in the proportion Ii39. In more con­
crete terms, the annual income of the General Manager of the 
Railway Administration in 1971 was Nj26,972, that of Senior Exec­
utive Officers N$l,608, whereas the skilled workers* starting 
rate was NJ2402. The political elite were even more highly paid 
than the senior civil servants. At the end of the G.P.P. period, 
Ministers received salaries of N09,OOO per annum. The N.L.C. 
regime awarded its civilian commissioners, who were performing 
ministerial duties N06,OOO. The Progress Party Government dec­
ided to pay its Ministers N014,OOO with additional allowances of 
N|£4,000. Workers in Sekondi-Takoradi often remarked, **We workers
in Ghana receive so much less than workers in Britain, yet our
2Ministers and Judges receive so much more.** Though inaccurate 
as regards the absolute salaries of British and Ghanaian Ministers, 
this view was at least correct in relative terms, and the bitter­
ness with which it was expressed readily understandable.
Such statistics do not of course necessarily mean a 
great deal unless income tax rates are also taken into account.
It is a commonly recognised fact of life in Ghana that members 
of the elite are generally able to avoid paying the full income 
tax for which they are liable. Yet, even accepted at face value, 
the rate of Ghanaian income tax increases only relatively slightly 
with income levels. As at 1970, a gross monthly emolument of 
N034 attracted a tax of 2 per cent of earnings, N01OO attracted 
6 per cent, N#500 15 per cent, and N#1,000 27 per cent. There
3
was no super tax. This was a much lower rate of increase than
1. J. E. Isaac, Questions of Wage Policy in Ghana, (I.L.O., 
1962).
2. Interview with B. T. Nahr, 8th July 1971.
3. Central Revenue Department *s General Information on Taxation 
in Ghana^ (Accra: Government Print er, 1970).
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that operative in the United Kingdom, for instance. The picture 
is further confirmed of a disproportionately rich Ghanaian elite.
Moreover, post-Independence development in Ghana has
resulted in a large increase in the elite's proportionate share
of national wealth. According to the estimates of Kodwo Ewusi:
in 1956 the upper 6 per cent of wage and salary earners received
12.9 per cent of the total national income; in 1962 the upper
5.1 per cent received 20.3 per cent; and in 1968 the upper 4.6
1per cent accounted for 24.7 per cent. Ewusi concludes, "The 
relative distribution of income in Ghana has radically deter­
iorated, resulting in the relative immiseration of the lower 
income groups." ^
Corruption.
The skilled workers of Ghana are most accurately cat- 
egprosed as a relatively comfortable section of the lower income 
group, rather than a distinct labour aristocracy: and, as such, 
with their real incomes steadily deteriorating while the upper 
income group becomes richer, they are in a position of acute 
conflict with the politico-administrative elite over the pro­
portionate distribution of the national income. A further source 
of conflict, or rather an additional dimension of this economic 
conflict, is provided by the issue of corruption. Corruption is 
seen primarily as a further mechanism of elite self-enrichment 
to the severe detriment of the lower income group and the nat­
ional economy as a whole.
There has recently been a tendency among British and 
American writers to take a more sympathetic, positive view of 
corruption in the underdeveloped states than that presented in
1. K. Ewusi, op.cit., p.96.
2. Ibid., p.95.
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earlier accounts* Donal Cruise O'Brien for instance, has 
argued that,
"Where 'corruption' and 'nepotism* have become 
general principles of political action, it may 
be more fruitful to see them as such, rather 
than as deviations from an officially proclaimed 
norm which is honoured above all in the breach* 
Corruption and nepotism correspond fairly closely 
to patronage and factionalism, and the stigma 
attached to the former pair of terms can obscure 
serious analysis. Clans in particular may be seen 
as the democratic dimension of the Senegalese 
state, as a means for local notables (and, indir­
ectly, their followers) to assert claims on the 
governing elite. Possible access to patronage 
in this manner helps to explain the otherwise 
surprisingly docile attitude of peasants in the 
face of bureaucratic exploitation. Some do benefit 
substantially from government handouts." 2
There is a great deal to be said for this change of perspective, 
so long as "the docile attitude of peasants" is not automatically 
interpreted as "acceptance of the corruption system" rather than 
mere "helplessness". But it remains important to recognise that 
corruption and patronage vary in the form they (predominantly) 
take from one social and political system to another, and in 
their relation to each other. It is necessary to analyse the 
predominant system of patronage and corruption in each society 
with some precision, and to assess its implications for different 
social groups.
1. Perhaps the most critical account of 'corruption' in the 
African states is that of S. Andreski, The African 
Predicament, (London: Michael Joseph, 1968).
2. Donal Cruise O'Brien, "Clan, Community, Nation: Dimensions 
of Political Loyalty in Senegal", (paper presented to the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies Seminar on African Urban 
Politics, November 1973).
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This is not the place to attempt a broad account of 
the patronage and corruption system in Ghana. But it is worth 
pointing out that, as far as the skilled workers are concerned, 
they have gained, and stand to gain, very little from patronage. 
Many gain their jobs initially through sponsorship, but that of 
relatives already employed by the firm rather than of politicians 
or other members of political 'clans', which do not exist in 
nearly so extensive or organised a form as they appear to do in
X
Senegal, for instance. Once given employment, the skilled 
worker is relatively secure in his job, and has no need to main­
tain or cultivate patronage ties either to retain it or gain 
promotion. Due partly to the strength of union organisation 
amongst skilled workers and their ability to protest favourit­
ism, promotion is generally on the basis of seniority and organ­
isational ability. In any case (and above all) promotion opp­
ortunities are very limited. A skilled manual worker can never 
hope to become more than a Foreman. The situation for clerical 
workers is very different, promotion being based on examination 
qualifications and bosses* favouritism, and there being far less 
definite limits to the heights a clerical worker might attain 
in the course of his career. Patronage affects the skilled 
workers mainly in the form of possible attempts by TUC or Party 
leaders to win over their union representatives, and is there­
fore strongly disapproved and resisted as a threat to their 
corporate unity.
While corruption may be involved in the operation of 
patronage networks, it might also, in the form of demanding 
bribes, be simply a means of self-enrichment through the exploit­
ation of official position. Skilled workers have no opportunity 
to benefit directly from this form of corruption, unlike executive 
staff in the state administration who come into direct contact 
with the public. They do, on the other hand, suffer directly
1. See Guy Pfefferman, Industrial Labour in the Republic of 
Senegal, (New York: Praeger, 1968).
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from corrupt practices on the part of the politico-administrative 
elite. Mention has already been made in previous chapters of a 
number of examples of this; how, for example, the skilled rail­
way workers frequently attribute the Railway’s failure to make 
a profit, and their own consequent failure to gain wage increases, 
to the corrupt practices of senior executives. It is widely sus­
pected that Railway finances are embezzled, and that traffic is 
reduced by administrative staff demanding bribes from would-be 
buyers of freight space. This latter form of corruption was 
held to be responsible for the increasing use of road, rather 
than rail, transport, by timber contractors in 1970-71. Perhaps 
the most sordid example of the directly pernicious effects of 
top-level corruption on the working-conditions of the lower-paid 
was provided by the background to the strike of Accra-Tema san­
itary workers in June 1971. The Accra-Tema City Council claimed 
that it simply did not have the money to provide its sanitary 
workers with the boots, gloves, and other clothing they were 
requesting, and to which they were officially entitled. Enquiries
by a national newspaper revealed that the Council’s pay roll
1included some 1,800 ’’ghost” employees. In other words, the 
money supposedly being paid out to these non-existent employees 
was in fact being misappropriated by Council officials. This 
clearly constituted fraud on an immense scale, and readily acc­
ounted for the Council's financial inability to provide its real 
employees with clothing essential to the hygienic performance of 
their work.
It might be argued that a great deal of the money 
extracted and embezzled in such ways is eventually redistributed 
back to the lower income group through elite hospitality, exten­
ded family ties, or other social networks. This question will be
1. See the Spectator, 19th June 1971, p.l.
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examined at greater length in the final section of this chapter. 
It is worth remarking here, however, that the skilled workers of 
Sekondi-Takoradi certainly do not think of corruption operating 
in this way. It ia sorely resented. Indeed, if corruption were 
not fairly widely resented in Ghana, it is difficult to under­
stand why newly ensconced regimes should attempt to court popular 
favour by initiating investigations into the corrupt practices 
of their predecessors. What distinguishes the unionised workers, 
and especially those of Sekondi-Takoradi, is perhaps less their 
resentment of corruption than their lack of resignation to it, 
their feeling that something can, and should, be done to check 
it. This feeling derives largely, no doubt, from their own 
relative success in checking corrupt practices within the pol­
itical sub-community of the Railway Union. Hence their enthus­
iasm for Bentum's attempt to develop a similar role for the 
labour movement on a national scale, acting as the "eyes and 
ears of society".
The Middle Glass and Mobility.
The pattern of post-Independence development in Ghana 
has, then, resulted in the progressive emergence of very real 
and serious sources of conflict between the skilled worker class 
and the governing elite. In protesting the inefficiency, cor£ 
ruption, and excessive wealth of this elite, it is readily 
understandable that they have conceived themselves as the spokes­
men of the poor, common people. Such a self-identification 
reflects awareness of their minority position as an occupational 
group, and the consequent need to rationalise their claim to a 
major political voice in national decision-making by projecting 
themselves as the representatives of a wider,mass constituency.
In actuality, the radicalism which characterises the skilled
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workers* view of the prevailing socio-economic order is perhaps
atypical rather than strictly representative of the attitudes of 
other sections of the 1 common people*. Certainly, it is more 
articulate and openly asserted. But this self-image does at least 
correspond far more closely to their objective position in the 
socio-economic structure than does their depiction as a labour 
aristocracy. This latter view retains what little currency it 
still has in Ghana primarily as a stratagem of governing elites 
to foster division in the ranks of the poor and divert attention 
from the major discontinuities in the ladder of economic strat­
ification.
Nevertheless, one might properly asks Is not this 
picture of a society sharply divided into elite and masses quite 
as over-simplified as that presented by Saul and Arrighi? Surely, 
the pattern of stratification is more complex, the ladder of 
stratification more continuous than this suggests. To what degree 
does the existence of a sizeable middle stratum between elite 
and masses, and the persistence of a relatively open society 
with extended family and other ties between the different strata, 
inhibit the development of conscious class antagonisms?
Some of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers interviewed by 
this author, generally the more educated and articulate amongst 
them, differentiated the social order in terms of **those big men'1, 
"comfortable people'*, and "us poor", rather than a simple mass- 
elite division. The existence of a fairly distinct middle class 
was recognised, but the skilled workers did not consider them­
selves members of it. This is a different view from that gen­
erally taken by Ghanaian governments which have rather persisted 
in including the skilled workers, though not the unskilled, in 
the category of wage-earners eligible for additional taxation 
in the form of Compulsory Savings, for instance, or the National 
Development Levy. Similarly, the 1960 Survey of High Level Man­
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power distinguished three main strata in Ghanaian urban society: 
a top-level elite of professionals, senior civil servants, 
managers (and of course politicians), constituting some 4 per 
cent of the total national labour force; a middle class of clerks, 
traders, miners, transport workers and other skilled workers con­
stituting 16 per cent; and an unskilled category, including petty
traders, accounting for 20 per cent of the total national labour 
1
force. But this categorisation is quite misleading as to the 
sharpest discontinuities in prevailing income levels. The dif­
ference between skilled and unskilled workers1 incomes is far 
less great, in proportionate as well as absolute terms, as that 
between skilled workers and the middle strata of medium-scale 
businessmen and middle-ranking executives. Recognising this,
Kodwo Ewusi suggests the following categorisation of income 
classes:
Table 8.4 : Distribution of Income by Classes.____________________
Glass % of Employment % of Income Earned
Lower (N01-1,200) 89.5 63.4
Lower Middle (N01,200-2,400) 7.9 20.6
Upper Middle (N02,400-6,000) 2.0 10.8
Upper (Nj£6,000 and above) 0.3 5.2
Source: K. Ewusi, op.cit., p.55.
The figure of N$l,200 seems rather high for the upper limit of 
the lower income class, which this writer, following the defin­
ition of a *worker1 suggested by most trade unionists interviewed, 
would set at around N#800. In any case, only 8.6 per cent of 
the 89.5 per cent of wage-earners included by Ewusi in this
1. Survey of High-Level Manpower in Ghana (1960), (Accra: 
Government Printer, 1961).
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category earned between N$800 and N01,2OO. The Upper Middle 
Class might properly be included with the Upper Class in the 
Elite. We then have: a Lower Class of 81 per cent of wage-earners 
at the upper limit of which are situated the most senior of 
skilled workers; a Middle Class of 16.5 per cent of wage-earners, 
earning between N08OO and N02,4OO per year; and an Elite of 
2.3 per cent receiving more than N02,4OO per year. The advantage 
of this classification is that it not only corresponds to the 
sharpest and clearest discontinuities in the national wage and 
salary structure, but also to the increasingly apparent dif­
ferences in life-style, consumption patterns, and social habits 
between these three classes. Whereas the skilled worker’s income, 
even if twice as high as that of the unskilled worker, barely 
enables him to subsist on basic home-produced foodstuffs, the 
incomes of this middle class are sufficient to support a far 
more comfortable and westernized style of living, entailing the 
regular consumption of certain imported foodstuffs, beer rather 
than 'akpoteshie* (the locally produced gin), and the possibility 
of affording secondary school or even university education for 
one's children. The question of cultural differences and social 
distance between classes will receive more detailed consider­
ation in the following section. But, here, it is important to 
emphasise the close relationship between education and mobility 
opportunities in Ghana, and the impact of differential access 
to educational opportunities on the formation of classes on an 
inter-generational basis.
If Ghana at Independence was a relatively open society, 
plentiful in opportunities for individual and inter-generational 
mobility, it has rapidly become relatively closed. Such oppor­
tunities as earlier existed lay mainly in the field of govern­
ment employment, private business openings (on any large scale) 
being relatively limited. A declining economy, combined with 
the over-staffing of the bureaucracy and state enterprises under
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the C.P.P. regime, has resulted in a sharp contraction of 
employment openings at all levels.  ^In this context, the in­
troduction of higher and more rigid educational qualifications 
for employment in the clerical-executive branch of the civil 
service, together with the abolition of free secondary school 
education,might properly be interpreted as an attempt by the 
elite and middle class to consolidate their position on an inter- 
generational basis in the face of a serious decline in the num­
ber of higher positions available. Certainly, this has severely 
reduced the chances of sons of lower-paid workers entering the 
ranks of the elite or even the middle class. One indication that
this reality is widely recognised is provided by a finding of
2Margaret Peilfs Survey. Nearly all factory workers aspired 
that their children might in turn become factory workers, pref­
erably in the skilled category. Very few could seriously 
entertain any hope of their children becoming "professionals” 
or even "clerical staff". Recognition of this reality was most 
pronounced, as one might expect, in Sekondi-Takoradi, the city 
which has experienced economic decline and the subsequent con­
traction of job openings in most severe form over the past dec­
ade. Only 3 per cent of Takoradi parents expressed the desire 
that their sons become professionals, compared to 22 per cent 
of Kumasi parents.
The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Stratification.
In Sekondi-Takoradi at least, these three main income 
groups tend increasingly to lead distinctive styles of social 
life and to mix predominantly with friends drawn from members
1. On the subject of "overstaffing" under the G.P.P. regime, 
see Douglas Rimmer, "The Crisis in the Ghanaian Economy", 
in The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.4, No. 1, 
(1966), pp.17-32.
2. See M. Peil, op.cit., p.Ill,
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of their own class. The elite generally keep 'closed* houses 
in secluded suburbs of the city, travel always by car rather 
than by public transport, and consume imported European food­
stuffs in the main. Their social life consists largely of 
having friends round to dinner. If they go out to eat and drink, 
it is invariably to a club or to the local plush hotel, the 
'Atlantic1, inhabited almost entirely by white expatriates and 
other members of the native elite. The middle class are more 
inclined to consume traditional foods and maintain the tradit­
ional values of sociability and keeping an open house. They 
generally live in closer contact to the urban poor, in the 
smarter central residential areas. But they nevertheless lead 
distinctly more comfortable, in-door, and westernized lives than 
the mass of urban residents. If they go out drinking, it is to 
a beer-bar, where the music is quiet and the atmosphere "cool" 
in the local parlance, and most of the clientele are smartly 
dressed. Some do still drink akpoteshie occasionally, but this 
is very much 'on the quiet*. Very few would ever admit to fre­
quenting akpoteshie bars which they regard as rowdy and vulgar. 
For the urban poor, their house, or more commonly their single 
room, serves as little more than a bedroom. Life is led almost 
entirely out of doors, strolling the streets, or sitting talking 
with friends on street corners. They generally drink in the 
akpoteshie bars which consist of little more than a small shack, 
or occasionally in one of the dancing bars where both beer and 
akpoteshie are sold.
This differentiation of various types of hostelry, 
catering for different social classes is a far more significant 
phenomenon than the work of most sociologists suggests. Drinking 
with friends is a major social activity in Ghana, and the dif­
ferent types of bar present a highly visible indication of social
J
323
class barriers. The position of the skilled workers in this 
class structure is vividly illustrated by their social drink­
ing habits. Unless they are single men, the skilled workers 
cannot possibly afford to drink in beer-bars regularly. The 
Household Budget Survey of 1955 discovered that few workers 
spent more than 5 per cent of their income on drinking and 
tobacco - in other words, approximately N#2-3 as at 1971 if 
this proportion was maintained. This figure is probably an 
understatement. But still the average skilled worker could 
not possibly afford to buy many bottles of beer at N0O.5O per 
bottle. Akpoteshie, in contrast, costs N0O.15 per large glass, 
enough for a whole evening for most people. On most evenings, 
therefore, the skilled workers meet with friends in akpoteshie 
bars, where the conversation often turns to the great drinking 
exploits of Pobee Biney and other cultural heroes. Yet many of 
these same workers do attempt to save a couple of Cedis a month 
in order to spend at least one evening in a beer-bar with the 
more esteemed amongst their friends or possibly with middle class 
relatives. There is a certain ambivalence, therefore, in the 
skilled workers' cultural orientation, corresponding to their 
socio-economic position on the threshold of the middle class 
world.
It has become a commonplace of the literature on social
stratification in Africa that the persistence of the extended
family and its network of obligations has inhibited the process
of class formation by maintaining regular contact and patronage
ties between members of the elite and relatives among the lower 
2
social strata. In the case of Sekondi-Takoradi at least, such
1. Sekondi-Takoradi Survey of Population and Household Budgets 
(1955), (Aceras Office of the Government Statistician. 1955).
2. See, for example, P.C.Lloyd, Glasses, Crises, and Coups, 
(London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1971), pp. 101 and 135; W.B.Schwab, 
"Social Stratification in Gwelo", in A. Southall (ed.),
Social Change in Modern Africa, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1961;, pp.126-44: and,in the same volume, 
J.E.Goldthorpe, "Educated Africans", pp.145-58.
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a formulation is quite misleading as to the nature and regul­
arity of contact between the majority of workers and members 
of the elite. It is certainly true that most workers still 
attribute great importance to extended family ties and part­
icipation in family events, especially funerals. But such 
family activities take up only a very small proportion of their 
leisure time, most of which is spent with friends of roughly 
similar socio-economic position. In any case, very few Ttforkers 
are at all closely related to members of the elite, and those 
extended family ties which are most regularly maintained tend 
to be those between members of similar educational and socio­
economic status. The principle of reciprocity, of being able 
(or expecting one day to be able) to return equivalent favours 
to those received, operates as a restricting factor on both 
Ghanaian friendships and, increasingly, extended family relation­
ships. Many of the workers interviewed by the author who claimed 
to be related to "big men" said that they would be far too embar­
rassed ever to ask such a relative to loan them money or find 
them a job because they knew they could do no similar favour in 
return. Some said they could not even consider visiting such 
relatives since they knew they would be thinking that the pur­
pose of the visit was to beg a favour. It is a commonplace of 
akpoteshie bar conversation, as distinct from the sociological 
literature, that members of the elite display unmistakable 
snobbery, unsociability, and annoyance with the theoretical 
obligations of the extended family when visited by lower strata 
relatives. As one railway worker put it;
"What? A rich man give money to his poor 
relatives? A rich man only knows his parents.
It makes little difference whether they are 
relatives or not, he soon forgets his poor 
cousins and friends. They do not even give...
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".. 20 pesewas to the very poor. Have you 
ever seen a wealthy man stop his Mercedes 
to get out and dash (give money to) a poor 
man. Not at all. It is rather we workers who 
have to look after our jobless brothers and 
friends. The rich men are too selfish." 1
Participation in voluntary associations is of interest 
here as providing, in theory at least, arenas of regular mass- 
elite contact and communication. More particularly, ethnic 
associations might be seen as fostering the perpetuation of 
tribal divisions which cross-cut, and thereby inhibit awareness 
of, class-type divisions. Yet associational life in Sekondi- 
Takoradi is extremely sparse. At one time, apparently, it was 
more vigorous. Busia informs us of the popularity of tribal 
associations in the city in 1949-50, and emphasises their import-
2ance in providing mutual assistance and arbitration in disputes. 
But, by 1971, only one ethnic association was to be found in 
active existence, that of the Ashantis, the "Asante Mmoa Kuo". 
There are two possible reasons for this. It seems probable that 
those described by Busia, or many of them, were the tribal youth 
associations inspired and organised by G.P.P. enthusiasts for the 
purpose of electoral mobilisation, and, as this purpose became 
obsolete, they withered away along with the rest of C.P.P. grass­
roots organisation. But, in addition, those of independent origin 
and purpose appear to have mostly collapsed during the past two 
decades owing to problems of efficient administration and finan­
cial trustworthiness (and, in particular, to the tendency of
3
financial secretaries to run off with the subscriptions).
1. Interview with B. Maurice, 13th August 1971.
2. K. A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, 
(London; Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1950), pp.74-75.
3. Interview with S. Biney, Community Development Officer for 
Sekondi-Takoradi District, 10th June 1971.
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Common tribal origin has, proved no reliable basis for mutual 
trust. A few small, multi-tribal mutual help associations, 
generally organised on a neighbourhood basis, are still in 
operation. But most inhabitants of Sekondi-Takoradi now prefer 
to participate in very small, informal mutual-aid groups, con­
sisting of no more than ten members, who are usually from the
same home-town or village and know each other extremely well.
1
They are also usually of similar class position.
Tribal division are not embodied in the form of large 
mass organisations, therefore, and, although common home-town 
origin tends to make for a special degree of mutual trust, ethnic 
differences constitute no obstacle to friendship as such. Sim­
ilarly, the residential pattern is characterised by a remarkable 
lack of ethnic prejudice or tribal conglomerations. The majority 
of southerner Ghanaians are scattered throughout the city on a 
socio-economic basis, and, to some degree, by considerations of 
proximity to the place of work, rather than concentrated in 
tribal sub-communities. This is partly to be explained by the 
history of property development in the city and the factors 
governing accommodation allocation. The Railway Administration 
and National Housing Corporation have generally allocated their 
houses on a non-tribal basis, and the City Council has similarly 
distributed land for development. This has been facilitated by 
the fact that, as the city grew, the local Ahantas were rapidly 
outnumbered by incoming Fantis, and, since the establishment of 
the Municipal Council in 1921 (to become the City Council in
1954), have never really succeeded in dominating the Council or
2other local institutions. In consequence, the main neighbour-
1. For example, the three groups with which the writer became 
familiar consisted of: (a) a bank manager, a car importer, 
an assistant headmaster, a police lawyer, and two sisters 
who owned a bar and lodging-house (Ga); (b) two school­
teachers, a naval officer, a cloth-seller, and two clerks 
(Ashanti); and (c) three skilled workers, a taxi driver,
a technical school teacher, and two seamstresses (Fanti).
2. F.N.Arko, **A History of the Sekondi Town Council1*, (M.A. 
thesis, Legon, 1970); and interviews with five ex-councillora
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hoods rapidly became multi-tribal, and newcomers simply took 
itfhatever accommodation they could find and afford rather than 
heading for particular* clusterings of co-ethnics. But, in any 
case, ever since the early decades of this century Sekondi- 
Takoradi has bean characterised, according to observers, by a 
distinctly cosmopolitan ethos. As the country's major sea-port, 
its inhabitants quickly grew accustomed, and came to look forward 
(largely no doubt for financial reasons) to the regular visits 
of foreign seamen. In addition, one might give some credit for 
the development of this ethos to the railway workers and their 
attempts to organise, from the first, on a strictly non-tribal 
basis (though, obviously, the relationship between their collect­
ive industrial experience and the social pattern of the wider 
community was one of two-way influence).
There are two minor exceptions to this pattern. The 
Ewe people from the Volta Region of Ghana have tended to cluster 
in a small area along the coast road between Sekondi and Takoradi, 
and other citizens frequently accuse them of displaying favour­
itism to co-ethnics in job recruitment and promotion wherever 
they have the opportunity. But the Ewes comprised only a very 
small proportion of the total city population, certainly no more 
than 4 per cent (or 6,000 out of 161,000), by 1971. Secondly, 
the northerners and non-Ghanaians still tend to live together 
in the "zongo" areas (i.e. the stranger communities), one being 
situated on the northern outskirt of the central residential 
area of Sekondi, the other out at the suburban village of 
Kwesi-Mintsim, to the north of Takoradi. Here, a modified version 
of the traditional northerner community structure persists, with 
headmen, and, above them, a zeriakin (or "supreme chief") settl­
ing disputes and organising communal activities. Although very
1. Interview with Joseph Ansah, 75 year old resident of
Sekondi, 14th June 1971.
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considerable economic differentiation characterises the north­
erners, some of them being wealthy butchers and traders, others 
unskilled labourers, this does not find expression in perceptible 
differences in style of living. Instances of northerners living 
in other, non-zongo, areas of the city were found to be virtually 
non-existent. Even the most eminent northerner in the city, the 
Regional Government's Publicity and Liaison Officer, a highly 
educated and sophisticated man, lived in a simple two-roomed 
house in Sekondi zongo. Elsewhere, he pointed out in explanation,
it would prove impossible for him to maintain observance of the
1
Moslem religion and the life style it dictates. Also, he 
claimed to gain more satisfaction from assisting his (mostly 
illiterate) fellow Moslems to cope with the problems of city 
life than he could possibly obtain from setting himself off as 
a member of the elite. In effect, he and other eminent north­
erners act as 'brokers' on behalf of the 2ongo community, inter­
mediaries between its culturally disadvantaged, semi-encapsulated, 
citizenry and the local government bureaucracy.
It would be misleading, however, to over-emphasise
the degree of northerner encapsulation, or to identify this with
social conflict. The zongo areas are geographically integrated
with the rest of the city and perfectly open to non-northerner
visitors. Southerners often attend their cultural festivities,
such as wrestling competitions and the visits of prominent
Moslem preachers, and the northerners in turn are enthusiastic
supporters of the local football teams. Many cases of close
friendship, and even rmrriage, between young northerners and
2southerners were encountered. Moreover, with the departure of
1. Interview with J. Y. Abdulai, 20th September 1971.
2. Margaret Peil provides evidence to suggest that the rate
of inter-ethnic marriage is considerably higher in Sekondi- 
Takoradi than in other Ghanaian cities. See M. Peil, op.cit., 
p. 192.
329
many non-Ghanaians, in consequence or anticipation of the 
Aliens Compliance Ordinance of June 1970, large numbers of 
young southerners, mostly unemployed, have moved into the 
cheap accommodation to be found in KwesifMintsim zongo. Many 
of these make a living from petty theft or prostitution and 
pimping, operating in 'rings' frequently composed of south­
erners and northerners together. In other words, one finds 
in Kwesi-Mintsim the development of a multi-tribal criminal 
lumpen-proletariat. This is the reality behind middle class 
allegations of northerner responsibility for the increasing 
rate of crime in the city, allegations which the skilled work­
ers, being more in touch with this reality, are far less in­
clined to make. The growing incidence of crimes against prop­
erty is rather seen by skilled workers as the understandable 
product of elite irresponsibility and uncharitability.
The only form of associational life in which any sub­
stantial proportion of the Sekondi-Takoradi populace participates 
is provided by the various churches. These are certainly class­
less in the sense that people from all social strata are gen­
erally to be found amongst their membership. And the older 
'historic* churches, such as the Roman Catholic, Methodist, and 
Presbyterian churches, tend rather to be differentiated along 
ethnic lines, having originally established themselves in dif­
ferent regional areas. But even here the growth of class- 
consciousness is to be observed as a contributory factor in the 
drift of many lower strata members away from the 'historic* to 
the 'spiritualist' churches. The Apostolic Church and the
Musama Disco Christo Church, in particular, have large and
1rapidly expanding congregations in Sekondi-Takoradi. A large
1. This assertion is based on interviews with church leaders, 
and the (perhaps more reliable) evidence that both of these 
sects were in the process of constructing large new churches 
in Sekondi in 1971. Information on the origins and beliefs 
of these churches is provided in C. G. Baeta, Prophetism 
in Ghana, (London: SCM Press, 1962).
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part of their appeal would seem to lie in the 'healing* services 
they claim to provide, and in the preference of many lower strata 
Ghanaians, especially women, for their more traditional musical 
style. But, in addition, there is a clear difference in the 
social composition and ethos of the two types of church. The 
more brotherly, less status conscious, atmosphere of the spirit­
ualist churches constitutes an important attraction for many 
nex-7 recruits. A railway worker who had recently joined the 
Apostolic Church put it this way:
"The most obvious difference between us and the 
Methodist Church is that they don't do the 
clapping and joyful singing the way we do.
There's a difference in ways of worshipping God.
We observe God's instruction in the Bible, that 
if you want to worship Him, it's best to do so by 
clapping of hands and joining together in brotherly, 
happy singing. But also we don't believe in looking 
up to rich men. I mean, in that Methodist Church, 
all the men wear suits to services and all the 
women kente cloth. They'll tell you to go home if 
you go in wearing clothes like these (working 
clothes). Well, if I don't own a suit, how can 
I go to worship there? And they're really very 
pompous, those people. The wealthiest or most 
important amongst them expect to be given the 
official positions in the church. And when they're 
collecting money for Thanksgiving or at Harvest 
time, for instance, they say, 'You should pay so 
much because you're a lawyer, and you should pay 
so much because you're a worker*. And you have to 
pay even if you can't afford it. And then the 
wealthy ones will embarrass you by shouting, 'I 
can afford to pay more than the 5 Cedis you said, 
here's 10 Cedis'. And then another one shouts 
'Here's 15 Cedis'.
"It's not that we don't have wealthy men in our 
Church. We have an army officer at our church in 
Accra, I'm told. And we have some very big col­
lections. Two months ago, we collected Nf£260 for 
an outdooring. But we just pay how much we want 
to. It all comes out of the heart. It's voluntary 
and therefore better in the sight of God. And...
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"wealthy people are not the officials in our 
church, rather the older, wiser men. We all 
mix together, and your dress doesn't make 
any difference. That's why a lot of people 
are coming to join our Church from the 
Methodists and Presbyterians." 1
Conclusion.
Post-Independence development in Ghana has resulted 
in a large proportionate increase in the share of national wealth 
going to the top-level elite, and a considerable expansion in 
size of the "comfortable" middle class of medium scale business­
men, large cocoa farmers, and middle-ranking civil servants; 
but the proletariat of skilled and unskilled manual workers has 
suffered relative impoverishment of a degree which has wiped out 
any significant difference between their own and average rural 
incomes. These three income groups increasingly approximate to 
classes in the strict sociological sense of the term. Children 
of the lower income group are severely disadvantaged in terms 
of life chances, or mobility opportunities, relative to those 
of the elite and middle class. And each class tends to lead a 
distinct style of life and mix (at all regularly) only with 
people of roughly similar economic and educational status. The 
theoretical obligations of the extended family are increasingly 
ineffective in serving to maintain regular contact between 
members of different classes.
.Of course, this class differentiation is not complete 
or absolute. It would also appear to be much less pronounced in 
Kumasi, where commerce provides the main form of employment and 
the gradation of income levels is far more continuous, than in 
Sekondi-Takoradi or Tema, where a majority of the population is
1. Interview with J. Blankson, 3rd July 1971.
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employed in wage and salary earning in industry and the state 
bureaucracy* But, in Sekondi-Takoradi, at least, class dif­
ferences and barriers have developed in a highly visible form 
and they are not significantly cross-cut by ethnic or other 
types of division. If social barriers are less rigid than in 
England, for instance, they are all the more resented for being 
of such recent origin and little traditional legitimacy. Also, 
the difference in living standards between the elite and the 
lower class is even more extreme.
The level of urban unemployment has risen rapidly 
since 1966. Official figures are notoriously inaccurate, but 
most observers estimate that something like 20 per cent of the
1
adult male labour force is unemployed or seriously under-employed. 
The skilled workers are, of course, relatively privileged com­
pared to this group, but only in this sense are they a labour 
aristocracy, and even this is the aristocracy of "noblesse 
oblige" to care for dependants rather than luxurious consumption. 
Their economic and social distance from the middle class is con­
siderable, being able to afford only occasional forays into the 
"smart clothes, beer-bar" world of the latter. If their position 
on the extreme threshold of the middle class Induces a certain 
ambivalence in their aspirations and cultural orientation, this 
only serves to increase the militancy of their pressure for a 
radical redistribution of national wealth. Glimpses of a more 
comfortable world exacerbate their discontent at being forced 
even further down into the ranks of the urban poor.
Economically, then, the skilled workers are in an 
intermediate position between the poorest sections of society, 
on the one hand, and the elite and middle class, on the other. : 
Their awareness of this situation is reflected in the claim to 
act as the "spokesmen of the people". But this self-image also
1. See Keith Hart, "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban
Employment in Ghana", in the Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Vol II, No. 1, (1973) pp.61-89; and John Weeks, "An Exploration 
into the Problem of Urban Imbalance in Africa", in Manpower 
and Unemployment Research in Africa. Vol. 6 , No. 2, (1973)",pp.9-37.
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reflects awareness of their singular position in the structure 
of power in Ghanaian society. Before proceeding to a consider­
ation of this question, it is worth making one further point 
here. The relationship between objective economic position, 
or even class formation in the sociological sense, and class 
action is by no means so simple as some writers suggest. 
Deterioration in the economic situation of a group tends to 
have the double-edged effect of increasing its susceptibility 
to division, and perhaps its political bewilderment, at the 
same time as exacerbating discontent with the prevailing order. 
Effective and united leadership, and the provision by that 
leadership of a persuasive, unifying ideology, are crucial to 
class action on the political level. Hence, in the absence of 
a united leadership in 1970-71, the railway workers were div­
ided in spite of their deteriorating position in an ever more 
visible and inequitable class structure.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE POWER OF THE RAILWAY WORKERS.
One of the most striking aspects of post-Independence 
politics in the African states is the relative ease with which 
the Masses*, at one time seen as involved in a populist surge 
toward greater participation, have in fact been effectively 
excluded from active political involvement. The chief exception 
to this tendency, in many states, has consisted in the staging 
of ’political1 strikes by unionised workers, especially railway 
workers. Elliot Berg and Jeffrey Butler might well be correct 
in suggesting that ’political' strikes have been the exception 
rather than the rule in both pre- and post-Independence Africa. 
Infrequent as they may have been, however, such political strikes 
as have occurred appear significant enough within this general 
context of popular passivity to merit serious consideration.
This they have not received with few exceptions, and for two 
main reasons. Firstly, there is the tendency of Berg & Butler 
and several other commentators to treat of trade unionism in 
Africa at a high (arguably too high) level of generality. This 
naturally leads to a focussing of attention on the organisational 
weaknesses and narrowly economic orientation of the majority of 
unions. Secondly, as was earlier remarked, many writers do not
1. Berg and Butler, op.cit., p.350.
2. Another commentary which, although highly perceptive in 
parts, might be criticised on these grounds is that of 
Michael F. Lofchie and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., "The Political 
status of African Trade Unions", in W. A. Beling (ed.),
The Role of Labor in African Nation-Building, (New York: 
Praeger, 1968), pp.130-62.
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consider the unionised workers as part of the Masses*, prop­
erly speaking, but rather a sub-section of the middle-class, 
fundamentally allied with the political elite. Saul and Arrighi, 
following Fanon, regard instances of labour opposition to ruling
regimes as mere "reformist opportunism", which the peasantry
1
rightly view with cynicism.. Considering rural political 
passivity to be a temporary phenomenon, they look forward to 
the development of truly revolutionary peasant-based movements. 
Other x^riters would no doubt wish to avoid association with any 
such speculation but are generally equally sceptical as to the 
political potential and orientation of (any group of) unionised 
workers.
There are a number of reasons for considering this 
formulation seriously misjudged. Firstly, in the case of Ghana, 
as more generally, there would appear to be little justification 
for the assumption, central to the whole labour aristocracy 
thesis, of the independent revolutionary potential of the •peas­
antry* . In the light of historical experience, this idea must 
appear sociologically and politically naive in the extreme. 
Instances of active peasant participation in revolutions, which 
have not also and primarily been nationalist revolutions, are 
extremely rare. In those few instances to which one might point, 
it is apparent that the leadership has generally been provided 
by other groups (urban activists), and that only certain sections, 
communal or economic, of the peasantry have participated at all 
actively. The reasons for this have been outlined by Eric Wolf 
with admirable lucidity:
1. Frantz Fanon, op.cit., p.98.
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nThe peasant is especially handicapped in passing 
from passive recognition of wrongs to political 
participation as a means of setting them right.
First, a peasant’s work is most often done alone, 
on his own land, than in conjunction with his 
fellows. Moreover, all peasants are to some extent 
competitors for available resources within the 
community as well as for sources of credit from 
without. Second, the tyranny of work weighs heavily 
upon a peasant: his life is geared to an annual 
routine and to planning for the year to come. 
Momentary alterations of routine threaten his 
ability to take up the routine later. Third, con­
trol of land enables him more often than not to 
retreat into subsistence production should adverse 
conditions affect his market crop. Fourth, ties of 
extended kinship and mutual aid within the com­
munity may cushion the shocks of dislocation.
Fifth, peasant interests - especially among poor 
peasants - often cross-cut class alignments. Rich 
and poor peasants may be kinfolk, or a peasant may 
at the same time be owner, renter, sharecropper, 
laborer for his neighbours, and seasonal hand on a 
nearby plantation. Each different involvement 
aligns him differently with his fellows and with 
the outside world. Finally, past exclusion of the 
peasant from participation in decision-making 
beyond the bamboo hedge of his village deprives 
him all too often of the knowledge needed to 
articulate his interests with appropriate forms 
of action. Hence, peasants are often merely passive 
spectators of political struggles or long for the 
sudden advent of a millenium, without specifying 
for themselves and their neighbours the many rungs 
on the staircase to heaven.'1 1
In addition, one has to take into account the generally weak 
power position of peasants relative to the suppressive forces 
of the landlord class and/or the officials of the state machine.
This is of course a somewhat extreme statement of the 
obstacles to peasant rebellion, and Wolf qualifies it by noting
1 . Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1971), pp.289-90.
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that the 'tactical mobility' possessed by 'middle peasants* 
does sometimes enable them to engage in effective oppositional 
movements.  ^ But this raises another consideration. Who do 
Saul and Arrighi wish to signify by 'the peasantry'? An undif­
ferentiated concept of peasantry clearly will not do for the 
case of Ghana. Evidence was presented in the previous chapter 
to indicate the very considerable differences in size and wealth 
of farmers both within the main cocoa-growing areas and between 
the different regions. Of these two dimensions of differentiation, 
the first is probably least important as an obstacle to concerted 
rural opposition, (though it does of course raise doubts as to 
whether such opposition can appropriately be described as 'class- 
conflict'). Both wealthy and relatively poor farmers within a 
particular locality are likely to unite in defence of communal 
economic interests whatever the differences between them. It 
would appear that even the hired agricultural labourers, working 
on the cocoa-farms of Ashanti and Brong/Ahafo, have exhibited 
little inclination or ability to organise in pressing demands 
against their farmer-employers. This is partly, no doubt, because, 
mostly illiterate, and widely scattered on numerous farms, they
have been unable to develop the efficient communications network
2
essential to effective organisation. But it is also due to 
the nature of their relations with employers. These are generally 
personalised, 'patron-client' rather than impersonal 'employer- 
employee* types of relationship, and the so-called 'hired'
1. Ibid., p.293.
2, The institution of the Agricultural Workers' Union in
1958 did little to alter this situation since, in spite
of the Union's large nominal membership (over 300,000 in 
1961), genuine participation was limited to technical and 
clerical workers in the government's Agricultural Research 
Department. Personal correspondence with Benjamin Bentum, 
14th August 1973.
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labourers are often working for the right of usufruct over 
part of the land they clear, or for a third share of the crop 
they cultivate, rather than simply for wage-payment. This is 
not to say that farmer-labourer relations on the large cocoa- 
farms have been entirely free from friction. During the 1937-38 
cocoa hold-up, for example, many labourers, resentful at the 
failure of their employers to pay them on time, or in full, for 
their season's work, 'stole* part of their employers' cocoa and 
sold it to the expatriate buying firms, thus unwittingly con­
niving in the attempt to break the cocoa-farmers' united front.  ^
But there do not seem to have been any similar instances of 
wide-scale farmer-labourer conflict in the post-Independence 
period.
Horizontal cleavages between the farmers of different 
regions of Ghana impose more serious limits on the extent to 
which concerted 'peasant' opposition can be expected to mater­
ialise. In consequence of the uneven spread of cocoa-production, 
the majority of farmers in the Western Region, for example, do 
not share the dominant economic interest of the Ashanti producers 
in the level of the cocoa-price. Their primary relationship is 
one of conflict over the regional distribution of rural develop­
ment finance. Such regional jealousies and communal sentiments 
can, moreover, undermine the solidarity of cocoa-producers located 
in different areas of the country, as they have indeed done in 
the past. Before turning to a consideration of cocoa-farmer 
politics, however, it is worth remarking on the marked political 
passivity displayed by the generally poor, small-scale cultiv­
ators of the non-cocoa-growing areas. With the partial exception 
of essentially communalistic movements, such as the support pro­
vided the Northern People's Party in 1954-56 and the secessionist 
movement among Ewe farmers in the Volta Region, these small
1 . This analysis is based on evidence presented in 
A. B Holmes IV, op.cit., pp.49-53.
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farmers have presented no overt or organised opposition to
post-Independence ruling elites. Even where a pool of outside
(but locally-connected) leadership has been available, as in
the case of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers and the farmers of the
Central and Western Regions, support for such leadership has not
1
been forthcoming. Part of the explanation for this, perhaps,
is that, being relatively poor and lying outside the aegis of state
or state-sponsored buying organisations, they have suffered less
in the way of direct governmental exploitation. Wolf might also
have a point in suggesting that 'small peasantry', if threatened
by governmental expropriation of their surplus produce, can more
2
easily retreat into subsistence cultivation. But, in addition, 
Marx's emphasis on the geographical dispersal of the peasantry 
is certainly relevant here:
"In so far as there is merely a loose inter­
connection among these small peasants, and 
the identity of their interests begets no 
unity and no political organisation, they do 
not form a class." 3
This is, however, too simple an assessment for unqual­
ified application to the Ghanaian cocoa-farmers. In spite of the 
very considerable income differences between them, the cocoa- 
farmers do constitute a form of class, even if this is not 
nation-wide. They not only occupy essentially the same position
1. Most of the Sekondi-Takoradi lower-paid workers retain 
strong links with their home-towns and villages, visiting 
relatives there approximately once a month on average.
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that no organised 
support for the strikes of 1961 and 1971 appears to have 
materialised from beyond the boundaries of Sekondi- 
Takoradi itself. This question awaits further research.
2. Wolf, op.cit., p.291.
3, Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 
(New York: International Publishers, 1932), p.19.
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in the structure of economic production and appropriation, but 
have proven themselves capable of creating autonomous political 
organisation for the protection of their (keenly appreciated) 
common interests. The contemporary weakness of such organisation 
relative to that of the railway workers is nevertheless strik­
ingly apparent.
The cocoa hold-ups of the 1930's well illustrate the 
requisites and limits of concerted independent political action 
on the part of Ghana's cocoa-farmers. Small, middle, and large 
producers all participated (most voluntarily, some through 
coercion), but the 'hold-ups' were organised and led by the 
wealthier farmers in conjunction with the chiefs (themselves 
often wealthy farmers). The chiefs were clearly in a tricky 
position, and generally avoided any open display or support for 
the hold-ups, projecting themselves (to the colonial authorities 
at least) as mediators between the farmers, on the one hand, and 
the expatriate companies and the government on the other. But, 
secretly, they lent their full support to the hold-ups in those 
areas in which the latter were effective, delegating their power 
to swear fetish oaths and arraign defaulters to the head-farmers 
in their districts in order to enforce general compliance. That 
the support and solidarity of the chiefs was crucial to united 
action was clearly revealed by the relative degrees of success 
of the various hold-ups. Those of 1931-32, and 1933-34, were 
effective only in a minority of localities. It was only with the 
restoration of the Ashanti Confederancy Council in 1935 and the 
forging of an alliance between this body and the Provincial 
Councils of the Colony, that it proved possible to enforce a 
nation-wide hold-up - that of 1937-38. ^
The alliance of middle and wealthy cocoa-farmers
1. This analysis is based on evidence presented in 
A. B. Holmes IV, op.cit,, pp.264-65.
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persisted into the early years of the C.P.P. regime, and became 
more overtly political. But it also began to split along regional 
lines. Under the C.P.P. regime no more than under the colonial 
regime did the large-scale farmers necessarily see themselves 
as allied with the governing elite. On the contrary, they, as 
much as the middle peasantry, had serious cause for grievance 
at the extortion of state officials and the level of taxation 
imposed on them in order to finance urban development projects. 
However, under the C.P.P. regime, those who would engage in 
oppositional activity had more reason to fear subsequent govern­
ment reprisals. In 1954-56, there appeared to be a good chance 
of displacing the C.P.P. regime and replacing it with a govern­
ment less inimical to their (and Ashanti) interests. This dis­
content (and optimism) furnished the main material basis of mass 
support for the National Liberation Movement (1954-56) which
succeeded in presenting a serious challenge to the C.P.P.’s
1
continuation in power. Yet the majority of cocoa farmers in 
the Colony ultimately determined not to support it in the 1956 
General Elections, thereby illustrating the persisting strength 
of communal divisions. According to Dennis Austin,
"As they (the southern farmers) listened to the 
propaganda coming out of the Ashanti capital, 
and saw the preparations being made for the 
extension of the party into the Colony, they 
saw the NLM not as the farmer's friend but 
as the spearhead of a new Ashanti invasion of 
the south." 2
With the failure of the NLM, the cocoa-farmers appear 
to have become more wary of engaging in oppositional activity. 
Certainly, the United Party's attempt to resuscitate the move­
ment in 1958-60 met with a far more limited response, and the
1. For further details, see D. Austin, op.cit., pp.250-316.
2. Ibid, p.344.
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understandable caution of chiefs and wealthy fanners may well
have been crucial here,  ^ With the subsequent detention of the
United Party leadership, and the smashing of its organisation,
the cocoa farmers proved unable to maintain or create any
independent organisation, however informal, to assert their
interests in concerted fashion. Essentially, this was due to
the tightness and ruthlessness of C.P.P. control, which involved
suppressing or co-opting any elements which might have been able
to organise and lead opposition - most notably, the farmer- 
2
chiefs. The period of C.P.P. tyranny had relatively permanent 
effects on the power of chieftaincy (which, having once been so 
thoroughly undermined, could not be expected ever to fully recover) 
and consequently on the ability of farmers to organise in pro­
tection of their interests.
Admittedly, this hypothesis was not seriously tested 
under the N.L.C. and Progress Party regimes, since relations 
between the farmers and the governing elite markedly improved.
It is oversimple to imagine that peasantry (wealthy, middle or 
poor) conceive their interests as being consistently at odds 
(or identified) with those of the politico-administrative elite. 
Under the N.L.C. and Progress Party regimes, many farmers, and 
especially those in the Ashanti and Brong/Ahafo Regions, benefited 
substantially from the Rural Development programme. Unlike the 
urban lower class, these farmers remained enthusiastic supporters 
of the P.P. Government right to the end, (though large-scale fraud 
on the part of government-sponsored cocoa-buying agents gave rise 
to rumblings of disillusionment even among the Ashanti farmers
1. Ibid., pp.384-95.
2. This assertion is based on evidence presented in Maxwell
Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, (London:
University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp.195-241; and
conversations with Richard Crook, who is at present 
preparing a thesis on Politics in the Offinso District 
of Ashanti.
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in late-1971).
In September 1971, the Sekondi-Takoradi strikers 
found themselves in a situation of direct (and consciously- 
perceived) conflict of interests with these cocoa-farmers.
It would be absurd to suggest that the cocoa-farmers thereby 
showed themselves to be fundamentally allied with the politico- 
administrative elite while the railway workers represented the 
forces of radicalism. It is unnecessary to reverse Saul and 
Arrighi's formulation in order to refute it. Both sides to this 
conflict consisted of mass groupings defined partly along class 
and partly communal lines. Instances of conflict between them 
can be expected to recur, since it is an obvious (though not 
necessarily wise) political strategy for ruling regimes to play 
off the most highly politicised section of the peasantry - the 
farmers of Ashanti and Brong/Ahafo - against the workers and urban 
masses of the southern coastal towns. One might simply point out 
that the Sekondi-Takoradi workers represent (in a Burkean sense 
at least) a mass grouping most of whose members are, if anything, 
poorer than the majority of the Ashanti and Brong/Ahafo farmers; 
that they would appear to have a broader and more coherent con­
ception of their reformist aims; and that they retain a strength 
of independent organisation (if not of electoral influence) which 
it is doubtful that the cocoa-farmers now possess.
Saul and Arrighi's blindness to the importance of 
organisation as a factor in political action is even more appar­
ent in their view of the unemployed and unskilled workers as the 
(potential) urban spearhead of a peasant-based revolutionary 
movement. In Ghana, as in other societies, the unskilled have 
generally depended on the skilled workers for organisation and 
leadership. The unemployed have proved unable to unite on any
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large scale in pursuit of the most basic of common interest. 
Lacking a common meeting-ground (apart, possibly, from the 
employment exchange), and characterised by intense competition 
among themselves for any source of sustenance, they have rather 
proved the most politically promiscuous of all socio-economic 
strata, in the African or any other political arena, constantly 
at the beck and call of the highest bidder. In those few in­
stances where they have been incorporated as active participants 
in revolutionary movements (e.g. in **Frelimo**), it is precisely 
the depth of organisation, led by others, which is remarkable 
and deserving of admiration.
Conversely, it is the railway workers* strength of 
organisation, independent and democratic, their ability to resist 
suppression, division, or control by ruling regimes, which acc­
ounts for their quite singular significance in the Ghanaian 
political arena. No other group which might in the vaguest sense 
be termed a section of the ’masses* has succeeded in maintaining 
its ability to protest government policies, and even threaten 
the stability of ruling regimes, to anything like the same degree. 
What are the main sources of the railway workers singular polit­
ical strength?
The Sources of Political Strength; Corporate Solidarity.
The power of the railway workers derives essentially 
from the strength of their corporate solidarity. Through united 
strike action they are able to exploit their strategic position 
in the national economy, disrupting the flow of imports and
1. This is not of course to deny that many unemployed display 
impressive skill and initiative in organising themselves 
on a small-scale for criminal or semi-criminal activities; 
or that such activities might be seen as carrying political 
implications.
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exports along the national transport system. This is an especially 
powerful weapon in a country such as Ghana, where a temporary 
halt in the flow of exports, and the consequent loss of much 
needed foreign exchange, can have disastrous repercussions for 
the economy as a whole* The power of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers 
has declined in this respect with the construction of a new and 
larger harbour at Accra-Tema and the failure, thus far, to co­
ordinate collective action between workers in the two cities, but 
it remains very considerable*
Corporate solidarity tends to be self-reinforcing. So 
long as they maintain their solidarity, the rank-and-file know 
that they are relatively secure from threats of victimisation or 
dismissal for participation in strike actions, and their leaders 
from intolerable periods of detention. (Strike leaders frequently 
have been detained, but they have always been able to rely on 
their successors in Union Office to exert pressure for their 
early release). In turn, this knowledge makes junior officials 
the more ready to step into the positions of leadership vacated 
by those arrested and so maintain the organisation essential to 
unity in the course of major strike actions.
This sense of corporate solidarity further enables the 
railway workers to maintain a quite exceptional degree of control 
over the election and behaviour of their officials. Where ruling 
regimes have sought to impose officials on the Union, or induce 
them to co-operate with the government against the wishes of the 
rank-and-file, they have generally succeeded only in the case of 
top-level officialdom, whose control over the membership and 
their middle-level representatives has consequently been tenuous 
in the extreme. Due largely to the (traditional) strength of 
the ethic of solidarity and accountability, and the vigour (and 
occasional violence) with which the rank-and-file have been
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accustomed to assert it, these middle-level representatives 
have proven remarkably resistant to 'buying-off* strategies 
on the part of government and top-level Union officialdom. ^
The railway workers' success in maintaining their 
unity has not been absolute. In 1970-71, in particular, they 
were deeply and critically divided. Amongst other factors, the 
very strength as a political force which the railway workers 
possess through their solidarity has led ruling regimes to make 
especially vigorous attempts to undermine it. Nevertheless, it 
is the relative strength of their sense of solidarity exerting 
a strong pressure to re-unification even in 1970-71 which des­
erves emphasis and causal analysis here.
(a) Common class interest.
In both narrower and wider senses of the term class, 
the railway workers have long possessed a keen awareness of 
common class interest. In the narrower sense with which this 
sub-section is concerned, this awareness derives from three 
main considerations. Firstly, all manual workers have shared 
a common interest in struggling to obtain concessions from gov­
ernment, since wage increases for unskilled workers have gener­
ally been accompanied by similar proportionate increases for 
skilled workers, and vice-versa. Secondly, such concessions 
have generally had to be forced from government by direct action, 
or the threat thereof, since successive regimes, both colonial
1. Behind the moral sanctions operating to maintain the
principle of leadership accountability lies, ultimately, 
of course, the threat of physical force. Instances of 
individual officials being actually beaten up appear to 
have been extremely rare in the Union's history. But 
there have been numerous occasions on which a "mob" from 
Location has surrounded the Union Headquarters threaten­
ing physical violence if their demands were not adopted 
as official Union policy.
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and independent, have refused to institute regular arrangements 
for collective bargaining with Railway Administration employees. 
Thirdly, a general and notorious shortage of promotion opportun­
ities for manual employees in the Railway Administration has 
inclined them to concentrate on securing collective benefits 
rather than individual advancement.
The skilled workers, although earning twice as much on 
average as unskilled workers, have generally been equally dis­
satisfied with their real wage level. This is related to the 
question of relative job stability and commitment, but in a less 
simple manner than most writers suggest. Most of the skilled 
railway workers are almost totally dependent on their wages to 
maintain a living, have wives and children to support in the 
city, and expect to continue in their occupation for some con­
siderable time. But few consider wage-employment a permanent 
career. Most rather aspire eventually to save enough to set up 
in business. Even small businesses generally bring better returns 
than a skilled worker’s wage, and involve less work. Moreover, 
a private business involves work for oneself rather than an 
employer, and it is considered undignified for an old man to 
be in wage-employment. However, this aspiration requires con­
siderable capital savings for its fulfillment. Consequently, as 
Adrian Peace has pointed out for the similar case of the Lagos 
proletariat, the desire of workers to leave industrial employment 
and enter the informal economy somewhat paradoxically increases
the pressure for higher wages and thereby workers’ willingness
1to engage in collective action.
1. Adrian Peace, ’’Towards a Nigerian Working Class: The 
Lagos Proletariat as a Political Elite”, (paper pre­
sented to the Toronto Conference on Workers, Unions, 
and Development, April 1973), p.12.
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(b) The relative weakness of ethnic divisions and patronage ties* 
The ethnic heterogeneity characteristic of most African 
work-forces frequently inhibits the development of a sense of 
solidarity, and, especially where particular categories of worker 
tend to be recruited from particular tribal groups, gives rise 
to serious intra-union conflict. In Jos (Nigeria), for example, 
Billy Dudley has described how, between 1949 and 1958, a single 
Mineworkers Union gradually split into three separate unions for 
Hausa, Birom and Ibo workers under the pressure of ethnic-occup­
ational jealousies and their exploitation by politicians.  ^The 
politics of ethnicity are often closely related to the cultiv­
ation of clientele followings by union leaders and personnel 
management. In her study of the trade union at the Nigerian 
Tobacco Company in Zaria, for instance, Dorothy Remy describes 
how the continuing social encapsulation of industrial workers 
in their ethnic communities encourages the development of a
£
system of sponsorship through which workers exert influence on
the personnel management in order to obtain employment for co- 
2
ethnics. In return, such sponsorship often entails an oblig­
ation on the part of the beneficiary to provide political support 
for his patron within the structure of both the ethnic community 
or association, and that of the N.T.C. Union. This results in 
the division of the union into competing clientele and tribal 
followings. It also means that both sponsors and clients are 
obligated to the personnel manager and seek to cultivate his 
favour, thus undermining union solidarity and militancy.
1. Billy J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria, 
(London: Frank Cass, 1968), pp.238-41.
2. Dorothy Remy, "Economic Security and Industrial Unionism: 
a Nigerian Case Study", (paper presented to the Toronto 
Conference on Workers, Unions, and Development, April 1973).
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In the case of the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers 
also, sponsorship by existing employees is crucial to an applic­
ant's chances of gaining employment. The Railway Administration
openly admits to giving preferential consideration to the rel-
1
atives or recommendees of employees of long standing. However, 
this system of job recruitment does not appear to have been 
systematically cultivated by personnel management or union leaders 
for the purpose of controlling workers' behaviour or building up 
clientele followings. Most probably, this would simply prove 
impracticable, since, once employed, railway workers are rel­
atively secure in their jobs, and the extra-union dimension of 
ethnic association participation, which greatly strengthens the 
sense of reciprocal obligation in the case of Zaria, is almost 
entirely lacking in Sekondi-Takoradi.
Sekondi-Takoradi, as we have seen, is characterised 
by a remarkable lack of ethnic prejudice, or residential or 
associational clusterings. This is reflected in the structure of 
Railway Union politics, and, in turn, the organisation of the 
unions in the city on the basis of common recognition of col­
lective, super-tribal interests has contributed to the lack of 
ethnic prejudice in the surrounding community. One partial excep­
tion to this generalisation must, however, be recognised. Workers 
from the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana have continued to 
cluster in separate residential areas, and the majority of unskil­
led workers in the Railway Administration have been recruited 
from their ranks. Such a situation, where occupational, ethnic, 
and cultural, divisions closely coincide, might be expected to 
give rise to serious inter-ethnic conflict within the Union.
1. Interview with Mr. J. Amissah, Railway Administration
Personnel Manager, 17th June 1971,
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In fact, the northerner unskilled workers have participated 
in Union affairs in a rather different manner from the majority 
of southerner skilled workers. Their mode of participation in 
the Union, as in the field of local government, has been through 
the intermediary leadership of the more experienced and literate 
amongst them, the rest following the instructions of these lead­
ers as a solid bloc. The intelligence of these leaders in rec­
ognising the dependence of the unskilled on the skilled workers 
for the effective pressing of their grievances largely accounts 
for the participation of the former in the 1961 strike (where 
their own interests were not directly at stake), and the con­
tinued co-operation of both groups in a single union. It remains 
the case, however, that the relationship between northerners and 
southerners in the Union is more accurately described as one of 
alliance of interests rather than solidarity. This is an increas­
ingly fragile alliance, moreover, as was illustrated by the skil­
led workers' failure to support the Permanent Waymen's strike of 
1967. And it is possible that, as the growing level of unemploy­
ment forces more southerners to seek unskilled jobs, southerners 
and northerners will come into increasing conflict over such 
issues as the necessity of possessing education for promotion to 
supervisory positions on the Permanent Way.
The support of the unskilled workers is nevertheless 
of marginal concern to the skilled workers' power position, since 
this does not seriously affect the ability of the latter to bring 
the railway system to a halt. It is the sense of solidarity of 
this artisan class which is of greatest importance here, and it 
is this with which the remainder of this chapter is specifically 
concerned.
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(c) The cultural community of skilled railway workers.
Max Weber writes:
"The rise of societal or even of communal action 
from a common class interest is by no means a 
universal phenomenon, (Communal action refers to 
that action which is oriented to the feeling of 
the actors that they belong together,..) The 
degree in which communal action emerges from the 
mass actions of the members of a class is linked 
to general cultural conditions, especially to 
those of an intellectual sort." 1
The skilled railway workers have developed a sense of "belong­
ing together", of cultural community, through their concentr­
ation in large groups in Takoradi harbour and the Location Work­
shops at Sekondi. A situation where three or four thousand 
workers are concentrated in approximately four square miles, 
most of them working at machines just a few yards from each 
other, makes for regular and easy communication between them, 
and a strong awareness of common interest. Union mass-meetings 
are easy to arrange and assemble. The workers sit together at 
lunchtimes, discussing personal problems, union affairs, and 
national politics. Union officials are easily contacted, and 
they and other Articulates* enlighten the less well-educated 
or informed workers in the implications of new government pol­
icies and developments (or non-developments) in other parts of 
the country.
Moreover, this close contact and regular communication 
extends beyond the bounds of the work-place to the residential 
situation and leisure pastimes of the railway workers. Almost a 
third of them live in one of the railway villages situated near
1. Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), p.181,
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the centre of Takoradi and at Ketan, on the outskirts of 
Sekondi (see Map 2). Another concentration is to be found in 
private accommodation in Essikadu, the home of such famed labour 
leaders as J. C. Vandyck and Pobee Biney (until his death in 
1968). In each of these residential areas, the railway workers 
are neighbours and regular drinking companions as well as work­
mates. Others live in private accommodation scattered through­
out the city, but the relatively small size of Sekondi-Takoradi 
makes for frequent meeting. The Railway Club at Sekondi provides 
a social centre for some, catering for both sporting and drink­
ing activities. To a large degree, therefore, the skilled rail­
way workers of Sekondi-Takoradi constitute a distinct social and 
cultural community (though, it is important to stress, they are 
not cut off from the wider urban community).
Within such a community, the ideas of such as Pobee 
Biney were the more easily communicated, and developed as the 
basis of a shared ideology or political culture. Moreover, the 
community's keen sense of its own history ensured that these 
ideas and stories of heroism were passed on from one generation 
to another and thus preserved as a living cultural influence.
(d) Ideology and leadership.
Class-consciousness, as several writers have observed,
is not simply or necessarily a direct reflection of objective
socio-economic position, but rather depends for its emergence
on ideological influences and on an organised network of com- 
1munication. As we have seen, such a network of communication 
has long existed in the close-knit community of the railway and 
harbour workers, and within this the influence of such as Biney
1. See, for example, Max Weber, Ibid.; and Giovanni Sartori, 
"Sociology of Politics and Politics of Sociology", in 
Government and Opposition, IV, 2, (1969).
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has been great in awakening others to the transparency of 
inequity in the prevailing economic order. To quote Max Weber 
again:
"The emergence of communal solidarity ... 
is especially linked to the transparency of 
the connections between the causes and the 
consequences of the 'class situation'. For, 
however different life chances may be, this 
fact in itself, according to all experience, 
by no means gives birth to class action. The 
fact of being conditioned and the results of 
the class situation must be distinctly recog­
nisable. For only then the contrast of life 
chances can be felt not as an absolutely 
given fact to be accepted, but as a resultant 
from either (1 ) the given distribution of 
property, or (2 ) the structure of the con­
crete economic order. It is only then that 
people may react against the class structure 
not only through acts of intermittent and 
irrational protest, but in the form of rational 
association." 1
In the case of the railway workers, the ideological influence 
to which they proved receptive was not that of explicit Marxist 
ideology. They reacted against Nkrumah's Marxism, partly (as we 
have seen) because it appeared 'alien', partly because it was 
Marxism of a distinctly Leninist variety with the emphasis on 
party control. The mode of consciousness they developed is per­
haps more accurately described as 'radical populist' than as 
class-consciousness. Nevertheless, this similarly involved a 
progressive realisation of the unjustifiability and political 
source of the growing elite-mass gap in Ghanaian society. And 
the influence of Biney might properly be described as 'ideol­
ogical', unless one limits the use of that term to highly 
sophisticated, 'written' ideologies. Certainly it served the 
ideological function of providing a group with a sense of its 
own distinct political identity and historical role.
1. Max Weber, Ibid., p.182.
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The nature of the railway workers* political con­
sciousness will be examined more closely in the following 
chapter. Here, however, it is worth noting that the unifying 
power of Biney*s ideology inevitably weakened with his personal 
departure from the Railway Union scene: and that, while Benjamin 
Bentum*s leadership of the TUG provided a (somewhat watered- 
down, but perhaps more realistic) substitute for many of the 
railway workers, his influence was limited by the medium of 
communication he found it necessary to employ. Without the 
personal contact with the railway workers which Biney maintained, 
he could not hope to achieve the quasi-charismatic status of the 
latter. The reports of his policy-pronouncements and attacks on 
governmental elitism in the national press and TUC organs, reached 
the illiterate section of the rank-and-file, if at all, only 
through the translations of educated friends and local union 
leaders. Some of these, as we have seen, were biased against 
Bentum for reasons of personal careerism and, to some extent, 
genuine distrust: and none of the railway unionists of 1966-71 
were capable of unifying and *enlightening* the rank-and-file 
in the manner of Biney. The Railway Union split of 1970-71 
illustrated the crucial contribution of leadership, as distinct 
from economic grievance or objective class position, to united 
class action.
(e)______
The railway workers* ability to maintain a united 
front in the strike of September 1961 was greatly facilitated 
by the material and moral support they received from other 
sections of the community. (In 1971, also, some such support 
was forthcoming, but the community, like the body of railway- 
workers itself, was more divided in its allegiance.) Most crucial, 
clearly, was the essential physical support provided by the
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market women's donation of food to the strikers. The alliance 
of market women and striking workers is not an unusual phen­
omenon in Ghanaian politics. In 1956, for example, the provision 
of food by the market women appears to have been a major factor
enabling the mineworkers to stay out on strike for over two 
1
months. Wherever there are large concentrations of workers, 
the local market-women clearly have a direct personal interest 
in the financial fortunes of their major customers. In many 
cases, family ties also serve to unite the two groups. In the 
1961 Sekondi-Takoradi strike, however, and, to a lesser extent, 
that of 1971, rather more than this was involved. Moral support 
was expressed by other non-elite sections of the community, 
either verbally, or, as in the case of the 'tro-tro' drivers' 
work stoppage, in more active and visible forms. The railway 
workers gave the lead for the expression of a widespread sense 
of grievance among the common people of Sekondi-Takoradi, incor­
porating many particular grievances, and conceived along both 
communal and class dimensions. Accurately or not, the railway 
workers could convince themselves, on the basis of these demon­
strations of support, that they were expressing a sense of 
grievance shared by the 'common people* of the country as a 
whole. People in other towns were regarded as being inhibited 
from engaging in similar protest actions simply because they 
lacked so courageous and solid a vanguard as the railway workers, 
capable of providing a lead and protective covering.
1. The question remains, of course: How were the market-
women able to do this without external financial assist­
ance? It would seem likely that either the National 
Liberation Movement, (whom Nkrumah suspected), the Inter­
national Federation of Mineworkers* Unions, or possibly 
even the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation itself was 
indirectly involved in financing the strike. However, 
this does not in any way alter the fact that the market- 
women were ready to support the strike, given any means 
to do so.
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There was perhaps some truth to this, as other groups 
of workers were happy to admit once the Nkrumah regime had been 
displaced. But the fact remains that the Sekondi-Takoradi workers 
were (and still are) unique in Ghana in being able to count on 
this kind of widespread community support. This derives from 
the peculiar composition and structure of the Sekondi-Takoradi 
community* More than an isolated workers' township, the city of 
Sekondi-Takoradi is nevertheless numerically and economically 
dominated by the railway and harbour workers* Sections of the 
community lacking so direct an interest as the market-women 
in the workers' financial fortunes are nevertheless inclined 
to lend the latter support out of a more vague and general 
sense of common interest. In turn, the railway workers take on 
the function, wittingly or no, of representing communal rather 
than specifically worker discontent.
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CHAPTER TEN.
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE RAILWAY WORKERS,
It is clear from the foregoing historical analysis 
that the Sekondi-Takoradi railway strikes of 1950, 1961 and 
1971, were all highly political in conception. That is to say, 
they were consciously directed against government, rather than 
management, and were concerned to protest general policies and 
characteristics of the regimes in question rather than to express 
narrowly occupational grievances. It would further appear that 
they all exhibited a certain ideological consistency or con­
tinuity. The 1950 strike, though openly staged in support of 
Nkrumah*s "Positive Action** campaign, was designed to articulate 
a particular, radical form of nationalism, rather than to indic­
ate unconditional support for the Convention People's Party as 
such. The strike of 1961 expressed the railway workers* dis­
illusionment with the C.P.P. regime, and, more particularly, its 
failure to live up to the radical expectations and promises of 
the early nationalist campaign. That of 1971 was a further pro­
test against the elitist and authoritarian conduct of government. 
In hindsight, Pobee Biney's exhortation to beware too close an 
association with ruling parties, and to prepare to struggle for 
a minimal realisation of original nationalist aims, appears to 
run as a continuous thread linking all these strike actions.
While such an interpretation might exaggerate Biney*s personal 
influence, it is nevertheless clear that the railway workers' 
political behaviour has been consistently informed by intense 
resentment of the inequities of the prevailing socio-economic 
order; by the assumption that responsibility for such inequities 
must be laid at the door of government itself; and by a sense of 
their own responsibility to lead reformist protest. The precise 
nature of these attitudes is the main concern of this chapter,
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the initial problem being why the railway workers have come 
to hold them with such exceptional strength and conviction.
Later it is worth asking whether or not such attitudes may 
appropriately be described as a form of class-consciousness.
It is well to point out first, however, that those 
writers on African labour who have concerned themselves with 
the issue of Consciousness* have mainly focussed on the part­
icular issue of 'class-consciousness*, and this in so pedantic,
preconceived a manner as to obscure a more basic yet extremely
1
important question. Have African workers, or particular groups 
of workers, developed a distinct, radical ideology or political 
sub-culture (relative, that is, to the dominant culture of the 
national political elite), and, if so, what is its nature? There 
can be no doubt that the railway workers of Sekondi-Takoradi have 
developed a distinct sub-culture, even if this is not properly 
described as class-consciousness. This must, in any case, be 
considered an important intervening variable in the translation 
of their economic interests into political action.
Whether this inter-related set of attitudes and values 
is best described as an ideology or, alternatively, a political 
culture, is a more difficult question and one which it is not 
proposed to discuss at any great length here. The extremely 
restricted sense in which Berg and Butler (together with many 
American scholars) use the term 'ideology* has already been noted. 
Clearly, this does not exhaust its possible valid uses. In the 
wider sense which Joseph La Palombara (for example) gives the 
term, Pobee Biney*s leadership of the railway workers was clearly 
ideological in character. That is to say, it involved **a philo- ■ 
sophy of history, a view of man*s (or a particular group’s) place 
in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development,
1. See, for example, P. C. Lloyd, Classes, Crises and Coups, 
(London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1971), pp. 122-27; and loan 
Davies, op.cit., pp.131-32.
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and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, 
and/or modify that developmental direction.1' Although rel­
atively unsophisticated, the main outlines of Biney's ideology 
were clear enough; all ruling classes, including the leaders of 
the Convention People's Party, tended to become elitist and 
authoritarian; it was the special responsibility of the railway 
workers, and, ideally, the labour movement, to challenge such 
tendencies and fight for the original, egalitarian aims of the 
nationalist movement. They could only do so by maintaining their 
solidarity and strict independence of the ruling party.
Yet it would be exaggerating Biney's influence somewhat 
to suggest that, even during the period of his leadership, the 
majority of the rank-and-file saw things so clearly or subscribed 
to these views in so committed and aggressive a fashion as Biney 
himself. On his departure from the Railway Union, moreover, and 
particularly after 1961, the influence of his prescriptions 
inevitably declined in intensity and immediacy, so that by 1971, 
the railway workers, critically divided amongst themselves, could 
hardly be said to subscribe to a unifying ideology. For both sets 
of workers (i.e. the memberships of both mother- and splinter- 
unions) memories of the Biney era and the 1961 strike exerted a 
significant influence on their attitudes and behaviour, in the 
one case fuelling anti-government feeling, in the other creating 
obstacles to too close or sympathetic a relationship to the 
Progress Party regime. But by this time, as indeed for the whole 
period after 1961, it is more appropriate to conceive of the 
railway workers as possessing a distinctive political culture, 
in which one very major element was the 'myth' of Biney and his
1. Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology; A Dissent and 
an Interpretation", American Political Science Review, 
Vol. LX, No. 1, (March 1966).
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revolutionary unionism.
The use of the term 'political culture* is especially 
germane in this context in serving to emphasise two main chara­
cteristics of railway worker attitudes. Firstly, it is important 
to stress the mutual interrelation of the various attitudes, 
norms, and goals of railway unionism - in brief, militancy, the 
norms of solidarity and independence of government, radical dis­
content with the prevailing socio-economic order, and the impulse 
to oppositional political participation. In terms of Philip 
Converse's definition of political culture, the various elements
"are bound together by some form of constraint or functional
2
interdependence." This interdependence might be held to rein­
force the strength of each of the various constituent elements, 
especially since it is quite consciously perceived by at least 
the more articulate and influential members of the rank-and-file. 
This is not to say that any one element necessarily produces or 
presupposes all the others. For example, militancy, narrowly 
defined as an especial predisposition to strike activity, might 
in some cases be interpreted as merely a product of immaturity 
on the part of unionists or of the refusal of management to 
institute regular mechanisms for the resolution of grievances.
It certainly does not necessarily imply a radically critical 
attitude toward the prevailing economic order, or a strong im­
pulse to political participation (even where government is
1. This is to use the term 'political culture' in a similar 
sense to that of most American political scientists. Roy Mac* 
ridis, for example, defines a political culture as "a set of 
commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules".
R. Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis", 
Journal of Politics, Vol XXIII, (1961), p.40. Here, how­
ever, it is important to add to this definition the extrem­
ely significant element of 'a common set of historical 
traditions *.
2. P. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", 
in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, (New York:
Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p.207.
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inclined to interpret any major strike action as a *political 
strike*). As Hobsbawm remarks, with his customary lucidity,
**A willingness to raise barricades does not necessarily indicate 
an extremist programme.'* ^
Nevertheless, where a radical critique of the existing 
social order is vigorously articulated, then labour militancy 
will obviously be strengthened by the addition of a moral dimen­
sion and sanction. In the particular case of the Sekondi-Takoradi 
railway workers, militancy might be held to result, in part, from 
particular characteristics of the labour force (to be discussed 
more fully below), and from a lack of adequate institutionalised 
channels for negotiating wage demands. But, it is argued here, 
the exceptional strength of railway union militancy, as of other 
elements of the culture can only be fully understood in relation 
to the radically critical attitudes held by the railway workers 
toward the existing socio-economic order and the role conceived 
for the strike weapon within the context of a wide-fronted pol­
itical struggle. In this sense, railway worker militancy is cer­
tainly a constituent element, and, in some instances, a direct 
expression, of an integrated political culture at the centre of 
which lies a particular form of anti-elite consciousness.
Secondly, the term ’political culture* is used to 
emphasise the influence of tradition, of past historical exper­
iences, selectively glorified and institutionalised as *myths*,
2
on subsequent attitudes and behaviour. The subjective moral
1. E. J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Man, (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1968), p.374.
2. The use of the term, ’myths*, is not intended to suggest 
that the historical events to which they refer are, nec­
essarily, fictionalised or falsely interpreted in any way. 
Rather, Hobsbawm*s comment seems particularly applicable 
to the railway workers: ”A political or ideological trad­
ition, especially if it sums up genuine patterns of 
practical activity in the past, or is embodied in stable
institutions, .....  must affect political behaviour.”
Hobsbawm, op.cit., p.377.
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legitimacy provided for the 1961 strike by the railway workers* 
'Positive Action* involvement has already been remarked upon. 
Similarly, in the summer of 1971, when discussing union-government 
relations and the legitimacy of alternative courses of action, 
the railway workers frequently referred back to the experience 
and aims of the 1961 strike. No observer could doubt that they 
were highly aware, and equally proud, of the lead they had given 
in the early development of Ghanaian trade unionism and in resis­
tance against government oppression ever since. Admittedly, this 
tradition was amenable to various, selective interpretations and 
contemporary applications. But it was not merely a lump of clay, 
capable of being moulded to fit any temporarily desired course 
of action.
Estimating the real part which tradition plays in the 
determination of subsequent attitudes and behaviour is, generally, 
one of the most difficult tasks confronting the historian or 
social scientist. This instance is no exception. At least one 
point may nevertheless be legitimately suggested. On one common 
interpretation of Marxian theory (supported, most notably, by 
Lenin ), the growth of class-consciousness is not a spontaneous 
or automatic corollary of developing socio-economic conditions, 
but rather requires some sort of ideological break-through. The 
highly uneven development of class-consciousness amongst workers 
is largely to be explained by the more or less successful educ­
ative activity of Marxist intellectuals, or by a particular group's 
possession of historical 'myths' supporting a revolutionary stance. 
The consciousness of the Sekondi-Takoradi railway workers is not, 
perhaps, 'revolutionary*. They do nevertheless exhibit an intense
1. V. I. Lenin, What is to be Done?, (New York; International 
Publishers, 1929).
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anti-elitism and a readiness for radical political action which, 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly given the nature of socio-economic 
change in post-Independence Ghana, are far from general amongst 
Ghanaian workers. In accounting for this distinctiveness, one 
important factor is clearly the belief in the legitimacy (under 
certain conditions) of political strikes lent them by Biney*s 
ideological influence and so singular a set of historical 
traditions.
Distinctive Characteristics of the Railway Workers.
At the same time, however, certain special character­
istics of the railway workers help account for their receptivity 
to Biney*s views. In this regard, it is worth noting that railway 
workers were among the first groups to unionise in virtually all 
of the African territories, developing a militant style of union­
ism which frequently brought them into sharp confrontation with
the colonial authorities, and, in many instances, with the new
1ruling regimes soon after Independence. It would therefore 
appear that African railway workers in general, or, to be more 
precise, the skilled workers who provide the main driving force 
and source of leadership in railway unionism, possess distinctive 
characteristics which mark them out as an exceptionally militant 
and political group. These are not difficult to discern.
1. See, for example, the references to railway unionism in
loan Davies, op.cit., especially pp.141-42; and R. D. Grillo, 
African Railwaymen; Solidarity and Opposition in an East 
African Labour Force, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973); also, for interesting accounts of particular 
railway strikes, see H. E. Conway, "Labour Protest Activity 
in Sierra Leone", Labour History, Vol.15, (1968), pp.49-63; 
and C. Allen, "Union-Party Relationships in Francophone 
West Africa", (paper presented to the Toronto Conference on 
"Workers, Unions, and Development in Africa’*, April 1973).
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In the first place, a relatively high proportion of 
skilled railway workers possess at least some education, which 
provides them with requisite organisational skills and access 
to political new© and ideas, as communicated through newspapers 
and pamphlets.  ^ This however is equally true of skilled workers 
in other industries. What is particularly distinctive about 
skilled railway workers is their exceptionally high skill level, 
their intimate association with the pioneering technological force 
in under-developed societies, and their correspondingly high sense 
of their own status and importance. Many so-called 'skilled* 
workers in Africa are, in reality, but semi-skilled by inter­
national standards. The railway artisans and enginetnen, however, 
are a genuinely skilled group, who have undergone many years of 
training, and who, as will be obvious to any observer of a rail­
way workshop, take a great deal of pride in their work and 
abilities. They are, in consequence, extremely sensitive to dis­
respectful treatment on the part of management or government, 
and especially inclined to resent the low economic status accor­
ded them relative to clerical and executive staff of no greater 
training or practical responsibility for the efficient operation 
of the railway system. It was this sense of status incongruity, 
and accompanying resentment, which, as we have seen, originally 
led to the formation of the Ghanaian Railway Union, and which 
might still be held to lie at the root of the railway workers' 
generalised sense of social injustice.
The railway system, moreover, is the arterial system 
of the underdeveloped economy. The strategic economic importance 
of the railway engine together with its technological qualities,
1. Such literature includes Marxist pamphlets, of course, but 
these do not seem to have made much impact on the African 
rank-and-file, except perhaps in the Sudan. For information 
on the Sudanese labour movement I am indebted to conver­
sations with Bill Warren.
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tend to imbue those working with it with a corresponding sense 
of their own importance and power. A steam-engine in motion is 
an impressive sight for the most detached observer. For the 
engine-driver, or those artisans responsible for keeping it in 
running order, it reflects strength and glory on themselves.
Through their intimate association with the railway engine, 
skilled railway workers come to see themselves as the powerful 
motor and driving force of national economic development, the 
harbingers of technological, and, in turn, of political, modern­
isation. They are not alone in seeing themselves thus. In the 
eyes of the local populace more generally, the railwayman possess 
something of an heroic status as pioneering masters of the 
'magical' modern technology. Herein lie significant psychological 
bases of railway worker militancy, solidarity, and political self- 
assertion.
Thirdly, the development of a shared political culture 
clearly requires some (formal or informal) organised network of 
communication. The railway workers possess Usuch a network in the 
engine drivers travelling up and down the railway system. On the 
most superficial level, their mobility would appear to facilitate 
the co-ordination of strike action (though, as we have seen, 'up- 
country' railway workers have not always been ready to support 
the Sekondi-Takoradi workers). More important, the geographical 
mobility of the enginemen serves to engender a highly concrete 
sense of the nation, and a keen awareness of economic and political 
developments. This awareness is in turn easily, and almost inevit­
ably, transmitted to the close-knit concentration of artisans at 
the Sekondi Workshops and Takoradi Harbour. The potential sig­
nificance of this network is vividly summed up in the image of 
Pobee Biney arriving in Sekondi, standing on the footplate of 
his engine surrounded by Workshop artisans, whom he informs as
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to the latest news of nationalist awakening up-country.
Finally, the railway workers' network of communication 
is at its most dense within Sekondi-Takoradi. The skilled railway 
workers of that city constitute a close-knit, and relatively 
stable, social and cultural community. Moreover, the fact that 
this railway worker community is not cut off from the surround­
ing urban community, but rather provides its social, economic, 
and cultural centre (at least for other non-elite groups), has 
a number of important consequences. The radical perspective of 
the railway workers tends to infuse the general ethos of the 
city. The railway workers take an interest in the fortunes of 
the urban masses - drastically declining fortunes, like those 
of the railway workers themselves, since Independence - which 
influences their view of government's performance. One thus 
finds a sense of shared social injustice, of belonging and suf­
fering together, which helps account for the railway workers' 
conviction of acting as 'the spokesmen of the people*, and of 
the legitimacy (even duty) of using the strike weapon as a form 
of political protest.
Biney's ideas have been outlined in some detail in an 
earlier chapter, and there is no point in repeating them here.  ^
It might be useful however to delineate, at a more general level, 
the interdependence of the various attitudes, principles, and 
goals of Railway Union political culture. This is bound to 
exaggerate a little the degree of clarity and sophistication with 
which the majority of railway workers perceive, or can system­
atically enunciate this interdependence. But it is implicit in 
their attitudes, vocabulary, and behaviour, and was quite clearly 
outlined for the present writer's benefit by several of the 
more articulate and influential amongst them. It is the
1. See Chapter Two, pp.72-79.
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’consciousness* of this group, of course, which matters most.
In reality, the political culture of the railway workers, as 
of any group, is differentially determined by individuals accord­
ing to their political weight, the intensity of their views, and 
their relative articulateness.
Characteristics of the Railway Workers’ Political Culture.
The culture of the Railway Union has been described 1
by Drake and Lacy as one of "conventional trade union practice".
In so far as this is intended to emphasise the representative 
ethic of the Union, in distinction from the control-orientated, 
or productionist, ethic sometimes alleged to be characteristic 
of most African unions, the point is no doubt worth making. But 
such a description, even if one adds that this is a highly mili­
tant form of conventional union practice, clearly does not go far 
enough in delineating the distinctive character of railway union­
ism. The culture of the Sekondi-Thkoradi railway workers is both 
highly militant and highly political, and it is in the inter­
relationship of these two characteristics that its distinctive 
character should be seen to lie.
The railway workers have tended to become centrally 
involved in national politics, not simply as a by-product of 
their militancy for improved economic status and the political 
importance attached by government to resisting such pressure.
The railway workers might equally well be said to derive their 
militancy from their concern with general issues of government 
policy and conduct, and the frustration of their drive to 
effective political participation. In terms of Almond and Verba*s
typology of political cultures - "participant", "subject", and 
2"parochial" - the railway workers possess a highly "participant"
1. St. Glair Drake and Lacy, op.cit., p.115.
2. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.17.
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culture. Opinions as to government’s policy decisions and
general performance are openly expressed and discussed at
mass-meetings of the Union, and frequently concluded with the
1phrase, "We must make our voice heard on this matter”.
The tenor of such discussions is generally critical 
and non-deferent. The reverse side of the railway workers* high 
opinion of their own rightful political status is a correspond­
ing irreverence and suspicion toward government. Governments 
are expected to misrule in the interests of a select elite.
But, rather than accepting this, the railwaymen seek to crit­
icise government whenever possible and express scorn for those 
who resign themselves to such misrule: ”The trouble with most of
our workers here in Ghana is that they are too timid. They are
2too frightened to speak up.” The ideal political system should 
be open and responsive. The automatic tendency of the ruling class 
to seek to close up the system has to be checked by the forceful 
assertion of the popular will - most notably, by the use of the 
strike weapon. The workers have to act as ”the eyes and ears of 
society” - and also its arm. The strikes of 1961 and 1971 both 
partook of this subjective significance: the stage had been 
reached where the strike weapon had to be used to maintain some 
semblance of the ethic of popular accountability in Ghanaian 
political life. Seen in this perspective, the use of the strike 
weapon is, on occasions at least, a political duty, not merely a 
right.
But while the railway workers * culture is highly pol­
itical in this sense, it is at the same time determinedly non­
partisan, or, to be more accurate, supra-partisan. The Union
1. This was perhaps the most commonly used phrase at mass- 
meetings of the two Railway Unions which the writer 
attended in June-September 1971.
2. Interview with A. E. Forson, 3rd September 1971.
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is not to be bound by too close an association with a political 
party. A temporary, informal alliance with a political party 
might be accepted, by some members at least, for the purpose of 
helping finance a major strike action, though even this is likely 
to attract the disapproval of most members as undermining the 
credibility of their claim to speak simply for *the people*. 
Alternatively, union leaders might seek to cultivate their ties 
with government leaders in order to gain concessions. But the 
railway workers have a sufficiently clear sense of their own 
political goals, and of the distance between these and those of 
any party bandwagon, to willingly compromise their independence. 
The working assumption of Railway Union political culture is 
that untrustworthiness and oligarchic self-interest are to be 
expected of all party politicians and of any union leader who 
associates too closely with them:
“There are two things the railway workers will 
not stand for. An untruthful leader, someone 
who changes his mind to suit his interest. And 
a leader who sides too strongly with a political 
party. They know he will sell them out.** 1
What are the railway workers* political goals? The 
liberal-reformist ideal of an open and responsive political 
system, certainly; and it might be argued that this ideal derives 
from socialisation in the processes and ethics of internal Rail­
way Union politics. There is certainly something to this, (even 
though the theory of small-group socialisation operates, 
generally, on somewhat unsure foundations). But the railway 
workers clearly have more specific, socio-economic goals which 
inform their striving to participate as an effective, independent
1. Interview with J. K. Baaku, 12th September 1971,
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force in national politics. While the discussions of political 
issues at union mass-meetings cover a wide range of areas, they 
have one consistent theme: the desirability and urgency of a 
more equitable distribution of the national income (or in local 
terminology "the national cake").
Since the railway workers have generally been in an 
essentially defensive position, both politically and economically, 
since Independence, they often express this social ideal in some­
what defensive a manner: for example, "We are telling all those 
big men that they should shoulder their fair share of the nat- 
ional burden". However, it is clear from the applause accorded 
the more positive and aggressive statements of reformist aims 
made by Fobee Biney in 1947 - 56, and by rank-and-file leaders 
in the course of the 1961 and 1971 strikes, that a more radical 
ideal is implicit in such negative formulations. This is also 
borne witness by the perfectly explicit manner in which, in the 
summer of 1971, many railway workers talked privately of "wanting 
to make all those big men to leave the country alone", and
"taking away half their salaries so that we poor can eat and
2
live like men".
It is in any case clear that, far from according leg­
itimacy to the existing pattern of socio-economic stratification, 
the railway workers deeply resent the failure to reform the 
pattern inherited at Independence, and the development since 
then of an ever-widening elite-mass gap. It is important, how­
ever, to be more precise as to just which forms, and degrees, of 
socio-economic differentiation are especially resented. The
1. Speech by Kofi Imbeah at a Union mass-meeting, 14th 
August 1971.
2. Interviews with Isaac Aygepong and Francis Dadzie, 
26th August 1971.
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railway workers are not, strictly speaking, social egalitarians. 
They are generally prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
considerable differences in income levels so long as these cor­
respond in some reasonable way - it is impossible to be very 
precise about this - to differences in skill-level, initiative, 
and contribution to the community. More particularly, (and very 
significantly from the perspective of the class-consciousness 
issue) they do not generally condemn the wealth of self-made 
businessmen. This is largely, no doubt, because the latter con­
stitute the aspirational reference-group for many skilled workers. 
Hoping one day to save enough capital to start up in business 
themselves, the skilled workers tend to emphasise the hard work 
and intelligence required for entrepreneurial success. Many suc­
cessful businessmen are held in high esteem, particularly those 
who (as a fair number do) continue to live in the poorer quarters 
of town, displaying generosity to those with some claim on their 
assistance or hospitality. Only those wealthy capitalists are 
seriously criticised who are believed to be ungenerous, who are 
suspected of gaining the capital for the establishment of their 
businesses through embezzlement of public funds, or (which is 
not very different) whose business success appears to stem prim­
arily from their political contacts.
The principal objects of railway worker resentment, 
the foci of their sense of social injustice, are two-fold. First 
is the fact that middle- and senior-level clerical and executive 
staff receive so much higher salaries than skilled or unskilled 
manual workers. Such income disparities, (where the ratio between 
lowest and highest salaries of government employees had reached 
1:39 by 1971), do not appear to be justified by the criteria of 
training, experience, or responsibility for the efficient oper­
ation of the public service. Most railway worker interviewees,
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when questioned as to their view of Bentum's demand that the 
above ratio should be reduced to 1:10, thought that this was 
about right, (though they also felt that this was too radical 
a demand to meet with any response from government). Resent­
ment at these income disparities is generally directed not so 
much against the holders of senior executive positions as against 
the political class which is seen as responsible for maintaining 
them. This is not, however, to deny that the social snobbery and 
exclusiveness of many individual members of the salaried classes 
certainly do arouse much anger.
The second, and most acute source of grievance, is 
provided by the wealth, high-living, and indifference to socio­
economic reform of the political class itself. It is considered 
quite intolerable that those who owe their positions, in theory 
at least, to the votes and/or confidence of*the people1, should 
proceed to "sell them out”, award themselves vast salaries, treat 
public property as though it were their own, and rush with such 
offensive haste to sever their social ties with those they claim 
to represent. The railway workers clearly feel they have especial 
cause for indignation in this respect, since they played so prom­
inent a role in achieving Independence. This focussing of resent­
ment on the expropriation of public as private wealth helps to 
explain what might otherwise appear as an inconsistency. Although 
the Progress Party elite were, if anything, more wealthy, more 
obviously wealthy, and more detached than the leaders of the 
G.P.P. regime, they were extended a greater degree of tolerance 
than the latter by many railway workers. It was possible to argue 
that the majority of Progress Party leaders were wealthy men 
before they came to power, and could therefore less readily be 
suspected of having enriched themselves through the abuse of
1. This demand was put forward in the ’’Proposals Submitted 
by the Trades Union Gongress to the (Campbell) Salary 
Review Commission, 1971”, (mimeo).
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political office. On the other hand, some railway workers were 
far more concerned with the fact that the introduction of fee- 
paying for post-primary education, together with the P.P. 
regime*s award of such high salaries to M.P.*s, and pensions 
to judges, were tending to make the social structure more closed 
and inegalitarian than ever before.
Glass, Mass, Community, and Political Consciousness.
In so far as the railway workers* political culture 
is highly antagonistic to the inequities of the prevailing socio­
economic order, and stresses their specially designated political 
role in striving to change this pattern, it might perhaps be 
described as a form of class-consciousness. In at least four 
major respects, it deviates, however, from the classical Marxist 
model of class-consciousness. In the first place, it is liberal- 
reformist in orientation rather than truly revolutionary. The 
idea of forming a Labour Party, or seeking to take over control
of the state in some other manner (though occasionally voiced)
1
has never been taken very seriously. The legend of Pobee Biney 
certainly endows railway worker political culture with something 
of a revolutionary strain; and there can be no doubting the 
radicalism of the changes the railway workers would (ideally) 
like to see in Ghanaian society. But this revolutionary impulse 
has, until now at least, been firmly held In check by a keen 
sense of political realism involving, most importantly, a pes­
simistic assessment of the support likely to be forthcoming 
from other groups.
Accordingly, they have come to resign themselves, and 
this with growing defensiveness, to playing a pressurising and
1. The idea of forming a Labour Party was briefly discussed 
by the railway workers in 1949, 1969, and again in 
November 1971. RUA, Railway Union Executive Council Minutes, 
3rd April 1949 and 7th March 1969. Interviews with various 
railway workers, November 1971.
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checking role within a political system controlled by others.
Secondly, the Exploiting* class is identified not 
as the indigenous capitalist class, nor clearly even as the 
foreign, neo-colonial capitalist class, but rather as the 
domestic class of politicians and senior civil servants. Given 
the Ghanaian situation of business* high degree of dependence 
on the politics of access to state machinery, the failure to 
develop a strong independent capitalist class, and the predom­
inance of public over private employment, such an emphasis is 
radily understandable. The distinctive characteristic of rail­
way worker culture lies in the deep conviction of the essentially 
exploitative character of all ruling regimes. Different as these 
might be in ideology, in the particular clientele networks they 
seek to benefit, or even, within a certain range, in general 
policies, they all become, and are expected to become from the 
railway workers* point of view, mere variants or sections of a 
single political class.
In the third place, the railway workers do not normally 
conceive or project themselves as acting simply as a section of 
the national working-class (i.e. unionised labour), but rather 
as the spokesmen of the people. This is perhaps more appropri­
ately described as mass- than as class-consciousness. During 
Bentum*s leadership of the TUG, considerable progress was made 
in the development of a nation-wide sense of working-class 
identity, but here, too, there was a tendency to rationalise the 
TUC*s political self-assertion in terms of acting as *the eyes 
and ears of society* rather than merely the voice of the working- 
class narrowly defined. Such terms are clearly intended to imply 
a large measure of common interest between unionised labour and 
other sections of the masses vis-a-vis the political class. The 
cynical observer might view this simply as a device to rationalise
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union leadership’s political ambitions, and rank-and-file economic 
demands, by laying claim to the representation of a wider con­
stituency than the unionised workers alone, themselves very much 
a minority group within the national society. There is undoubt­
edly something to this, and the claim to mass representation is, 
of course, strictly speaking illusory. Nevertheless, the import­
ant point is that the railway workers believe in the idea of an 
essential unity of interest of the common people. In their view, 
it is lent confirmation by the supporting activity of other 
sections of the urban masses in such major strike actions as 
those of 1961 and 1971. It should also be recognised that there 
is some truth to the railway workers* self-image, and that this 
sense of identity and responsibility imbues the railway workers* 
political culture with a very real element of idealism. The idea 
of mass spokesmanship also, however, reflects the fact that the 
railway workers look to the common people of Sekondi-Takoradi, 
rather than to the unionised workers of other towns or cities, 
for moral and material support. This brings us to the fourth, 
and perhaps most important respect, in which railway worker pol­
itical culture deviates from a Marxist model of class-conscious­
ness. It has seemed justified, till now, to emphasise the rel­
atively generalised nature of railway worker attitudes, and so 
highlight their distinctiveness. Generally speaking, political 
attitudes and behaviour in Ghana are most realistically described 
in terms of identification with the people of particular local­
ities or particular personalities and patrons. The contrast in 
the case of the railway workers is indeed striking and deserves 
emphasis. Nevertheless, as the foregoing historical analysis 
will have made clear, the relatively general, principled nature 
of railway worker political attitudes is in practice qualified 
by the influence of local identifications. One important element
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in the popularity of Biney, Woode and Ocran, for instance, was 
undoubtedly the fact that they were local men as well as Rad­
icals *. More important from the point of view of our concern 
here, it seems clear that when the railway workers talk of act­
ing as the spokesmen of the people, they have primarily in mind 
the people of the Central and Western Regions of Ghana, and, 
even more particularly, the people of Sekondi-Takoradi. These 
are the people by whose welfare the performance of government 
tends to be judged, and to whom the railway workers look for 
support in times of confrontation with government.
It is of course far from unusual, in the 1 advanced*
countries as well as the underdeveloped, to find a pronounced
communal dimension and sense of identity informing militant
forms of working class action; forms which some historians, at
least, would classify as manifestations of class-consciousness.
One might point for example to the traditional militancy of ioubh
1Wales steel-workers and the Northumberland-Durham miners. The 
Marxist nation of a self-conscious national working-class, if 
not entirely mythical, is perhaps misleading as to the real 
nature of many historical examples of (so-called) class-action. 
But, in any case, this term does not seem properly applicable to 
an instance in which the notion of (national) class identification 
is so weakly developed relative to that of mass spokesmanship, 
and the communal element in this 1mass-consciousness * is so sal­
ient. If one seeks a single term to depict the distinctive nature 
of railway worker political culture as a reformist and communally 
refined form of mass-ism, then the most appropriate would appear 
to be that of ’radical populism*.
1. See, for example, E. Welbourne, The Miners * Unions of
Nor thumb e r1and and Durham, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1923); and E. W. Evans, The Mines of South Wales, 
(Gardiff: University of Wales Press, 1961).
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This is admittedly a somewhat vague concept which has
been used by different writers to describe diverse social and
ideological phenomena, and therefore far from entirely satis-
factory.  ^Yet one of the harshest critics of its usage in the
literature on African politics has conceded that it is employed
in an illuminating sense by Martin Kilson to denote certain kinds
of movement which challenge authority from a democratic pers- 
2pective. In Kilson*s words:
”ln describing political pressures as ’populist*,
I do not suggest that they x^ ere part of a system­
atic egalitarian ideology. X simply mean that 
they represent (or claim to represent) the lox^ er 
reaches of provincial society, they come nearest 
to reflecting the political feelings of what we 
call the masses - the little people.** 3
In this sense ’Populism* provides an appropriate description of 
the consciousness of the railway workers, even if they are a 
somewhat less ’provincial’ group than those Kilson has in mind.
At least it serves to high-light a major reality of their social 
situation of xdiich they are acutely aware, xtfhich will most prob­
ably influence their thinking for some time to come, and differ­
entiate them in an important way from workers in the developed 
countries. Hox^ever much progress is made in the development of a 
sense of working-class unity, Ghanaian xrorkers will, by all 
indications continue to be a minority group within their national
1. See for example, G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (ed.), Populism:
its meanings and national characteristics, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970),
2. John Saul, ’’Africa”, in Ionescu and Gellner, op.cit.
3. Martin Kilson, Political change in a West African State,
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966).
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society, and one whose demands are liable to be presented 
(to considerable effect) by ruling elites as mere sectional 
selfishness. The success of their attempt to develop a major 
and socially meaningful role for themselves will depend in 
large part, on the credibility of their claim to embrace the 
interests of other, even more under-privileged groups; in 
short, to speak up for the 'little people*.
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CONCLUSION.
The railway and harbour workers of Sekondi-Takoradi 
have a quite exceptional political history, and, partly in con­
sequence of this historical legacy, continue to display a union 
orientation markedly more self-assertive than that of other 
groups of Ghanaian workers. In spite of the foregoing present­
ation of one clearly deviant case, therefore, Elliot Berg and 
Jeffrey Butler’s general view of African trade unions as dis­
playing little political inclination or potential might still be 
considered substantially valid. Yet, there is a pronounced danger 
in such general perspectives of playing down the significance of 
deviant cases as though only the normal is to be considered sig­
nificant, or as though a radical, political form of unionism 
possesses little national political import unless it becomes 
part of a national working-class movement of similar character.
It is worth noting this danger here, not in order to attack Berg 
and Butler specifically, but because it is to be found in even
more pronounced form in certain more recent writings on the 
1subject. Of course, a General Strike is likely to be more 
effective in political terms than any strike action staged by 
a single group of workers, (though this is certainly not always 
the case). But the railway workers of Sekondi-Takoradi have 
shoxvn themselves quite capable of presenting serious challenges 
to the legitimacy and stability of Ghanaian ruling regimes with­
out any such widespread assistance. Indeed, the significance of 
railway worker unionism in Ghanaian political history, and its 
interest for the student of Ghanaian politics, might be held 
to lie precisely in its exceptional character, not only as a
1. For example, Henry Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa. 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1973).
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form of trade unionism, but more generally, as a form of mass 
organisation and spokesmanship. This point deserves elaboration, 
and this it will shortly receive.
But, first, it is worth registering a further criticism 
of the Berg and Butler thesis on the question of general ten­
dencies in African unionism. Accurate as their general charac­
terisation of African trade unions might have proven till now, 
this study strongly suggests that, as far as Ghana is concerned, 
they have been right for very largely the wrong reasons. This, 
of course, matters a great deal. While Berg and Butler correctly 
identified the skilled workers as the real force to be reckoned 
with in the African unions, they were quite wrong in suggesting 
that the economic gains made by these workers in the post-Indepen 
dence period would necessarily disincline them from radical pol­
itical activity. In the first place, the prediction that skilled 
workers would steadily improve their economic position after 
Independence has, with the temporary exception of the 1957-61 
period, proven quite false in the case of Ghana, as it has in 
Nigeria and a number of other African states. But, equally import 
ant, we have seen that the oppositional stance of the Sekondi- 
Takoradi skilled workers was not to be reversed or weakened by 
the concessions they did receive during that short period. Their 
keen aspiration to a more secure and comfortable niche in a more 
equitable social order, and consequent resentment of a pattern 
of development which appeared to deny any hope of its attainment, 
were not to be assuaged by such minor concessions. The railway 
workers assessed the legitimacy of the C.P.P., as of other 
regimes, by wider, and more radical criteria than immediate wage 
benefits.
Indeed, it is clearly invalid to posit any simple 
correlation between relative economic position and radical labour 
activity. In our analysis of factors making for the exceptionally
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militant, political unionism of the railway workers, as for 
the growing radicalism of other sections of the Ghanaian 
labour movement in 1966-71, it became apparent that the workers* 
"ideology** must be a central concern. It really does matter, in 
short, not only who the workers are (in terms of their objective 
socio-economic position), but how they see themselves (in terms 
of the economic status they believe themselves to deserve, and 
how they conceive their social role). It will not do to dismiss 
the role of ideology in African trade unionism simply because it 
is not specifically Marxist or revolutionary ideology, or some 
pre-conceived model of class-consciousness, which is involved.
Ideological communication requires an efficient organ­
isational network, as does the ability to co-ordinate and maintain 
strike actions. Berg and Butler attributed the vulnerability of 
African unions to governmental control in large part to organis­
ational weakness, and in this they were surely correct. But the 
sources of union weakness which they emphasised - financial 
difficulties, and ethnic heterogeinity of membership - have 
been among the least important in Ghana. The main problem for 
Ghanaian workers has been that of gaining control of their own 
unions, or developing an informal corporate solidarity within it. 
Their main source of weakness, in other words, derived from the 
opportunistic initiation and subsequent control of embryonic 
unions by (C.P.P.) party apparatchiks, a kind of pre-empting of 
their development as genuine workers * organisations. With the 
exception of the pre-1950 unions, workers were never allowed 
(that is, under the C.P.P. regime) to participate actively in 
the running or development of unions of a representative, solid- 
aristic character. They clearly lacked the sense of distinct class 
identity or the informal organisation to resist the firm hand of 
C.P.P. control. But the C.P.P. legacy was double-edged. Whilb it
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temporarily retarded the growth of representative unionism, it 
also provided the organisational machinery which, however control- 
oriented at the time, could later be taken over and moulded by 
workers to give expression to their own interests and opinions. 
Within the independent and relatively democratic union movement 
that developed in 1966-71, it was possible for leadership and 
rank-and-file to engage in a mutually educative dialogue as to the 
legitimate socio-economic aspirations and political role of 
Ghanaian labour.
Berg and Butler’s general thesis must be criticised 
here, in short, as implying a serious under-estimation of the 
foi’ces making, in the long term, for the growth of an opposit­
ional political orientation and potential amongst Ghanaian labour.
There is no question that the Sekondi-Takoradi railway 
workers have, in the past, displayed a quite exceptional political 
radicalism: nor that this past history and experience, together 
with certain distinctive characteristics of their occupation and 
of their relationship to the surrounding urban community, con­
tinue to engender a quite singular readiness to engage in oppos­
itional political activity. This case-study has naturally tended 
to emphasise the significance of such particular characteristics 
and so singular a historical legacy. Nevertheless, in 1966-71, 
the basic motive force and ideological and organisational pre­
requisites for the railway workers* style of unionism were increas 
ingly to be found amongst other groups of Ghanaian workers.
Granted the continuing obstacles to a further strengthening of 
the unions* position - most notably, the force of the threat 
of mass dismissals in a situation of growing unemployment - it 
is at least unlikely that the Ghanaian labour movement will be 
treated in future as readily manipulable social matter, posses­
sing little solidity, or, as one railway unionist described the
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C.P.P. “TUG "a bit of a political joke". ^
What might be considered the significance for the 
national political system of the development of relatively 
strong, independent, and (in the local ideological context) 
decidedly radical trade unions? It will be illuminating to 
approach this question historically, in the first instance, 
before proceeding to a more general statement. To take, for 
example, the question of labour*s historical role in the African 
nationalist movements, Henry Bretton has recently elaborated 
Berg and Butler’s basic position in the following terms:
"To be sure, \\?orkers, and in some cases trade 
unions, and certainly individual trade union 
trained leaders played a part in the march to 
independence. But it was only an auxiliary and 
short-lived performance. At best African labour 
can be credited with providing the spark that 
kindled the flame of Independence in isolated 
cases - for example, In the 1947 railway strike 
in French West Africa." 2
A further * isolated* instance is surely provided by the railway 
workers* 1950 "Positive Action" strike in Ghana. If this strike 
merely provided "the spark that kindled the flame of independ­
ence", one might nevertheless point out that, without such a 
spark, the tinder of militant nationalist feeling may well have 
lain unignited and unobserved for some considerable time. More­
over, the realisation that the railway workers* constituted the 
only highly organised (and politically conscious) body of mass 
support which Nkrumah possessed should serve to emphasise the 
interest and significance of their organisation and politicis­
ation, as well as to illustrate the somewhat flimsy foundations 
of the nationalist movement more generally. This, in turn, high­
lights the seriousness and bitterness of the subsequent process 
of alienation of the railway workers from Nkrumah*s leadership.
1. Interview with K. Imbeah, 12th June 1971.
2. H. Bretton, op.cit., p.250.
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After Independence, Berg and Butler describe the 
African unions as passively accepting an even more restricted 
political role, while Bretton similarly remarks:
"Independence, of course, by itself brought 
labour no real gains whatsoever. Soon after 
the new flag had been raised, organised as 
well as unorganised workers were promptly 
harnessed to the national chariot and were 
exhorted relentlessly to strive for goals 
essentially unrelated to traditional trade 
union interest. Substantial relief is nowhere 
in sight." 1
There is, of course, an element of truth to this, but one which
2is exaggerated and over-generalised. It must be pointed out, 
on the basis of evidence presented in this thesis, that the des­
cription of organised workers being "promptly harnessed to the 
national chariot" constitutes a gross over-simplification of the 
political struggle waged within the Ghanaian trade union movement 
over the period 1950-61; and, further, that the resistance to 
party incorporation displayed by the railway workers and certain 
other groups did achieve the granting of concessions which tem­
porarily raised the real level of workers1 wages to the highest 
point of the century. Moreover, this struggle culminated, as we 
have seen, in the 1961 Sekondi-Takoradi strike, the desperate
1. Ibid., p.249.
2. The question of the relative influence of union pressures
on the level of real wages, in the post-Independence period, 
is far more complex than Bretton*s formulation suggests.
The present writer does not feel qualified to enter into the 
debate on this topic, but the reader might be referred to 
the following articles: P. Kilby, "Industrial Relations and
Wage Determination: Failure of the Anglo-Saxon Model",Journal 
of Developing Areas, I, 1967, pp.489-520: J.F.Weeks, "A Com­
ment on Peter Kilby: Industrial Relations and Wage Determin­
ation", Journal of Developing Areas, III, 1968, pp.7-17;
P. Kilby "A Reply to John F. Weeks* Comment, Journal of 
Developing Areas, 111,1968; J.F.Weeks, "Further Comment on 
the Kilby/Weeks Debate; An Empirical Rejoinder**, Journal of 
Developing Areas, V, 1971,pp.165-74; W.M.Warren, "Urban Real 
Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60:
/continued overleaf
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last stand of the railway workers, perhaps, but one which at 
least lent added momentum to the pressure for reform of the 
composition and character of the C.P.P. leadership.
It is worth noting Bretton1s comment on this strike:
"The 1961 railway and port strike in Ghana, based 
mainly on Sekondi-Takoradi, graphically illustrates 
the importance of transport workers as compared to
other segments of the labour force, and the limits
of that importance if countered by the weight of the 
state. It demonstrates that even in conditions 
singularly auspicious for a successful rising the 
collective strength of rail and port workers is 
not sufficient to overcome the phalanx aligned 
against it." 1
Bretton here illustrates the tendency he shares with 
Berg and Butler to treat all instances of union activity, short 
of successful revolution, at a similar level of political insig­
nificance, to paint all in the same colour of dull, depressing 
grey. The general theme is pursued with such deliberate disregard
for major exceptions as to become doctrinaire, and even deter­
ministic. Moreover, the criterion of political significance* 
adopted implies a subscription, not the less influential for 
being unconscious perhaps, to a simplistic Marxist perspective. 
This is especially clearly the case with Bretton, and it is worth
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
..A Comment", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 
XVII, 1969, pp.604-17; E. J. Berg, "Urban Real Wages and 
the Nigerian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60: A Comment", 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, XVII, 1969, 
pp.604-17; W. M. Warren, "Urban Real Wages and Nigerian 
Trade Union Movement, 1939-60: Rejoinder", Economic Devel­
opment and Cultural Change, XVII, 1969, pp.618-33.
1. H. Bretton, op.cit., p.253.
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summarising his general argument here since it represents an 
all too common tendency in the politico-economic approach to 
the politics of the African states.
Bretton argues that the attainment of formal political 
independence did virtually nothing to alter the locus of real 
power and decision - making with respect to the economic and 
socio-economic structures of the ex-colonial countries. This 
remained firmly located in London, Paris, and other centres of 
the industrialised world. Indeed, the vicious circle of growing 
indebtedness and developing underdevelopment operated, if any­
thing, to increase the dependence of African governments on the 
advanced countries. If the new political elites in the African 
states soon discovered that their supposed independence was quite 
mythical, the various interest-groups comprising ,fthe masses11 
have been forced to accept the reality of their continuing impor­
tance in even harsher fashion, though they have sometimes been 
slower to distinguish illusion from actuality. The power of the 
new ruling elites might be severely constrained by external 
pressures, but for the purposes of domestic containment it is 
sufficiently formidable to render the relative power of local 
interest-groups, to all intents and purposes, non-existent. 
Everything points to an elitist interpretation of African pol­
itics. "Why then", Bretton aks, "do we concern ourselves with 
pressure and interest groups" Because even in an inchoate state 
they are important instruments of rule". The idea that they 
might, in certain instances, provide a significant checking 
mechanism to the exercise of such rule is not deemed worthy of 
serious consideration.
But it is not realistic to suggest that the ruling 
regime of these states are insensitive to popular pressure and 
expressions of protest. Unionised labour and other interest- 
groups are sometimes able to wield considerable influence, if 
often only negative or checking influence, over the conduct of 
government, and thus over the governance of their own destinies.
1. Ibid., p.196.
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Amongst other considerations, African governments do vary 
greatly, within the external constraints imposed on them, in 
the relative benevolence and civility of their rule; and this 
is not entirely independent of the attitudes and influence of 
local interest-groups, even if the exact connection involved 
is sometimes impossible to trace with any precision. The point 
about such protests as the 1961 Sekondi-Takoradi strike is not 
that a segment of labour, such as the railway workers, can or 
cannot hope to defeat or displace a ruling regime on their own 
account. It is simply that they (and they virtually alone) can 
at least resist the forces of government control, and, on 
occasion, articulate widespread popular discontent, thereby 
harrassing ruling regimes into making reformist gestures. Under 
more favourable circumstances, they might (as in 1966-71) pro­
vide the main power base for a national trade union movement, 
capable of articulating reformist demands on a wide platform 
and more regular basis. Little positive or tangible might 
materialise of the promises governments are thus worried into 
making, depending on the structure of forces within the ruling 
regime. But at least such challenges might operate as a check­
ing influence on the rapacious self-interest of ruling elites, 
encourage the development of a more conciliar style of rule, 
and serve to uphold some semblance of the ethic of popular 
accountability in Ghanaian political life. Were this source of 
countervailing power to be completely eliminated from the Ghana 
ian political system, it might well come, with hindsight, to 
be viewed in far more positive a light.
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ANNEXURE A.
Survey Questionnaire administered to a sample of railway
workers at Sekondi Location.
Face-sheet:
Age
Tribe and Place of Origin 
Job Category
Family size (and number of non-nuclear dependents)
Length of time resident in Sekondi-Takoradi
Length of time working in the Railways
Future intentions and aspirations
Father1s occupat ion
Educational level
Questions:
(1) Which Union do you belong to? Why do you prefer 
this to the other Union?
(2) What do you consider to be the most important 
qualities of a good trade union leader?
(3) Have you ever been, or would you like to be a 
union official? Why, or why not?
(4) Do you think the present TUG leadership is doing 
a good job?
(5) When do you think it is legitimate for workers to 
strike? What do you think is the main cause of the 
large number of strikes in Ghana?
(6) Do you think Ghana's politicians and senior civil 
servants are (a) mostly fairly honest, (b) setting 
an example of making sacrifice, (c) capable of 
improving the country's economic situation?
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(7) Do you generally approve of the recent budget?
Why, or why not?
(8) Do you agree that the Government's first priority 
should be rural development?
(9) Are you hopeful of gaining any wage increase from 
the Campbell Commission or the Pay Research Unit?
(10) Thinking of the next few years, which three of the 
following goals do you think the unions should con­
centrate on achieving:
(a) Obtaining improved conditions of service and 
promotion opportunities,
(b) Bridging the wages gap between the lower- and 
higher-paid.
(c) Obtaining more influence in the administration 
of the industry.
(d) Developing more union spirit and solidarity 
among workers.
(e) Improving the education and discipline of the 
workers.
(f) Making workers more politically conscious.
(g) Establishing a fuller programme of social 
activities and facilities.
(h) Helping to provide employment for the jobless.
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